Developing real option game models

By mixing concepts from both game theoretic analysis and real options theory, an investment decision in a competitive market can be seen as a ‘‘game’’ between firms, as firms implicitly take into account other firms’ reactions to their own investment actions. We review two decades of real option game models, suggesting which critical problems have been ‘‘solved’’ by considering game theory, and which significant problems have not been yet adequately addressed. We provide some insights on the plausible empirical applications, or shortfalls in applications to date, and suggest some promising avenues for future research

Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes.Investment Timing; Real Options; Simultaneous Equilibrium; Joint-Value Maximization; Cooperation; Investment Externalities

Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

Working paper GATE 2011-28We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes

Формирование стратегических альянсов в инновационном секторе экономики: подход опционных игр в биофармацевтической отрасли

Рассматривается кооперативная стратегическая модель взаимодействия фармацевтической компании и биофармацевтической, занимающейся разработкой инновационного препарата. Подчеркивается, что взаимовыгодные альянсы игроков помогут отрасли увеличить количество оригинальных лекарств и ускорить процессы их вывода на рынок. В качестве инструмента для изучения перспектив стратегических альянсов предлагается использовать теорию игр совместно с теорией реальных опционов, тем самым расширяя традиционные методы оценки. При построении кооперативной модели также описываются факторы, влияющие на время заключения альянс

Modeling airport capacity choice with real options

This study analyzes optimal choice of the airport capacity to invest immediately (the prior capacity) and the size of real option to acquire for possible future expansion. Facing demand uncertainty, an airport first chooses its prior capacity and real option, and then later chooses its final capacity and airport charge once demand is observed. Our analytical results show that if demand uncertainty is low and capacity and real option costs are relatively high, an airport will not acquire a real option. Otherwise, an airport can use a real option to improve its expected profit or social welfare. Both the magnitude of profit or welfare gain and the optimal size of the real option increase with demand uncertainty. A higher real option cost leads to a larger prior capacity and smaller real option, whereas a higher capital cost leads to lower prior capacity. A profit-maximizing airport would choose a smaller prior capacity and real option than a welfare-maximizing airport. Competition in the airline market promotes airport capacity investments and the adoption of real options by profit-maximizing airports, whereas airport commercial services increase prior capacity but not real option

Rivalry and uncertainty in complementary investments with dynamic market sharing

We study the effects of revenue and investment cost uncertainty, as well non- preemption duopoly competition, on the timing of investments in two complementary inputs, where either spillover-knowledge is allowed or proprietary-knowledge holds. We find that the ex-ante and ex-post revenue market shares play a very important role in firms’ behavior. When competition is considered, the leader’s behavior departs from that of the monopolist firm of Smith (Ind Corp Change 14:639–650, 2005). The leader is justified in following the conventional wisdom (i.e., synchronous investments are more likely), whereas, the follower’s behavior departs from that of the conventional wisdom (i.e., asynchronous investments are more likely)

European Option Based R&D Investment Decision Making under Uncertainties

This paper establishes the payoff models of the European option for research and development (R&D) projects with two enterprises in a research joint venture (RJV). The models are used to assess the timing and payoffs of the R&D project investment under quantified uncertainties. After the option game, the two enterprises can make optimal investment decision for the R&D project investment in the RJV