Evolutionary Game Theory

Articl

Knowledge Migration Strategies for Optimization of Multi-Population Cultural Algorithm

Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) are meta-heuristic algorithms used for optimization of complex problems. Cultural Algorithm (CA) is one of the EA which incorporates knowledge for optimization. CA with multiple population spaces each incorporating culture and genetic evolution to obtain better solutions are known as Multi-Population Cultural Algorithm (MPCA). MPCA allows to introduce a diversity of knowledge in a dynamic and heterogeneous environment. In an MPCA each population represents a solution space. An individual belonging to a given population could migrate from one population to another for the purpose of introducing new knowledge that influences other individuals in the population. In this thesis, we provide different migration strategies which are inspired from game theory model to improve the quality of solutions. Migration among the different population in MPCA can address the problem of knowledge sharing among population spaces. We have introduced five different migration strategies which are related to the field of economics. The principal idea behind incorporating these strategies is to improve the rate of convergence, increase diversity, better exploration of the search space, to avoid premature convergence and to escape from local optima. Strategies are particularly taken from the economics background as it allows the individual and the population to use their knowledge and make a decision whether to cooperate or to defect with other individuals and populations. We have tested the proposed algorithms against CEC 2015 expensive benchmark problems. These problems are a set of 15 functions which includes varied function categories. Results depict that it leads a to better solution when proposed algorithms used for problems with complex nature and higher dimensions. For 10 dimensional problems the proposed strategies have 7 out 15 better results and for 30 dimensional problems we have 12 out of 15 better results when compared to the existing algorithms

An Evolutionary Learning Approach for Adaptive Negotiation Agents

Developing effective and efficient negotiation mechanisms for real-world applications such as e-Business is challenging since negotiations in such a context are characterised by combinatorially complex negotiation spaces, tough deadlines, very limited information about the opponents, and volatile negotiator preferences. Accordingly, practical negotiation systems should be empowered by effective learning mechanisms to acquire dynamic domain knowledge from the possibly changing negotiation contexts. This paper illustrates our adaptive negotiation agents which are underpinned by robust evolutionary learning mechanisms to deal with complex and dynamic negotiation contexts. Our experimental results show that GA-based adaptive negotiation agents outperform a theoretically optimal negotiation mechanism which guarantees Pareto optimal. Our research work opens the door to the development of practical negotiation systems for real-world applications

Computability and Evolutionary Complexity: Markets As Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS)

The purpose of this Feature is to critically examine and to contribute to the burgeoning multi disciplinary literature on markets as complex adaptive systems (CAS). Three economists, Robert Axtell, Steven Durlauf and Arthur Robson who have distinguished themselves as pioneers in different aspects of how the thesis of evolutionary complexity pertains to market environments have contributed to this special issue. Axtell is concerned about the procedural aspects of attaining market equilibria in a decentralized setting and argues that principles on the complexity of feasible computation should rule in or out widely held models such as the Walrasian one. Robson puts forward the hypothesis called the Red Queen principle, well known from evolutionary biology, as a possible explanation for the evolution of complexity itself. Durlauf examines some of the claims that have been made in the name of complex systems theory to see whether these present testable hypothesis for economic models. My overview aims to use the wider literature on complex systems to provide a conceptual framework within which to discuss the issues raised for Economics in the above contributions and elsewhere. In particular, some assessment will be made on the extent to which modern complex systems theory and its application to markets as CAS constitutes a paradigm shift from more mainstream economic analysis

Resource Allocation in Decentralised Computational Systems: An Evolutionary Market-Based Approach

We present a novel market-based method, inspired by retail markets, for resource allocation in fully decentralised systems where agents are self-interested. Our market mechanism requires no coordinating node or complex negotiation. The stability of outcome allocations, those at equilibrium, is analysed and compared for three buyer behaviour models. In order to capture the interaction between self-interested agents, we propose the use of competitive coevolution. Our approach is both highly scalable and may be tuned to achieve specified outcome resource allocations. We demonstrate the behaviour of our approach in simulation, where \textit{evolutionary market agents} act on behalf of service providing nodes to adaptively price their resources over time, in response to market conditions. We show that this leads the system to the predicted outcome resource allocation. Furthermore, the system remains stable in the presence of small changes in price, when buyers' decision functions degrade gracefully

2008,06: Evolutionary modelling in economics : a survey of methods and building blocks

In this paper we present an overview of methods and components of formal economic models employing evolutionary approaches. This compromises two levels: (1) techniques of evolutionary modelling, including multi-agent modelling, evolutionary algorithms and evolutionary game theory; (2) building blocks or components of formal models classified into core processes and features of evolutionary systems - diversity, innovation and selection - and additional elements, such as bounded rationality, diffusion, path dependency and lock-in, co-evolutionary dynamics, multilevel and group selection, and evolutionary growth. We focus our attention on the characteristics of models and techniques and their underlying assumptions. -- bounded rationality ; evolutionary algorithms ; evolutionary game theory ; evolutionary growth ; innovation ; multilevel evolution ; neo-Schumpeterian models

Marginal contribution, reciprocity and equity in segregated groups: Bounded rationality and self-organization in social networks

We study the formation of social networks that are based on local interaction and simple rule following. Agents evaluate the profitability of link formation on the basis of the Myerson-Shapley principle that payoffs come from the marginal contribution they make to coalitions. The NP-hard problem associated with the Myerson-Shapley value is replaced by a boundedly rational 'spatially' myopic process. Agents consider payoffs from direct links with their neighbours (level 1) which can include indirect payoffs from neighbours' neighbours (level 2) and up to M-levels that are far from global. Agents dynamically break away from the neighbour to whom they make the least marginal contribution. Computational experiments show that when this self-interested process of link formation operates at level 2 neighbourhoods, agents self-organize into stable and efficient network structures that manifest reciprocity, equity and segregation reminiscent of hunter gather groups. A large literature alleges that this is incompatible with self-interested behaviour and market oriented marginality principle in the allocation of value. We conclude that it is not this valuation principle that needs to be altered to obtain segregated social networks as opposed to global components, but whether it operates at level 1 or level 2 of social neighbourhoods. Remarkably, all M>2 neighbourhood calculations for payoffs leave the efficient network structures identical to the case when M=2.