DRONE DELIVERY OF CBNRECy – DEW WEAPONS Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD)

Drone Delivery of CBNRECy – DEW Weapons: Emerging Threats of Mini-Weapons of Mass Destruction and Disruption (WMDD) is our sixth textbook in a series covering the world of UASs and UUVs. Our textbook takes on a whole new purview for UAS / CUAS/ UUV (drones) – how they can be used to deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction and Deception against CBRNE and civilian targets of opportunity. We are concerned with the future use of these inexpensive devices and their availability to maleficent actors. Our work suggests that UASs in air and underwater UUVs will be the future of military and civilian terrorist operations. UAS / UUVs can deliver a huge punch for a low investment and minimize human casualties.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1046/thumbnail.jp

Advantages and challenges of unmanned aerial vehicle autonomy in the Postheroic age

Over the past decade, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have revolutionized how the U.S. engages elusive militants in low-intensity conflicts by allowing the U.S. to project continuous military power without risking combat casualties. While UAV usage promises additional tactical advantages in future conflicts, little agreement exists regarding a strategic vision for UAV research and development, necessary for the U.S. to allocate limited resources among UAV development programs that address national security objectives. The present research makes the case for a future UAV technology evolutionary path leading to fully autonomous intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)/strike UAV systems for the United States Air Force that are capable of sensing their environments through multiple modalities, recognizing patterns, and executing appropriate actions in response to their real-time analyses. The thesis addresses enabling technology inroads stemming from major improvements in our understanding of human neural circuitry that promise to enable innovations in the artificial intelligence needed to achieve autonomous system function. Arguments are based on projected military and economic benefits of autonomous systems and extend the historical model established by the CIA\u27s successful UAV program to unconventional warfare (UW) conflicts that the U.S. Air Force finds itself ill-equipped to handle. Counter-arguments are addressed relating to uncontrolled lethal technology, conflict initiation thresholds, and the vulnerability of overreliance on high-technology systems. In making the case for fully automated UAV technology, research provides a strategic future vision for autonomous UAV usage by highlighting the important interaction of artificial intelligence, “smart” wide-area sensors, and cooperative micro UAVs

Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Material Dynamic Risk Management

Each year, over 2 billion tons of hazardous materials are shipped in the United States, with over half of that being moved on commercial vehicles. Given their relatively poor or nonexistent defenses and inconspicuousness, commercial vehicles transporting hazardous materials are an easy target for terrorists. Before carriers or security agencies recognize that something is amiss, their contents could be detonated or released. From 2006 to 2015, the U.S. Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) recorded 144,643 incidents involving a release of hazardous materials. Although there were no known instances of terrorism being the cause, accidental releases involving trucks carrying hazardous materials are not an uncommon occurrence. At this time, no systems have been developed and operationalized to monitor the movement of vehicles transporting hazardous materials. The purpose of this dissertation is to propose a comprehensive risk management system for monitoring Tier 1 Highway Security Sensitive Materials (HSSMs) which are shipped aboard commercial vehicles in the U.S. Chapter 2 examines the history and current state of hazardous materials transportation. Since the late 19th century, the federal government often introduced new regulations in response to hazardous materials incidents. However, over the past 15 years few binding policies or legislation have been enacted. This demonstrates that government agencies and the U.S. Congress are not inclined to introduce new laws and rules that could hamper business. In 2003, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) and other agencies led efforts to develop a prototype hazardous materials tracking system (PHTS) that mapped the location of hazardous materials shipments and quantified the level of risk associated with each one. The second half of this chapter uses an in-­‐depth gap analysis to identify deficiencies and demonstrate in what areas the prototype system does not comply with government specifications. Chapter 3 addresses the lack of customized risk equations for Tier 1 HSSMs and develops a new set of risk equations that can be used to dynamically evaluate the level of risk associated with individual hazardous materials shipments. This chapter also discusses the results of a survey that was administered to public and private industry stakeholders. Its purpose was to understand the current state of hazardous materials regulations, the likelihood of hazardous materials release scenarios, what precautionary measures can be used, and what influence social variables may have on the aggregate consequences of a hazardous materials release. The risk equation developed in this paper takes into account the survey responses as well as those risk structures already in place. The overriding goal is to preserve analytical tractability, implement a form that is usable by federal agencies, and provide stakeholders with accurate information about the risk profiles of different vehicles. Due to congressional inaction on hazardous 3 materials transportation issues, securing support from carriers and other industry stakeholders is the most viable solution to bolstering hazardous materials security. Chapter 4 presents the system architecture for The Dynamic Hazardous Materials Risk Assessment Framework (DHMRA), a GIS-­‐based environment in which hazardous materials shipments can be monitored in real time. A case study is used to demonstrate the proposed risk equation; it simulates a hazardous materials shipment traveling from Ashland, Kentucky to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The DHMRA maps risk data, affording security personnel and other stakeholders the opportunity to evaluate how and why risk profiles vary across time and space. DHRMA’s geo-­‐fencing capabilities also trigger automatic warnings. This framework, once fully implemented, can inform more targeted policies to enhance the security of hazardous materials. It will contribute to maintaining secure and efficient supply chains while protecting the communities that live nearest to the most heavily trafficked routes. Continuously monitoring hazardous materials provides a viable way to understand the risks presented by a shipment at a given moment and enables better, more coordinated responses in the event of a release. Implementation of DHRMA will be challenging because it requires material and procedural changes that could disrupt agency operations or business practices — at least temporarily. Nevertheless, DHRMA stands ready for implementation, and to make the shipment of hazardous materials a more secure, safe, and certain process. Although DHMRA was designed primarily with terrorism in mind, it is also useful for examining the impacts of accidental hazardous materials releases. Future iterations of DHMRA could expand on its capabilities by incorporating modeling data on the release and dispersion of toxic gases, liquids, and other substances

Designing and Operating Safe and Secure Transit Systems: Assessing Current Practices in the United States and Abroad, MTI Report 04-05

Public transit systems around the world have for decades served as a principal venue for terrorist acts. Today, transit security is widely viewed as an important public policy issue and is a high priority at most large transit systems and at smaller systems operating in large metropolitan areas. Research on transit security in the United States has mushroomed since 9/11; this study is part of that new wave of research. This study contributes to our understanding of transit security by (1) reviewing and synthesizing nearly all previously published research on transit terrorism; (2) conducting detailed case studies of transit systems in London, Madrid, New York, Paris, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C.; (3) interviewing federal officials here in the United States responsible for overseeing transit security and transit industry representatives both here and abroad to learn about efforts to coordinate and finance transit security planning; and (4) surveying 113 of the largest transit operators in the United States. Our major findings include: (1) the threat of transit terrorism is probably not universal—most major attacks in the developed world have been on the largest systems in the largest cities; (2) this asymmetry of risk does not square with fiscal politics that seek to spread security funding among many jurisdictions; (3) transit managers are struggling to balance the costs and (uncertain) benefits of increased security against the costs and (certain) benefits of attracting passengers; (4) coordination and cooperation between security and transit agencies is improving, but far from complete; (5) enlisting passengers in surveillance has benefits, but fearful passengers may stop using public transit; (6) the role of crime prevention through environmental design in security planning is waxing; and (7) given the uncertain effectiveness of antitransit terrorism efforts, the most tangible benefits of increased attention to and spending on transit security may be a reduction in transit-related person and property crimes

Recommendations for National Risk Assessment for Disaster Risk Management in EU

Decision No 1313/2013/EU on a Union Civil Protection Mechanism (UCPM) calls Participating States to develop risk assessments periodically and make the summary of their National Risk Assessment (NRA) available to the European Commission as a way to prevent disaster risk in Europe. In order to facilitate countries on this task, the European Commission developed the Guidelines on risk assessment and mapping. In spite of these, the summaries received have revealed several challenges related to the process and the content of the assessments. The current report aims to provide scientific support to the UCPM participant countries in their development of NRA, explaining why and how a risk assessment could be carried out, how the results of this could be used for Disaster Risk Management planning and in general, how science can help civil protection authorities and staff from ministries and agencies engaged in NRA activities. The report is the result of the collaborative effort of the Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre team and nine Joint Research Centre expert groups which provided their insight on tools and methods for specific risk assessment related to certain hazards and assets: drought, earthquakes, floods, terrorist attacks, biological disasters, critical infrastructures, chemical accidents, nuclear accidents and Natech accidents. The current document would be improved by a next version that would include scientific guidance on other risks and the collaboration of potential users.JRC.E.1-Disaster Risk Managemen

Understanding the Humanitarian Consequences and Risks of Nuclear Weapons : New findings from recent scholarship

Publisher PD

Strategic Latency Unleashed: The Role of Technology in a Revisionist Global Order and the Implications for Special Operations Forces

The article of record may be found at https://cgsr.llnl.govThis work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-59693This work was performed under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Energy by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in part under Contract W-7405-Eng-48 and in part under Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344. The views and opinions of the author expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States government or Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC. ISBN-978-1-952565-07-6 LCCN-2021901137 LLNL-BOOK-818513 TID-5969

Miscommunicating ideas: some key lessons for risk management.

This PhD submission consists of twelve articles and six reviews published over the period 1999 to 2007, together with a context statement that seeks to draw out the dominant themes, methodologies and results of my research. Essentially, I have examined the impact on the risk management of certain areas in science and security, of two significant trends that emerged and merged within contemporary society over the last 25 years. These are; processes of 'individuation' and of lde-politicisation'. Together, they have helped shape a new culture for policy-making and communication in most fields which, I suggest, has adverse consequences. 'Individuation' refers to the gradual breakdown of social bonds of solidarity and community which, while hardly new in capitalist society, accelerated in their reach and consequence over this period. Individuals isolated from strong social networks are ultimately weak. 'De-politicisation' refers to the loss of interest and participation in mainstream politics, which has also been widely noted and commented upon. This reached new heights (or lows) in the current period, and is distinct from the 'politicisation’ of both science and security. These themes are explored further elsewhere, but it is my contention that their convergence has led to the creation of a new culture of risk management and communication which I have sought to critique. My research, presented in the accompanying papers, has utilised a diverse set of methodological approaches, focusing primarily on the reinterpretation of existing data and analysis through a series of case-studies. Intelligence, in both the general sense and in the world of security, consists of a combination of information and interpretation. My purpose here has been to present an alternative framework for contemporary debates. My work has revealed the impact of these key processes and the new culture and identities - vulnerable victims and assertive advocates - that have been created by them. I have examined numerous manifestations and limitations of these. My articles confirm the rise of a culture more worried over possibilities than probabilities. The precautionary principle in science and pre-emptive action in relation to perceived security threats are examples of this. I conclude by noting that this has led to society being reorganised around risk. By miscommunicating risk - to connect with isolated individuals - politicians and officials will further exacerbate the trends identified above. By implication, I point to the possibility of an alternative - a debate about risks that maintains a sense of perspective and proportion, thereby rekindling the social bonds that generate confident individuals and purposeful politics