34,060 research outputs found
Cooperative Epistemic Multi-Agent Planning for Implicit Coordination
Epistemic planning can be used for decision making in multi-agent situations
with distributed knowledge and capabilities. Recently, Dynamic Epistemic Logic
(DEL) has been shown to provide a very natural and expressive framework for
epistemic planning. We extend the DEL-based epistemic planning framework to
include perspective shifts, allowing us to define new notions of sequential and
conditional planning with implicit coordination. With these, it is possible to
solve planning tasks with joint goals in a decentralized manner without the
agents having to negotiate about and commit to a joint policy at plan time.
First we define the central planning notions and sketch the implementation of a
planning system built on those notions. Afterwards we provide some case studies
in order to evaluate the planner empirically and to show that the concept is
useful for multi-agent systems in practice.Comment: In Proceedings M4M9 2017, arXiv:1703.0173
Representation recovers information
Early agreement within cognitive science on the topic of representation has now given way to a combination of positions. Some question the significance of representation in cognition. Others continue to argue in favor, but the case has not been demonstrated in any formal way. The present paper sets out a framework in which the value of representation-use can be mathematically measured, albeit in a broadly sensory context rather than a specifically cognitive one. Key to the approach is the use of Bayesian networks for modeling the distal dimension of sensory processes. More relevant to cognitive science is the theoretical result obtained, which is that a certain type of representational architecture is *necessary* for achievement of sensory efficiency. While exhibiting few of the characteristics of traditional, symbolic encoding, this architecture corresponds quite closely to the forms of embedded representation now being explored in some embedded/embodied approaches. It becomes meaningful to view that type of representation-use as a form of information recovery. A formal basis then exists for viewing representation not so much as the substrate of reasoning and thought, but rather as a general medium for efficient, interpretive processing
On the interplay between multiscaling and stocks dependence
We find a nonlinear dependence between an indicator of the degree of
multiscaling of log-price time series of a stock and the average correlation of
the stock with respect to the other stocks traded in the same market. This
result is a robust stylized fact holding for different financial markets. We
investigate this result conditional on the stocks' capitalization and on the
kurtosis of stocks' log-returns in order to search for possible confounding
effects. We show that a linear dependence with the logarithm of the
capitalization and the logarithm of kurtosis does not explain the observed
stylized fact, which we interpret as being originated from a deeper
relationship.Comment: 19 pages, 8 figures, 9 table
Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract
In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is
realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core
insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we
employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The
structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between
what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the
foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these
notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles
Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle
equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker
"evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads
to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in
topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge
and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic
as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that
preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for
any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these
irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide
sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this
paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205
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