Analysis of the NIST database towards the composition of vulnerabilities in attack scenarios

The composition of vulnerabilities in attack scenarios has been traditionally performed based on detailed pre- and post-conditions. Although very precise, this approach is dependent on human analysis, is time consuming, and not at all scalable. We investigate the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD) with three goals: (i) understand the associations among vulnerability attributes related to impact, exploitability, privilege, type of vulnerability and clues derived from plaintext descriptions, (ii) validate our initial composition model which is based on required access and resulting effect, and (iii) investigate the maturity of XML database technology for performing statistical analyses like this directly on the XML data. In this report, we analyse 27,273 vulnerability entries (CVE 1) from the NVD. Using only nominal information, we are able to e.g. identify clusters in the class of vulnerabilities with no privilege which represent 52% of the entries

Methodologies to develop quantitative risk evaluation metrics

The goal of this work is to advance a new methodology to measure a severity cost for each host using the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) based on base, temporal and environmental metrics by combining related sub-scores to produce a unique severity cost by modeling the problem's parameters in to a mathematical framework. We build our own CVSS Calculator using our equations to simplify the calculations of the vulnerabilities scores and to benchmark with other models. We design and develop a new approach to represent the cost assigned to each host by dividing the scores of the vulnerabilities to two main levels of privileges, user and root, and we classify these levels into operational levels to identify and calculate the severity cost of multi steps vulnerabilities. Finally we implement our framework on a simple network, using Nessus scanner as tool to discover known vulnerabilities and to implement the results to build and represent our cost centric attack graph

A preliminary analysis of vulnerability scores for attacks in wild

NVD and Exploit-DB are the de facto standard databases used for research on vulnerabilities, and the CVSS score is the standard measure for risk. On open question is whether such databases and scores are actually representative of at- tacks found in the wild. To address this question we have constructed a database (EKITS) based on the vulnerabili- ties currently used in exploit kits from the black market and extracted another database of vulnerabilities from Symantec's Threat Database (SYM). Our nal conclusion is that the NVD and EDB databases are not a reliable source of in- formation for exploits in the wild, even after controlling for the CVSS and exploitability subscore. An high or medium CVSS score shows only a signi cant sensitivity (i.e. prediction of attacks in the wild) for vulnerabilities present in exploit kits (EKITS) in the black market. All datasets ex- hibit a low speci city

Exact Inference Techniques for the Analysis of Bayesian Attack Graphs

Attack graphs are a powerful tool for security risk assessment by analysing network vulnerabilities and the paths attackers can use to compromise network resources. The uncertainty about the attacker's behaviour makes Bayesian networks suitable to model attack graphs to perform static and dynamic analysis. Previous approaches have focused on the formalization of attack graphs into a Bayesian model rather than proposing mechanisms for their analysis. In this paper we propose to use efficient algorithms to make exact inference in Bayesian attack graphs, enabling the static and dynamic network risk assessments. To support the validity of our approach we have performed an extensive experimental evaluation on synthetic Bayesian attack graphs with different topologies, showing the computational advantages in terms of time and memory use of the proposed techniques when compared to existing approaches.Comment: 14 pages, 15 figure

Impact estimation using data flows over attack graphs

We propose a novel approach to estimating the impact of an attack using a data model and an impact model on top of an attack graph. The data model describes how data flows between nodes in the network -- how it is copied and processed by softwares and hosts -- while the impact model models how exploitation of vulnerabilities affects the data flows with respect to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the data. In addition, by assigning a loss value to a compromised data set, we can estimate the cost of a successful attack. We show that our algorithm not only subsumes the simple impact estimation used in the literature but also improves it by explicitly modeling loss value dependencies between network nodes. With our model, the operator will be able to use less time when comparing different security patches to a network