69 research outputs found
Automatic Verification of Correspondences for Security Protocols
We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security
protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize
authentication. Our technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded
number of sessions of the protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It
significantly extends a previous technique for the verification of secrecy. The
protocol is represented in an extension of the pi calculus with fairly
arbitrary cryptographic primitives. This protocol representation includes the
specification of the correspondence to be verified, but no other annotation.
This representation is then translated into an abstract representation by Horn
clauses, which is used to prove the desired correspondence. Our technique has
been proved correct and implemented. We have tested it on various protocols
from the literature. The experimental results show that these protocols can be
verified by our technique in less than 1 s.Comment: 95 page
Security Protocol Specification and Verification with AnBx
Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms.
To tame this complexity, we propose AnBx, a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission.
AnBx extends existing proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate forwarding agents. We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model
and a possible cryptographic implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide, thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET
Secure Distribution of Protected Content in Information-Centric Networking
The benefits of the ubiquitous caching in ICN are profound, such features
make ICN promising for content distribution, but it also introduces a challenge
to content protection against the unauthorized access. The protection of a
content against unauthorized access requires consumer authentication and
involves the conventional end-to-end encryption. However, in
information-centric networking (ICN), such end-to-end encryption makes the
content caching ineffective since encrypted contents stored in a cache are
useless for any consumers except those who know the encryption key. For
effective caching of encrypted contents in ICN, we propose a secure
distribution of protected content (SDPC) scheme, which ensures that only
authenticated consumers can access the content. SDPC is lightweight and allows
consumers to verify the originality of the published content by using a
symmetric key encryption. Moreover, SDPC naming scheme provides protection
against privacy leakage. The security of SDPC was proved with the BAN logic and
Scyther tool verification, and simulation results show that SDPC can reduce the
content download delay.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures, This article is an enhancement version of
journal article published in IEEE Systems Journal, DOI:
10.1109/JSYST.2019.2931813. arXiv admin note: text overlap with
arXiv:1808.0328
Formal Models and Techniques for Analyzing Security Protocols: A Tutorial
International audienceSecurity protocols are distributed programs that aim at securing communications by the means of cryptography. They are for instance used to secure electronic payments, home banking and more recently electronic elections. Given The financial and societal impact in case of failure, and the long history of design flaws in such protocol, formal verification is a necessity. A major difference from other safety critical systems is that the properties of security protocols must hold in the presence of an arbitrary adversary. The aim of this paper is to provide a tutorial to some modern approaches for formally modeling protocols, their goals and automatically verifying them
Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey
Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac
User-friendly Formal Methods for Security-aware Applications and Protocols
Formal support in the design and implementation of security-aware applications increases the assurance in the final artifact. Formal methods techniques work by
setting a model that unambiguously defines attacker capabilities, protocol parties behavior, and expected security properties.
Rigorous reasoning can be done on the model about the interaction of the external attacker with the protocol parties, assessing whether the security
properties hold or not.
Unfortunately, formal verification requires a high level of expertise to be used properly and, in complex systems, the model analysis requires an amount of resources (memory and time) that are not available with current technologies.
The aim of this thesis is to propose new interfaces and methodologies that facilitate the usage of formal verification techniques applied to security-aware protocols and distributed applications. In particular, this thesis presents: (i) Spi2JavaGUI, a framework for the model-driven development of security protocols, that combines (for the first time in literature) an intuitive user interface, automated formal verification and code generation; (ii) a new methodology that enables the model-driven development and the automated formal analysis of distributed applications, which requires less resources and formal verification knowledge to complete the verification process, when compared to previous approaches; (iii) the formal verification of handover procedures defined by the Long Term Evolution (LTE) standard for mobile communication networks, including the results and all the translation rules from specification documents to formal models, that facilitates the application of formal verification to other parts of the standard in the future
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