Differential Game Analyses of Logistics Service Supply Chain Coordination by Cost Sharing Contract

Cooperation of all the members in a supply chain plays an important role in logistics service. The service integrator can encourage cooperation from service suppliers by sharing their cost during the service, which we assume can increase the sales by accumulating the reputation of the supply chain. A differential game model is established with the logistics service supply chain that consists of one service integrator and one supplier. And we derive the optimal solutions of the Nash equilibrium without cost sharing contract and the Stackelberg equilibrium with the integrator as the leader who partially shares the cost of the efforts of the supplier. The results make the benefits of the cost sharing contract in increasing the profits of both players as well as the whole supply chain explicit, which means that the cost sharing contract is an effective coordination mechanism in the long-term relationship of the members in a logistics service supply chain

Revenue-Sharing Contract Models for Logistics Service Supply Chains with Mass Customization Service

The revenue-sharing contract is one of the most important supply chain coordination contracts; it has been applied in various supply chains. However, studies related to service supply chains with mass customization (MC) are lacking. Considering the equity of benefit distribution between the members of service supply chains, in this paper, we designed two revenue-sharing contracts. The first contract for the maximum equity of a single logistics service integrator (LSI) and single functional logistics service provider (FLSP) in a two-echelon logistics service supply chain was designed by introducing the fair entropy function (“one to one” model). Furthermore, the method is extended to a more complex supply chain, which consists of a single LSI and multiple FLSPs. A new contract was designed not only for considering the equity of an LSI and each FLSP but also for the equity between each FLSP (“one to N” model). The “one to one” model in three-echelon LSSC is also provided. The result exemplifies that, whether in the “one to one” model or “one to N” model, there exists a best interval of customized level when the revenue-sharing coefficient reaches its maximum

Optimization of a Dual-Channel Retailing System with Customer Returns

A plethora of retailers have begun to embrace a dual-channel retailing strategy wherein items are provided to consumers through both an online store and a physical store. As a result of standards and competitive measures, many retailers provide buyers who are unhappy with their purchases with the ability to achieve a full refund. In a dualchannel retailing system, full reimbursements can be done through what is called a crosschannel return, when a buyer purchases a product from an online store and returns it to a physical store. They can also be done through what is called a same-channel return, when a buyer purchases a product from a physical store and returns it back to the physical store, or purchases a product from an online store and returns it back to the online store. No existing research has examined all common types of customer returns in the context of a dual-channel retailing system. Be notified that the practice of cross-returning an item purchased from the physical store back to the online store is not common. Thus, it is not considered in this dissertation. We first study the optimal pricing policies for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer (DCR) with same- and cross-channel returns. We consider two factors: the dual-channel retailer’s performance under centralization with unified and differential pricing schemes, and the dual-channel retailer’s performance under decentralization with the Stackelberg and Nash games. How dual-channel pricing behaviour is impacted by customer preference and rates of customer returns is discussed. In this study, a channel’s sales requests is a linear function of a channel’s own pricing strategy and a cross-channel’s pricing strategy. The second problem is an extension of the first problem. The optimal pricing policies and online channel’s responsiveness level for a centralized and decentralized dual-channel retailer with same- and cross-channel returns are studied. Indeed, the online store is normally the distribution centre of the enterprise and is not limited to the customers in its neighbourhood. Also, the online store experiences a much higher return rate compared to the physical store. Thus, it has the capability and the need to optimize its responsiveness to customer returns along with its pricing strategy. A channel’s sales requests, in the second problem, is a linear function of a channel’s own price, a crosschannel’s price, and the online store’s responsiveness level. The third problem studies the dilemma of whether or not to allow unsatisfactory online purchases to be cross-returned to the physical store. If not properly considered, those returns may create havoc to the system and a retailer might overestimate or underestimate a channel’s order quantity. Therefore, we study and compare between four vi different strategies, and propose models to determine optimal order quantities for each strategy when a dual-channel retailer offers both same and cross-channel returns. Several decision making insights on choosing between the different cross-channel return strategies and some properties of the optimal solutions are presented. From the retailer’s perspective of outsourcing the e-channel’s management to a third party logistics and service provider, we finally study three different inventory strategies, namely transaction-based fee, flat-based fee, and gain sharing. For each strategy, we find both channels’ optimal inventory policies and expected profits. The performances of the different strategies are compared and the managerial insights are given using analytical and numerical analysis. Methodologies, insights, comparative analysis, and computational results are delivered in this dissertation for the above aforementioned problems

Cost-sharing contract design in a low-carbon service supply chain

This paper investigates a service supply chain (SC) consisting of a service provider (SP) who is in charge of carbon emission reduction and service, and a service integrator (SI) who is responsible for low-carbon advertising, considering corporate social responsibility (CSR). Given that SP shares SI’s advertising cost, SI may have three types of cost sharing decisions, namely, not sharing any cost of SP (contract PA), sharing SP’s emission reduction cost (contract PAIE), or sharing SP’s service cost (contract PAIS). We establish three differential game models to explore the optimal decisions, and identify the conditions under which SP and SI would provide positive participation rates. Our findings demonstrate that consumers’ low-carbon preference, and chain members’ marginal profits and CSR behaviors significantly influence the optimal solutions. Furthermore, we indicate that two-way contracts (contracts PAIE and PAIS) could benefit the entire service SC and its members. Specifically, SI prefers contract PAIE when SP’s service cost efficiency is lower, whereas he would rather choose contract PAIS under a higher one. More importantly, contracts PAIS and PAIE would be the potential equilibrium contract when SI has a relatively high marginal profit. When it is sufficiently low, contracts PAIE and PA would be the possible equilibrium contract

Fuelling the zero-emissions road freight of the future: routing of mobile fuellers

The future of zero-emissions road freight is closely tied to the sufficient availability of new and clean fuel options such as electricity and Hydrogen. In goods distribution using Electric Commercial Vehicles (ECVs) and Hydrogen Fuel Cell Vehicles (HFCVs) a major challenge in the transition period would pertain to their limited autonomy and scarce and unevenly distributed refuelling stations. One viable solution to facilitate and speed up the adoption of ECVs/HFCVs by logistics, however, is to get the fuel to the point where it is needed (instead of diverting the route of delivery vehicles to refuelling stations) using "Mobile Fuellers (MFs)". These are mobile battery swapping/recharging vans or mobile Hydrogen fuellers that can travel to a running ECV/HFCV to provide the fuel they require to complete their delivery routes at a rendezvous time and space. In this presentation, new vehicle routing models will be presented for a third party company that provides MF services. In the proposed problem variant, the MF provider company receives routing plans of multiple customer companies and has to design routes for a fleet of capacitated MFs that have to synchronise their routes with the running vehicles to deliver the required amount of fuel on-the-fly. This presentation will discuss and compare several mathematical models based on different business models and collaborative logistics scenarios

Strengthening Resilience of Supply with Essential Goods through Public-Private Emergency Collaborations: Challenges and Incentives

Private actors ensure the supply of essential goods such as food, drinking water, and medicine to the population. However, crises such as natural disasters, human-caused conflicts, or pandemics can cause disruptions of private supply chains and, subsequently, supply shortages in the market. In this case, public actors need to become active and responsible for supplying the population with essential goods. Nevertheless, the ability of public actors to provide essential goods in a crisis is constrained due to limited resources and a lack of knowledge about the relevant commercial supply chains. Therefore, companies that produce, distribute, or sell essential goods can be valuable partners but must be adequately motivated to participate in crisis management. A promising form of collaboration to strengthen resilience lies in the concept of public-private emergency collaborations (PPECs), elaborated in different studies within the dissertation. The necessity of PPECs and their public acceptance depends on the attitude and preparation of the population, which is why the empirical investigation of these accompanying questions is another central part of the dissertation. Five studies published as companion articles address necessary prerequisites and approaches to the design of collaborations in crises: Study A examines the PPEC concept and puts it into a more specific framework, considering logistical requirements in a game-theoretic model. The model addresses private actors’ incentives to collaborate, such as a positive reputation or learning effects for internal processes. Both can provide a substantial —- not least financial —- advantage for the company in the long run. Study B investigates crises and PPECs from a company perspective by evaluating an empirical study with 398 responses from essential goods and logistics companies. The results show companies’ high interest in participating in PPECs. Nevertheless, the data reveals that certain conditions, such as adequate compensation or consideration of companies’ operational procedures, must be fulfilled for collaboration with public actors. Study C addresses the attitude of the population in a survey of 402 randomly selected participants and finds that the population highly values companies’ involvement in PPECs. The companies’ communication strategy and the population’s risk perception affect the attitude. Study D analyzes the stockpiling behavior of the population in two door-to-door surveys, the first with 330 participants and the second with 402. The timing of the before-and-after survey provides a special value: The study considers possible changes due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The results show low stockpiling levels and that stockpiling has only marginally increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. Study E examines an economic experiment with 262 participants in 13 sessions to clarify the importance of safety-stock levels for companies’ reputation in a failure-prone supply chain. The design made it possible to disentangle indirect losses due to customer churn and direct losses due to disruptions, thus quantifying firm reliability and customer loyalty. Four general recommendations for the stakeholders in crisis management, public actors, private actors, and the population, are derived: First, all stakeholders must adapt their behavior and improve current protection measures and strategies against global crises and supply chain disruptions. Second, humanitarian crisis management is a team effort involving many actors. Therefore, understanding synergies, mutual attitudes, and the incentive constellation of the actors involved is a crucial prerequisite for success. Third, crisis management also includes the right communication strategy. It is not only important to contribute but also to communicate it in a successful and convincing way. Fourth, collaborative approaches, as in PPECs, where each stakeholder brings his or her strengths into the collaboration, are beneficial for all parties involved, and increase society’s overall resilience. Consequently, this dissertation provides valuable insights into the status of humanitarian crisis management from the perspective of different stakeholders. It offers the potential to improve this field of research through collaborative approaches, as in PPECs, addressing the strengths and incentives of stakeholders accordingly

An economic enquiry into the welfare effects of fair-trade

PhDThe copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.Fair-trade is investigated at three levels. Each level relates to a specific group of actors. The first group are the consumers of fair-trade. In this respect fair-trade overlaps with altruism. A model is developed which seeks out parameters by which to judge whether or not a person will engage into this gesture of altruism, and accordingly measures the fair-trade utility of the consumer. On the basis that it is voluntary, fair-trade is deemed to be virtuous in that it either uplifts consumer utility, or else the consumer withdraws their patronage. Information is hypothesised to play a key role in determining the depth of this relationship. The second group are neighbouring producers, that is the non fair-trade producers who compete in the same market. A situation is modelled in which fair-trade is viewed as a switch in demand preference rather than new demand. The model allows an evaluation based on the standard tenets of welfare economics: to inform upon which movements are value-creating, which are merely transfers, the symmetry of those transfers and where Pareto improvements can and cannot be realised. The policymaker is afforded a logical overview, but with the implication that many of the relevant variables may be lie beyond their direct influence. The third group are landless vineyard labours in South Africa who are empirically analysised. We observed the strongest performance of fair-trade with respect to subjective improvement in wellbeing and the sort of participation that could be categorised as empowerment.Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC