Economic analysis of wireless sensor-based services in the framework of the Internet of Things. A game-theoretical approach

El mundo de las telecomunicaciones está cambiando de un escenario donde únicamente las personas estaban conectadas a un modelo donde prácticamente todos los dispositivos y sensores se encuentran conectados, también conocido como Internet de las cosas (IoT), donde miles de millones de dispositivos se conectarán a Internet a través de conexiones móviles y redes fijas. En este contexto, hay muchos retos que superar, desde el desarrollo de nuevos estándares de comunicación al estudio de la viabilidad económica de los posibles escenarios futuros. En esta tesis nos hemos centrado en el estudio de la viabilidad económica de diferentes escenarios mediante el uso de conceptos de microeconomía, teoría de juegos, optimización no lineal, economía de redes y redes inalámbricas. La tesis analiza la transición desde redes centradas en el servicio de tráfico HTC a redes centradas en tráfico MTC desde un punto de vista económico. El primer escenario ha sido diseñado para centrarse en las primeras etapas de la transición, en la que ambos tipos de tráfico son servidos bajo la misma infraestructura de red. En el segundo escenario analizamos la siguiente etapa, en la que el servicio a los usuarios MTC se realiza mediante una infraestructura dedicada. Finalmente, el tercer escenario analiza la provisión de servicios basados en MTC a usuarios finales, mediante la infraestructura analizada en el escenario anterior. Gracias al análisis de todos los escenarios, hemos observado que la transición de redes centradas en usuarios HTC a redes MTC es posible y que la provisión de servicios en tales escenarios es viable. Además, hemos observado que el comportamiento de los usuarios es esencial para determinar la viabilidad de los diferentes modelos de negocio, y por tanto, es necesario estudiar el comportamiento y las preferencias de los usuarios en profundidad en estudios futuros. Específicamente, los factores más relevantes son la sensibilidad de los usuarios al retardo en los datos recopilados por los sensores y la cantidad de los mismos. También hemos observado que la diferenciación del tráfico en categorías mejora el uso de las redes y permite crear nuevos servicios empleando datos que, de otro modo, no se aprovecharían, lo cual nos permite mejorar la monetización de la infraestructura. También hemos demostrado que la provisión de capacidad es un mecanismo válido, alternativo a la fijación de precios, para la optimización de los beneficios de los proveedores de servicio. Finalmente, se ha demostrado que es posible crear roles específicos para ofrecer servicios IoT en el mercado de las telecomunicaciones, específicamente, los IoT-SPs, que proporcionan servicios basados en sensores inalámbricos utilizando infraestructuras de acceso de terceros y sus propias redes de sensores. En resumen, en esta tesis hemos intentado demostrar la viabilidad económica de modelos de negocio basados en redes futuras IoT, así como la aparición de nuevas oportunidades y roles de negocio, lo cual nos permite justificar económicamente el desarrollo y la implementación de las tecnologías necesarias para ofrecer servicios de acceso inalámbrico masivo a dispositivos MTC.The communications world is moving from a standalone devices scenario to a all-connected scenario known as Internet of Things (IoT), where billions of devices will be connected to the Internet through mobile and fixed networks. In this context, there are several challenges to face, from the development of new standards to the study of the economical viability of the different future scenarios. In this dissertation we have focused on the study of the economic viability of different scenarios using concepts of microeconomics, game theory, non-linear optimization, network economics and wireless networks. The dissertation analyzes the transition from a Human Type Communications (HTC) to a Machine Type Communications (MTC) centered network from an economic point of view. The first scenario is designed to focus on the first stages of the transition, where HTC and MTC traffic are served on a common network infrastructure. The second scenario analyzes the provision of connectivity service to MTC users using a dedicated network infrastructure, while the third stage is centered in the analysis of the provision of services based on the MTC data over the infrastructure studied in the previous scenario. Thanks to the analysis of all the scenarios we have observed that the transition from HTC users-centered networks to MTC networks is possible and that the provision of services in such scenarios is viable. In addition, we have observed that the behavior of the users is essential in order to determine the viability of a business model, and therefore, it is needed to study their behavior and preferences in depth in future studios. Specifically, the most relevant factors are the sensitivity of the users to the delay and to the amount of data gathered by the sensors. We also have observed that the differentiation of the traffic in categories improves the usage of the networks and allows to create new services thanks to the data that otherwise would not be used, improving the monetization of the infrastructure and the data. In addition, we have shown that the capacity provision is a valid mechanism for providers' profit optimization, as an alternative to the pricing mechanisms. Finally, it has been demonstrated that it is possible to create dedicated roles to offer IoT services in the telecommunications market, specifically, the IoT-SPs, which provide wireless-sensor-based services to the final users using a third party infrastructure. Summarizing, this dissertation tries to demonstrate the economic viability of the future IoT networks business models as well as the emergence of new business opportunities and roles in order to justify economically the development and implementation of the new technologies required to offer massive wireless access to machine devices.El món de les telecomunicacions està canviant d'un escenari on únicament les persones estaven connectades a un model on pràcticament tots els dispositius i sensors es troben connectats, també conegut com a Internet de les Coses (IoT) , on milers de milions de dispositius es connectaran a Internet a través de connexions mòbils i xarxes fixes. En aquest context, hi ha molts reptes que superar, des del desenrotllament de nous estàndards de comunicació a l'estudi de la viabilitat econòmica dels possibles escenaris futurs. En aquesta tesi ens hem centrat en l'estudi de la viabilitat econòmica de diferents escenaris per mitjà de l'ús de conceptes de microeconomia, teoria de jocs, optimització no lineal, economia de xarxes i xarxes inalàmbriques. La tesi analitza la transició des de xarxes centrades en el servici de tràfic HTC a xarxes centrades en tràfic MTC des d'un punt de vista econòmic. El primer escenari ha sigut dissenyat per a centrar-se en les primeres etapes de la transició, en la que ambdós tipus de tràfic són servits davall la mateixa infraestructura de xarxa. En el segon escenari analitzem la següent etapa, en la que el servici als usuaris MTC es realitza per mitjà d'una infraestructura dedicada. Finalment, el tercer escenari analitza la provisió de servicis basats en MTC a usuaris finals, per mitjà de la infraestructura analitzada en l'escenari anterior. Als paràgrafs següents es descriu amb més detall cada escenari. Gràcies a l'anàlisi de tots els escenaris, hem observat que la transició de xarxes centrades en usuaris HTC a xarxes MTC és possible i que la provisió de servicis en tals escenaris és viable. A més a més, hem observat que el comportament dels usuaris és essencial per a determinar la viabilitat dels diferents models de negoci, i per tant, és necessari estudiar el comportament i les preferències dels usuaris en profunditat en estudis futurs. Específicament, els factors més rellevants són la sensibilitat dels usuaris al retard en les dades recopilats pels sensors i la quantitat dels mateixos. També hem observat que la diferenciació del tràfic en categories millora l'ús de les xarxes i permet crear nous servicis emprant dades que, d'una altra manera, no s'aprofitarien, la qual cosa ens permet millorar la monetització de la infraestructura. També hem demostrat que la provisió de capacitat és un mecanisme vàlid, alternatiu a la fixació de preus, per a l'optimització dels beneficis dels proveïdors de servici. Finalment, s'ha demostrat que és possible crear rols específics per a oferir servicis IoT en el mercat de les telecomunicacions, específicament, els IoT-SPs, que proporcionen servicis basats en sensors inalàmbrics utilitzant infraestructures d'accés de tercers i les seues pròpies xarxes de sensors. En resum, en aquesta tesi hem intentat demostrar la viabilitat econòmica de models de negoci basats en xarxes futures IoT, així com l'aparició de noves oportunitats i rols de negoci, la qual cosa ens permet justificar econòmicament el desenrotllament i la implementació de les tecnologies necessàries per a oferir servicis d'accés inalàmbric massiu a dispositius MTC.Sanchis Cano, Á. (2018). Economic analysis of wireless sensor-based services in the framework of the Internet of Things. A game-theoretical approach [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/102642TESI

Economic Feasibility of Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision in a Duopoly Setting with a Monopolist Operator

[EN] We analyze the feasibility of providing Wireless Sensor Network-data-based services in an Internet of Things scenario from an economical point of view. The scenario has two competing service providers with their own private sensor networks, a network operator and final users. The scenario is analyzed as two games using game theory. In the first game, sensors decide to subscribe or not to the network operator to upload the collected sensing-data, based on a utility function related to the mean service time and the price charged by the operator. In the second game, users decide to subscribe or not to the sensor-data-based service of the service providers based on a Logit discrete choice model related to the quality of the data collected and the subscription price. The sinks and users subscription stages are analyzed using population games and discrete choice models, while network operator and service providers pricing stages are analyzed using optimization and Nash equilibrium concepts respectively. The model is shown feasible from an economic point of view for all the actors if there are enough interested final users and opens the possibility of developing more efficient models with different types of services.This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through projects TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R and (co-supported by the European Social Fund) BES-2014-068998.Sanchis-Cano, Á.; Romero-Chavarro, JC.; Sacoto-Cabrera, E.; Guijarro, L. (2017). Economic Feasibility of Wireless Sensor Network-Based Service Provision in a Duopoly Setting with a Monopolist Operator. Sensors. 17 (12)(2727):1-22. https://doi.org/10.3390/s17122727S12217 (12)272

Dynamic capacity provision for wireless sensors connectivity: A profit optimization approach

[EN] We model a wireless sensors' connectivity scenario mathematically and analyze it using capacity provision mechanisms, with the objective of maximizing the profits of a network operator. The scenario has several sensors' clusters with each one having one sink node, which uploads the sensing data gathered in the cluster through the wireless connectivity of a network operator. The scenario is analyzed both as a static game and as a dynamic game, each one with two stages, using game theory. The sinks' behavior is characterized with a utility function related to the mean service time and the price paid to the operator for the service. The objective of the operator is to maximize its profits by optimizing the network capacity. In the static game, the sinks' subscription decision is modeled using a population game. In the dynamic game, the sinks' behavior is modeled using an evolutionary game and the replicator dynamic, while the operator optimal capacity is obtained solving an optimal control problem. The scenario is shown feasible from an economic point of view. In addition, the dynamic capacity provision optimization is shown as a valid mechanism for maximizing the operator profits, as well as a useful tool to analyze evolving scenarios. Finally, the dynamic analysis opens the possibility to study more complex scenarios using the differential game extension.The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R; AEI/FEDER, UE through project TEC2017-85830-C2-1-P; and co-supported by the European Social Fund BES-2014-068998.Sanchis-Cano, Á.; Guijarro, L.; Condoluci, M. (2018). 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Economic Analysis of a Multi-Sided Platform for Sensor-Based Services in the Internet of Things

[EN] A business model for sensor-based services is proposed where a platform creates a multi-sided market. The business model comprises a platform that serves as an intermediary between human users, app developers, and sensor networks, so that the users use the apps and the apps process the data supplied by the sensor networks. The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts a fee for each of the three sides so as to maximize its profit. This business model intends to mimic the market-creating innovation that main mobile apps platforms have generated in the smartphone sector. We conduct an analysis of the profit maximization problem faced by the platform, show that optimum prices exist for any parameter value, and show that these prices always induce an equilibrium in the number of agents from each side that join the platform. We show that the relative strength of the value that advertisers attach to the users determines the platform price structure. Depending on the value of this relative strength, two alternative subsidizing strategies are feasible: to subsidize either the users¿ subscription or the developers¿ registration. Finally, all agents benefit from an increase in the population at any of the three sides. This result provides a rationale for incentivizing not only the user participation, but also the entry of developer undertakings and the deployment of wireless sensor network infrastructure.This work has been supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness through Project TIN2013-47272-C2-1-R (co-supported by the European Social Fund) and by Institute ITACA-UPVthrough "Convocatorias Ayudas 2019-5"Guijarro, L.; Vidal Catalá, JR.; Pla, V.; Naldi, M. (2019). Economic Analysis of a Multi-Sided Platform for Sensor-Based Services in the Internet of Things. Sensors. 19(2):1-23. https://doi.org/10.3390/s19020373S12319

Road-side units operators in competition: A game-theoretical approach

International audienceWe study the interactions among Internet providers in vehicular networks which offer access to commuters via road side units (RSUs). Namely, we propose a game-theoretical framework to model the competition on prices between vehicular Internet providers to capture the largest amount of users, thus selfishly maximizing the revenues. The equilibria of the aforementioned game are characterized under different mobile traffic conditions, RSU capabilities and users requirements and expectations. In particular, we also consider in the analysis the case where mobile users modify the price they accept to pay for the access as the likeliness of finding an access solution decreases. Our game-theoretical analysis gives insights on the outcomes of the competition between vehicular Internet providers, further highlighting some counter-intuitive behaviors; as an example, comparing with the case when users have constant price valuation over time, having users inclined to increasing their "acceptable" price may force vehicle Internet providers to charge lower prices due to competition

Novel Fuzzy and Game Theory Based Clustering and Decision Making for VANETs

Different studies have recently emphasized the importance of deploying clustering schemes in Vehicular ad hoc Network (VANET) to overcome challenging problems related to scalability, frequent topology changes, scarcity of spectrum resources, maintaining clusters stability, and rational spectrum management. However, most of these studies addressed the clustering problem using conventional performance metrics while spectrum shortage, and the combination of spectrum trading and VANET architecture have not been tackled so far. Thus, this paper presents a new fuzzy logic based clustering control scheme to support scalability, enhance the stability of the network topology, motivate spectrum owners to share spectrum and provide efficient and cost-effective use of spectrum. Unlike existing studies, our context-aware scheme is based on multi-criteria decision making where fuzzy logic is adopted to rank the multi-attribute candidate nodes for optimizing the selection of cluster heads (CH)s. Criteria related to each candidate node include: received signal strength, speed of vehicle, vehicle location, spectrum price, reachability, and stability of node. Our model performs efficiently, exhibits faster recovery in response to topology changes and enhances the network efficiency life time

A Property Rights Enforcement and Pricing Model for IIoT Data Marketplaces

학위논문(석사)--서울대학교 대학원 :공과대학 협동과정 기술경영·경제·정책전공,2019. 8. Jörn Altmann.The Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has become a valuable data source for products and services based on advanced data analytics. However, evidence suggests that industries are suffering a significant loss of value creation from insufficient IIoT data sharing. We argue that the limited utilization of the Sensing as a Service business model is caused by the economic and technological characteristics of sensor data, and the corresponding absence of applicable digital rights management models. Therefore, we propose a combined property rights enforcement and pricing model to solve the IIoT data sharing incentive problem.산업용 사물 인터넷 (IIoT) 데이터가 제품과 서비스를 위한 중요한 고급 데이터 소스로 여겨지고 있지만, 여전히 수 많은 기업들은 불충분한 산업용 사물 인터넷 데이터 공유 시스템으로 인하여 고충을 겪고 있다. 방대한 분량의 산업용 데이터가 제대로 거래되지 못하고 있으며, 이는 데이터의 커다란 가치 손실로 이어지고 있다. 본 연구에서는 서비스로서의 센싱 (Sensing as a Service) 비지니스 모델이 한정적으로 적용되고 있는 원인이 해당 정보의 경제적, 기술적 특징들을 반영하는 디지털 권리 시스템의 부재에 기인한다고 보고 있다. 따라서 본 연구에서는 산업용 사물 인터넷 데이터에 대한 지적재산권 집행 시스템과 데이터 가격산정 모델을 제안하여 산업용 사물 인터넷 데이터 공유 인센티브 문제를 해결하고자 한다.1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Problem Description 6 1.3 Research Objective and Question 8 1.4 Methodology 8 1.5 Contributions 9 1.6 Structure 10 2 Literature Review 11 2.1 Sensing as a Service 11 2.2 Economic Characteristics of IIoT Data 14 2.2.1 Property Rights of Data 18 2.2.2 Licensing of IIoT Data 23 2.3 IIoT Data Marketplaces 25 2.3.1 Use-cases and Value Propositions 30 2.3.2 Market Structures and Pricing Models 34 2.4 Digital Rights Management for IIoT 36 3 Model 44 3.1 Assumptions 45 3.2 Watermarking Technique 47 3.2.1 Function 48 3.2.2 Example 50 3.2.3 Robustness 51 3.3 Economic Reasoning 54 3.3.1 The Quality Gap 55 3.3.2 Cost of Watermarking (CoW) 57 3.3.3 Cost of Attacking (CoA) 58 4 Analytical Analysis 60 4.1 Equilibrium Between CoW and CoA 60 4.2 Determining the Optimal Quality Gap 62 4.3 Applicability of the Quality Gap Function 64 5 Conclusion 66 5.1 Summary 66 5.2 Discussion 66 6 Limitations and Future Research 68 References 70 Abstract (Korean) 79Maste

The challenge of smooth transition from R&D business for innovation in a telecom company

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 2005.Includes bibliographical references.The environment surrounding telecom companies has changed dramatically since most were privatized in the 1980s. Under the influence of regulations, they had faced globalization and have repeatedly divided and consolidated to improve competitiveness. From the technology and marketing points of view, two disruptive innovations occurred in the 1990s: IP and wireless communications. Originally, IP was used only for data communications, but it has now evolved to include voice communications as VolP. This had a huge impact on telecom companies because IP has destroyed the legacy cost structure that was based on a pay-as-you-go system; the new demand is for a flat rate fee structure. IP also moved forward the commoditization of communication network services. At the same time, demand for cellphone service grew exponentially, and the number of cellphone subscribers surpassed that of fixed phone in 2000 in Japan. As a result, competitive superiority is shifting from long- distance companies to local and wireless companies. In this thesis, I discuss the telecom industry's situation, and compare three major carriers: AT&T, BT and NTT.(cont.) I describe the organizational structures of each company to determine where there are-or if there is a requirement to improve- smooth transitions from R&D to business as one way to enhance the telecom companies' competitiveness. My research found that their strategies regarding the acquisition of competence are totally different: AT&T did internal development; BT purchased necessary technologies from the market; NTT led joint development with manufacturers. From the comparison and analysis, I determined that the R&D structure should be changed from the legacy linear model to a circular model that produced fast clock speed. In addition, companies must have relationships with external companies and universities in order to purchase products or technologies quickly and efficiently. Managing NTT Group effectively is another key issue to be executed. If NTT can turn these changes into an opportunity, the company can transform itself into an IP communication services company that is able to use its huge technical resources to give themselves a marketing advantage.by Yukari Tsuji.M.B.A