Protecting the ‘rights of others’ in the UK: religious expression, reasonable accommodation and the real meaning of non-discrimination

Over the years, states have been developing and implementing legislation with the aim of protecting individuals against discrimination, inter alia, on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Recent developments have led to an expansion of the concept of ‘family’ to include same-sex couples and single parents and the progressive adjustment of the law with a view to extend parenthood rights to less ‘’traditional’ family forms. In terms of access to parenthood, objections of conscience may arise in relation to facilitating adoption by same-sex couples or single parent adoption, whereby religious objectors may feel that their professional duties are in direct conflict with the tenets of their religion. Conscientious objections have traditionally been expressed by persons whose beliefs are at odds with laws compelling them to carry out certain functions, such as facilitating adoptions in same-sex families or registering and officiating civil unions. The progressive legal recognition of alternative family unions and parenthood rights to non-traditional family forms on the one hand, and the manifestation of religious beliefs outside an individual’s forum internum1 on the other, can be described as an ‘explosive mix’ of conflicting rights and freedoms. In addition to national courts in the Council of Europe’s member states, the European Court of Human Rights has been exploring the scope and limits of the right of conscientious objection as a particular aspect of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In the European context, the European Court of Human Rights has demonstrated through its jurisprudence that although a ‘human right’ to conscientious objection exists, this is not absolute, but subject to permissible limitations as found in Article 9(2) ECHR2 including the protection of the rights and freedoms of others

The Europeanization of Law : Jurisprudential Problems

The Europeanization of Law – Jurisprudential Problems The study’s point of departure is to use the evolution of EU Law as a huge societal experience providing us with insight that enables us to test the tenability of the basic theoretical constructions of analytical legal positivism. The thesis consists of a collection of articles and a summary. The summary forms, at an abstract legal-theoretical level, a rational reconstruction of the themes discussed in the articles. The summary updates the articles and provides a rational “legal-theoretical” reconstruction of the themes addressed in the articles. This reconstruction is based on an orthodox understanding of EU law as an autonomous legal order that is valid as applicable binding law in the Member States but retains its independent character as EU law and is not merged into national law. This entails that Europeanization leads to an asymmetric view of valid law: for national judges valid law is a combination of national and European law; for EU judges, valid law is only EU law. In the summary, the different interpretations that can be given to the concept of Europeanization of law are analysed on the basis of a conceptual framework that makes a distinction between propositional/behavioural and concrete/abstract aspects of law. The framework is inspired by J.W.Harris’s distinction between momentary and non-momentary legal systems and Kaarlo Tuori’s three-level model of law. This leads to a conceptual stipulation that distinguishes between the legal order (concrete/propositional), juridical practices (concrete/ behavioural), the legal system (abstract/propositional) and legal culture (abstract/behavioural.In the context of the legal order the issues discussed include the ultimate rules (Grundnorm,Rule of Recognition) that form the foundations of legal order and the representation of Europeanized law as contextual fields of consistent normative meaning based on both national and European sources. The discussion of the Europeanization of juridical practices addresses such questions as the penetration of European law into national legislation and adjudication. Concerning Europeanization of the legal system the discussion takes up such themes as conceptual divergence between EU law and national law, fragmentation of national law, the metaconstitutional paradox in the EU and the relation between European democracy and EU law.Finally, the chapter on legal culture proposes a hermeneutic understanding of the concept of legal of culture as unarticulated Vorverständniss, and links the discussion of the approximation of legal cultures in the EU to Aulis Aarnio’s theory of legal audiences.Eurooppalaistuvan oikeuden oikeusteoreettisia ongelmia on väitöskirjatutkimus, jonka muodostavat yhdeksän artikkelia ja yhteenveto-osa. Artikkelit käsittelevät EU-oikeuden omaksumista Suomessa, EU:n perustuslaillistumisprosessia, demokratian ja perusoikeuksien suhdetta sekä EU-oikeuden käsitteenmuodostuksen ongelmia. Yhteenveto-osassa päivitetään artikkelien teemoja ja esitetään niiden rationaalinen rekonstruktio abstraktimmalla oikeusteoreettisella tasolla. Tässä nojaudutaan oikeuden nelikenttämalliin, jossa eurooppalaistumista tarkastellaan oikeusnormeista muodostuvan oikeusjärjestyksen, oikeuskäsitteistä ja periaatteista muodostuvan oikeusjärjestelmän, oikeudellisista käytännöistä muodostuvan juridiikan ja oikeudellisen toiminnan esitiedollisista lähtökohdista muodostuvan oikeuskulttuurin muutoksena

Why We Have No Theory of European Private Law Pluralism

The recent popularity of legal pluralism has now reached the area of European private law. In this paper Michaels scrutinizes the concepts of legal pluralism used by three of its most prominent proponents: Pierre Legrand, Jan Smits, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. He does not offer fully-fledged criticism of their theories (each of which are among the most fascinating and helpful in the European private law debate) but only address their use of ideas of legal pluralism, and the relation of these ideas with the legal pluralism debate. His analysis shows not only that these three use sharply different concepts of legal pluralism, but also, that none of these three concepts is in accordance with traditional definitions of pluralism. Further, it turns out that several points of criticism can be raised against their theories that stem from the legal pluralism debate. Michaels does not, here, take the second step of determining whether an actual concept of European private law pluralism can be established – and whether such a concept can withstand the criticism that has been voiced against the idea of legal pluralism

Why We Have No Theory of European Private Law Pluralism

The recent popularity of legal pluralism has now reached the area of European private law. In this paper Michaels scrutinizes the concepts of legal pluralism used by three of its most prominent proponents: Pierre Legrand, Jan Smits, and Thomas Wilhelmsson. He does not offer fully-fledged criticism of their theories (each of which are among the most fascinating and helpful in the European private law debate) but only address their use of ideas of legal pluralism, and the relation of these ideas with the legal pluralism debate. His analysis shows not only that these three use sharply different concepts of legal pluralism, but also, that none of these three concepts is in accordance with traditional definitions of pluralism. Further, it turns out that several points of criticism can be raised against their theories that stem from the legal pluralism debate. Michaels does not, here, take the second step of determining whether an actual concept of European private law pluralism can be established – and whether such a concept can withstand the criticism that has been voiced against the idea of legal pluralism

From the Ground up: The Use of Minimum Rules in EU Procedural Criminal Law and the Question of Member States’ Discretion

The concept of minimum rules is inextricably linked to the approximation of criminal norms in the European Union. In the field of procedural criminal law, the adoption of minimum rules supports the need to facilitate mutual recognition and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. This Article seeks to introduce the reader to the world of minimum rules. In order to understand what it means to have minimum rules in a criminal law context, it is necessary to discuss about the origins, the development, the use and the role of minimum rules within this particular context. Following a complete depiction of the way in which minimum rules function in the field of procedural criminal law, the question arises: can Member States go beyond minimum rules? This Article attempts a comprehensive answer to the question of national discretion, arguing for the existence of different limits that can confine the discretion of the national legislator to go beyond minimum rules, and advocating the need for an ad hoc assessment of Member States’ discretion.Criminal Justice: Legitimacy, accountability, and effectivit