3 research outputs found

    Authentication Primitives for Protocol Specifications

    No full text
    We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for distributed systems, as a further instrument for programmers interested in authentication. These primitives offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and obtaining idealized protocols “secure by construction”. We can consequently prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol; when the proof fails, reasoning on the abstract specification may drive to the correct implementation

    Authentication Primitives for Protocol Specifications

    No full text
    We advocate here the use of two authentication primitives we recently propose in a calculus for distributed systems, as a further instrument for programmers interested in authentication. These primitives offer a way of abstracting from various specifications of authentication and obtaining idealized protocols “secure by construction”. We can consequently prove that a cryptographic protocol is the correct implementation of the corresponding abstract protocol; when the proof fails, reasoning on the abstract specification may drive to the correct implementation
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