Cooperation through social influence

We consider a simple and altruistic multiagent system in which the agents are eager to perform a collective task but where their real engagement depends on the willingness to perform the task of other influential agents. We model this scenario by an influence game, a cooperative simple game in which a team (or coalition) of players succeeds if it is able to convince enough agents to participate in the task (to vote in favor of a decision). We take the linear threshold model as the influence model. We show first the expressiveness of influence games showing that they capture the class of simple games. Then we characterize the computational complexity of various problems on influence games, including measures (length and width), values (Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf) and properties (of teams and players). Finally, we analyze those problems for some particular extremal cases, with respect to the propagation of influence, showing tighter complexity characterizations.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft

From degree-correlated to payoff-correlated activity for an optimal resolution of social dilemmas

An active participation of players in evolutionary games depends on several factors, ranging from personal stakes to the properties of the interaction network. Diverse activity patterns thus have to be taken into account when studying the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we study the weak prisoner's dilemma game, where the activity of each player is determined in a probabilistic manner either by its degree or by its payoff. While degree-correlated activity introduces cascading failures of cooperation that are particularly severe on scale-free networks with frequently inactive hubs, payoff-correlated activity provides a more nuanced activity profile, which ultimately hinders systemic breakdowns of cooperation. To determine optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation, we introduce an exponential decay to payoff-correlated activity that determines how fast the activity of a player returns to its default state. We show that there exists an intermediate decay rate, at which the resolution of the social dilemma is optimal. This can be explained by the emerging activity patterns of players, where the inactivity of hubs is compensated effectively by the increased activity of average-degree players, who through their collective influence in the network sustain a higher level of cooperation. The sudden drops in the fraction of cooperators observed with degree-correlated activity therefore vanish, and so does the need for the lengthy spatiotemporal reorganization of compact cooperative clusters. The absence of such asymmetric dynamic instabilities thus leads to an optimal resolution of social dilemmas, especially when the conditions for the evolution of cooperation are strongly adverse.Comment: 8 two-column pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Axelrod’s metanorm games on networks

Metanorms is a mechanism proposed to promote cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental results show that network structures that underlie social interactions influence the emergence of norms that promote cooperation. We generalize Axelrod’s analysis of metanorms dynamics to interactions unfolding on networks through simulation and mathematical modeling. Network topology strongly influences the effectiveness of the metanorms mechanism in establishing cooperation. In particular, we find that average degree, clustering coefficient and the average number of triplets per node play key roles in sustaining or collapsing cooperationSpanish MICINN projects CSD2010-00034 (CONSOLIDER-INGENIO 2010) and DPI2010-16920, and by the Junta de Castilla y Leo´ n, references BU034A08 and GREX251-2009

Social dynamics and cooperation: The case of nonhuman primates and its implications for human behavior.

The social factors that influence cooperation have remained largely uninvestigated but have the potential to explain much of the variation in cooperative behavior observed in the natural world. We show here that certain dimensions of the social environment, namely the size of the social group, the degree of social tolerance expressed, the structure of the dominance hierarchy, and the patterns of dispersal, may influence the emergence and stability of cooperation in predictable ways. Furthermore, the social environment experienced by a species over evolutionary time will have shaped their cognition to provide certain strengths and strategies that are beneficial in their species' social world. These cognitive adaptations will in turn impact the likelihood of cooperating in a given social environment. Experiments with one primate species, the cottontop tamarin, illustrate how social dynamics may influence emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in this species. We then take a more general viewpoint and argue that the hypotheses presented here require further experimental work and the addition of quantitative modeling to obtain a better understanding of how social dynamics influence the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior in complex systems. We conclude by pointing out subsequent specific directions for models and experiments that will allow relevant advances in the understanding of the emergence of cooperation.Ángel Sánchez was partially supported by Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain) through grants MOSAICO, PRODIEVO and Complexity-NET RESINEE, and by Comunidad de Madrid (Spain) through grant MODELICO-CM.Publicad

The Power of Places in Building Cultural and Arts Education Networks and Cooperation in Rural Areas

Volunteering plays a central role in cultural and arts education in rural areas in Germany. However, a decrease in the number of volunteers in structurally weak regions can be observed in recent years. This poses existential challenges for cultural and arts education. The promotion of social networks and regional cooperation, as well as a sense of place, can counteract this decline. This article aims to explore how sense of place influence cooperation and thus social networks between actors of different institutions in the context of cultural and arts education in rural areas. A total of 34 interviews and egocentric network maps were conducted with different local actors (e.g., volunteers in the theatre association, mayors, etc.) in four municipalities. The data were analysed using qualitative content analysis. Our results show that, through active participation in cultural events and associations, new cooperation is created and maintained, which also expands the social network. This active participation can be positively influenced by the existing attachment to the region and cultural places

The evolutionary dynamics of tolerance

This paper incorporates the phenomenon of tolerance, as the ability to accept diversity, into an economic analysis showing how different aptitudes to trust and cooperation can affect economic outcomes. In the economic system we propose, tolerance is associated with the different weight that agents attribute to their own nature and to the institutional parameters in their utility function. We thus construct a model of overlapping generations, showing that the incentives that influence descendants’ predisposition to tolerance depend on both institutional factors, where behaviour is imposed by rules, and on social (or cultural) factors, found in popular customs and established traditions. Our study highlights the absolute impossibility of affirming tolerance through formal rules. In fact, intolerance is a persistent attitude and its control is only possible through constant and continuous interventions on the educational processes of new generations (intolerance trap).Tolerance; Evolutionary dynamics; Imperfect empathy

The role of Guanxi on Chinese leadership innovation:the pilot study on the electric motor sector

This research aims to examine the existence and nature of complex business-social relationships in the Chinese context (Guanxi) and evaluate how these relationships influence the behaviors of managers in State-owned Chinese engineering firms. Research on Guanxi is comprehensive though little work investigates internal influences and how internal relationships may mirror or replicate external Guanxi. This study uses a snowball sample of 66 senior managers across the key functional disciplines in typical large Chinese firms and explores how often strategic level problems in the firm are solved through relationships outside, inside or between the companies. Do Guanxi networks penetrate the organization itself and are there relationships that are unique to internal networks? The research finds that problem solving at strategic levels are often through internal and external networks, rather than internal management structures, but also that different problems complexities typically demonstrate unique problem-solving networks. The research identifies three different forms that these relationships take: Internal, inter-firm and hybrid relationship modes. Implications for this work suggest problem solving in Chinese firms is enhanced through cooperation and mutual respect, and likely to be inhibited by traditional Western approaches to management

Contribution of individual social preferences on the propensity to cooperate: Lessons from an experimental study

Abstract. Axelrod (1992) highlighted the important role of cooperation in actors’ strategy and performance in the social interactions. This importance is confirmed by Thépot (1998). The understanding of individual propensity to cooperate is an important field to better know their strategies and the performance of the economic systems’ in which they evolve. In this sense, game theory indicates that individual’s propensity to cooperate depends on his anticipation of decision that will be made by other participants and his expected gain. The challenge of this assumption based on experimental study generated other motivations to individual decision. An individual can be motivated by altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, …these motivations, other than self-pecuniary interest, form the social preferences theory which opened the way to other reading of individual propensity to cooperate within organizations. A better understanding of the influence of these social preferences on the decisions to cooperate (or not) within organizations have motivated this research. It relies on data collected through an experimental study which allowed the identification of the motivations (altruism, desire of reciprocity, inequity aversion,…) which best characterize individual social preferences and to study its influence on the contributions made in public good game. It concludes that the presence of rational selfish persons only motivated by pecuniary gain is the cause of cooperation’s declining within organizations and that individuals motivated by an inequity aversion have some resilience when they experiment a lack of cooperation from other organizations members. It therefore establishes that an individual social preference influence his propensity to cooperate within organization. As well, in addition to other determinants found in the literature, the conclusions of this research underline the role of social preferences in the functioning and the dynamics of organizations. Keywords. Social preferences, Cooperation, Experimental study.JEL. C72, C81

Social Capital in Bahia Clusters

This paper aimed to assess the impact of social capital on the performance of clusters in the state of Bahia Brazil Through bibliographic and documentary research it was possible to achieve the desired objective It was evident that the most developed clusters in Bahia are found in regions with good levels of social capital The operationalization of social capital results in cooperation processes that have a direct influence on the performance of the agglomerations of companies It is concluded that social capital is a decisive factor for the development of cluster