Prediction Markets: Alternative Mechanisms for Complex Environments with Few Traders

Double auction prediction markets have proven successful in large-scale applications such as elections and sporting events. Consequently, several large corporations have adopted these markets for smaller-scale internal applications where information may be complex and the number of traders is small. Using laboratory experiments, we test the performance of the double auction in complex environments with few traders and compare it to three alternative mechanisms. When information is complex we find that an iterated poll (or Delphi method) outperforms the double auction mechanism. We present five behavioral observations that may explain why the poll performs better in these settings

Forecasting in Continuous Double Auction

Recently, the continuous double auction, i.e. the trading mechanism used in the majority of the financial markets, is the subject of an extensive study. In the present paper, a model of the continuous double auction with the completely random flow of the limit orders is studied. The main result of the paper is an approximate formula for the distribution of the market price and the traded volume at the time s given the information available at tlimit order markets, continuous double auction, price and volume, forecasting, market microstructure

Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods

Motivated by applications such as stock exchanges and spectrum auctions, there is a growing interest in mechanisms for arranging trade in two-sided markets. Existing mechanisms are either not truthful, or do not guarantee an asymptotically-optimal gain-from-trade, or rely on a prior on the traders' valuations, or operate in limited settings such as a single kind of good. We extend the random market-halving technique used in earlier works to markets with multiple kinds of goods, where traders have gross-substitute valuations. We present MIDA: a Multi Item-kind Double-Auction mechanism. It is prior-free, truthful, strongly-budget-balanced, and guarantees near-optimal gain from trade when market sizes of all goods grow to $\infty$ at a similar rate.Comment: Full version of IJCAI-18 paper, with 2 figures. Previous names: "MIDA: A Multi Item-type Double-Auction Mechanism", "A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism". 10 page

Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be constructed from a truthful, single-period (i.e. static) double-auction rule. The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst dynamic-auction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various single-period rules, including the canonical McAfee double-auction rule. For a baseline we also consider non-truthful double auctions populated with zero-intelligence plus"-style learning agents. Chain-based auctions perform well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls and agent valuations become more volatile

Toward an Autonomous-Agents Inspired Economic Analysis

This paper demonstrates the potential role of autonomous agents in economic theory. We first dispatch autonomous agents, built by genetic programming, to double auction markets. We then study the bargaining strategies discovered by them, and from there an autonomous-agent-inspired economic theory with regard to the optimal procrastination is derived.Agent-Based Double Auction Markets, Autonomous Agents, Genetic Programming, Bargaining Strategies, Monopsony, Procrastination Strategy

Perfect Competition in an Oligoply (including Bilateral Monopoly)

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.Limit orders, double auction, Nash equilibria, Walras equilibria, mechanism design

Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.Limit orders, double auction, Nash equilibria, Walras equilibria, perfect competition, bilateral monopoly, mechanism design

Perfect Competition in a Bilateral Monopoly (In honor of Martin Shubik)

We show that if limit orders are required to vary smoothly, then strategic (Nash) equilibria of the double auction mechanism yield competitive (Walras) allocations. It is not necessary to have competitors on any side of any market: smooth trading is a substitute for price wars. In particular, Nash equilibria are Walrasian even in a bilateral monopoly.Limit orders, double auction, Nash equilibria, Walras equilibria, perfect competition, bilateral monopoly, mechanism design

Conditional Distribution of the Limit Order Book Given the History of the Best Quote Process

Recently, models of limit order markets, particularly those of the continuous double auction, are subject to an intense research. Due to their complexity, the models are regarded to be analytically intractable. In the present paper, nonetheless, a closed form result is derived: the conditional distribution of the limit order book given the history of the best quote process.limit order markets, continuous double auction, limit order book, conditional distribution, immigration-death process

Ergodic transition in a simple model of the continuous double auction

We study a phenomenological model for the continuous double auction, whose aggregate order process is equivalent to two independent M/M/1 queues. The continuous double auction defines a continuous-time random walk for trade prices. The conditions for ergodicity of the auction are derived and, as a consequence, three possible regimes in the behavior of prices and logarithmic returns are observed. In the ergodic regime, prices are unstable and one can observe a heteroskedastic behavior in the logarithmic returns. On the contrary, non-ergodicity triggers stability of prices, even if two different regimes can be seen