New concepts in global wargaming

This report addresses resurgence in wargaming and new techniques used to address complex political-military issues. Relationships between gaming and analysis are examined and benefits, opportunities, and drawbacks of gaming addressed. Requirements for Control Team in modern computer-assisted State and Path games and seminar games are discussed. Authors conclude with the value of modern simulation techniqueshttp://archive.org/details/newconceptsinglo00tritN

Constrained Cognition: Information Management and the Practical Limits of Nuclear Escalation Control

Nuclear escalation control theory rests on the idea that decision makers, in a limited nuclear war scenario, will choose their actions based on a rational assessment of the available information. That information essentially consists of intelligence reports about one\u27s adversary and information reporting the status of one\u27s own forces\u27 ability to execute offensive actions and the damage level of vital national targets. Yet the practical limits of managing the flow and quality of this information, coupled with the fog and friction inherent in human analyses, significantly affect the decision-making process vis-à-vis nuclear escalation. Hence, these limitations cast a pall over any military doctrine that relies heavily on the assumption that nuclear escalation can be controlled with precision. Examining information management during the Cuban Missile Crisis shows the practical limits of managing this information flow, which in turn limits the ability of national leaders to make such decisions properly

Cyberspace and International Relations: Rising Powers, Proxies, and Norms

Cyberspace hat sich zu einem wichtigen Teil in Analysen von Machtverschiebungen im internationalen System zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts entwickelt. Mehr als die Hälfte der Menschheit hat heute Zugang zum Internet, dessen strategische Bedeutung mit einer zunehmenden Anzahl von Nutzern und Maschinen weiter wachsen wird. Diese kumulative Dissertation beschäftigt sich daher mit der übergreifenden Forschungsfrage „Wie beeinflusst Cyberspace Machtverschiebungen im internationalen System?“ In drei Artikel und einer Monographie wird untersucht (a) warum die BRICS-Staaten sich in ihrem Verhalten im Bereich der Informations- und Telekommunikationstechnologie mit Blick auf die USA unterscheiden, (b) warum und wie Staaten über Proxybeziehungen auf nichtstaatliche Akteure zur Machtprojektion im Cyberrraum zurückgreifen und (c) wie Normen für den Cyberraum konstruiert werden und welche Rolle die Vereinten Nationen in diesem Prozess bisher spielen. Es ist klar, dass das Internet zu verschiedenen systemrelevanten Veränderungen beigetragen hat. Ein Hauptfaktor ist die diffusion of reach – „die Möglichkeit für Akteure Effekte aus Distanz nicht nur über regionale sondern globale Entfernungen“ über das Internet zu erzeugen. Darüber hinaus lässt sich das Verhalten von Staaten auf internationaler Ebene mit Blick auf das Internet, inklusive dessen offensive Nutzung, wesentlich dadurch erklären, wie diese Regierungen den Einfluss des Internets auf ihre innerstaatlichen Verhältnisse einschätzen. Dieser Umstand erklärt auch die Anfechtung von Normen in diesem Bereich als Teil der Konfrontation zwischen offenen und geschlossen Systemen.Analyzing shifts of power in global affairs is no longer complete without considering cyberspace. Today more than half of the world’s population has access to the Internet. As the number of people and machines connected to the Internet continues to increase, so will its strategic value and impact on international affairs. This cumulative dissertation is therefore guided by the overarching research question, “How does cyberspace affect these power shifts in global affairs?” and three main lines of inquiry pursued across this body of work. The first focuses on the transition of power among states within the context of the rising powers of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa – the BRICS – and how they engage in the contestation of cyberspace vis-à-vis the U.S. The second focuses on the diffusion of power and projection of cyber power by non-state hackers, specifically focusing on proxy relationships between such actors and states. The third analyzes the emerging normative framework governing coercive cyber power consisting of existing international law and nascent norms. The Internet has contributed to several fundamental systemic shifts in significant ways. A key finding across the three lines of inquiry is that the Internet’s single most important impact with respect to the international system is its diffusion of reach – “the ability to cause effects remotely not only over regional but also global distances.” In addition, it is clear that how governments view cyberspace with respect to their domestic political system shapes how they behave in cyberspace internationally—including the use of coercive cyber power directly and indirectly via proxies. This also helps explain the intense contestation with respect to norms for cyberspace as part of the competition between open and closed systems

Crises and perceptions in enduring rivalries

The thesis assesses the impact of tense international crises on leadership perceptions, across enduring rival and non-rival dyads. Associated in the relevant literature with escalation and conflict, interstate militarized crises are systematically explored in order to ascertain their impact on perceptions. Cognitive theories of decision making suggest that rationality is compromised in crises, as emotional stress, time constraints and pervasive uncertainty intensify cognitive rigidities among policy makers. A strong possibility, therefore, exists that leaders will be oblivious to crucial information, which will either be neglected or erroneously interpreted. In that sense, crises are viewed with apprehension by analysts, fearing misperception and miscalculation that may lead to unintended war. Through a detailed assessment of severe crisis case studies (The Greco-Turkish Aegean Sea crisis of 1996, the Russo-Georgian War of 2008 and the Cypriot S-300 missile crisis of 1998), this thesis suggests that crises may, contrary to expectations, shed light on long-running trends which were ignored or misinterpreted by decision makers, thereby “forcing” an accurate re-assessment of enemy and third party intentions and capabilities. Therefore, by posing a clarifying (shock) effect on leadership perceptions, cognitive mechanisms in crises could actually act supportively in drawing accurate inferences, bolstering objectivity

The Marine Corps War College Strategy Primer

The Marine Corps War College Strategy Primer not only provides students an overview of the elements of strategic logic but also introduces a cognitive model for developing and assessing strategy by leveraging innovative design methodologies and other critical and creative thinking approaches. In short, this primer aides in forging strategically minded warfighters who understand how the military instrument fits within a whole-of-government strategy. Only then can MCWAR’s historical case studies effectively teach the art and science of the ‘strategy bridge,’ nesting military options in support of policy ends in shared pursuit of a better peace

Influence without Boots on the Ground

Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events. Many scholars have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors. The theoretical literature covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action; to emphasis on international trade and economics; and to domestic politics. Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such as democracy and human rights. Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons. From this vast field, the author has selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946-2006. Within these U.S. activities, the author distinguishes between crisis response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1038/thumbnail.jp

The will-to-incapacitate: An experiment in actuarial justice in the period between 1970 and 1987 in the United States.

This thesis interrogates incapacitation as it developed in the 1970s and 1980s in the United States to conduct a genealogy of the conditions of emergence of actuarial justice (Foucault, 1981; Feeley and Simon, 1992; 1994) as it is enacted within this particular knowledge-power formation. Incapacitation is a penal rationale that concentrates on anticipating future crimes, and preventing offenders from committing crimes, effectively prioritizing public safety above all other considerations. My mapping of incapacitation demonstrates that it is recursively performed along two mutually conditioning poles that are illustrative of Foucault’s account of biopolitics and security (1978, 2003, 2007). These poles are: technocratic penal managerialism, which regulates the actions of diverse agents and authorities as they participate in a program of reducing recidivism within a mobile population of offenders; and, danger management of this distributed population of offenders, driven by a desire to anticipate and selectively incapacitate the most dangerous offenders. This analysis supports the mapping of actuarial justice provided by Feeley and Simon; however, my typology uses Galloway’s (2004) concept of protocol, to extend and refine their diagram about actuarial power. Given the high levels of scientific uncertainty about the efficacy of selective incapacitation as a penal policy, and the poor predictive powers of actuarial instruments in accurately classifying high-rate offenders in the early 1980s, my analysis demonstrates how protocollary power established the rules for modulating the participation of autonomous and diverse agents that are enlisted within the distributed networks of actuarial justice to propel its movement forward, this being the birth of evidence-based penal policy and practice. This protocol projects an ontological view of recidivism derived from criminal career research that filters and experiments with probabilistic actuarial codes or profiles of risk. These biopolitical codes regulate future research into advancing knowledge, predicting and controlling levels of dangerousness, and auditing of governmental performance in reducing recidivism, all of which are contingent upon the anticipatory longitudinal tracking of an aleatory population of offenders within the penal environment. Protocol is a biopolitical form of management that is central in the logistical control of this penal network and its nodes of operation and decision-making, constantly mining data for new possibilities. At the same time, I demonstrate that this will-to knowledge uses its technocratic expertise to distort, exaggerate, or conceal difference in its struggle for authority given high levels of uncertainty about recidivism and how to control it

Bernard Brodie and the bomb: at the birth of the bipolar world

Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. This thesis explores Brodie’s evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that transformed warfare from World War II to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical development within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie came to be known as “America’s Clausewitz.” While his first influential works focused on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America’s strategy of deterrence, later taking into account America’s loss of nuclear monopoly, the advent of thermonuclear weapons, and proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Brodie’s strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age led to his life-long effort to reconcile Clausewitz’s theories of war, which were a direct response to the strategic innovations of the Napoleonic era, to the new challenges of the nuclear age. While today’s world is much changed from the bipolar international order of the Cold War period, contemporary efforts to apply Clausewitzian concepts to today’s conflicts suggests that much can be learned from a similar endeavor by the previous generation as its strategic thinkers struggled to imagine new ways to maintain order in their era of unprecedented nuclear danger.acceptedVersio