A Software Platform for Research on Auction Mechanisms, Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2011, nr 3

The platform for research on auction mechanisms is a distributed simulation framework providing means to carry out research on resource allocation efficiency mechanisms and user strategies. Both kinds of algorithms examined are completely user-defined. Interaction of algorithms is recorded and pre-defined measures for the final resource allocation are calculated. Underlying database design provides for efficient results lookup and comparison across different experiments, thus enabling research groupwork. A recognised, open and flexible information model is employed for experiment descriptions

Service Negotiation and Contracting in Virtual Network Environment

The current Internet presents a high barrier to entry for new service providers, due to its inability to accommodate new protocols and technologies, and lack of competition among the network providers. Recently, network virtualization has gained considerable attention as a possible solution, as it enables multiple networks to concurrently run over a shared substrate. It allows for deploying diverse network protocols and technologies customized for specific networked services and applications. Moreover, any party can take on the role of a network provider by simply offering his virtual network infrastructure to customers, increasing competition in the market. However, the first challenge in realizing a fair and competitive market in a virtual network environment is to have a service negotiation and contracting mechanism in place, that will allow (i) multiple infrastructure providers to participate in a fair and faithful competition, and (ii) a service provider to negotiate the price and quality of service with the providers. In this thesis, we present V-Mart, an open market model and enabling framework for automated service negotiation and contracting in a virtual network environment. To the infrastructure providers, V-Mart fosters an open and fair competition realized by a two stage auction. The V-Mart auction model ensures that bidders (infrastructure providers) bid truthfully, have the flexibility to apply diverse pricing policies, and still gain profit from hosting customers’ virtual resources. To the service providers, V-Mart offers virtual network partitioning algorithms that allow them to divide their virtual networks among competing infrastructure providers while minimizing the total cost. V-Mart offers two types of algorithms to suit different market scenarios. The algorithms not only consider virtual resource hosting price but also the service provider’s preference for resource co-location and the high cost of inter-provider communication. Through extensive simulation experiments we show the efficiency and effectiveness of the algorithms under various market conditions

Telecommunication Economics — Summary on the Dagstuhl Perspectives Seminar No. 08043

The telecommunications sector and the Internet section of Internet Service Providers (ISP) have become a dynamic key area for the economic development of industrialized nations in the world. It is in constant evolution. Because of intense competition, telecommunications companies and ISPs are forced to diversify their offers and thus to propose an increasing number of services. However, economic analysis often ignores important technical aspects of telecommunications and is not aware of new developments. Engineering models often ignore economic factors. Thus, the design and deployment of future networks that incorporate new services are subject to uncertainties such as equipment and capacity prices (due to technological innovation), demand and supply for services (due to competition). Seeing leading researchers bringing together with various backgrounds, all working on innovative aspects of technical, techno-economic, social, and regulatory issues, lead to the following four main areas that have been partially tackled in an integrated manner: Architectural side, Social side, Economic and business side, and Regulatory side

Socio-economic vision graph generation and handover in distributed smart camera networks

In this article we present an approach to object tracking handover in a network of smart cameras, based on self-interested autonomous agents, which exchange responsibility for tracking objects in a market mechanism, in order to maximise their own utility. A novel ant-colony inspired mechanism is used to learn the vision graph, that is, the camera neighbourhood relations, during runtime, which may then be used to optimise communication between cameras. The key benefits of our completely decentralised approach are on the one hand generating the vision graph online, enabling efficient deployment in unknown scenarios and camera network topologies, and on the other hand relying only on local information, increasing the robustness of the system. Since our market-based approach does not rely on a priori topology information, the need for any multicamera calibration can be avoided. We have evaluated our approach both in a simulation study and in network of real distributed smart cameras

Economic regulation for multi tenant infrastructures

Large scale computing infrastructures need scalable and effi cient resource allocation mechanisms to ful l the requirements of its participants and applications while the whole system is regulated to work e ciently. Computational markets provide e fficient allocation mechanisms that aggregate information from multiple sources in large, dynamic and complex systems where there is not a single source with complete information. They have been proven to be successful in matching resource demand and resource supply in the presence of sel sh multi-objective and utility-optimizing users and sel sh pro t-optimizing providers. However, global infrastructure metrics which may not directly affect participants of the computational market still need to be addressed -a.k.a. economic externalities like load balancing or energy-efficiency. In this thesis, we point out the need to address these economic externalities, and we design and evaluate appropriate regulation mechanisms from di erent perspectives on top of existing economic models, to incorporate a wider range of objective metrics not considered otherwise. Our main contributions in this thesis are threefold; fi rst, we propose a taxation mechanism that addresses the resource congestion problem e ffectively improving the balance of load among resources when correlated economic preferences are present; second, we propose a game theoretic model with complete information to derive an algorithm to aid resource providers to scale up and down resource supply so energy-related costs can be reduced; and third, we relax our previous assumptions about complete information on the resource provider side and design an incentive-compatible mechanism to encourage users to truthfully report their resource requirements effectively assisting providers to make energy-eff cient allocations while providing a dynamic allocation mechanism to users.Les infraestructures computacionals de gran escala necessiten mecanismes d’assignació de recursos escalables i eficients per complir amb els requisits computacionals de tots els seus participants, assegurant-se de que el sistema és regulat apropiadament per a que funcioni de manera efectiva. Els mercats computacionals són mecanismes d’assignació de recursos eficients que incorporen informació de diferents fonts considerant sistemes de gran escala, complexos i dinàmics on no existeix una única font que proveeixi informació completa de l'estat del sistema. Aquests mercats computacionals han demostrat ser exitosos per acomodar la demanda de recursos computacionals amb la seva oferta quan els seus participants son considerats estratègics des del punt de vist de teoria de jocs. Tot i això existeixen mètriques a nivell global sobre la infraestructura que no tenen per que influenciar els usuaris a priori de manera directa. Així doncs, aquestes externalitats econòmiques com poden ser el balanceig de càrrega o la eficiència energètica, conformen una línia d’investigació que cal explorar. En aquesta tesi, presentem i descrivim la problemàtica derivada d'aquestes externalitats econòmiques. Un cop establert el marc d’actuació, dissenyem i avaluem mecanismes de regulació apropiats basats en models econòmics existents per resoldre aquesta problemàtica des de diferents punts de vista per incorporar un ventall més ampli de mètriques objectiu que no havien estat considerades fins al moment. Les nostres contribucions principals tenen tres vessants: en primer lloc, proposem un mecanisme de regulació de tipus impositiu que tracta de mitigar l’aparició de recursos sobre-explotats que, efectivament, millora el balanceig de la càrrega de treball entre els recursos disponibles; en segon lloc, proposem un model teòric basat en teoria de jocs amb informació o completa que permet derivar un algorisme que facilita la tasca dels proveïdors de recursos per modi car a l'alça o a la baixa l'oferta de recursos per tal de reduir els costos relacionats amb el consum energètic; i en tercer lloc, relaxem la nostra assumpció prèvia sobre l’existència d’informació complerta per part del proveïdor de recursos i dissenyem un mecanisme basat en incentius per fomentar que els usuaris facin pública de manera verídica i explícita els seus requeriments computacionals, ajudant d'aquesta manera als proveïdors de recursos a fer assignacions eficients des del punt de vista energètic a la vegada que oferim un mecanisme l’assignació de recursos dinàmica als usuari

Resource Allocation in Decentralised Computational Systems: An Evolutionary Market-Based Approach

We present a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets, for resource allocation in fully decentralised systems where agents are self-interested. Our market mechanism requires no coordinating node or complex negotiation. The stability of outcome allocations, those at equilibrium, is analysed and compared for three buyer behaviour models. In order to capture the interaction between self-interested agents, we propose the use of competitive coevolution. Our approach is both highly scalable and may be tuned to achieve specified outcome resource allocations. We demonstrate the behaviour of our approach in simulation, where \textit{evolutionary market agents} act on behalf of service providing nodes to adaptively price their resources over time, in response to market conditions. We show that this leads the system to the predicted outcome resource allocation. Furthermore, the system remains stable in the presence of small changes in price, when buyers' decision functions degrade gracefully

Incentive-driven QoS in peer-to-peer overlays

A well known problem in peer-to-peer overlays is that no single entity has control over the software, hardware and configuration of peers. Thus, each peer can selfishly adapt its behaviour to maximise its benefit from the overlay. This thesis is concerned with the modelling and design of incentive mechanisms for QoS-overlays: resource allocation protocols that provide strategic peers with participation incentives, while at the same time optimising the performance of the peer-to-peer distribution overlay. The contributions of this thesis are as follows. First, we present PledgeRoute, a novel contribution accounting system that can be used, along with a set of reciprocity policies, as an incentive mechanism to encourage peers to contribute resources even when users are not actively consuming overlay services. This mechanism uses a decentralised credit network, is resilient to sybil attacks, and allows peers to achieve time and space deferred contribution reciprocity. Then, we present a novel, QoS-aware resource allocation model based on Vickrey auctions that uses PledgeRoute as a substrate. It acts as an incentive mechanism by providing efficient overlay construction, while at the same time allocating increasing service quality to those peers that contribute more to the network. The model is then applied to lagsensitive chunk swarming, and some of its properties are explored for different peer delay distributions. When considering QoS overlays deployed over the best-effort Internet, the quality received by a client cannot be adjudicated completely to either its serving peer or the intervening network between them. By drawing parallels between this situation and well-known hidden action situations in microeconomics, we propose a novel scheme to ensure adherence to advertised QoS levels. We then apply it to delay-sensitive chunk distribution overlays and present the optimal contract payments required, along with a method for QoS contract enforcement through reciprocative strategies. We also present a probabilistic model for application-layer delay as a function of the prevailing network conditions. Finally, we address the incentives of managed overlays, and the prediction of their behaviour. We propose two novel models of multihoming managed overlay incentives in which overlays can freely allocate their traffic flows between different ISPs. One is obtained by optimising an overlay utility function with desired properties, while the other is designed for data-driven least-squares fitting of the cross elasticity of demand. This last model is then used to solve for ISP profit maximisation

Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, 2011, nr 3

kwartalni

Resource Allocation, and Survivability in Network Virtualization Environments

Network virtualization can offer more flexibility and better manageability for the future Internet by allowing multiple heterogeneous virtual networks (VN) to coexist on a shared infrastructure provider (InP) network. A major challenge in this respect is the VN embedding problem that deals with the efficient mapping of virtual resources on InP network resources. Previous research focused on heuristic algorithms for the VN embedding problem assuming that the InP network remains operational at all times. In this thesis, we remove that assumption by formulating the survivable virtual network embedding (SVNE) problem and developing baseline policy heuristics and an efficient hybrid policy heuristic to solve it. The hybrid policy is based on a fast re-routing strategy and utilizes a pre-reserved quota for backup on each physical link. Our evaluation results show that our proposed heuristic for SVNE outperforms baseline heuristics in terms of long term business profit for the InP, acceptance ratio, bandwidth efficiency, and response time