A verification approach to applied system security

We present a method for the security analysis of realistic models over off-the-shelf systems and their configuration by formal, machine-checked proofs. The presentation follows a large case study based on a formal security analysis of a CVS-Server architecture. The analysis is based on an abstract architecture (enforcing a role-based access control), which is refined to an implementation architecture (based on the usual discretionary access control provided by the POSIX environment). Both architectures serve as a skeleton to formulate access control and confidentiality properties. Both the abstract and the implementation architecture are specified in the language Z. Based on a logical embedding of Z into Isabelle/HOL, we provide formal, machine-checked proofs for consistency properties of the specification, for the correctness of the refinement, and for security propertie

Probabilistic model checking of complex biological pathways

Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique that has been successfully applied to the analysis of systems from a broad range of domains, including security and communication protocols, distributed algorithms and power management. In this paper we illustrate its applicability to a complex biological system: the FGF (Fibroblast Growth Factor) signalling pathway. We give a detailed description of how this case study can be modelled in the probabilistic model checker PRISM, discussing some of the issues that arise in doing so, and show how we can thus examine a rich selection of quantitative properties of this model. We present experimental results for the case study under several different scenarios and provide a detailed analysis, illustrating how this approach can be used to yield a better understanding of the dynamics of the pathway

Tools for model-based security engineering: models vs. code

We present tools to support model-based security engineering on both the model and the code level. In the approach supported by these tools, one firstly specifies the security-critical part of the system (e.g. a crypto protocol) using the UML security extension UMLsec. The models are automatically verified for security properties using automated theorem provers. These are implemented within a framework that supports implementing verification routines, based on XMI output of the diagrams from UML CASE tools. Advanced users can use this open-source framework to implement verification routines for the constraints of self-defined security requirements. In a second step, one verifies that security-critical parts of the model are correctly implemented in the code (which might be a legacy implementation), and applies security hardening transformations where is that not the case. This is supported by tools that (1) establish traceability through refactoring scripts and (2) modularize security hardening ad-vices through aspect-oriented programming. The proposed method has been applied to an open-source implementation of a cryptographic protocol implementation (Jessie)in Java to build up traceability mappings and security aspects. In that application, we found a security weakness which could be fixed using our approach. The resulting refactoring scripts and security aspects have found reusability in the Java Secure Socket Extension (JSSE) library

Security in Open Model Software with Hardware Virtualisation – The Railway Control System Perspective

Using the openETCS initiative as a starting point, we describe how open software can be applied in combination with platform-specific, potentially closed source extensions, in the development, verification, validation and certification of safety-critical railway control systems. We analyse the safety and security threats presented by this approach and discuss conventional operating system partitioning mechanisms, as well as virtualisation methods with respect to their potential to overcome these problems. Furthermore, we advocate a shift from open source to open models, in order to increase the development efficiency of combined open and proprietary solutions

INCREMENTAL FAULT DIAGNOSABILITY AND SECURITY/PRIVACY VERIFICATION

Dynamical systems can be classified into two groups. One group is continuoustime systems that describe the physical system behavior, and therefore are typically modeled by differential equations. The other group is discrete event systems (DES)s that represent the sequential and logical behavior of a system. DESs are therefore modeled by discrete state/event models.DESs are widely used for formal verification and enforcement of desired behaviors in embedded systems. Such systems are naturally prone to faults, and the knowledge about each single fault is crucial from safety and economical point of view. Fault diagnosability verification, which is the ability to deduce about the occurrence of all failures, is one of the problems that is investigated in this thesis. Another verification problem that is addressed in this thesis is security/privacy. The two notions currentstate opacity and current-state anonymity that lie within this category, have attracted great attention in recent years, due to the progress of communication networks and mobile devices.Usually, DESs are modular and consist of interacting subsystems. The interaction is achieved by means of synchronous composition of these components. This synchronization results in large monolithic models of the total DES. Also, the complex computations, related to each specific verification problem, add even more computational complexity, resulting in the well-known state-space explosion problem.To circumvent the state-space explosion problem, one efficient approach is to exploit the modular structure of systems and apply incremental abstraction. In this thesis, a unified abstraction method that preserves temporal logic properties and possible silent loops is presented. The abstraction method is incrementally applied on the local subsystems, and it is proved that this abstraction preserves the main characteristics of the system that needs to be verified.The existence of shared unobservable events means that ordinary incremental abstraction does not work for security/privacy verification of modular DESs. To solve this problem, a combined incremental abstraction and observer generation is proposed and analyzed. Evaluations show the great impact of the proposed incremental abstraction on diagnosability and security/privacy verification, as well as verification of generic safety and liveness properties. Thus, this incremental strategy makes formal verification of large complex systems feasible

Providing a formal linkage between MDG and HOL based on a verified MDG system.

Formal verification techniques can be classified into two categories: deductive theorem proving and symbolic state enumeration. Each method has complementary advantages and disadvantages. In general, theorem provers are high reliability systems. They can be applied to the expressive formalisms that are capable of modelling complex designs such as processors. However, theorem provers use a glass-box approach. To complete a verification, it is necessary to understand the internal structure in detail. The learning curve is very steep and modeling and verifying a system is very time-consuming. In contrast, symbolic state enumeration tools use a black-box approach. When verifying a design, the user does not need to understand its internal structure. Their advantages are their speed and ease of use. But they can only be used to prove relatively simple designs and the system security is much lower than the theorem proving system. Many hybrid tools have been developed to reap the benefits of both theorem proving Systems and symbolic state enumeration Systems. Normally, the verification results from one system are translated to another system. In other words, there is a linkage between the two Systems. However, how can we ensure that this linkage can be trusted? How can we ensure the verification system itself is correct? The contribution of this thesis is that we have produced a methodology which can provide a formal linkage between a symbolic state enumeration system and a theorem proving system based on a verified symbolic state enumeration system. The methodology has been partly realized in two simplified versions of the MDG system (a symbolic state enumeration system) and the HOL system (a theorem proving system) which involves the following three steps. First, we have verified aspects of correctness of two simplified versions of the MDG system. We have made certain that the semantics of a program is preserved in those of its translated form. Secondly, we have provided a formal linkage between the MDG system and the HOL system based on importing theorems. The MDG verification results can be formally imported into HOL to form the HOL theorems. Thirdly, we have combined the translator correctness theorems with the importing theorems. This combination allows the low level MDG verification results to be imported into HOL in terms of the semantics of a high level language (MDG-HDL). We have also summarized a general method which is used to prove the existential theorem for the specification and implementation of the design. The feasibility of this approach has been demonstrated in a case study: the verification of the correctness and usability theorems of a vending machine

Probabilistic model checking of complex biological pathways

Probabilistic model checking is a formal verification technique that has been successfully applied to the analysis of systems from a broad range of domains, including security and communication protocols, distributed algorithms and power management. In this paper we illustrate its applicability to a complex biological system: the FGF (Fibroblast Growth Factor) signalling pathway. We give a detailed description of how this case study can be modelled in the probabilistic model checker PRISM, discussing some of the issues that arise in doing so, and show how we can thus examine a rich selection of quantitative properties of this model. We present experimental results for the case study under several different scenarios and provide a detailed analysis, illustrating how this approach can be used to yield a better understanding of the dynamics of the pathway