Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary

Electronic version of an article published as Online graph coloring against a randomized adversary. "International journal of foundations of computer science", 1 Juny 2018, vol. 29, núm. 4, p. 551-569. DOI:10.1142/S0129054118410058 © 2018 copyright World Scientific Publishing Company. https://www.worldscientific.com/doi/abs/10.1142/S0129054118410058We consider an online model where an adversary constructs a set of 2s instances S instead of one single instance. The algorithm knows S and the adversary will choose one instance from S at random to present to the algorithm. We further focus on adversaries that construct sets of k-chromatic instances. In this setting, we provide upper and lower bounds on the competitive ratio for the online graph coloring problem as a function of the parameters in this model. Both bounds are linear in s and matching upper and lower bound are given for a specific set of algorithms that we call “minimalistic online algorithms”.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

The Advice Complexity of a Class of Hard Online Problems

The advice complexity of an online problem is a measure of how much knowledge of the future an online algorithm needs in order to achieve a certain competitive ratio. Using advice complexity, we define the first online complexity class, AOC. The class includes independent set, vertex cover, dominating set, and several others as complete problems. AOC-complete problems are hard, since a single wrong answer by the online algorithm can have devastating consequences. For each of these problems, we show that $\log\left(1+(c-1)^{c-1}/c^{c}\right)n=\Theta (n/c)$ bits of advice are necessary and sufficient (up to an additive term of $O(\log n)$) to achieve a competitive ratio of $c$. The results are obtained by introducing a new string guessing problem related to those of Emek et al. (TCS 2011) and B\"ockenhauer et al. (TCS 2014). It turns out that this gives a powerful but easy-to-use method for providing both upper and lower bounds on the advice complexity of an entire class of online problems, the AOC-complete problems. Previous results of Halld\'orsson et al. (TCS 2002) on online independent set, in a related model, imply that the advice complexity of the problem is $\Theta (n/c)$. Our results improve on this by providing an exact formula for the higher-order term. For online disjoint path allocation, B\"ockenhauer et al. (ISAAC 2009) gave a lower bound of $\Omega (n/c)$ and an upper bound of $O((n\log c)/c)$ on the advice complexity. We improve on the upper bound by a factor of $\log c$. For the remaining problems, no bounds on their advice complexity were previously known.Comment: Full paper to appear in Theory of Computing Systems. A preliminary version appeared in STACS 201

Online Multi-Coloring with Advice

We consider the problem of online graph multi-coloring with advice. Multi-coloring is often used to model frequency allocation in cellular networks. We give several nearly tight upper and lower bounds for the most standard topologies of cellular networks, paths and hexagonal graphs. For the path, negative results trivially carry over to bipartite graphs, and our positive results are also valid for bipartite graphs. The advice given represents information that is likely to be available, studying for instance the data from earlier similar periods of time.Comment: IMADA-preprint-c

Online Bin Packing with Advice

We consider the online bin packing problem under the advice complexity model where the 'online constraint' is relaxed and an algorithm receives partial information about the future requests. We provide tight upper and lower bounds for the amount of advice an algorithm needs to achieve an optimal packing. We also introduce an algorithm that, when provided with log n + o(log n) bits of advice, achieves a competitive ratio of 3/2 for the general problem. This algorithm is simple and is expected to find real-world applications. We introduce another algorithm that receives 2n + o(n) bits of advice and achieves a competitive ratio of 4/3 + {\epsilon}. Finally, we provide a lower bound argument that implies that advice of linear size is required for an algorithm to achieve a competitive ratio better than 9/8.Comment: 19 pages, 1 figure (2 subfigures

Finding fair and efficient allocations

We study the problem of fair division, where the goal is to allocate a set of items among a set of agents in a ``fair" manner. In particular, we focus on settings in which the items to be divided are either indivisible goods or divisible bads. Despite their practical significance, both these settings have been much less investigated than the divisible goods setting. In the first part of the dissertation, we focus on the fair division of indivisible goods. Our fairness criterion is envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). An allocation is EFX if no agent envies another agent following the removal of a single good from the other agent's bundle. Despite significant investment by the research community, the existence of EFX allocations remains open and is considered one of the most important open problems in fair division. In this thesis, we make significant progress on this question. First, we show that when agents have general valuations, we can determine an EFX allocation with a small number of unallocated goods (almost EFX allocation). Second, we demonstrate that when agents have structured valuations, we can determine an almost EFX allocation that is also efficient in terms of Nash welfare. Third, we prove that EFX allocations exist when there are three agents with additive valuations. Finally, we reduce the problem of finding improved guarantees on EFX allocations to a novel problem in extremal graph theory. In the second part of this dissertation, we turn to the fair division of divisible bads. Like in the setting of divisible goods, competitive equilibrium with equal incomes (CEEI) has emerged as the best mechanism for allocating divisible bads. However, neither a polynomial time algorithm nor any hardness result is known for the computation of CEEI with bads. We study the problem of dividing bads in the classic Arrow-Debreu setting (a setting that generalizes CEEI). We show that in sharp contrast to the Arrow-Debreu setting with goods, determining whether a competitive equilibrium exists, is NP-hard in the case of divisible bads. Furthermore, we prove the existence of equilibrium under a simple and natural sufficiency condition. Finally, we show that even on instances that satisfy this sufficiency condition, determining a competitive equilibrium is PPAD-hard. Thus, we settle the complexity of finding a competitive equilibrium in the Arrow-Debreu setting with divisible bads.Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der gerechten Verteilung (fair division), welches zum Ziel hat, eine Menge von Gegenständen (items) einer Menge von Akteuren (agents) \zuzuordnen". Dabei liegt der Schwerpunkt der Arbeit auf Szenarien, in denen die zu verteilenden Gegenstände entweder unteilbare Güter (indivisible goods) oder teilbare Pflichten (divisible bads) sind. Trotz ihrer praktischen Relevanz haben diese Szenarien in der Forschung bislang bedeutend weniger Aufmerksamkeit erfahren als das Szenario mit teilbaren Gütern (divisible goods). Der erste Teil der Arbeit konzentriert sich auf die gerechte Verteilung unteilbarer Güter. Unser Gerechtigkeitskriterium ist Neid-Freiheit bis auf irgendein Gut (envy- freeness up to any good, EFX). Eine Zuordnung ist EFX, wenn kein Akteur einen anderen Akteur beneidet, nachdem ein einzelnes Gut aus dem Bündel des anderen Akteurs entfernt wurde. Die Existenz von EFX-Zuordnungen ist trotz ausgeprägter Bemühungen der Forschungsgemeinschaft ungeklärt und wird gemeinhin als eine der wichtigsten offenen Fragen des Feldes angesehen. Wir unternehmen wesentliche Schritte hin zu einer Klärung dieser Frage. Erstens zeigen wir, dass wir für Akteure mit allgemeinen Bewertungsfunktionen stets eine EFX-Zuordnung finden können, bei der nur eine kleine Anzahl von Gütern unallokiert bleibt (partielle EFX-Zuordnung, almost EFX allocation). Zweitens demonstrieren wir, dass wir für Akteure mit strukturierten Bewertungsfunktionen eine partielle EFX-Zuordnung bestimmen können, die zusätzlich effizient im Sinne der Nash-Wohlfahrtsfunktion ist. Drittens beweisen wir, dass EFX-Zuordnungen für drei Akteure mit additiven Bewertungsfunktionen immer existieren. Schließlich reduzieren wir das Problem, verbesserte Garantien für EFX-Zuordnungen zu finden, auf ein neuartiges Problem in der extremalen Graphentheorie. Der zweite Teil der Arbeit widmet sich der gerechten Verteilung teilbarer Pflichten. Wie im Szenario mit teilbaren Gütern hat sich auch hier das Wettbewerbsgleichgewicht bei gleichem Einkommen (competitive equilibrium with equal incomes, CEEI) als der beste Allokationsmechanismus zur Verteilung teilbarer Pflichten erwiesen. Gleichzeitig sind weder polynomielle Algorithmen noch Schwere-Resultate für die Berechnung von CEEI mit Pflichten bekannt. Die Arbeit untersucht das Problem der Verteilung von Pflichten im klassischen Arrow-Debreu-Modell (einer Generalisierung von CEEI). Wir zeigen, dass es NP-hart ist, zu entscheiden, ob es im Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit Pflichten ein Wettbewerbsgleichgewicht gibt { im scharfen Gegensatz zum Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit Gütern. Ferner beweisen wir die Existenz eines Gleichgewichts unter der Annahme einer einfachen und natürlichen hinreichenden Bedingung. Schließlich zeigen wir, dass die Bestimmung eines Wettbewerbsgleichgewichts sogar für Eingaben, die unsere hinreichende Bedingung erfüllen, PPAD-hart ist. Damit klären wir die Komplexität des Auffindens eines Wettbewerbsgleichgewichts im Arrow-Debreu-Modell mit teilbaren Pflichten