11 research outputs found

    Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

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    Peer-to-peer systems have reached a widespread use, ranging from academic and industrial applications to home entertainment. The key advantage of this paradigm lies in its scalability and flexibility, consequences of the participants sharing their resources for the common welfare. Security in such systems is a desirable goal. For example, when mission-critical operations or bank transactions are involved, their effectiveness strongly depends on the perception that users have about the system dependability and trustworthiness. A major threat to the security of these systems is the phenomenon of collusion. Peers can be selfish colluders, when they try to fool the system to gain unfair advantages over other peers, or malicious, when their purpose is to subvert the system or disturb other users. The problem, however, has received so far only a marginal attention by the research community. While several solutions exist to counter attacks in peer-to-peer systems, very few of them are meant to directly counter colluders and their attacks. Reputation, micro-payments, and concepts of game theory are currently used as the main means to obtain fairness in the usage of the resources. Our goal is to provide an overview of the topic by examining the key issues involved. We measure the relevance of the problem in the current literature and the effectiveness of existing philosophies against it, to suggest fruitful directions in the further development of the field

    5G and the Internet of everyone: motivation, enablers, and research agenda

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    As mobile broadband subscriptions grow twice as fast as the fixed ones and the Internet of Things comes forth, the 5G vision of the Internet of Everything (people, devices, and things), becomes a substantial and credible part of the near future. In this paper, we argue that the 5G vision is still missing a fundamental concept to realize its societal promise: the Internet of EveryOne (IoEO), i.e., means and principles to overcome the concerns that the current 5G perspective raises for the digital divide and the network neutrality principle. We discuss open-source software and hardware, Community Networks, mobile edge computing and blockchains as enablers of the IoEO and highlight open research challenges with respect to them. The ultimate objective of our paper is to stimulate research with a short-term, lasting impact also on that 50% (or more) of population that will not enjoy 5G anytime soon. Internet of EveryOne, community networks, 5G, mobile edge computing, network neutrality, community cloud computing.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

    SMART: A Subspace based Malicious Peers Detection algorithm for P2P Systems

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    In recent years, reputation management schemes have been proposed as promising solutions to alleviate the blindness during peer selection in distributed P2P environment where malicious peers coexist with honest ones. They indeed provide incentives for peers to contribute more resources to the system and thus promote the whole system performance. But few of them have been implemented practically since they still suffer from various security threats, such as collusion, Sybil attack and so on. Therefore, how to detect malicious peers plays a critical role in the successful work of these mechanisms, and it will also be our focus in this paper. Firstly, we define malicious peers and show their influence on the system performance. Secondly, based on Multiscale Principal Component Analysis (MSPCA) and control chart, a Subspace based MAlicious peeRs deTecting algorithm (SMART) is brought forward. SMART first reconstructs the original reputation matrix based on subspace method, and then finds malicious peers out based on Shewhart control chart. Finally, simulation results indicate that SMART can detect malicious peers efficiently and accurately

    Decentralized Review and Attestation of Software Attribute Claims

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    Software can be described, like human users and other objects, through attributes. For this work, we define software attributes as humanly verifiable, falsifiable, or judgeable statements regarding characteristics of said software. Much like attributes in general, software attributes require robust identities for their source but also for their target, meaning a software in general or a binary in particular. As software can be of critical importance, performing an independent review of attribute claims appears beneficial. We posit that decentralized platforms that were developed and refined over the past decade can bridge the gap between existing tools and methods for software review and their open, transparent, and accountable use for the benefit of users. In this work, we explore the feasibility and implications of decentralizing an independent review of software attribute claims. We envision the decentralization of a review process from initialization and execution to the persistent recording of results. We sketch the available design space by decomposing the overall process into a modular design and describe how each component covers overarching objectives. To illustrate practical implications and tradeoffs, we present ETHDPR, a proof of concept implementation based on Ethereum and IPFS. Through a quantitative and qualitative evaluation, we show that a decentralized software review is practically feasible. We illustrate the flexibility of the proposed approach using a toy example of a software component in automotive systems. Lastly, we provide a discussion on fundamental limits and open issues of facilitating independent reviews via technological means

    Community Networks and Sustainability: a Survey of Perceptions, Practices, and Proposed Solutions

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    Community network (CN) initiatives have been around for roughly two decades, evangelizing a distinctly different paradigm for building, maintaining, and sharing network infrastructure but also defending the basic human right to Internet access. Over this time they have evolved into a mosaic of systems that vary widely with respect to their network technologies, their offered services, their organizational structure, and the way they position themselves in the overall telecommunications’ ecosystem. Common to all these highly differentiated initiatives is the sustainability challenge. We approach sustainability as a broad term with an economical, political, and cultural context. We first review the different perceptions of the term. These vary both across and within the different types of stakeholders involved in CNs and are reflected in their motivation to join such initiatives. Then, we study the diverse approaches of CN operators towards the sustainability goal. Given the rich context of the term, these range all the way from mechanisms to fund their activities, to organizational structures and social activities serving as incentives for the engagement of their members. We iterate on incentive mechanisms that have been proposed and theoretically analyzed in the literature for CNs as well as tools and processes that have been actually implemented in them. Finally, we enumerate lessons that have been learned out of these two decades of CNs’ operation and discuss additional technological and regulatory issues that are key to their longer-term sustainability

    Conciliando satisfação e paridade para promover reciprocidade em federações de provedores de computação na nuvem.

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    Provedores privados de computação na nuvem poderiam obter considerável benefício mútuo ao operar suas infraestruturas de forma federada. Tal operação permite que a demanda excedente de um provedor possa ser atendida por outros provedores que estejam experimentando uma baixa demanda naquele mesmo instante. Sob uma ótica de mercado, federações com arquitetura descentralizada têm como principal desafio a promoção de cooperação entre indivíduos egoístas e racionais em um cenário que não dispõe de uma autoridade central e confiável. Este trabalho se concentra em arquiteturas de mercado descentralizado, baseadas em mecanismos de reciprocidade, para suporte a federações P2P (Peer-to-Peer) de provedores de computação na nuvem. Nos mecanismos de reciprocidade, um indivíduo utiliza o histórico de comportamentos de cooperação dos demais indivíduos para doar seus recursos aos que forem mais recíprocos. A maioria dessas estratégias se atém à priorização dos participantes (a quem devo doar?) de acordo com métricas tais como reputação ou grau de reciprocidade. Essa estratégia é suficiente para promover cooperação e assegurar aos participantes cooperativos os melhores níveis possíveis de satisfação (percentual de requisições atendidas). Porém, em cenários com baixa contenção de recursos, a priorização por si só não é suficiente para evitar o aproveitamento por parte de indivíduos não-cooperativos e garantir paridade (percentual de recursos retribuídos). Neste sentido, este trabalho propõe que mecanismos de reciprocidade, especialmente aqueles baseados em reciprocidade direta, sejam estendidos com um laço de controle retroalimentado que regula a quantidade de recursos que cada nuvem deveria ofertar à federação. Quando cada participante cooperativo controla de maneira individual a quantidade de recursos ofertada à federação, tem-se como resultado um controle indireto da contenção de recursos, que por sua vez é mantida em um patamar que assegura aos participantes cooperativos níveis adequados de satisfação e paridade. Por fim, é apresentada uma investigação acerca da utilização de uma forma mais limitada de reciprocidade indireta, a reciprocidade transitiva, que pode ser utilizada conjuntamente com mecanismos de reciprocidade direta, para evitar impasses gerados pela assimetria de tempo/interesses, aquecendo a economia da federação e consequentemente provendo maiores níveis de paridade e satisfação aos nós cooperativos.Private cloud providers could obtain considerable benefits from operating their infrastructures within a federation. Such operation allows a provider’s exceeding demand to be met by other providers experimenting a resource underutilization on the same moment. From a market perspective, federations with decentralized architecture have as main challenge the promotion of cooperation among rational selfish individuals in a context with no central trusted authorities. This work focuses in decentralized market architectures, based on reciprocity mechanisms, to support P2P (Peer-to-Peer) federations of cloud providers. In reciprocity mechanisms, an individual uses the history of behaviors of other individuals, reflecting their cooperation levels, in order to prioritize the provision of resource to those shown to be the most reciprocative. Most of these strategies are restricted to the prioritization of participants (to whom should I donate?) according to metrics such as reputation or degree of reciprocity. This strategy is sufficient to promote cooperation and assure cooperative participants the best possible levels of satisfaction (percentage of requests met). However, in low resource contention scenarios, prioritization alone is not sufficient to avoid resource provision to non-cooperative individuals and thus to guarantee fairness (percentage of resources reciprocated). In this sense, this work proposes that mechanisms of reciprocity, especially those based on direct reciprocity, be extended with a feedback control loop that regulates the amount of resources that each cloud should offer to the federation. When each cooperative participant controls individually the amount of resources offered to the federation, there is an indirect control of resource contention, which in turn is kept at a level that ensures cooperative participants adequate levels of satisfaction and fairness. Finally, an investigation on the use of a more limited form of indirect reciprocity is presented, the transitive reciprocity, which can be used in conjunction with direct reciprocity mechanisms to avoid deadlocks generated by time/interest asymmetry, moving the federation’s economy and consequently assuring higher levels of fairness and satisfaction to cooperative nodes.Cape

    ADDRESSING SELFISHNESS IN THE DESIGN OF COOPERATIVE SYSTEMS

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    I sistemi distribuiti cooperativi, tra cui in particolare i sistemi peer-to-peer, sono oggi alla base di applicazioni Internet di larga diffusione come file-sharing e media streaming, nonch\ue9 di tecnologie emergenti quali Blockchain e l'Internet of Things. Uno dei fattori chiave per il successo di un sistema cooperativo \ue8 che i nodi che vi partecipano mettano a disposizione della comunit\ue0 una parte delle proprie risorse (es. capacit\ue0 di calcolo, banda, spazio disco). Alcuni nodi, poich\ue9 controllati da agenti autonomi e indipendenti, potrebbero tuttavia agire egoisticamente e scegliere di non condividere alcuna risorsa, spinti dall'obiettivo di massimizzare la propria utilit\ue0 anche se a danno delle prestazioni dell'intero sistema. Affrontare l'egoismo dei nodi rappresenta dunque un'attivit\ue0 imprescindibile per lo sviluppo di un sistema cooperativo affidabile e performante. Nonostante il grande numero di tecniche ed approcci presenti in letteratura, tale attivit\ue0 richiede elaborazioni complesse, manuali e laboriose, nonch\ue9 conoscenze approfondite in vari domini di applicazione. Obiettivo di questa tesi \ue8 di fornire strumenti sia pratici che teorici per semplificare lo studio e il contrasto dei comportamenti egoistici nei sistemi cooperativi. Il primo contributo, basato su un'analisi esaustiva dello stato dell'arte sull'egoismo in sistemi distribuiti, presenta un framework di classificazione finalizzato all'identificazione e comprensione dei comportamenti egoistici pi\uf9 importanti su cui concentrarsi durante la progettazione di un sistema cooperativo. Come secondo contributo, presentiamo RACOON, un framework per la progettazione e configurazione di sistemi cooperativi resilienti all'egoismo dei nodi. L'obiettivo di RACOON \ue8 di semplificare tali attivit\ue0 fornendo una metodologia generale e semi-automatica, capace di integrare in un dato sistema pratici meccanismi di incentivo alla cooperazione, attentamente calibrati in modo da raggiungere gli obiettivi di resilienza e performance desiderati. A tal fine, RACOON impiega sia strumenti analitici appartenenti alla teoria dei giochi che metodi simulativi, che vengono utilizzati per fare previsioni sul comportamento del sistema in presenza di nodi egoisti. In questa tesi presentiamo inoltre una versione estesa del framework, chiamata RACOON++, sviluppata per migliorare l'accuratezza, flessibilit\ue0 e usabilit\ue0 del framework originale. Infine, come ultimo contributo del lavoro di tesi, presentiamo SEINE, un framework per la rapida modellazione e analisi sperimentale di vari tipi di comportamenti egoistici in un dato sistema cooperativo. Il framework \ue8 basato su un nuovo linguaggio specifico di dominio (SEINE-L) sviluppato per la descrizione degli scenari di egoismo da analizzare. SEINE fornisce inoltre supporto semi-automatico per l'implementazione e lo studio di tali scenari in un simulatore di sistemi distribuiti selezionato dallo stato dell'arte.Cooperative distributed systems, particularly peer-to-peer systems, are the basis of several mainstream Internet applications (e.g., file-sharing, media streaming) and the key enablers of new and emerging technologies, including blockchain and the Internet of Things. Essential to the success of cooperative systems is that nodes are willing to cooperate with each other by sharing part of their resources, e.g., network bandwidth, CPU capability, storage space. However, as nodes are autonomous entities, they may be tempted to behave in a selfish manner by not contributing their fair share, potentially causing system performance degradation and instability. Addressing selfish nodes is, therefore, key to building efficient and reliable cooperative systems. Yet, it is a challenging task, as current techniques for analysing selfishness and designing effective countermeasures remain manual and time-consuming, requiring multi-domain expertise. In this thesis, we aim to provide practical and conceptual tools to help system designers in dealing with selfish nodes. First, based on a comprehensive survey of existing work on selfishness, we develop a classification framework to identify and understand the most important selfish behaviours to focus on when designing a cooperative system. Second, we propose RACOON, a unifying framework for the selfishness-aware design and configuration of cooperative systems. RACOON provides a semi-automatic methodology to integrate a given system with practical and finely tuned mechanisms to meet specified resilience and performance objectives, using game theory and simulations to predict the behaviour of the system when subjected to selfish nodes. An extension of the framework (RACOON++) is also proposed to improve the accuracy, flexibility, and usability of RACOON. Finally, we propose SEINE, a framework for fast modelling and evaluation of various types of selfish behaviour in a given cooperative system. SEINE relies on a domain-specific language for describing the selfishness scenario to evaluate and provides semi-automatic support for its implementation and study in a state-of-the-art simulator.Les syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s collaboratifs, en particulier les syst\ue8mes pair-\ue0-pair, forment l\u2019infrastructure sous-jacente de nombreuses applications Internet, certaines parmi les plus populaires (ex\ua0: partage de fichiers, streaming multim\ue9dia). Ils se situent \ue9galement \ue0 la base d\u2019un ensemble de technologies \ue9mergentes telles que la blockchain et l\u2019Internet des Objets. Le succ\ue8s de ces syst\ue8mes repose sur la contribution volontaire, de la part des n\u153uds participants, aux ressources partag\ue9es (ex : bande passante r\ue9seau, puissance de calcul, stockage de donn\ue9es). Or ces n\u153uds sont des entit\ue9s autonomes qui peuvent consid\ue9rer comme plus avantageux de se comporter de mani\ue8re \ue9go\uefste, c\u2019est-\ue0- dire de refuser de collaborer. De tels comportements peuvent fortement impacter les performances et la stabilit\ue9 op\ue9rationnelles du syst\ue8me cible. Prendre en compte et pr\ue9venir les comportements \ue9go\uefstes des n\u153uds est donc essentiel pour garantir l\u2019efficacit\ue9 et la fiabilit\ue9 des syst\ue8mes coop\ue9ratifs. Cependant, cela exige du d\ue9veloppeur, en d\ue9pit de la grande quantit\ue9 de techniques et d\u2019approches propos\ue9es dans la litt\ue9rature, des connaissances multisectorielles approfondies. L'objectif de cette th\ue8se est de concevoir et \ue9tudier de nouveaux outils th\ue9oriques et pratiques pour aider les concepteurs de syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s collaboratifs \ue0 faire face \ue0 des n\u153uds \ue9go\uefstes. La premi\ue8re contribution, bas\ue9e sur une analyse exhaustive de la litt\ue9rature sur les comportements \ue9go\uefstes dans les syst\ue8mes distribu\ue9s, propose un mod\ue8le de classification pour identifier et analyser les comportements \ue9go\uefstes les plus importants sur lesquels il est important de se concentrer lors de la conception d'un syst\ue8me coop\ue9ratif. Dans la deuxi\ue8me contribution, nous proposons RACOON, un framework pour la conception et la configuration de syst\ue8mes coop\ue9ratifs r\ue9silients aux comportements \ue9go\uefstes. Outre un ensemble de m\ue9canismes d'incitation \ue0 la coop\ue9ration, RACOON fournit une m\ue9thodologie semi-automatique d\u2019int\ue9gration et de calibration de ces m\ue9canismes de mani\ue8re \ue0 garantir le niveau de performance souhait\ue9. RACOON s\u2019appuie sur une analyse du syst\ue8me cible fond\ue9e sur la th\ue9orie des jeux et sur des simulations pour pr\ue9dire l\u2019existence de n\u153uds \ue9go\uefstes dans le syst\ue8me. RACOON a \ue9t\ue9 \ue9tendu en un deuxi\ue8me framework, RACOON++. Plus pr\ue9cis, plus flexible, RACOON++ offre \ue9galement une plus grande facilit\ue9 d'utilisation. Une derni\ue8re contribution, SEINE, propose un framework pour la mod\ue9lisation et l'analyse des diff\ue9rents types de comportements \ue9go\uefstes dans un syst\ue8me coop\ue9ratif. Bas\ue9 sur un langage d\ue9di\ue9, d\ue9velopp\ue9 pour d\ue9crire les sc\ue9narios de comportement \ue9go\uefstes, SEINE fournit un support semi-automatique pour la mise en \u153uvre et l'\ue9tude de ces sc\ue9narios dans un simulateur choisi sur la base de l\u2019\ue9tat de l\u2019art (PeerSim)

    Collusion in Peer-to-Peer Systems

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    P2P systems are used to provide distributed storage, file sharing, video streaming, distributed gaming, and other applications based on the collaboration of participating peers and on the observation that sharing resources used sporadically leads to huge savings. The operation of a P2P system, as well as its sheer survival, however, is open to many kinds of attacks, which are tough to fight due to both the decentralized nature of P2P applications, and the lack, in some of them, of a central authority, or of a well-defined structure, or both. Particularly, as P2P systems require the active collaboration of the participants beyond their selfish interest, many systems include methods designed to lure the most resourceful users into broader participation, to provide an overall better service. The methods devised to attract the contribution of users are unfortunately vulnerable to a particular class of attacks: collusion. Collusion is broadly defined as any malicious coordinated behavior of a group of users aimed at gaining undeserved benefits, or at damaging (some) well behaved users. In this paper, we survey the literature on P2P systems security with specific attention to collusion, to find out how they resist to such attacks and what solutions can be used, e.g., game theory, to further counter this problem and give P2P systems the possibility of developing into full fledged services of the future Internet
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