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Influence without Boots on the Ground

Larissa Forster

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Influence without Boots on the Ground

Seaborne Crisis Response

Larissa Förster



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Larissa Forster



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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

A	AMP	amphibious
	AOR	area of responsibility
	APS	Africa Partnership Station
	ARG	amphibious ready group
	ASBM	antiship ballistic missile
	ATF	amphibious task force
C	CNA	Center for Naval Analyses
	CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
	CONUS	continental United States
	COW	Correlates of War
	CS21	“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”
	CT	counterterrorism
	CV	aircraft carrier
	CVBG	carrier battle group
CVN	aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered	
D	DoD	Department of Defense
	DR	disaster relief
E	ESG	expeditionary strike group
F	FY	fiscal year
G	GFS	Global Fleet Station
	GMP	Global Maritime Partnership

	GPS	Global Positioning System
	GWOT	global war on terror
H	HA	humanitarian assistance
I	ICB	International Crisis Behavior Project
	IMI	International Military Interventions
	IW	irregular warfare
L	LCS	littoral combat ship
M	MARG	Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group
	MDA	maritime domain awareness
	MEU(SOC)	Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)
	MID	Militarized Interstate Disputes
	MIO	maritime intercept operations
	MIPS	Military Interventions by Powerful States
	MOOTW	military operations other than war
N	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
	NCW	network-centric warfare
	NECC	Naval Expeditionary Combat Command
	NEO	noncombatant evacuation operation
	NOP	Naval Operations Concept
	NSS	National Security Strategy
O	OLS	ordinary-least-square
P	PLA	People's Liberation Army
	PLAN	People's Liberation Army Navy
	PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
	PRC	People's Republic of China

Q	QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
S	SEAL	Sea-Air-Land [USN special operations forces]
	SPS	Southern Partnership Station
	SSBN	ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarine
	SSN	nuclear-powered attack submarine
U	UN	United Nations
	UNSC	United Nations Security Council
	USAF	U.S. Air Force
	USARMY	U.S. Army
	USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
	USN	U.S. Navy
	USS	United States Ship
	USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Acknowledgments

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Coming to the United States left me in uncharted (for me) academic waters; luckily, I was able to work with Professor Michael Butler, who patiently helped me navigate some of the unknown American academic customs. His guidance and his connection to the Naval War College were crucial for the success of this dissertation. I will always be grateful for his help and advice and for his effort in introducing me to this new world. Clark University gave me the environment I was missing as a graduate student, far from my home department. The psychology graduate students integrated me into their circle as if I were one of them. My heartfelt gratitude goes out to all their support, in both my private and academic lives.

In the early stages of my dissertation my knowledge was limited to military interventions in general; I was not very familiar with the many details of the service branches. Dr. Peter Swartz's help and advice there were invaluable; he provided me with much-needed literature and helped me understand naval forces. Moreover, he tried to get me access to as much information as possible, and was quick to answer any questions. Dr. Henry Gaffney greatly helped the structuring of this work by providing advice to narrow down my originally unrealistic aspirations. Dr. Eugene Cobble's previous empirical research on naval crisis response provided me with the groundwork I needed.

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Foreword

On occasion in Newport and at other venues where scholars of naval and maritime affairs congregate, old-timers lament the relative shortage of scholars, especially younger ones, interested in the U.S. Navy. Aside from a handful of naval officers who manage to earn their doctorates while on active duty or who return to the university upon retirement to finish their terminal degrees, there are relatively few scholars of the younger generations deeply interested in the U.S. Navy. Many of us read the bloggers and op-ed writers who write passionately about the latest development regarding the littoral combat ship or the impact of so-called strategic-pivot naval deployments. A few of us know faculty at the Naval War College or one of the other professional military education institutions who, after cutting their intellectual teeth on other topics, ranging from nuclear deterrence to Asian regional security, turn their attention to the U.S. Navy or the Marines for professional reasons. And, of course, they have written some very fine analyses. But scholars who begin their careers researching Navy issues are few and far between. (No, I have not named names in this paragraph, but I could. The risk would be to leave out worthy scholars or to mischaracterize someone and thus draw attention away from the larger point.)

Further, those who are interested in the Navy—whether serving or retired officers or scholars dabbling in naval affairs later in their careers—are often historians studying past battles, the evolution of technology, or long-lost doctrinal debates. Few use quantitative methods, concern themselves with testing hypotheses, or address long-standing arguments within the disciplines of political science, international relations, or even strategic studies.

Many maritime hands might argue, so what? Why is it important for scholars from other disciplines to study the Navy? Why not leave the business of studying what the Navy does and has done to specialists and members of the community? The answers to these questions would require more argumentation than is appropriate here, but two points are suggestive. First, skeptics aside, methodologically sound studies can offer insights that would be difficult to replicate from traditional historical or case-based research. Second, I would also argue that the Navy's intellectual capital occasionally needs replenishment from outside the proverbial lifelines. After all, some of the most influential postwar studies of the U.S. Navy, its role in the world, and its contribution to U.S. national security have come from scholars not closely associated with the service;

Bernard Brodie and the Sprouts, Harold and Margaret, are some of the earliest and most famous examples.

It is thus a welcome development to find a young civilian scholar with few ties to the Navy who seeks to study that service using the techniques of modern social science. It is even more welcome for the young scholar to be a woman, a non-American, and a native of a small, landlocked country. But that is exactly what we have here, with the author of this Newport Paper—Dr. Larissa Forster.

Dr. Forster came to our attention through a roundabout but classic fashion: hers was a story of scholars talking to scholars about who is studying what, why, and where. Eventually, she found her way, as a predissertation doctoral student at the University of Zurich, to the Strategic Research Department of the Naval War College's Center for Naval Warfare Studies, where she was a visiting research fellow. With the encouragement of many, ranging from Provost Mary Ann Peters to Dean Robert C. "Barney" Rubel, she conceived of a dissertation that became, with many revisions and rewrites, the monograph that follows.

I would encourage readers to consider Dr. Forster's arguments carefully both because of her substantive conclusions and, perhaps even more importantly, because of her efforts to build on the work of analysts like Adam Siegel, who in his days at the Center for Naval Analyses worked long and hard to build a usable database of naval activities. Like Adam and a handful of others, Dr. Forster has labored to increase our analytic capacity by collecting data that will be available to analysts and scholars in the future.

In terms of substance, this study explores the political use of naval forces during foreign policy crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster uses a statistical model to analyze naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and strategists. She outlines the unique characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of naval forces; summarizes theoretical literature on naval diplomacy and coercion; reviews earlier quantitative research; and explains the variables used in her analysis. In the end, the monograph presents an empirical analysis in terms of crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. involvement, and outcomes.

PETER DOMBROWSKI
Chairman, Strategic Research Department
Naval War College

Introduction: Military Interventions and the Deployment of Naval Forces

As long as the United States chooses to continue as the leader of the free world, sea power is the absolutely vital basis for United States policy, in peace or war, anywhere in the world.

J. C. WYLIE

Mit der Navy sichern die USA im Frieden und im Krieg ihren Einfluss und ihre Macht. (*The U.S. Navy secures U.S. influence and power in both wartime and peacetime.*)

ALBERT A. STAHEL

The use of military force is not restricted to fighting; it can also be employed to shape and influence events.¹ During the October Arab-Israeli War of 1973, neither superpower was directly engaged in the fighting, but both heavily supported their “client” states. The deployment of naval forces sent a strong signal, not only to the direct crisis participants but also to the other superpower. The Soviet navy initiated movements of assets into proximity of the crisis a couple of days before hostilities erupted. In direct reaction to the outbreak of the conflict on 5 October, the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet and also moved vessels closer to the crisis location.

At the onset of the war, the U.S. Navy (USN) had two aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean and was thus ready to react on the same day. The aircraft carrier USS *Independence* (CV 62) and three destroyers were ordered almost immediately to proceed to Crete and to stand by there. The other carrier, USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* (CV 42), began to move east a couple of days later, and a third aircraft carrier was sent to the Mediterranean as a backup. Over the next few weeks, the United States stretched a chain of ships, elements of the Sixth Fleet, across the Mediterranean to support U.S. transport aircraft and replacement fighter-bombers on their way to Israel. The ships were placed to provide navigational, refueling, and rescue services and if necessary to prevent interdiction attempts from North Africa.

Increased readiness was relaxed on 17 November. The third, backup, aircraft carrier departed the Mediterranean, and the Sixth Fleet resumed its normal operations. While the U.S. naval vessels had played no direct role in the fighting, they had contributed greatly to the U.S. diplomatic efforts. During the conflict the naval forces never entered the

combat zone and faced no direct challenge, but by containing the conflict they helped achieve diplomatic success. The presence of a strong force, strategically distributed, sent clear signals to both the Soviet Union and the crisis participants and underscored U.S. resolve.² This example shows how naval forces can be used as a political tool to add weight to the diplomatic efforts without resorting to full-scale force.

Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events.³ Many scholars have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is intervention successful? The explanations are manifold and include political, military, economic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors.⁴ The theoretical literature covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national interests, as guides to state action;⁵ to emphasis on international trade and economics;⁶ and to domestic politics.⁷ Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such as democracy and human rights.⁸ Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons.⁹ As Ken Booth observes, a combination of motivations is the most common.¹⁰ An approach mostly neglected in the political science research is to ask why states choose different intervention strategies.¹¹ Assuming capacity and will to intervene, policy makers must also determine how to pursue their goals.¹²

From this vast field I have selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activity in the years 1946–2006. Within these U.S. activities, I distinguish between crisis response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge of the use of *U.S. naval forces* as a response to *international crises* and to contribute to a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed. There are various studies analyzing why the United States becomes involved in international conflicts, crises, or wars.¹³ One factor nearly absent in the research of this broad topic is in-depth analysis of what form and type of force is employed and why. Military interventions are responses to a variety of situations, exercised by many states, and carried out by different types of military services. As James Meernik and Chelsea Brown observe, “While there has been a tremendous amount of research regarding the domestic and international factors that influence the decision to use force, far less work has been done to analyze the types of operations authorized and their relationship to duration, policy success, security, and stability in the affected areas, as well as a host of other concerns. Further research is needed in several areas.”¹⁴

Full-scale wars have become rare, and the majority of confrontations occur at lower intensity levels. Crisis response is an activity short of full-scale war. Some identify it as a peacetime activity, and others locate it between peace and war. Most international crises

have occurred without an escalation to war, and many have been resolved without even resorting to the use of force. Crisis response covers a range of activities, from strictly political uses of force, such as the backing up of diplomacy with the threat of force, to open military engagement. While war preparedness is their ultimate *raison d'être*, armed forces are involved in many other international situations short of actual war, a fact that allows a broad analysis of naval activities. As a superpower, the United States is in an exceptional position to influence global events. The questions of when, where, and why the country should employ military force are among the national issues most frequently and passionately debated.¹⁵

Naval forces possess certain advantages over other military services. “Navies are not something you think about,” says Robert Kaplan.¹⁶ “They are out there over the horizon. But if you look throughout history, navies are often a good indicator of where power is going. Navies are able to do things that armies can’t.” The U.S. Navy supports foreign policy objectives through a variety of missions, ranging from “showing the flag” to retaliatory attacks against hostile nations. An important asset in crises is the Navy’s ability to act as a persuasive deterrent to war by demonstrating an ability to destroy.¹⁷ The vast presence of the U.S. Navy around the world at all times allows for fast reaction. Sea power can influence nearly every country; very few places have no access to the sea or are beyond the reach of the power-projection capabilities of aircraft carriers. The ability to be present almost anywhere around the world and exert influence without “boots on the ground” is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces in deployments short of war and highlights their unique capabilities for political missions during peacetime and crises.¹⁸ Before World War II, the engagement of the United States in world affairs was sporadic. But by the end of the war, it had established its preeminence in world politics, finance, and security. Today, the nation’s armed forces, especially the U.S. Navy, face no equal competitor.

To date, naval forces as crisis-response tools have not been analyzed sufficiently. Although there are studies researching the involvement of naval power in a particular crisis or war, there is a dearth of empirical analysis and theory on their systemic role. The nation’s continuing reliance on the use of military force to influence events throughout the world justifies an in-depth inquiry into these events.¹⁹

The impetus of this project is to gain a fuller grasp of the U.S. Navy not simply as a military fighting force but as a political instrument. In the twentieth century, the Navy climbed up into the top ranks of the world’s fleets and became a powerful actor on the global stage. Harold and Margaret Sprout identify the end of World War I as the beginning of the U.S. Navy’s worldwide power status and of its evolution from an important instrument of national policy into an important element of the *foreign* policy of the United States.²⁰ U.S. naval forces played a prominent role during World War II, from

battles like those of Midway and Leyte Gulf to Japan's official surrender on the deck of USS *Missouri* (BB 63). The end of World War II and the changed international structure and politics that emerged favored the use of naval forces as political instruments over other types of forces. Not only did the political situation and the general U.S. use of force change significantly after World War II, but the U.S. Navy itself was transformed dramatically. It was by then the world's largest and able to exert significant influence, with the help of its powerful aircraft carriers.

Since World War II the Navy has functioned simultaneously as what Charles Pirtle calls the "Sword of the State" and the "Shield of the Republic."²¹ The Navy's crisis-response capabilities (assisted by those of the Marine Corps) guaranteed its important position as a tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. In the following Cold War, the Navy served as a nuclear deterrent and crisis-response force, while preparing for a possible global war with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the USN was always ready for this eventuality. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy's power has been unchallenged. Peacetime presence and focus on regional conflicts have been emphasized.²² The USN has regularly responded to international incidents, but it has done so even more frequently since the demise of the Soviet Union.²³

The specific goals of this study are twofold. First, a new data set will be generated. Most popular crisis data sets do not distinguish between the involvements of different military service types within an intervention. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) published studies with basic data about the reactions of naval forces to international situations but not in a larger context.²⁴ This exploratory study combines both extensive crisis data with naval involvement information by introducing new variables to an established data set. Thus, the first step is the generation of data that will allow examining naval crisis response more broadly than is possible with case studies. On the basis of the available data and information, different empirical methods will be employed to analyze hypotheses derived from assumed advantages and disadvantages of naval forces. Second, the basic empirical results will help to begin answering the many questions pertaining to the overarching question that follows.

What Is the Role of U.S. Naval Forces in Crisis Response?

In order to structure the analysis, the study focuses on four different areas critical for understanding crisis response. The first set of questions focuses on the dimensions, context, and attributes of the crisis, followed by actor characteristics. The next category poses questions in regard to the U.S. involvement, both as third party and direct actor; the last part is concerned with the crisis termination. These four categories encompass most significant events.

1. Crisis Characteristics

- 1.1. In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?
- 1.2. To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

2. Crisis Actors

- 2.1. How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?
- 2.2. What crisis-actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?
- 2.3. How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

3. U.S. Involvement

- 3.1. In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?
- 3.2. How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services?
- 3.3. How effective is the U.S. naval involvement?

4. Crisis Outcomes

- 4.1. How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Defining the Concepts

Military forces can be deployed as reactions to a variety of incidents, such as full-scale wars, small wars, civil wars, domestic crises, international crises or conflicts, ethnic conflicts, intrastate conflicts, or disasters, to name a few.

Crises, Conflicts, and Wars

Richard Lebow presents the following justification for focusing on international crises in studying the use of force short of war: “Short of war, crises are the most salient and visible points of conflict between states.”²⁵ Crisis and conflict, although often conflated, are different phenomena. In most cases, a crisis concerns a single event—for example, a threat to a political regime—whereas “conflict” emphasizes the time factor. Conflicts can stretch over a long period of time and may erupt on multiple occasions with different degrees of intensity. International crises often occur within conflicts or even within wars—“intrawar crises.” Crises can also lead to long-lasting conflicts or to the outbreak of wars. Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld classify war as a subset of crisis.²⁶ Furthermore, all wars are preceded by crises, but not all crises conclude in a war.²⁷

There are many definitions of international crisis. According to Lebow, most classifications have in common certain elements, such as “perception of threat, heightened anxieties on the part of the decision-makers, the expectation of possible violence, the belief that important far-reaching decisions are required and must be made on the basis

of incomplete information in a stressful environment.”²⁸ International crises often represent turning points in international politics and change the perceptions of the crisis participants, not only between those involved but also their perceptions of other states. “We regard crisis as an occasion for decision. That is, crisis is a situation or an event that confronts decision makers with an opportunity for response, either action or inaction.”²⁹

This analysis considers, in accordance with the International Crisis Behavior Project, that an international crisis is present when the following conditions are met:³⁰

1. A change in type/or increase of disruptive—that is hostile verbal or physical—interactions between two or more states, with a heightened possibility of military hostilities, that, in turn:
2. destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system—global, dominant, or subsystem.

An international crisis erupts with a “break-point,” posing a threat to the values of states, coupled with time restraint and “a heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities.”

International crises are heavily influenced by external parties. Much depends on when, how, and why these parties become involved. The involvement of a major power can profoundly impact and shape the outcome.

Political Use of Force and (Military) Intervention

Many authors, such as Barry Blechman, point to the great value of military power as a political use of force short of actual deployment in war.³¹ Generally, the political use of force means the use of armed forces short of war. In their extensive study on the use of armed forces Blechman and Kaplan define the political use of force as follows: “A political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”³²

The ultimate goal should be a show of military strength that allows a nation to accomplish goals without having to resort to violence. As Clausewitz remarked, “So, too, the armed forces—by their very existence as well as by their general character, deployment, and day-to-day activities—can be used as an instrument of policy in time of peace. In peace, as in war, a prudent statesman will turn to the military not as a replacement or substitute for other tools of policy but as an integral part of an admixture . . . of means.”³³

Any decision to intervene in an international crisis is risky and challenging. It is often difficult to categorize the involvement clearly. Generally war *imposes* the will of one state on another, whereas the political use of force involves a lesser degree of violence (if any) and is employed to *influence* the behavior of foreign actors. Despite this distinction,

it is not always clear where to draw the line. Meernik describes the intervention in Panama in 1989 as an example.³⁴ That invasion can be viewed as an effort either to impose U.S. will on Panama or merely to influence events. The existence of permanent military bases abroad and routine operations, he believes, do not fall under the category of political uses of force. While I agree with Meernik on this point, I disagree with his statement that covert or paramilitary operations cannot be part of the political use of force. This deployment of armed forces too aims at altering and influencing the behavior and actions of adversaries and therefore can be said to be political rather than specifically military and violent in nature, not synonymous with imposing will and employing full-scale force.

By becoming involved in an international crisis, the actors essentially intervene in the affairs of a third party, or several parties. For the statistical analyses in this study, no classification of intervention is needed. However, the following explanations help in understanding the broader picture of involvement in international crises. Intervention can be a very extensive concept. James Rosenau points to the difficulty of agreeing on a clear definition.³⁵ For Adrian Guelke, intervention can include *any* event between states, while for Bryan Hehir, “intervention means the *use of force* to address problems within boundaries of a sovereign state.”³⁶ Karen Feste describes intervention, in its broadest form, as a

process of overt or covert involvement by an outsider in the internal economic, social, or political processes of another society with the aim of determining the direction of trends in the target country’s policies, institutions, or policies. Strategies used to exercise leverage in these situations include a range of assistance through military instruments (supplying combat troops or peacekeeping observers, weaponry, advisors), economic support or sanctions (financial aid, embargo), and political and diplomatic initiatives (mediation offices, nonrecognition, refugee policies). The intervention approach may be passive, providing little beyond words of support or condemnation to the parties in the conflict; or active, with physical movement of troops and supplies.³⁷

Some scholars, like Hehir, already include the use of force in their definitions of intervention.³⁸ Elizabeth Saunders provides a detailed account of *military* interventions, adding the “military component” to interventions:

I thus define military intervention as an overt, short-term deployment of at least 1,000 combat-ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions. “Short-term” may encompass a wide range of time frames, but it excludes conquest or colonialism. Interventions into both interstate and intrastate conflicts or crises are included in the universe of cases; both can vary in the degree of internal interference.³⁹

These definitions demonstrate how variously the concept of intervention can be interpreted. Thus a deployment of naval forces to reach a foreign-policy objective can be classified, depending on goals and forms of deployment, as either an intervention or a military intervention. For a detailed analysis of the deployment of the U.S. armed

services, it is important to maintain the distinctions between forms of intervention, including between covert/semi-military and direct military, and types of mission. Feste's detailed explanation and very inclusive description of the different characteristics help to demonstrate the various aspects the term can encompass.⁴⁰ The identification of both overt and covert activities and of both military and nonmilitary aspects captures important elements of interventions.

Naval Crisis Response: Peacetime or Wartime Activity

The focus on crisis response invites the question where to locate this activity along the spectrum of naval operations. The broadest classification of naval functions divides it into two categories: the *use of force* and action *short of the use of force*. Another possibility is categorization into wartime and peacetime functions. Crisis response, often referred to as a peacetime function, can include not only threatened but also actual use of force. Therefore, arguably, crisis response should be a separate category, between peacetime and wartime. To employ the first distinction—that between the use of force and action short of force—crisis response would be situated between these two. While the mere demonstration of power without actual employment of force is desirable, it might be necessary to resort at least to a limited amount of force to resolve a crisis.

The second categorization—wartime and peacetime—allows a more nuanced explanation of crisis response. Scholars differ in their interpretations of “peacetime.” For Alberto Coll, “peacetime engagement refers to those activities carried out before a crisis exists, or at least before it has crossed the threshold into armed violence.”⁴¹ Dr. Coll refers to operations between war and peace, such as humanitarian interventions or peace enforcement, as “chaos management,” accompanied by a heightened possibility of force. Other scholars define peacetime more broadly. During the Cold War, Bradford Dismukes suggested the following comprehensive definition: “[peacetime] is meant to encompass all situations short of major war with the USSR. Operations in peacetime can range from routine forward deployments, to crisis augmentations of forces, to actions against a nation other than the USSR, and can even include a local conventional exchange between U.S. and Soviet forces in connection with a Third World crisis.”⁴²

At around the same time, Charles Allen distinguished two peacetime deployments for naval forces: routine posture, and operations/reactions to increased tensions or crisis.⁴³ Robert Mahoney and Adam Siegel (writing separately) also define crisis response as a peacetime activity but offer more general classifications independent of the Cold War.⁴⁴ The absence of war, defined by the threshold of U.S. casualties lower than one thousand, defines the term “peacetime activity.” The U.S. General Accounting Office (as today's Government Accountability Office was then known) and Linton Brooks provided in the mid-1990s more detailed characterizations.⁴⁵ According to the former, “the peacetime

role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nationals, to major amphibious operations.” Similarly, Brooks defines crisis as part of “military operations other than war” (MOOTW). In his view, all military peacetime operations support one of the three following tasks:

- *Preparing for war.* Training, operating in areas of potential conflict to get accustomed to them, working with allies.
- *Responding to crises with action.* Protecting American citizens, respond to natural disasters, solutions for local conflicts, prevent conflicts from spreading, punishing aggression.
- Advancing U.S. interests without the use of force. Deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and friends, sending signals of U.S. interests, fostering goodwill.⁴⁶

More recently, in 2007, in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the heads of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard highlighted the presence of naval forces in the event of crisis. The Navy possesses, it declared, the capability to respond even “should peacetime operations transition to war.”⁴⁷ It is debatable when exactly this “transition” occurs, when an operation is considered a wartime, and no longer a peacetime, undertaking. International crises per se are confrontations short of actual full-scale wars, and therefore I will follow the earlier definition of Mahoney and Siegel, considering all responses involving fewer than a thousand U.S. casualties “peacetime operations.”⁴⁸

Plan of the Study

This study is very exploratory in nature. First, a new data set had to be created combining crisis and naval-response information. Second, four subsets of crisis are chosen in an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the influence of seaborne forces. The idea of the political use of force, short of full-scale warfare, guides the entire analysis. Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces and providing a detailed account of naval functions. The chapter concludes with the most recent developments, as of this writing; an understanding of the unique capabilities of naval forces is important as a basis for theories and hypotheses. The theoretical explanations in chapter 2 connect naval capabilities with literature on naval diplomacy and coercion, so as to inform the hypotheses. Chapter 3 explains the groundwork of my empirical analyses, discussing earlier quantitative research and identifying naval variables for international crises, thereby generating a new data set. The various empirical methods will be explained, followed by the presentation of “simple frequencies.” The purpose in doing so will be not to develop a complex statistical model but rather to find and present naval crisis data. Chapters 4 (crisis characteristics and actors) and 5

(U.S. involvement and outcomes) present the results of the empirical analyses. Where possible, specific international crises will be briefly summarized to support or question the findings. After each of these two chapters, the results of the models will be explained. The last chapter reviews the most important findings, discusses limitations, points to future research, and argues that these results are of importance for policy and decision makers.

Notes

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29. James Robinson, "Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories," in *International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research*, ed. Charles Hermann (New York: Free Press, 1972), p. 29.
30. Brecher and Wilkenfeld, *Study of Crisis*, pp. 3–5. I recognize that following the definition of the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICB) means that I will exclude some cases.

Somalia in 1992 is a good example: while the crisis did not qualify as an international crisis according to the ICB criteria, the United States did deploy military forces in response. In the data chapter 1 will discuss this problem further.

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Navies Are Able to Do Things That Armies Can't

The Difference between the U.S. Navy and Other U.S. Armed Forces

We can do all that because our equipment is flexible and fungible, because our forces have a zero land based footprint, and we can maneuver because our forces and their equipment are together. When we are ordered by the President to meet some challenge on behalf of our Nation, we don't have to negotiate or wait for permission to use someone else's soil. We move on the seas that we control.

RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, 2009

The U.S. Navy enjoys a unique position among the military services. Armies, navies, and air forces are not of the same kind.¹ The most obvious difference is in the environments within which they operate—land, sea, and air. The Navy is the only armed force that operates on, above, and under the surface of the sea.²

Advantages of Naval Forces

As regulated by international law and convention, naval forces are free to maneuver on the world's oceans as close to any coastline as twelve miles.³ The vast presence of the U.S. Navy around the world at all times enables fast reactions. This ability to be present almost anywhere is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces. The U.S. Navy can be employed “overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, actively or passively, but almost always effectively, in whatever may at any moment be the national interest.” J. C. Wylie further describes “maritime presence” as subtle, benign, and ubiquitous in quality and as the great asset of sea power in times of peace and war.⁴ Fleets are not only highly effective combat tools; they can also be employed as mediums of diplomacy, advancing U.S. interests without the use of force.⁵ Ubiquity, flexibility, mobility, limited intrusiveness (“leaving no footprints”), readiness, and independence represent the great advantages of navies.⁶

Ubiquity, Flexibility, Mobility, and Limited Intrusiveness

The fact that naval forces operate in the neutral medium of the world's oceans permits nations to engage relatively subtly and nonintrusively. Naval forces can be sent to points on the sea near crises and there wait for developments. They can be visible without invading foreign sovereign territory, but they can also wait close by and yet stay out of sight. Such actions will most likely be perceived as less invasive than the movement of land forces, and the risks, as well as the political costs, will likely be more acceptable. James Cable points out that the U.S. Air Force and Army cannot be deployed without evoking the threat of high levels of violence and anxiety.⁷ Navies, even if they enter foreign territorial waters, are portrayed as “a lesser involvement than a platoon that has crossed the frontier or an aircraft that has dropped a bomb.”

The traditional combination of the military and diplomatic roles of naval forces means that while potential adversaries view the use of naval forces as representing significant national interest and willingness to act on the part of the United States, it also implies a lesser threat than do airpower or armies of destruction and war.⁸ As Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, for many years commander in chief of the Soviet navy, once wrote, navies can “demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one's state. Demonstrations by the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one's own potential might and threatening to start military operations. Thus, the navy has always been an instrument of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.”⁹ The great mobility and flexibility of naval power allow for the calibration of action to circumstances.¹⁰ Should political initiatives and shows of force fail, naval forces can resort to coercion and war fighting.¹¹ At any time of the day and under almost any weather conditions, and at times and locations of their choosing, naval forces can project offensive power.¹²

The Navy can hardly be studied without taking account of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), the “sea portable” ground force. This sea mobility is the Marines' advantage.¹³ With the help of the Marine Corps, power can be projected ashore through amphibious operations, in addition to naval gunfire, carrier airpower, or cruise missiles. Marines embark on USN vessels and are able to change quickly from sea to land combat, often with support of naval forces. With amphibious landings, Marines can be deployed to the crisis location with little political constraint.¹⁴ In most naval crisis responses, USMC forces deploy with the USN. Ever since the American Revolution, the two services have regularly deployed jointly.¹⁵ Sean Cate describes the “Navy–Marine Corps team,” with its mobility, sustainability, and power-projection capability, as a “go anywhere, do anything [force].”¹⁶

Independence and Readiness

The Navy and Marine Corps are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and have conducted peacetime operations in littoral areas since their respective creations. Both forces are designed so that the naval services collectively can maintain forward presence and rapidly respond to crises, in addition to their war-fighting requirements.¹⁷ Other military forces are more constrained by their needs and by the environment they operate in and so cannot deploy as freely. They depend on approval of third parties and are restricted by legal, logistical, and political factors. Navies, unlike armies and air forces, are not dependent on access to foreign bases or military facilities, permission to use foreign airspace, or rights to refuel in other countries. Their strength lies in their freedom of action, their ability to function on their own without depending on the goodwill and support of others. According to Dakota Wood, the Navy can stay on crisis location and sustain itself for months.¹⁸ P. K. Ghosh writes, “A single naval unit is self-sufficient on its own. A naval task force is a stand-alone unit that incorporates the elements of land, air and sea power into it.”¹⁹ Its ability to “wait and see” allows the government to gain time—for reflection, for other preparations, for diplomacy, or for negotiation.²⁰ Naval forces promise a more rapid deployment compared to land-based units and are less costly to move.²¹ Arthur Barber acknowledges the high costs of maintaining strong naval forces but argues that “cheapness is relative: the most expensive force for a given mission is the one that does not have the flexibility or availability to be used when force is needed.”²² Once naval forces arrive at the crisis location, their ships are immediately ready for action—what Pirtle calls “readiness on arrival.”²³ Furthermore, the withdrawal of navies is less difficult than the withdrawal of land forces.²⁴

Finally, the deployment of naval forces also provokes less criticism or debate within the United States. Kaplan observes,

If we want to deploy an extra 30,000 troops somewhere, there is a big national debate about it. But you can double the number of warships in the Persian Gulf and nobody in Congress breathes a word about it or cares. You can go from one to two to three carrier strike groups in the Persian Gulf—a carrier strike group is an aircraft carrier with 5,000 seamen onboard, with two cruisers, two destroyers, a frigate, two submarines; you are dealing with 10,000 or so sailors—you can just send one a few miles off the coast of Iran, and there is nary a word of protest.²⁵

Disadvantages of Naval Forces

Notwithstanding the many valuable characteristics of naval forces, there are also disadvantages and limitations. According to Joseph Bouchard, the “irony of naval crisis response is that the characteristics of naval forces that make them the preferred type of force for use as a political instrument in crisis also tend to make them relatively more susceptible to crisis stability problems than other types of forces.”²⁶ Weaknesses include

misinterpretation of signals, limitations on endurance, vulnerability, and indecisive outcomes.

Misperception, Endurance, and Vulnerability

Signaling by naval forces is prone to misperception. Observing events and showing presence from a distance may have a positive influence on a crisis, but they may also worsen the situation. The signal perceived in naval presence can lead to very different interpretations about reasons and intentions. In a crisis situation, potential enemies might fear an intervention because of ships' presence; this perception can lead either to reluctance to continue the fighting or resolution to escalate an already tense situation. Another problem is the duration of the deployments. Even a carrier group, despite its ability to replenish, refuel, and rearm at sea, can sustain itself for only a certain period before it needs access to a base, at least for the replenishment ships supporting it; also, replacements on station are required periodically to allow opportunities for major repairs and crew rest. While not a problem for short-term crises and conflicts, this becomes an issue if the crisis and tensions persist. Naval vessels, particularly aircraft carriers, are also very vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, especially to missiles, is one of the aircraft carrier's main weaknesses.²⁷

Decisiveness

"Maritime power is such a flexible instrument that it is inevitably the tool of choice, whenever circumstances permit, for the government intending the threat or use of limited force. On the other hand, its value in total war has declined."²⁸ This quotation from Cable dates back many years, but the use of exclusively naval forces in full-scale wars has decreased even more since the demise of the Soviet Union. Because the USN faces no equal competitor, its role has changed mostly to supporting wars on land. Richard Betts even says, "The one unique thing naval combat forces can do is fight other blue-water navies. . . . With the exception of war at sea, naval combat power overlaps with the capabilities of the other services and fills *few* gaps that are completely uncovered."²⁹ He further claims that naval airpower is too expensive and limited in its effects and is therefore justifiable only in situations when there is no access to land airfields.

Many scholars agree that in military confrontations, U.S. naval forces rarely achieve decisive results on their own.³⁰ However, Don Inbody argues that neither does airpower, when it comes to winning a war.³¹ While sea power and airpower (as well as space power) will play enabling roles, ground forces are necessary to achieve a decisive victory on land. But according to Colin Gray, this naval help is very important and may well "provide a decisive edge in war overall."³² Most importantly, Norman Friedman argues that "in the post-Cold War age . . . we are not fighting for our lives; we rarely seek decisive

ends. Almost always we seek some limited outcome, which reduces dangers to ourselves. We cannot afford unlimited investment in each conflict to achieve the most favorable decisive resolution. Agile, mobile, seapower is well suited to such a world. We can gain a satisfactory outcome, and then leave when we want or when we must.³³ Thus while naval forces might need support to achieve decisive victories, this is hardly a reason to dismiss their importance or ignore their other advantages. Ground troops, for their part, rely on naval and air forces to bring them to the operation theater. Thus today, no full-scale war is fought by one armed service alone—rather, they deploy jointly.

Era of Jointness

The end of the Cold War marked a growing importance for joint operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 represented a major change in the organization of defense and promoted joint forces. Brooks states that “a major goal of peacetime operation should be to work with other services to foster inter-operability between U.S. forces, especially the Navy, and the air forces, and to a lesser extent, the ground forces, of potential coalition partners.”³⁴ The Navy is equipped to transport other military forces to desired destinations and to support land operations. Because naval forces are often the first to arrive at a crisis location, they possess the military capabilities to secure the environment and prepare for the arrival of other forces.³⁵ Once other military services have reached the theater, naval forces can switch to a supporting function.³⁶ While this latter role is important, the U.S. Marine Corps and Army are to a certain extent capable of sustaining their own land operations and can receive support from the Air Force instead of the USN.³⁷ Today important Navy missions such as worldwide presence and deployments to support foreign policy are no longer solely naval in character. The Army and Air Force have also served as political U.S. foreign-policy tools; despite all their advantages, navies are not the only military forces employed in MOOTW.³⁸ Exercising with foreign armed forces, deploying mobile-training or humanitarian-assistance teams, and sending logistical aircraft and attachés are only a few of the examples. Especially the Air Force has been more frequently deployed for humanitarian responses, at about ten times the rate of the other services.³⁹ While the Navy and the Army are clearly distinct services, the Air Force has certain characteristics and capabilities in common with naval forces.

Sea and Air

The Navy and the Air Force, ever since the establishment of the latter as a separate service, have been in constant competition. Roy Walker and Larry Ridolfi find that “we no longer always need to wait for the power of the U.S. Navy to steam to the area to defend our interests in littoral areas which coincidentally place the fleet within range of enemy

mines or shore-to-ship weapons. Land based airpower can be anywhere in the world in a matter of hours. The historic notion that *only* ships are needed to extend maritime influence has ended.⁴⁰ These authors claim the Air Force can perform equally well in maritime operations. They list functions ranging from projecting power ashore and controlling sea lines of communication to bottling up enemy shipping, attacking and sinking enemy ships, and conducting maritime interdiction operations. They come to the radical conclusion that the advantages of airpower render the Navy obsolete:

The Revolution in Military Affairs has placed the ship as a weapon of war in the same position as a Knight from the Middle Ages. Knights were well trained and armed; expensive to maintain. Along came cheap Longbow technology[,] which pierced a Knight's defenses. European battlefields were quickly covered with expensive casualties. The era of Knights came to an end. Navies are well armed and expensively manned. Today, we have the potential for a new innovative use of high tech airpower and missiles. Should the next battleground be covered with sacrificial ships?⁴¹

Not many critics go as far. Inbody locates the main advantages of the Air Force in accuracy, speed, and range.⁴² Surged from the United States, air forces travel much faster than sea forces.⁴³ But they require highly technical support and need prepared airfields, which are highly vulnerable to attack. The safety of the sea in comparison to bases ashore; independence from the need for access rights by host countries; mobility and endurance; and the ability to deliver accurate air strikes, conduct blockades and port-denial attacks, interdict commerce, move large numbers of personnel and volumes of matériel, and insert and aid ground forces are the main advantages of naval forces, according to Inbody. He identifies the biggest disadvantages of sea power as the challenge of protecting supply lines and vulnerability to long-range aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and cruise missiles. However, control of the sea and air can minimize these threats. Inbody considers it very important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of both the Navy and the Air Force and to employ the two services accordingly. Both can be successful in limited wars and interventions, but as mentioned previously, in a full-scale war they need the support of ground troops. Overall, Inbody argues that naval forces offer more advantages than air forces and in particular are better suited for coercion but that the Air Force is more useful for achieving strategic effects. He concludes "that, applied correctly with its full range of capabilities (which includes air, sea, and land components), sea power can bring an enemy to its knees while air power cannot."

It is important to note that despite the competition between these two services, they operate jointly and support each other. Good examples are joint pilot training and aerial refueling of Navy aircraft by the Air Force.⁴⁴ This integration of the Navy and Air Force in aerial strike warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon in American military experience. For more than two centuries the Navy operated independently on the high seas and so became accustomed to functioning independently and self-reliantly. The nation's sea service was forward deployed from the beginning of its existence, and throughout most

of the Cold War it was, Benjamin Lambeth writes, the only service that was “‘out there,’ in and above the maritime commons and ready for action.”⁴⁵

But the Gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the Navy that its environment had changed—the capacity to fight open-ocean battles was no longer relevant. In that conflict the USN faced no surface forces or aerial threat.⁴⁶ Lacking a significant precision-strike capability, naval strike aviation was denied certain targets during Operation DESERT STORM, targets that were assigned to the Air Force instead. Over the next years, however, the several Iraq operations brought the two services closer together. Land-based and sea-based fighters jointly enforced the no-fly zones, in what Lambeth calls an “aerial strike policing function.”⁴⁷ After 9/11, the lack of access to land bases in Southwest Asia led to the creation of sea bases, with deep-strike capability to project power. The fact is that

for the first time in the history of joint warfare, Operation Enduring Freedom showed real synergies in Air Force and Navy conduct of integrated strike operations. Navy fighters escorted Air Force bombers into Afghan airspace until allied air supremacy was established. For its part, the Air Force (along with the [United Kingdom’s] RAF [Royal Air Force]) provided roughly 80 percent of the tanker support . . . that allowed Navy carrier-based fighters to reach central and northern Afghanistan. That support, in turn, enabled sea-based strikes far beyond littoral limits, as well as a sustained carrier-based strike-fighter presence over remote target areas for hours if needed for on-call strikes on [time-sensitive targets].⁴⁸

As can be seen, naval forces show both similarities to and differences from other military forces. In order to analyze the role naval forces play in crisis response, it is also fundamental to understand general naval functions as defined by national policy. Shedding light on the unique capabilities they can offer in the context of crisis management will be important for the theoretical background of seaborne crisis response. We have defined naval crisis response as a peacetime activity. The remainder of this chapter presents a more general introduction into the functions of naval forces, highlighting their important role in activities short of wars and placing them in a historical context.

Functions of the U.S. Navy

There are many ways to categorize and describe naval responsibilities. Booth offers a good introductory example, characterizing the functions of navies as the sides of a triangle: a *diplomatic role* (negotiation, manipulation, and prestige), a *military role* (balance of power and projection of force), and a *policing role* (coast-guard responsibilities and nation building).⁴⁹

General Naval Functions

The Navy’s diplomatic responsibilities are concerned with most aspects of foreign policy short of the use of force. *Bargaining*, such as occurs in negotiations, aims to persuade a target state to act in the desired manner. The military capabilities of countries affect and

shape the thinking and choices of their political leaders and policy makers. *Manipulation* attempts to change the political calculations of the target state by granting or withholding rewards. Booth describes *military aid* as one of the most important tools used to influence foreign governments. *Prestige* is mostly a useful by-product of naval activities—for example, port visits, aid, and events hosted on board ship in foreign harbors. Balance-of-power functions comprise the peacetime activities of the military role. Deterrence (conventional and nuclear), defense, and maintenance of good order at sea fall into this category.⁵⁰

The other aspect of the military role is the use of force. Booth divides the use of force at sea into four categories: “General Wars,” “Conventional Wars,” “Limited Wars,” and “Guerilla Wars.” The first two categories have not involved naval forces since the end of World War II. The U.S. Navy has mostly been concerned with small-scale interventions and limited wars. The deployment of forces to protect interests in conflicts and crises has been widely employed. But most Western navies have left the policing role to their nations’ coast guards. Policing functions are mainly concerned with extending sovereignty as far out as the nation’s maritime frontiers.⁵¹ In Ty Waterman’s words, “In modeling naval functions as a combination of diplomatic, military, and policing roles, generic coast guard functions fall under the policing role.”⁵²

On the basis of these considerations about limited policing and direct war fighting, the following sections describe the functions carried out by U.S. naval forces in some detail.

Specific Functions of the U.S. Navy

The U.S. Navy has always had wartime and peacetime functions, but the relative emphasis has varied over time. Although wartime combat missions are the main rationale for equipping naval forces, the Navy’s strength and uniqueness lie in employment short of full-scale wars.⁵³ As Cable has said, “Anyone who denies the peacetime relevance of navies will find himself rather short of recent examples of the traditional wartime battle between rival fleets.”⁵⁴ U.S. naval forces have always engaged in MOOTW and small contingencies, in various environments and with changing technologies.⁵⁵ Over the years a succession of documents have been released discussing the missions of the U.S. Navy. In them, not only is the term “strategy” widely debated, but there is also no common agreement as to whether to call “missions” by that name or, instead, “functions,” or “capabilities.” The terms have been used interchangeably.⁵⁶ But if naval and maritime visions, concepts, and strategies have shifted over time, core missions have remained constant.

There are many different characterizations of the purposes and contents of the documents. In 2009, Peter Swartz developed a comprehensive report discussing all major naval documents released since 1970. Figure 1 shows the capstone documents since

FIGURE 1

Major Capstone Documents since 1970 (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, p. 745)

NAME	MISSIONS
Project Sixty (1970)	4 categories of USN capabilities ("classic 4")
Missions of the USN (1974)	4 missions ("classic 4")
NWP 1 (Rev. A) (1978)	2 functions (sea control, power projection); 3 roles (including strategic nuclear deterrence); presence a side benefit
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)	
Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)	
The Maritime Strategy (1986)	3 primary missions (sea control, power projection, sealift)
The Way Ahead (1991)	
The Navy Policy Book (1992)	20 characteristics of naval operations, including "classic 4," sealift
. . . From the Sea (1992)	6 capabilities ("classic 4," crises, sealift)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994)	10 characteristics of "what we do," including "classic 4"
Forward . . . From the Sea (1994)	5 fundamental and enduring roles ("classic 4" + sealift)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)	
Anytime, Anywhere (1997)	4 broad missions (sea control the prerequisite)
NSPG II (1999–2000)	10-part multilevel model, including "classic 4" missions
SP 21 & Global CONOPS (2002)	5 enduring missions ("classic 4" + strategic sealift)
Naval Power 21 (2002)	
NOCJO (2003)	
Fleet Response Plan (2003)	
NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)	
NOP 2006 (2006)	13 naval missions, including "classic 4"; no sealift
NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)	
Cooperative Strategy (2007)	6 expanded core capabilities ("classic 4" + MSO, HA/DR); no sealift
NSG ISO PR 11 (2007)	
NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1) (2008)	
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)	
NSP ISO POM 12	
NOP 2010	

1970. Figure 2 lists the most important of these documents and the core capabilities defined in them.⁵⁷

The more than twenty-five "capstone" documents that have been published since 1970 have made it clear that the global environment and the challenges facing the United States have changed and that different functions have gained priority and others are no longer regarded as vital. What has remained consistent are what Stansfield Turner listed in 1974 as the four missions of the U.S. Navy.⁵⁸ The "classic four" have proved to

be enduring and are still relevant today, although new functions have been added. The following discussion of U.S. naval missions is based on Turner’s categorization.⁵⁹

- Sea control
- Projection of power ashore
- Naval presence
- Strategic deterrence.

FIGURE 2
Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47)

PROJECT SIXTY (1970) 4 CAPABILITIES	MISSIONS OF THE US NAVY (1974) 4 MISSIONS/MISSION AREAS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Assured second strike □ Control of sea lines & areas/sea control ■ Projection of power ashore ◆ Overseas presence in peacetime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Strategic deterrence □ Sea control ■ Projection of power (ashore) ◆ Naval presence
NWP 1 (REV A) (1978) 2 FUNCTIONS	THE MARITIME STRATEGY (1986) 3 PRIMARY MISSIONS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Sea control ■ Power projection 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Sea control ■ Power projection ❖ Sealift
. . . FROM THE SEA (1992) 6 CAPABILITIES	FORWARD . . . FROM THE SEA (1994) 5 FUNDAMENTAL & ENDURING ROLES
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ◆ Forward deployment/presence ● Strategic deterrence □ Control of the seas ▷ Crisis response ■ Project precise power ❖ Sealift 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ■ Projection of power from sea to land □ Sea control and maritime supremacy ● Strategic deterrence ❖ Strategic sealift ◆ Forward naval presence
ANYTIME, ANYWHERE (1997) 4 BROAD MISSIONS	SEA POWER 21 (2002) 5 ENDURING MISSIONS
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Sea and area control ■ Power projection ◆ Presence ● Deterrence 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> □ Sea control ■ Power projection ● Strategic deterrence ❖ Strategic sealift ◆ Forward presence

The newest (at this writing) documents—such as *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* (CS21), and the *Naval Operations Concept*—enlarge on the original four core missions, notably with the additions of security operations, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief, as well as cyber and space capabilities.⁶⁰ I will discuss these recent developments after analyzing the four core missions. The following models show


FIGURE 2
Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47), continued

NAVAL OPERATIONS CONCEPT (2006)		COOPERATIVE STRATEGY FOR 21ST CENTURY SEAPOWER (2007)	
13 NAVAL MISSIONS		6 EXPANDED CORE CAPABILITIES	
◆ Forward naval presence		◆ Forward presence	
▷ Crisis response		● Deterrence	
■ Expeditionary power projection		□ Sea Control	
◀ Maritime security operations		■ Power projection	
□ Sea control		◀ Maritime security	
● Deterrence		Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief	
Security cooperation			
Civil-military operations			
Counterinsurgency			
Counterterrorism			
Counterproliferation			
Air and missile defense			
Information operation			
NAVAL STRATEGIC GUIDANCE ISO PR 11 (2007)			
6 CORE CAPABILITIES: 6 ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES			
Enabling capabilities	Warfare capabilities		
● Deterrence	● Deterrence		
Humanitarian assistance & disaster relief	□ Sea control		
◆ Forward presence	■ Power projection		
Sea basing	◀ Maritime security		
Cyber superiority	Maritime BMD		
Global awareness	Cyber superiority		
Space superiority	Space superiority		
Naval expeditionary logistics			
■ Power projection	□ Sea control	● Deterrence	◆ Forward presence
◀ Maritime security	▷ Crisis response		❖ Sealift

alternative permutations of crisis response within the different possibilities, in order to situate crisis response and the Navy's core capabilities. Generally, sea control and power projection are categorized as war-fighting capabilities and forward presence and deterrence as peacetime functions. The relationships between the missions themselves are not part of the models.

FIGURE 3

Crisis Model 1 and 2: Crisis Part of War and Peace and Crisis Part of Peace



Crisis is located between war and peace, though realistically the three are not completely separate. In a crisis, all four naval functions are important tools. Although most important in the categories of war and crisis, sea control facilitates the Navy's routine activities in peace as well. Presence is not necessary in war, but reaction times are shorter if ships are already close by at the outbreak. Also, familiarity with the environment greatly helps in any operation. Deterrence pertains only to crisis and peace. If war breaks out, deterrence has failed, although it could be argued that further escalation might be deterred. Power projection might become necessary in a crisis, but only in a limited form. Model 1 (see figure 3) situates crisis in between war and peace but overlapping with both, while Model 2 (again, see figure 3) depicts crisis response as part of peacetime and distinct from war. As Bouchard states, "national objectives are achieved through political impact, and, if necessary, the direct military impact, of war-fighting capabilities brought to bear at the scene of a crisis."⁶¹ Although crisis response includes tasks such as power projection, not otherwise employed in peacetime, the two categories differ in degree—it is possible to describe the power projection in crisis as a "mild" form

of power projection and therefore clearly distinct from wartime. Although it is often difficult to draw a clear line between nonwar and war, I argue that the level of intensity is lower in crisis response and thus it should be seen as separate from war.

Sea Control. *Sea control* has been the central mission for naval forces for a long time. In 1977 the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. James L. Holloway III, defined sea control as “the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy, . . . [connoting] control of designated air, surface, and subsurface areas.”⁶² It secures free usage of the sea while denying—or, more realistically, limiting—the adversary’s use of the sea.⁶³ “Sea control” replaced the expressions “command of the sea” and “control of the sea.” The difference between “control of the sea” and “sea control” would seem minor but the change, according to Turner, was a deliberate one, meant to reflect the impact of technological innovations on previous notions of control, notably in air and submarine warfare.⁶⁴ Sea control no longer connotes absolute control everywhere and at all times but rather in limited areas and for particular periods of time. “Nowadays force can be used on, over or under the sea to protect or to deny a particular use of the sea.”⁶⁵ But even Alfred Thayer Mahan was not writing about absolute but rather working command—absolute command in a certain area at a certain time.⁶⁶

Sea denial, another term closely related to sea control, focuses mostly on denying the enemy the use of the sea; it is often the strategy chosen by weaker navies. For Mahan and other influential naval strategists, gaining control of the sea was a necessary first step in exploiting an advantage.⁶⁷ The views of these theorists varied as to what forms gaining control of the sea might take—for example, commerce protection, interdiction of the sea lines of communication, for *guerre de course*, or for power projection at sea or ashore. In Mahan’s view, control of the sea in war meant the destruction of the enemy’s fleet. This, he argued, should be the exclusive focus of the Navy. Gained control of the sea would bring economic rewards, maintaining free access to the resources of the world while at the same time denying access to the enemy, thereby strangling his economy.⁶⁸

Although navies operate on water, their actions are mostly reactions to events on land. The earliest navies only had one mission—command of the sea. It was because of Rome’s control over the western Mediterranean during the Second Punic War (218–202 BC) that Carthage was unable to reinforce the army under Hannibal that was ravaging the Italian Peninsula. Subsequently, control of the sea became vital as well for commerce protection and for military expeditions. It was crucial not only to secure free usage of the seas but also to deny it to the enemy, for both commercial and military reasons.

According to Turner, there has been a redefinition of traditional U.S. naval roles and missions since the 1970s.⁶⁹ Since World War II, there have been no major battles at sea.⁷⁰

This has affected the role of the USN. Its primary missions today focus much more on influence *from* the sea than *at* sea, a perspective emphasizing power projection ashore.⁷¹ Nevertheless, as James Ellis says, “Maritime supremacy will provide the ability to use the oceans as a bridge to its friends, a barrier to its enemies, a source of bountiful resources, and a bastion from which to wield power.”⁷² Geoffrey Till calls the sea a “strategic highroad.”⁷³ Around three-quarters of the earth is covered by seawater, and about the same percentage of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, within two hundred miles of the shore. Eighty percent of the world’s capital cities, as well as the most important trading centers and states that are military powers, are located within this area.⁷⁴ Around 90 percent of world trade travels by sea. It is therefore not surprising that control over the seas always has been afforded a very high value.

Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the World, and consequently the world itself.⁷⁵

Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in the world . . . [and] is the chief among the merely material elements on the power and prosperity of nations.⁷⁶

Although these quotes date back to the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respectively, they are still valid today.

The following incident highlights the benefits of sea control in a crisis. In May 1958, Lebanon experienced a crisis in which riots among political and religious factions threatened the government. The Lebanese president requested U.S. help to control the situation. Washington was at first hesitant, but a revolt in Iraq in July 1958, triggered by an army coup against the Hashemite government in Baghdad, led President Dwight D. Eisenhower to approve Operation BLUE BAT in Lebanon. All branches of the U.S. armed forces were involved. Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in Beirut, stabilize the country, and protect American citizens. Deployed U.S. naval forces comprised seventy vessels, including the three aircraft carriers USS *Saratoga* (CV 60), *Wasp* (CV 18), and *Essex* (CV 9), as well as heavy cruiser USS *Des Moines* (CA 134), the guided-missile heavy cruiser *Boston* (CAG 9), and twenty-eight destroyers. The entire Sixth Fleet supported the operation, especially through the landing of the Marines. Its tasks included patrol, reconnaissance, and transportation by carrier aviation of Marines who needed to be evacuated.

This incident clearly demonstrated the Sixth Fleet’s dominance in the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces in the proximity were capable of challenging neither U.S. influence in this crisis nor the Sixth Fleet’s control over the Mediterranean. The Navy’s readiness played an important role; in contrast, U.S. Air Force and Army units were unable to react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to advance from its base in

Turkey.⁷⁷ This example also shows how closely power projection and sea control are connected.⁷⁸ Naturally, most crisis examples “fit” more than just one mission, as they are all interlinked.

Projection of Power Ashore. *Projection of power ashore* is the use of naval forces against land forces and targets. In the words of Till “maritime power projection involves the use of seaborne military forces directly to influence events on land. Whereas the area of sea control is on, under and over the sea, power projection ashore manifests itself in the naval influence on events ashore. For Corbett this is the ultimate justification for having navies.”⁷⁹

Turner divides power projection ashore into three categories, Friedman into four, as shown in the figure.⁸⁰ Through his three categories, Turner sees navies attempting to

TURNER (1974)	FRIEDMAN (2001)
1. Amphibious assault	1. Traditional (control of offshore shipping, e.g., embargo)
2. Naval bombardment	2. Discrete strikes (e.g., air raid on Tripoli, 1986)
3. Tactical air (strikes by carrier-based tactical aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles).	3. Sustained air attacks (usually in support of other operations, e.g., Kosovo)
	4. Landing Marines.

achieve the following four objectives: “to secure territory from which a land campaign can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure land area from which an air operation can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure selected territory or facilities to prevent enemy use of them[;] . . . [t]o destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, divert his effort, et cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.”⁸¹

Tactical air and naval bombardment are employed to influence happenings ashore directly. These bombardments can be delivered in support of troops operating near the coast or for interdiction and pursuit close to the shore. Tactical air projection aims at destroying the enemy’s war-making potential and hinders his movement, while facilitating the movement of one’s own troops. Power projection is most efficient when the targets are close to the shore or within the radius of carrier-launched aircraft.⁸² Till identifies eight specific goals of maritime power projection:⁸³

- | | |
|---|--|
| (1) Determining the outcome of a conflict | (5) Economic warfare |
| (2) Opening new operational fronts | (6) Seizing or attacking naval bases and ports |
| (3) Direct support of the land forces | (7) Forcing an inferior adversary to fight |
| (4) Force displacement | (8) Political coercion. |

In the post–Cold War era, power projection has become more difficult. The increasing need to move into the littorals to influence events on land or to support the operations of other services ashore poses a great risk of enemy attack on naval forces.⁸⁴ But Admiral Gary Roughead, when Chief of Naval Operations (2007–2011), praised the USN’s force-projection capabilities in times of war and peace. As his statement shows, even power projection is not confined to the use of force:

We project power in a variety of ways. We can do it from our aircraft carriers of which they are always deployed. We can do it in the form of missiles that come off of our cruisers and destroyers or submarines, but we in the Navy have also another unique relationship in that we project power with the United States Marine Corps with our amphibious ships and the Marines that launch either on the sea or in the air for whatever operations they need to take part. And that power projection doesn’t always mean that it’s a forceful power. Consider for example, in the last couple of weeks a Navy and Marine Corps task group, amphibious ready group happened to be operating in the Western Pacific. The range hit the Philippines, the earthquake hit Indonesia, and a tsunami hit Samoa. That amphibious ready group was there; they were global, they were forward, they were ready; they projected their power in a humanitarian way; and split themselves apart. Some went to the Philippines, some went to Indonesia and then some operated in and around Samoa to render humanitarian assistance.⁸⁵

American retaliatory strikes in 1998 in response to attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa constitute an exemplary use of forceful power projection ashore. On 7 August 1998, the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, were the targets of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded more than five thousand. Shortly thereafter, the United States identified al-Qa’ida as the primary suspect and accused the Taliban in Afghanistan of allowing Osama Bin Laden and al-Qa’ida to operate freely. Although the United States received international support in condemning the embassy attacks, the Taliban refused to comply with its request to hand over Bin Laden. On 20 August, U.S. forces executed retaliatory air and cruise-missile strikes in Operation INFINITE REACH against terrorist training grounds in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan. Allegedly this pharmaceutical factory, in Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, was capable of producing chemical weapons and was collaborating with al-Qa’ida. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and involved a number of naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Seas.⁸⁶ The surface combatants and nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) that fired the cruise missiles, Tomahawks, had been in the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks. INFINITE REACH highlights the limited use of force to achieve an objective and supports Booth’s observation that killing and fighting are not the Navy’s foremost functions: “Military strategy is not the science of military victory but the diplomacy of violence.”⁸⁷

The next two naval functions to be discussed—*naval presence* and *deterrence*—are primarily political uses of naval forces in which actual force plays only a secondary role. As Les Aspin, when Secretary of Defense (1993–94), said, “Our naval forces should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important

tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence and crisis control.”⁸⁸

Naval Presence. The term “naval presence,” as a mission, was first defined by Turner in 1974—the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. Naval presence had been exercised before, but its characterization as a separate mission was new. In the Maritime Strategy of 1986, the mission of “forward presence” encompassed earlier concepts of naval forces as instruments of foreign policy and of “naval presence.” Today the Navy states on its website, “The U.S. Navy is engaged. And engaged means being there.”⁸⁹ Forward presence comprises forward-stationed and rotationally deployed forces. The former are dependent on the goodwill and permission of friends and allies. The latter are homeported on U.S. territory and are deployed as necessary to guarantee a continuous presence. Both forms of presence can symbolize U.S. interest or concern and demonstrate to friends and enemies alike where U.S. global interests lie. Forward presence by U.S. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs), expeditionary strike groups (ESGs), and amphibious ready groups (ARGs) helps secure national interests overseas. As William Cohen, former secretary of defense (1997–2001), once declared, “If you don’t have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a voice, less of an influence.”⁹⁰

Till stresses the difference between presence and “existence”—that is, the simple possession of a fleet. Presence, he argues, can take various forms, from routine operations to demonstrate interest or periodic deployments, but in any case deploys forces actively around the globe, whereas “existence” does not necessarily imply “forward.”⁹¹ Similarly, Bud Jones defines the objective of military presence as exerting influence and thus as requiring more than “just being present.”⁹² According to Frank Uhlig, Jr., through naval presence a force can pose a threat of the following:

- Amphibious assault
- Air attack, bombardment
- Blockade and exposure through reconnaissance.⁹³

Commander James McNulty identifies seven specific roles for naval forces during a presence mission:

1. Supporting U.S. international military commitments, such as the NATO alliance, with forward-deployed forces;
2. Confirming on a routine basis U.S. political commitments to other nations, by showing the flag in port visits and holding joint exercises with other navies;

3. Demonstrating the capability of U.S. naval forces to act in support of national interests;
4. Asserting continuing U.S. interest in important areas of the world, such as the Persian Gulf;
5. Demonstrating war-fighting capabilities in a tension area to deter potential opponents and serving as an instrument of crisis management, such as by signaling U.S. intentions;
6. Providing humanitarian aid; and
7. Coercing an opponent to comply with a preferred course of action.⁹⁴

As this list shows, the presence mission has been defined as covering the full range of naval missions short of wartime actions.⁹⁵ Such capabilities as showing the flag, signaling, and coercion lie on a continuum from peace to war. As James Miskel states, “naval presence is as much a diplomatic as it is a military function.”⁹⁶ Naval forces have to be forward deployed to influence events and to be able to react immediately. Robert Work underlines the importance of forward-deployed and -stationed forces to support U.S. foreign policy and calls for the establishment of seven “global fleet stations,” in the Caribbean/east coast of South America, the west coast of Africa, the east coast of Africa, Southwest/South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the western Pacific/Oceania.⁹⁷ The deployment of naval forces overseas is an important part of the U.S. national strategy, demonstrating presence year-round, not only during times of hostilities. The presence of naval forces of any size can signal concern. Turner emphasized the importance of sending the right force at the right time: “Naval Presence can be enormously useful in complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. Applied deftly but firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to war.”⁹⁸ This function of presence provides the link to deterrence. The 2010 *Naval Operations Concept* (known as NOP 2010) describes the changes of forward presence: “Originally conducted to protect U.S. merchant shipping, promote overseas trade, and support diplomacy, over time the basis of our forward presence operations has evolved and expanded to include crisis response as well as conventional and nuclear deterrence.”⁹⁹

An illustration of the benefits of presence (and deterrence) is the crisis in Lebanon of 1982. Israel attacked the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in southern Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. The rapid progress of the invasion deepened the crisis for Syria. Israel and Syria agreed on a cease-fire with the help of U.S. mediation, but fighting erupted again on 11 June. The Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) was ordered to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean in June, and the aircraft carrier USS *John F. Kennedy* (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for

possible evacuation of American and other foreign nationals from Beirut. *Kennedy* was relieved on 17 June by USS *Dwight D. Eisenhower* (CV 69). The U.S. embassy, advising all American citizens to leave Lebanon, closed on 24 June. U.S. nationals were evacuated and transported to ships of the Sixth Fleet, which took them to Cyprus. In July the United States halted military aid to Israel to demonstrate its disapproval of Israel's activities. In August the situation worsened, and the MARG stood ready for deployment as part of a peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut. By September, with the help of U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syria and Israel was resolved. On 22 September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon, together with two aircraft carriers, to support U.S. Marines ashore. On 2 January 1983 USS *America* (CV 66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon, where it was relieved by USS *Nimitz* (CV 68) on the 20th. In February the U.S. alert level was lowered, but the United States remained actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to Lebanon if necessary. Direct talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under American auspices led to a peace agreement in May 1983.

The presence of U.S. (and other nations') naval forces had helped limit the conflict by preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also supported the diplomatic efforts of the United States, not least by providing helicopter transportation for the mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.¹⁰⁰

Yet not everybody supports forward presence. Brooks points to the possible negative effects of constant U.S. naval presence. The permanent stationing of the U.S. Navy in a particular region signals the importance of that region to the United States, but the demonstrated resolve may become taken for granted and thus exert only limited influence. Moreover, it may even have a reverse effect—if forces are withdrawn temporarily, their absence may be more visible than their extended presence and create the impression that the United States is losing interest.¹⁰¹ Daniel Gouré criticizes the shaping function of forward presence as not well defined and empirically unprovable.¹⁰² He even calls naval forward presence a “tyranny” overstressing naval capabilities, since the USN does not dispose of a sufficient number of ships to meet all the demands.

Deterrence. Sea control, projection of power ashore by amphibious means, and naval presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.¹⁰³ After the war two new missions—tactical airpower in support of land campaigns (as an addition to projection of power ashore) and strategic deterrence—were added. Deterrence threatens the use of force by conditioning forceful actions on the part of the opponent. As Robert Art has said, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”¹⁰⁴ Naval forces are used to persuade the adversary not to do something by demonstrating that the likely costs may well outweigh the expected benefits. According to Turner, strategic

deterrence missions are employed “to deter all-out attack on the United States or its allies; to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unacceptable risks; and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the United States or its allies is minimized.”¹⁰⁵ Till names two forms of deterrence: “The mere existence in an area of a capable naval force loitering with intent in international waters near an area of concern may be all that is required. Or naval forces may be ostentatiously surged into the area to bring the prospective adversary to realize the error of his way. Here the naval advantage most of value for purposes of deterrence is their speed and strategic mobility.”¹⁰⁶

It is important to note that deterrence is based on the potential rather than the actual use of force and is highly dependent on the enemy’s reaction. Because deterrence is essentially psychological, the naval forces involved need to have the necessary capabilities to convince the adversary. The more powerful the ships (in general), the more successfully deterrence works. Thus the deterrence function is linked with the scale of military power, and the deployment of strong naval forces underlines the willingness to use these forces if necessary.¹⁰⁷ The ability to deter by the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear weapons at sea is the most extreme case (nuclear deterrence). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, conventional deterrence has supplanted the Cold War focus on nuclear deterrence. Michael Gerson distinguishes between deterrence by punishment (mostly precision strikes) and the more common form, deterrence by denial.¹⁰⁸ The latter frustrates the adversary’s hostile objectives by signaling: “Deterrence is best served when the attacker believes that his only alternative is a protracted war: The threat of a war of attrition is the bedrock of conventional deterrence.”¹⁰⁹ Gerson emphasizes the importance of both strategies:

Some adversaries are more likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and others by the threat of denial. For example, some leaders may believe that they can simply withstand or “ride out” whatever punishment the opponent’s conventional forces can inflict. For these regimes, threats to deny success may be a more potent deterrent than threats of punishment. On the other hand, some aggressors may convince themselves that US conventional forces will not be able to successfully deny their objectives. These leaders may believe that they can achieve their aims in spite of the opposing conventional power because they have greater resolve and are willing to fight longer and harder, and accept greater casualties. Often, they base this resolve on the belief that they can achieve their goals before substantial US conventional power arrives, a *fait accompli*.¹¹⁰

“Compellence” is closely related to deterrence. Compellence is the use of threats to make a target stop an action it has already undertaken or take an action that the coercer wants. Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target believes that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats will have a great impact on the target).¹¹¹ In general, deterrence aims at preventing an unwanted action from taking place by showing the costs of those actions, whereas compellence is specific and active, intended to oblige an adversary to act according to the

wishes of the “compelling” party, usually to reverse an action already begun.¹¹² Despite this distinction, some argue that there are no major differences between the two strategies. According to Edward Luttwak, both belong to the realm of “coercive suasion,” a term that underscores the use of the direct threat and suggests an affinity with coercive diplomacy.¹¹³ “It boils down to the assertion that it is more difficult to compel than it is to deter since (1) moves are more difficult to reverse than prevent in that the moves to be stopped or reversed may have acquired their own ‘tactical’ and political momentum and (2) public compliance with others’ demands would entail additional losses in the way of prestige. The underlying working principles and requirement of both strategies are the same.”¹¹⁴ However, deterrence is passive and preventive, whereas compellence is active and offensive, usually involving the threatened or actual use of force. Compellence offers an alternative crisis response to unforeseen crises that, by definition, cannot be deterred.¹¹⁵

It is very difficult to measure the direct impact of deterrence. In the Iraq/Kuwait crisis of 1994 the presence of naval forces is said to have exerted a deterrent effect. The crisis had its origin in an Iraqi troop deployment toward the Kuwaiti border on 7 October. The United States responded within a day, deploying the aircraft carrier *Eisenhower*, accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles, to demonstrate resolve and deter Iraq from crossing the border. Air Force and Navy units already in the area as part of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH were now assigned to a new operation, VIGILANT WARRIOR. Additional vessels supporting VIGILANT WARRIOR included the USS *George Washington* (CVN 73) battle group, USS *Tripoli* (LPH 10), an amphibious ready group, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (or MEU(SOC)), and Military Sealift Command ships.¹¹⁶ The U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia was reaffirmed, and Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 October. The crisis ended on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed a declaration of “Iraq’s recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence.” The United States increased its military strength in the region so as to respond quickly to future threats.

As this introduction into the core naval functions demonstrates, all four functions play important roles in naval crisis response. The recent past, however, has brought about significant changes in the strategic environment. In order to understand the future of naval crisis response, it is important to take new realities into account.

Recent Transformations and Challenges

We have gone from a blue-water Navy, which is clearly where we were before the [Berlin] Wall came down, to a Navy that has vastly expanded

its mission sets in a world that's much more uncertain, much more unpredictable, and in a world that I believe the Navy and the Marine Corps have the ability and the maneuverability to be out and about.

ADMIRAL MICHAEL MULLEN, 2006, THEN CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

As at the end of the Cold War, the events on 9/11 caused a shift in the strategic environment, leading to a new emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and asymmetric operations.¹¹⁷ The global war on terror (GWOT) and the emergence of new security threats have influenced naval responsibilities.

The Twenty-First-Century Navy

In 2007 the National Research Council released a document identifying three roles for naval forces to support the GWOT efforts: “forward presence, maritime operations, and homeland defense.” These roles require three critical naval capabilities: maritime domain awareness (or MDA, which includes increased maritime intelligence), command and control, and naval force protection. In a 2009 report for Congress, Ronald O’Rourke presented a more detailed list of actual USN operations in CT missions.¹¹⁸ He highlighted the importance of joint operations of the three U.S. sea forces, emphasizing homeland defense. Other important points he raised include Tomahawk cruise-missile attacks, SEAL operations, and surveillance by naval forces, as well as MDA and protection of forward-deployed naval vessels. The Navy, he argued, is less concerned with preventing terrorists from carrying out attacks at sea than with denying them the use of the seas. Terrorists resort to the oceans and waterways to move people, resources, and money in relative anonymity. As Joshua Lasky says, “attacks at sea have little chance of attracting maximum public attention, achieving significant loss of life, and are significantly complicated by reasonably good security measures, thus hold little value. The challenge for the U.S. Navy and all U.S. Navy naval forces is to detect, monitor, and interdict or facilitate the interdiction of terrorists, or prevent terrorism related use of the vast maritime domain.”¹¹⁹ Low-intensity, irregular warfare (IW), and counterterrorism are important challenges for the Navy, generally trained as it is in conventional warfare. Further, the Navy has responded with sea basing, global partnerships, intensified interservice collaboration, and expansion of expeditionary missions. The service has also taken into account new technologies and weapons, and the need to replace ships, as well as new challenges—for example, maritime security and the emergence of new maritime powers—especially China.

In early 2006, in reaction to the increased demand for expeditionary missions and to support the six core missions later put forward in CS21, the Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was established. NECC “provides a full spectrum of operations,

including effective waterborne and ashore antiterrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.¹²⁰ The grouping of forces known as the expeditionary strike group, comprising amphibious ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was developed. The nature of expeditionary missions allows fast reactions aimed at shaping the world order. The forces employed are sea based; they “come from the sea and return to the sea [and are] sustained from the sea.”¹²¹ Most expeditionary operations are executed in a littoral environment, not on the high seas. Expeditionary forces need high-grade equipment and skills that are specific to their particular tasks and operational area. The development of littoral combat ships (LCSs) and advances in riverine warfare demonstrate that the U.S. Navy is preparing for the new challenges, where in the past the Navy was predominantly focused on blue-water operations.¹²² The ESG broadens the response capabilities of seaborne forces. They are capable of operating independently in low-to-medium-threat environments, thereby increasing the fleet’s responsiveness and strategic impact, especially when aircraft carriers are scarce. NOP 2010 highlighted the value of naval expeditionary capabilities in enabling and supporting joint force efforts to combat conventional and irregular threats. In 2008 the Navy Irregular Warfare Office was established, to “institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].”¹²³

Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the USN has been heavily engaged in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea in support of the Army and Marine Corps in Iraq and Afghanistan. Navy personnel are also involved ashore in the two theaters. Robert C. Rubel highlights Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan as a good example of the use of sea basing, as the initial phase of this operation was almost entirely supported by a naval task force.¹²⁴ But the lack of suitable bases had already become apparent in earlier conflicts, such as the first Persian Gulf War (1990), Bosnia, and Kosovo.¹²⁵ Securing access to foreign land bases or permission to maintain naval bases in foreign countries is becoming steadily more difficult—most countries do not allow the United States to base military personnel on their soil. Additionally, land bases are increasingly vulnerable to attack.¹²⁶

The Navy has responded by shifting to the role “of an offshore weapons platform.”¹²⁷ Sea basing lessens dependence on the support of other countries. The Navy’s “Sea Power 21” initiative brought forward three new concepts: “Sea Strike,” the projection of offensive power; “Sea Shield,” the projection of defensive power; and “Sea Basing,” the projection of sovereignty.¹²⁸ The concept of sea basing centers on the use of the ocean to assemble, move, project, support, and sustain forces. In some respects the sea offers many advantages over the land. Forces there are less vulnerable to enemy attack, sovereignty

concerns and need for access rights can be avoided, and personnel and equipment can be transported and withdrawn quickly.¹²⁹ The need to build logistic stockpiles ashore is reduced, sealift is minimized, and joint forces can be positioned forward without depending on the goodwill of host nations. Henry Cook highlights too such benefits as accelerated deployment times and seaborne positioning.¹³⁰ Douglas King and John Berry point out that sea basing not only functions as a platform but also supports the projection of sea power ashore to influence events.¹³¹ Till praises sea-based strategic missile attacks: "Today a fleet operating against the shore is able not only to solve the tasks connected with territorial changes, but directly to influence the course and even outcome of a war."¹³² Swartz, however, does not view this as a new concept; he points out that the Continental Navy landed Marines in the Bahamas, and shore bombardment was used against the Barbary States.¹³³ Similarly Peter Dombrowski and Andrew Ross see *Sea Power 21* as largely repackaging already existing capabilities.¹³⁴

While the new terms will advance the technology, then, the underlying ideas are not revolutionary. The 9/11 attacks suggested the need to be equipped for long-term operations. The difficulty of executing operations in failed or failing states and the reluctance of neutrals or allied countries to allow U.S. military access or overflight rights point to the future value of sea basing. The idea of sea basing posits a nonhostile sea environment, and today the USN enjoys broad sea control. Where land-based air support is either unavailable (the Falklands, Sierra Leone) or insufficient (*DESERT STORM*, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan), fleets can provide fire support (sea-launched cruise missiles, carrier-based aviation, and naval gunfire).¹³⁵ The response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti illustrated this strength. Although the aircraft carrier deployed to Haiti surged from the continental United States, it served on arrival as the sea base for an aerial rescue mission, most of the infrastructure ashore having been destroyed or badly damaged. Within three days, the carrier was on the scene and ready to act. However, as Work says, while sea basing does offer more independence, it is not replacing land bases. There are also voices that find the value of sea basing overrated.¹³⁶ One of the often-praised benefits is the reduced dependence on host nations, but Gouré claims that if the United States needs land bases, it will find them, and if it meets resistance will seize and occupy them.¹³⁷

The concept of sea basing led to the development of the Global Fleet Station (GFS). In October 2007 the Africa Partnership Station (APS) was established in the Gulf of Guinea, where it served as a platform for humanitarian and disaster-relief (HA and DR) operations in the area. The pilot APS mission, which ended in May 2008, laid a foundation for conflict prevention. Future deployments were facilitated through the relationships the USN built with and between the peoples of the Gulf of Guinea region and by the goodwill it created through its HA and DR activities.¹³⁸ In November 2008 the Southern

Partnership Station (SPS) mission was established; until April 2009 the USN deployed various forces throughout the Caribbean and Central and South America. SPS strengthened regional partnerships and maritime security; USN forces conducted training and cooperative activities with navies, coast guards, and civilian services.¹³⁹ Kathi Sohn sees this development of sea basing as a broad concept “and its promise and flexibility arise from . . . its minimal military footprint ashore and the wide cross-section of professional resources that it hosts.”¹⁴⁰

Generally, Till notes an increase in coalition operations and a rising concern about the maintenance of international security.¹⁴¹ Collaboration between navies is important and is much more frequent than land military cooperation. Kaplan attributes that to the “brotherhood of the sea.”¹⁴² In 2006 Adm. Michael Mullen had announced the “Thousand-Ship Navy,” now known as the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP), to enhance cooperation between the USN and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces in identifying common threats and jointly providing security against them, as well as in maintaining global maritime security.¹⁴³ The SPS and APS can be viewed as specific measures for promoting global maritime partnership, for supporting U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of security partnership building, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for maritime-security operations.

These developments can be traced back to CS21.¹⁴⁴ This strategy provided the first unified maritime strategy for the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, *and* Coast Guard, stressing their partnership. To the USN responsibilities for global presence, deterrence, sea control, and power projection ashore, this maritime strategy added maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. Another important change is the equal priority afforded preventing wars and winning them. According to Wang Baofu, the pursuit of absolute military superiority, assuring the defeat of any opponent, has always been the core of U.S. military strategy.¹⁴⁵ The objective of using military force to prevent war has been embodied to some extent in U.S. military strategic deterrence theory but has very rarely been placed at the same level as winning wars in important strategic documents. Nonetheless, Till does not see a major change, since most of the Cold War era was spent preventing wars.¹⁴⁶ He rather emphasizes the enlarged function of deterrence: “The coercive approach of demonstrating denial capabilities against, or promising punishment for, prospective wrongdoers has been absorbed into a much wider concept of working against the social, environmental, and economic conditions that make wrongdoing more likely.” He also highlights the new profile of HA and DR as a new development: “Instead of being something of bonus when the need arises and assets are available because there is no decent war to fight elsewhere, the task is accepted as part of one of the six strategic imperatives, and the ability to do it has apparently been elevated

to equal standing with more traditional core capabilities like forward presence and sea control.” Thus the new maritime strategy explicitly emphasizes maritime cooperation and naval soft power—a new development, and one viewed very favorably by other nations and navies.

Increased international cooperation is also encouraged by recent operations to protect shipping. These maritime security operations aim at securing global commerce and sea-lanes. Maritime security is now defined as “the creation and maintenance of security at sea, which is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”¹⁴⁷ In the realm of maritime security, counterpiracy efforts have become a central focus. In the recent past, piracy has seen a stark increase, leading to the launching of multinational antipiracy operations in 2008 off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden.¹⁴⁸ In an impressive display of international cooperation, navies from many nations are collaborating to protect commercial and other ships from pirate attacks. The European Union, NATO, Australia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia are among the participants. This collaboration is even more impressive in that some of the involved countries are otherwise politically alienated from the United States. Furthering the cooperation with China and Russia in the counterpiracy efforts, especially information sharing, is emphasized in the “CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Guidance” for 2010.¹⁴⁹

New strategic documents, such as the National Security Strategy or the *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) for 2010 have defined the larger Indian Ocean region as an area of interest to the United States. Tim Sullivan states that “as home to a number of the world’s most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, Asia is a region of enormous strategic importance to the United States. For over six decades, America has functioned as the preeminent power in Asia, playing a vital role in providing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region’s states to flourish politically and economically.”¹⁵⁰ Within the Indo-Pacific commons, the two rising powers, China and India, are of particular U.S. interest. James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara speak of a strategic triangle in the region, consisting of the United States, China, and India.¹⁵¹

The rise of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy, or PLAN) is a topic of highest priority in Washington. Some believe China’s preoccupation with Taiwan is the main reason behind the PLAN buildup, while others emphasize the Chinese desire to control sea-lanes, to make manifest its status as a major world power, to secure regional interests (such as in disputes over the South China Sea and, in particular, the resource-rich Spratly and Paracel Islands), or generally to oppose U.S. regional military influence.¹⁵² China is building defenses (antiaccess forces) against hostile naval intervention with the aim of delaying its arrival or reducing its effectiveness. O’Rourke

compares the strategy to Soviet sea denial during the Cold War.¹⁵³ Also, according to Kaplan, China is producing or acquiring submarines at five times the rate of the United States.¹⁵⁴ What makes China's strategy more dangerous is its possession of antiship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), capable of hitting moving targets at sea. Furthermore the PLA Navy has been buying naval mines and technology to block Global Positioning System (GPS) signals. The PLAN is also striving for a fifth generation of stealth fighters, new submarine models, aircraft carriers, and advances in space.¹⁵⁵ In August 2011 China began sea trials with its first aircraft carrier—an old, retrofitted Soviet vessel formerly known as *Varyag*.¹⁵⁶ At some point in the next decade the PLAN will surpass the USN in number of warships overall. According to Work, “China is now the largest builder of merchant ships in the world, and it has embarked on an impressive buildup of naval warfighting capabilities—many of them directly targeting the U.S. Navy fleet.”¹⁵⁷ These modernization efforts have implications for the USN and affect deliberations about forward homeporting, forward basing and shipbuilding, and the advancement of other naval capabilities such as improved antisubmarine-warfare systems and antimissile defenses to protect ships. More generally, they impact strategic planning for the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the South China Sea, as well as future relations with allies and non-allies in the region.

In order to become more familiar with the PLAN, cooperation mechanisms should be explored. The USN and PLAN have engaged in joint search-and-rescue exercise, but to foster mutual understanding, more cooperation is needed. Nontraditional security issues like international terrorism offer a good starting point.¹⁵⁸ For the United States, the establishment of military-to-military relations with China is difficult, in particular because of the Taiwan question. The accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.S. intelligence aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island in 2001, and the 1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis had serious implications for U.S.–Chinese military relations. Nonetheless, nontraditional security issues such as counterpiracy, joint search and rescue, and humanitarian missions offer ways to increase interactions and create an environment to foster a relationship. Promoting mutual trust and building consensus are essential preconditions for future Sino-U.S. naval security cooperation. A report by the Heritage Foundation argues that misperception and misunderstanding are only part of the problem and different goals and incentives further explain the difficulties of U.S. Navy–Chinese military relations.¹⁵⁹ In May 2011, the Chinese counterpart of the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (then Admiral Mullen) visited Washington, D.C., for talks that both sides described as a positive step toward a stronger relationship.¹⁶⁰

But above all, the developments themselves must be closely observed and analyzed. The United States is striving for a force distribution of sixty–forty between the Pacific and

Atlantic.¹⁶¹ Already six out of the eleven aircraft carriers (CVs) are located in the Pacific Ocean. In the recent past, incidents between the PLAN and the USN in the western Pacific have increased. PLAN vessels have shadowed or even blocked U.S. ships in the region.¹⁶² The Chinese maritime ambitions are matters of concern not only for U.S. strategy but for that of many regional countries. India, the other major growing power in the region, with close ties to the United States, has shown great concern about the rise of the Chinese navy, especially in the Indian Ocean, in close proximity to India. That country is determined to defend its influence in the surrounding waters, and a stronger PLAN presence is likely to trigger Indian maritime countermeasures. Holmes and Yoshihara see possibilities in a more rapid buildup of naval forces or an expansion of Indian naval presence toward both the South China Sea and Horn of Africa.¹⁶³

Moreover, innovative technologies and the changing global security environment pose serious challenges and greatly affect U.S. defensive and offensive considerations. O'Rourke, for example, sees a need to replace the fourteen *Ohio*-class ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) with twelve next-generation SSBNs and to develop LCSs and longer-range carrier aircraft.¹⁶⁴ In December 2010, after much negotiation, Congress approved the building of twenty LCSs through 2015. To meet the growing demand for ballistic-missile defense, the Navy also calls for a large number of Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers. The former CNO, Admiral Roughead, had promised to make ballistic-missile defense a core mission and in April 2009 established the Navy Air and Missile Defense Command. A breakthrough in 2011 was the beginning of the technology-development phase of the *Ohio* replacement program—an important step toward a shipbuilding contract.¹⁶⁵

According to Navy officials, the USN will require a larger fleet to meet its growing responsibilities, including sustained forward presence and maritime security, partnership capacity building, and humanitarian relief. As Admiral Roughead commented in 2008, “even the [planned] 313-ship Navy will not be enough for the missions that we’re going to be tasked with in the coming years.”¹⁶⁶ The Navy is striving to add fifty new battle-force ships by fiscal year (FY) 2015. While the 313-ship Navy could be realized in theory, this prospect seems less plausible in light of the current budget crisis. In early May 2010, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned that “our current plan is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 and it’s in the budget. And to be sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the massive overmatch the United States already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing antiship capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 years when no other country has more than one?”¹⁶⁷

While he did not doubt the need for new ships, Gates pointed to the considerable increase in costs. Today, submarines and amphibious ships have tripled their building

costs compared to the 1980s, while the overall budget has shrunk by 20 percent. But Gates also spoke of possibilities offered and challenges presented by new technologies: “At the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.S. has enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding—especially with long-range, accurate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the horizon.”¹⁶⁸ Work, for his part, argues that it is crucial to focus on the capabilities when talking about ship numbers.¹⁶⁹ With (at this writing) the aircraft carriers USS *Roosevelt* and *Lincoln* undergoing repair and maintenance and *Enterprise* scheduled to retire after its next deployment in spring 2012 (inactivation ceremony December 2012), the number of active CVBGs could temporarily drop to nine.¹⁷⁰ *Roosevelt* should be ready to deploy again in December 2012;¹⁷¹ *Lincoln* is likely to return to active service only in 2015. The newest CV, USS *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78), is scheduled to be ready for deployment in 2015, but Raymond Pritchett suggests 2017 as more likely.¹⁷²

The revolution in technology does not affect shipbuilding and weapon requirements alone. As Thomas Mahnken said in 2001, the U.S. Navy must “define its roles in space and cyberspace.”¹⁷³ The importance of intelligence and communication was recognized by reestablishing the Tenth Fleet (it had been a specialized antisubmarine force in World War II), reactivated in January 2010 as the cyber fleet, without ships or aircraft but fitted for joint information and intelligence tasks.¹⁷⁴ The fleet’s mission is to combine intelligence and communication to support information warfare. Richard Burgess calls this an important step compared to the Cold War, when there was a “wall of separation between intelligence collection and fleet operations that once was a given—for security reasons.”¹⁷⁵ In May 2009, Admiral Roughead, as CNO, argued that while within the military, cyberspace is often depicted as “a little lightning bolt going up to the satellites and running around down to earth[,] [t]hat’s not cyber space. Cyber space is on the bottom of the ocean because 95 percent of what moves in cyber space moves on cables that rest on the bottom of the ocean. That’s the maritime domain. That’s the domain of the United States Navy.” Therefore the USN has to play a lead role in securing, protecting, and defending cyberspace.¹⁷⁶

In addition to the cyberspace domain, naval use of space is the subject of an important debate today. In the 1990s Gulf War U.S. space-based assets delivered valuable operational information.¹⁷⁷ Since then other states have been striving to advance in space. Space-based systems can perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, in the air, and on and under the sea. Because of the diverse nature of space, U.S. space operations have implications influencing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, technological, and information.¹⁷⁸ According to Frank Lacroix and Irving Blickstein, this development could influence the naval presence mission and maybe one day even replace it.¹⁷⁹

Two aspects of the space discussion are important: command of space and space communication. Space command is the control of space communications for civil, commercial, intelligence, and military purposes. Command of space allows the close study of the adversary and the tailoring of capabilities to fight that enemy.¹⁸⁰ Command of space does not mean that one's adversary cannot act in space, only that he cannot seriously interfere in one's actions thereby. Space has great value for communications; therefore, space warfare must aim at either securing command of space or preventing the enemy from securing it. Space communications are used for the movement of trade, matériel, supplies, and information.¹⁸¹ Network-centric warfare (NCW) heavily relies on space assets.¹⁸² NCW focuses on the combination of actions by a fleet, even if not physically concentrated. With the help of sensors, valuable information about the adversary's forces is collected and distributed in real time.¹⁸³ Rear Admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch, speaking before the Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, described space systems as providing "essential communication capabilities, position, navigation and timing support, missile warning, meteorological data, and over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis."¹⁸⁴ Most space-related issues have been moved to the Air Force, but the Navy has important interests in space and must be involved in that realm. According to Steven Whiting, space assets offer unique diplomatic advantages: "From peacetime through war, the United States can use the varied components of space assets' diplomatic power directly to improve its diplomatic, economic, and military position."¹⁸⁵

The Navy, then, has gone through a number of transformations and now faces many challenges. Before turning to the next chapter, the study will discuss developments of the peacetime missions—forward presence and deterrence—and also the "enabler" of the two, sea control.

Development of Naval Functions

CS21 marked a milestone for cooperation activities and emphasized naval missions that are essentially peacetime functions—exercising soft power, nation building, cooperation building, and the "Thousand-Ship Navy," to name a few. However, traditional naval roles have remained relevant.¹⁸⁶ The newest strategic document, NOP 2010, lists sea control, power projection, deterrence, forward presence, maritime security, and HA/DR as core capabilities. It builds on CS21 and essentially provides the basis for assessing the forces required to implement that document.

A study in 2009 by the Institute for Defense Analysis proposes five core capabilities for the USN (adding one new mission to Turner's list), ranking them as follows: strategic deterrence, maritime security/irregular warfare (new), power projection, sea control, and forward deterrence (presence, renamed).¹⁸⁷ Its authors see a change since the

outbreak of the GWOT, in that adversaries have become less visible and more difficult to influence. Because forward presence aims at deterring conventional and irregular threats to (regional) stability, and forward forces are immediately ready to deploy in case conventional deterrence fails, the study's authors argue for renaming forward presence "forward deterrence/assurance." They write, "strategic" deterrence "is defined as the prevention of nuclear war and aggression or coercion, threatening the vital interests of the United States, and/or our national survival."¹⁸⁸

The study also discusses HA and DR, added to core capabilities in 2007. Its authors conclude that those two missions, while very important, are by-products of traditional naval capabilities and therefore do not need to be categorized as separate core capabilities. However, I believe that this elevation of them is appropriate, as it recognizes the important contributions military forces can offer in this arena. Since the relief efforts after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004, the military role in HA and DR missions has gained prominence and the U.S. armed forces have conducted several such operations. Examples include the responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the tsunami in Japan 2011. Also, annual deployments offer humanitarian, medical, dental, and engineering assistance to South and Latin America (under CONTINUING PROMISE—the hospital ship USNS *Comfort* or an amphibious vessel, in alternate years) and to Asia (as part of the Pacific Partnership program—the hospital ship USNS *Mercy* or an amphibious ship in alternate years). Overall, the USN has a long tradition of providing medical aid and disaster relief.

Since World War II, the USN has enjoyed sea control, though during the Cold War its ability to retain it should conflict break out was sometimes challenged. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the mission lost its highest priority, but it is still nevertheless important for security and prosperity.¹⁸⁹ Sustaining sea control is vital to allow the USN to move freely in peacetime and react to crises. The rise of the Chinese navy has the potential to pose a threat to U.S. sea control in the future. James Kraska hypothesizes that by 2015 American command of the global commons will no longer be taken for granted.¹⁹⁰ While the oceans and the airspace above them have been the exclusive domain of the U.S. Navy since World War II, this situation could be challenged by then. Although China is not an enemy of the United States it is becoming a legitimate peer competitor. But not only China is augmenting its naval forces; Russia and India are also attempting to strengthen their navies. Kaplan surmises that India will soon possess the third-largest navy.¹⁹¹ Forces engaged in expeditionary operations depend especially on safe passage in both open ocean and coastal waters. As Till observes, "This kind of assured theater access, in turn, depends on naval forces securing the degree of sea control necessary for them to operate effectively and for the shipping they protect to arrive safely at its

destination and operate there according to requirements.¹⁹² Therefore sea control has to remain a core function and priority for the USN.

In the first decades after World War II, the Navy emphasized two missions, projection of force and nuclear deterrence.¹⁹³ Both were direct reactions to the environment of the Cold War and the possibility of confrontation with the Soviet Union. Deterrence works best when there are constants and certainty in the international system.¹⁹⁴ But it has not lost its value with the end of the Cold War; deterrence without the Soviet Union has, according to Brooks, become even more convincing.¹⁹⁵ The focus has largely shifted to conventional deterrence. Although it is impossible to measure how much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring any specific adversary, naval operations can help display national power and signal national will, both essential components of deterrence. The Navy has to adapt deterrence strategies to the party it wishes to deter; different enemies require different types of deterring forces. Today, Gerson argues, “with two ongoing wars already straining the military, concerns about a recalcitrant and militarized Russia, Iran’s continued uranium enrichment activities, North Korea’s nascent nuclear arsenal, and top-to-bottom military modernization in China, adversary-specific deterrence strategies will likely become a prominent component of national and international security in an increasingly multipolar world.”¹⁹⁶


But not only naval forces contribute to deterrence. The Army and Air Force argue that they are better suited for this task and that forward presence is not a necessary capability. The Army reasons that because deterrence is mostly related to perception, land power is more influential and effective. The Air Force, for its part, views deterrence as a task that can be fulfilled from a distance. In this view, new technology trumps forward presence and will help to stabilize the post-Cold War world order.¹⁹⁷ A study by Gerson and Daniel Whiteneck lays out in graphic form the functions of the different U.S. armed forces in deterrence missions.¹⁹⁸

Gerson and Whiteneck cite North Korea as an instance where “U.S. presence on the Korean peninsula has apparently deterred North Korean aggression against South Korea for over five decades (although . . . we cannot definitively prove that North Korea has wanted to attack the South at any time since the Korean War).”¹⁹⁹ While land-based presence is assumed to be a more effective deterrent, stationing troops on foreign soil becomes, as we have noted, increasingly more difficult. Forward naval forces and sea basing offer alternatives. Conventional deterrence is closely linked with forward deployment, intended to act as a deterrent or for immediate reaction if deterrence fails, in what Jerome Burke and his coauthors rename “forward deterrence.”²⁰⁰

Beginning with a traditional status as a by-product of other naval missions, the presence mission has grown to the Navy’s most important contribution to peacetime operations.

FIGURE 4

Deterrence Capabilities by U.S. Armed Forces (adapted from Gerson and Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence, p. 61)



During the Cold War the Navy identified its principal duties as containing Soviet expansion, destroying the Soviet navy in case of war, securing command of the sea, and contributing to nuclear deterrence with the help of forward forces. As part of this strategy, the Navy recognized the diplomatic leverage its forces could produce when forward deployed. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, it began searching for a new strategy, and a resulting white paper, *From the Sea*, stated that the Navy–Marine Corps team was reorienting toward a littoral strategy intended to focus on influencing events ashore.²⁰¹ As part of this strategy, the Navy stated, the highest peacetime priority was achieving diplomatic benefits by the forward presence of naval vessels. Forward presence had evolved to a core function of the USN. Today the GWOT relies on and calls for forward presence in critical regions. NOP 2010 even states that “forward presence facilitates all other naval missions, most importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force.”

But the concept and the amount of forward presence are intensely debated. Some argue it puts an unnecessary strain on forces and diverts combat power from other areas.

Others argue that forward presence makes the Navy capable of reacting immediately, influencing events, or nipping crises in the bud before they can seriously break out or escalate. In any case, the justification goes both ways: the Navy needs to be there to respond rapidly, and because the Navy *is* there, it is the first force to arrive on a scene. Presence is not risk-free, as, for example, the bombing in 2000 of the guided-missile destroyer USS *Cole* (DDG 67) in Yemen painfully demonstrated. Conversely, events such as the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 clearly underscored the value of forward presence. The USN was the first military force to arrive and provide crucial help. As Admiral Mullen said,

We must be able to continue to react quickly in times of humanitarian crises and with resolve in times of conflict. We must deter and dissuade potential adversaries in peacetime through persistent forward presence, and respond instantaneously in war by amassing overwhelming and lethal combat power. As we learned in Indonesia, and as we are seeing in the international relief efforts in earthquake-stricken Pakistan today [a Pakistani zone of Kashmir was, when the admiral wrote in 2006, recovering with substantial U.S. military assistance from an earthquake that had occurred in October 2005], virtual presence is not the answer. You need to be there to make a difference.²⁰²

Although acknowledging the great influence of the Navy–Marine Corps teams, exerted without leaving footprints, Kaplan argues that the “United States was able to lead the relief effort off the coast of Indonesia only because the carrier strike group USS *Abraham Lincoln* happened to be in the vicinity and not in the Korean Peninsula, where it was headed.”²⁰³ However, even a deployment from the Korean Peninsula would have shortened the reaction time dramatically compared to a surge from the continental United States. Kaplan further points out that while this was a humanitarian mission, the necessary skills resembled a war situation, with the need for rapid assembly of ships and aircraft. During the crisis sea basing proved highly valuable. All land routes had been damaged, and supplies could be delivered only by air, but the United States could perform its services independently of land access. Furthermore the geographic conditions (an impassable mountain range in the northwest of the affected province, Aceh) favored access from the sea.²⁰⁴

Forward presence clearly helps the United States respond rapidly, and it supports not only deterrence and power projection but also HA and DR, maritime security, and diplomatic initiatives. Additionally, concepts like sea basing demonstrate the importance of forward naval forces for other military services. The capabilities of “being there” and influencing without leaving footprints are unique and make naval forces important. No other service can replace these advantages. “For example, a U.S. military base in Okinawa, Japan, simultaneously provides a forward base to deter North Korea, prevents Japan from increasing defense spending and becoming a potential military rival to the United States, and provides U.S. Marines an important training area.”²⁰⁵ Notwithstanding the current debate over which types of forces best provide presence, the real question

is: Which forces will work successfully across the widest possible spectrum of events to influence future international situations?²⁰⁶ Giving up global presence would surrender the initiative to adversaries, unless naval forces were deployed preemptively from the continental United States. But any preemptive deployment or attack would involve great costs, both domestically and internationally. Any policy/decision maker would take preemptive action only after much deliberation and with great care.

Dismukes describes forward forces as “immune to this problem.”²⁰⁷ Augmenting already deployed forward forces has smaller political costs and “express[es] unambiguous U.S. commitment in the most compelling form of political communication: the language of action.” Forward forces have the capability to demonstrate American intentions and are likely to be more credible than words alone. Further, Dismukes points to the lack of experience of forces that have remained in the continental United States with potential crisis locations. Through forward presence they become familiar with conditions, environments, and possible partners. Forward-deployed forces frequently engage in exercises with foreign navies, enhancing their interoperability with potential allies. Cultural awareness is crucial to fostering trust and building relationships. Only frequent interaction can create such an environment. Furthermore, cooperation with foreign forces is necessary to learn their procedures and prepare for combined military operations. Hans Binnendijk emphasizes as well the benefits of close cooperation for diplomatic initiatives:

Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace has demonstrated. . . . Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without which American influence would rapidly decline. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to America’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian concerns.²⁰⁸

Additionally, the backing-up of diplomacy with force is more effective when forces are in proximity and immediately ready to react; an example would be a suddenly necessary evacuation of an embassy. Forces based at home require time and would deploy only after a warning of a possible or actual crisis. In 2002 a Center for Strategic Studies study researched warning times in crises, distinguishing between “out of the blue” cases (no warning time), “peaks in messes” (situations of concern that have slowly arisen until a certain event led the United States to deploy forces), “slowly gathering cases” (“no particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.S. response. The responses became a matter of when the United States found the situation so intolerable that it decided to act”), and “those where it was the U.S.’s choice of the time to initiate some action” (“that is, warning time was not the problem since a situation existed beforehand and there was no precipitating attack or incident that the U.S. was responding to”). The study’s author found that even when there is sufficient warning time, sometimes years,

the forces actually used are most often already overseas, and thus forward presence greatly helps the United States to respond to crises. The most important value of forward forces lies in small-scale crises and when action is required immediately, but even for larger interventions familiarity with the environment and closer proximity favor them over forces that have remained at home.²⁰⁹

All this argues that as long as the United States continues to have globally distributed national interests, those interests will need to be defended, and forward presence helps secure them and demonstrate the will and capacity to do so. But as mentioned above, budget restrictions threaten the status quo. In a recent CNA study, Whiteneck and coauthors concluded that the existing forward strategies based on combat-credible forward presence are unsustainable.²¹⁰ It is a fact that while the demand remains constant, resources are stagnating or even shrinking. In addition, great costs are associated with modernization, people, and infrastructure. The Navy's battle forces have decreased by 20 percent, while the number of deployments has remained more or less the same. The CNA coauthors suggest a "two hub" approach (credible combat power in East Asia *and* Arabian Sea/Indian Ocean, with reduction of global forward presence) or one "hub" (credible combat power only in East Asia, with global forward presence less than currently but still robust) to preserve sufficient forward presence to reassure allies and deter adversaries but not overstrain naval forces. The two-hub option would result in fewer resources for lower-end missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, engagement, shaping, and maritime policing. The one-hub scenario means an unbalanced fleet, with consequent loss of flexibility, but more resources for small-scale activities.

Alternatives such as reducing combat credibility overall while maintaining the global presence or significantly reducing forward presence while focusing more on surging naval forces are less attractive. But if the current forward posture is not reconsidered, the USN is at risk of losing influence and credibility. In this realm the importance of ESGs arises—less costly than carrier strike groups, this type of force presents a viable alternative for lower-intensity crises. The emphasis on combat-credible forward forces requires those forces to be strong, so that, while rarely engaged in combat alone, they might influence by virtue of their combat credibility. The CNA study's suggestion to concentrate on East Asia while keeping smaller forces globally dispersed would leave much of the globe with limited combat-credible forward presence.

It is not yet clear whether, for example, deterrence would have the same effect with smaller forces. The focus on East Asia, however, is in line with the steadily rising importance of the Indo-Pacific commons. NOP 2010 recognizes the difficulties posed by forward presence but nonetheless continues to emphasize its importance: "The challenge is to employ *globally distributed, mission-tailored forces* across a wide range of missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism; while maintaining

the capability to *regionally concentrate credible combat power* to protect vital American interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces and forces surged from the United States, along with those of allies and partners, must be sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad spectrum of crises.²¹¹ It remains to be seen how this will affect the Navy and its functions in the coming years.

Summary

The goal of chapter 1 was twofold. First, it intended to show the importance of seaborne crisis response and the need of an approach focusing on the military services separately, rather than treating armed forces as a unity. Second, it provided an introduction into the different naval core missions, with emphasis on peacetime activities, linking them to recent developments. Which military service is best for what purpose is widely debated, and as this study develops it will link naval advantages, disadvantages, and crisis response in more detail. Because of the differences between the military services, it is important to appreciate the impact of the uniqueness of each part of the armed forces. A better understanding of why, how, and when naval forces are sent to respond to a crisis can enhance crisis-response effectiveness. The influence of latent use of force and the frequent employment of the USN as an instrument of foreign policy in times of peace point to the importance of a more in-depth inquiry of the influence of uniquely naval attributes. The next chapter provides the theoretical background and relevant literature for hypotheses explaining naval crisis response.

Notes

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Just Enough Force? A Theoretical Framework for Seaborne Crisis Response

In having a peacetime political function in addition to their combat capabilities, naval forces are like all other forms of military power, only more so.

EDWARD LUTTWAK

There is no single theory directly linking the involvement of the United States in international crises with the use of naval forces.¹ However, there are many theories explaining the motivations of the use of force and assumptions about the advantages as well as disadvantages of naval power. The first part of this chapter will briefly summarize the history of the American use of force, followed by the three dominant schools of thought for justifying intervention decisions: realist, idealist, and diversionary theories. These theories will serve as an introduction into the U.S. use of force, but not all directly influence the hypotheses drawn later.

There are a variety of different approaches states can employ in reacting to international conflicts and crises. Political leaders can publicly voice disapproval, announce political or economic sanctions, engage in negotiations, support mediation attempts, undertake diplomatic efforts, or employ violence. This diversity of possible responses suggests the many tools at the disposal of the decision makers. As Meernik says, “the United States has utilized a vast arsenal of foreign policy carrots and sticks to induce, compel, and deter changes in other nations’ foreign policies.”² Often, especially since the end of the Cold War, the United States has relied on military forces to respond to crises.³ Ideally, military force is used as only a last resort, but frequently it not only serves as a backup for other forms of engagement but substitutes for them. However, military power can be employed in many different ways and forms; it is not confined to war fighting.

The second part of this chapter focuses on the use of naval power and crisis-response capabilities. Because naval forces share a number of attributes with ground and land-based air forces, I will attempt to identify any significant circumstances where naval

capabilities are of unique value, especially for operations short of full-scale war.⁴ Together with the advantages/disadvantages of seaborne forces, these considerations will inform the building of measurable hypotheses. Rather than establishing a single theory of naval deployments, I pursue here a general inquiry that encompasses as many factors as possible in order to answer four main questions—pertaining to the relations between the use of naval forces and crisis characteristics, actors, U.S. activity, and outcomes—to determine where future research will be useful.

Explaining the U.S. Use of Force

Up until the twentieth century, as Gerald Astor describes, Americans used force as a means of protecting national security or self-defense.⁵ The war against the Barbary States, the War of 1812, and the Civil War are cited as examples. The war with Mexico (1846–48) was fought for territorial gains, and the Spanish-American War (1898) can be seen as a demonstration of American power in the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. Within the United States, the Sioux wars (between 1854 and 1890) exemplify a fight for territory between U.S. and Indian forces.⁶

Motives behind Intervention Decisions

Since the founding of the Republic, the United States has deployed forces overseas for many purposes short of war. Prior to World War II, these included protecting commerce and trade routes, deterring and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating relations with foreign governments, restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of debts, and defending American citizens and interests during regional upheavals.⁷ Strictly speaking, the United States was never truly isolationist. For example, U.S. military forces have been committed in East Asia since 1898 and have frequently intervened in the Western Hemisphere.⁸

By the twentieth century, however, the United States had troops almost constantly deployed around the world.⁹ Feste identifies four moments in American history that have shaped intervention policy: World War II, the middle of the Vietnam War, the end of the Cold War, and one decade post-Cold War.¹⁰ Before World War II, American military capabilities were limited; real global intervention activism and commitment began only after the war.¹¹ The United States was resolved to remain actively involved in world affairs and to prevent a unilateral buildup of hostile might. Munich was engraved in the minds of American presidents. No longer were the main reasons for using force threats to U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, its citizens, or—however rarely—the homeland.

During the Cold War, the use of force centered on the standoff between the two superpowers. Protection of the free world, maintenance of the balance of power, and

prevention of Soviet gain of territory or the spread of communism dominated U.S. foreign policy. The United States tried to keep the Western Hemisphere, and as many other Third World nations as possible, under American control.¹² In Vietnam, the United States suffered a major defeat and for a while became more reluctant to use force (openly) abroad. But Jeffrey Record interprets the lesson from Vietnam not as an example to discredit U.S. use of force but rather as evidence of the mismatch between conventional military power and revolutionary forces.¹³ The two paradigms, Munich and Vietnam, influence most presidents in their attitudes toward intervention.

In the wake of the Cold War, the United States no longer faced an equal adversary, and its military supremacy became unchallenged.¹⁴ Escalations with the Soviet Union, triggered by involvement in countries located in the Soviet sphere of interest, did not influence U.S. intervention decisions any more.¹⁵ The danger of a war between the superpowers had been eliminated, but conflicts and crises persisted, and military power remains essential, rendering the “responsibility of global leadership greater than ever.”¹⁶ As many crises and conflicts have occurred since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union as prior to those momentous events. As Richard Neal says, “While the Cold War superpower contest is over, the world may be a more peaceful place, but it is not a world at peace.”¹⁷ According to Art, military power continues to be important because the relations between states remain anarchic.¹⁸ Thus military force and foreign policy stay closely linked.¹⁹

Some even see a rising importance of intervention since the end of the Cold War.²⁰ Humanitarian interventions, for example, have emerged as a new post-Cold War phenomenon.²¹ Human suffering, brought to the American homes on television, has led to interventions mainly undertaken to halt human-rights abuses.²² In general, military operations other than war gained momentum in the post-Cold War era.²³ The increase of overt intervention after the end of the Cold War, according to Feste, can be attributed to a combination of diminished concern about Soviet involvement, the rising importance of economic criteria, and reemphasis on idealistic considerations, such as human rights and democracy.²⁴ While American intervention policy continues to be strongly oriented to national interests, humanitarian concerns—and, since 9/11, antiterrorism—seem to have replaced communist containment. The year 2001 brought the global war on terror and opened a new chapter in the justification of U.S. use of force—preemptive strikes, democratization, and a new (or renewed) moralization of warfare. The communist threat from the Cold War had shifted to the terrorist threat, no longer confined to states but instead found among individuals and transnational and international organizations. But in Paul Atwood’s words the war on terror “is in keeping with the long history of American foreign policy.”²⁵ Some even argue that military supremacy has become part of the national identity.²⁶

Thomas Barnett highlights the changes in the U.S. intervention pattern.²⁷ Key targets are countries located in what Barnett calls the “gap,” that part of the world excluded from the benefits of globalization and therefore outside the “core”: “Simply put, . . . [if a] country was losing out to globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, there was a far greater chance that the United States would end up sending troops there at some point across the 1990s.” The 9/11 attacks triggered another change. Barnett speaks of a time of chaos and uncertainty and of the necessity to “defend all against all.”²⁸ Since the demise of the Soviet Union, no coherent strategy for when force should be used had been established. “Today, America and the world stand at a crossroad similar to the one we faced following World War II. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have provided us all a glimpse of the new form of international crisis that will define our age.”²⁹ The attacks of 2001 represented a milestone in the international security system. States were no longer the exclusive actors but gave way to substate and transstate systems.³⁰ During the 1990s, Washington mainly concentrated on individual enemies, whereas the Cold War had focused on a hostile order. Rogue states and their leaders, failing states, extremists, and terrorists became new targets.³¹ The war on terrorism focuses mostly on individuals or groups and on countries providing them with support and safe havens. During the Cold War the West faced a known threat from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China, which had well-known intentions and goals. Today the motives and moves are less predictable. In the words of the former American secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, new military thinking is now required to arm Western societies “against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”³²

Soft Power?

Feste observes that “the United States is widely perceived as emphasizing military power as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other forms of soft power.”³³ Joseph Nye has frequently warned that the United States has lost “soft power”—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them.³⁴ The United States both undervalues this form of power and underestimates its importance. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment that employed soft power along with hard power. After 9/11 the United States pursued a unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve all security problems, not only damaging its hard power but also seriously setting back its soft power. Damage to hard power can be made good in a relatively short period, whereas losses in soft power are long lasting and require fundamental policy changes to address. The preemption doctrine has removed “the distinction between imminent (immediate) and potential future threats. It assumes that grave threats are now *always* imminent.” This thought process leads to the devaluation of diplomacy and negotiation and shifts

the emphasis to the use of force as an immediate resource, thereby failing to distinguish between short- and long-term threats and different adversaries. The result is a more complex security scenario and greater instability.³⁵ The soft-power dilemma has triggered persistent discussions in the U.S. academic community. The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), an American think tank in Washington, D.C., held in 2007 special seminars involving such former government officials and expert as Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Armitage, and Joseph Nye.³⁶ The consensus view was the need for a new balance on the part of the United States if it was to prolong its hegemony. The participants “proposed to use hard and soft power in coordination as ‘rational strength’ in order to realize strategic national security goals.”³⁷ Nye had previously defined this “combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persuasion and attraction” as smart power.

Two years later, in 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates proposed the following approach:

What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.³⁸

This statement supports the smart-power commission’s call for a soft-power approach linked with military force.³⁹

A policy shift became visible with the release of a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2010 and the 2010 QDR. Both strategic documents recognized the importance of soft power and emphasized the American interest in focusing on it. If necessary, however, soft power can be backed up by hard power, which suggests a combination of the two. Naval forces are a uniquely appropriate smart-power tool, because of their global presence, frequent interactions, diplomatic potential, and low intrusiveness. This point is reflected in the newest maritime strategy, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” and NOP 10.⁴⁰ The latter explains how naval forces “will blend soft and hard power in support of the approach, objectives and enduring national interests articulated in the National Defense Strategy (NDS).” According to Bruce Elleman, “during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very thought that sea powers might regularly use naval platforms to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century, however, national power and prestige are more and more characterized by ‘soft power.’”

UNIFIED ASSISTANCE [after the tsunami in Southeast Asia] showed that ‘hard power’ assets like aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of ‘soft power.’”⁴¹

Realism, Idealism, and Diversionary Theory

Policy and decision makers face the challenge of deciding whether, when, and how to use force.⁴² A large body of literature, with the help of various theoretical approaches, has studied how the use of military force has helped to promote U.S. foreign-policy goals.⁴³ Three schools of thought—realism, idealism, and diversionary theory—capture the main paradigms. Realism remains the most important for studying the use of force and international relations.⁴⁴ In classical realism, sovereign states are the dominant actors in the international system, which is characterized by anarchy. Nation-states are in a constant state of competition as they seek power, maximization of security, and material wealth.⁴⁵ This struggle shapes the conduct of foreign policy and international relations. Political, military, and economic assets can be used to support power and security. In its exercise of foreign policy, the state depends on public support and economic resources. However, domestic politics are (for the most part) secondary in the formulation of foreign policy in the realist paradigm.⁴⁶ Hans Morgenthau and E. H. Carr are among the main proponents of classical realism, the roots of which go as far back as Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli.⁴⁷

Unlike classical realism, the reformulated neorealism, or structural realism, downplays the importance of the individual and human nature in explaining why states seek power and sees the pursuit of power as a derivative of international structure.⁴⁸ Even without an imminent threat, states, treated in the aggregate, as “black boxes,” are considered well advised to pursue power sufficient for self-defense. Different forms and interpretations, such as defensive and offensive, have emerged.⁴⁹ Defensive realists argue against the maximization of power, because they believe the system will punish states that attempt to gain too much power, whereas offensive realists would maximize power to the point of hegemony: “The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival. For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means to an end and the ultimate end is survival.”⁵⁰ National interests are closely linked to realist thinking, as they are essential for power and security: “The dominant paradigm in world politics—realism—would suggest that interventions take place only when clear national interests are at stake.”⁵¹

John Ikenberry describes the mainstream of American foreign policy since World War II as influenced by either realist or liberalist considerations.⁵² These two strategies have guided American presidents in their foreign-policy orientations. Liberal institutionalism, like idealism, acknowledges the importance of multilateralism, international law,

international institutions, and democracy. U.S. power can help to create a more peaceful and cooperative world, the vision of Woodrow Wilson. Following this ideal, foreign policy should prefer a “carrot” rather than a “stick” approach and downplay the role of military force. David Skidmore, analyzing American presidents from Nixon to G. W. Bush, identifies Nixon’s foreign policy as most “realist,” whereas he believes Jimmy Carter and William Clinton favored a liberal institutionalist approach; Carter was a strong advocate of human rights, and Clinton promoted “assertive multilateralism.”⁵³ But both presidents began shifting their policies toward realism as a result of international events and domestic pressure. He describes Ronald Reagan and (after the 9/11 attacks) Bush as followers of neoconservatism. While the Reagan administration engaged in covert operations to topple socialist and communist regimes, the “Bush doctrine” and the GWOT endorsed overt regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan. Ikenberry argues that the Bush doctrine sets a new precedent of unilateralism, involving less reliance on allies and global institutions in the battle against terrorism and rogue states.⁵⁴ He criticizes the U.S. use of military force to refashion the global order and favors more attention to the international community and world stability. Francis Fukuyama cautions that “neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and American hegemony. What is needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how America is to relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the universality of human rights, but without illusions about the efficacy of American power and hegemony to bring these ends about.”⁵⁵

Generally, realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the importance of institutions, while liberals value the importance of institutions but are skeptical of the use of power to restructure them. But Steven Brooks and William Wohlforth argue that the benefits of international institutions are grounded in realism—that it will be more challenging for the United States to advance its national interests if it does not invest in those institutions.⁵⁶ A discussion sparked in April 2010 after remarks by the former White House chief of staff Rahm Emanuel highlighted the difficulties of labeling a president’s orientation in regard to idealism and realism. Rahm told the *New York Times*, “If you had to put him [Barack Obama] in a category, he’s probably more realpolitik, like Bush 41 [that is, G. H. W. Bush]. . . . He knows that personal relationships are important, but you’ve got to be cold-blooded about the self-interests of your nation.”⁵⁷ Several scholars reacted in *Foreign Policy* to the categorization. Whereas Robert Kagan sees Obama’s foreign policy as oriented to idealism, Stephen Walt and Charles Kupchan see a tilt into a realist direction. Thus a clear categorization is nearly impossible and often depends more on the nature of the decision that needs to be made.⁵⁸ Similarly Nye

points out that Obama should not be categorized as either idealist or realist but rather as oriented toward liberal realism.⁵⁹

To capture this variety, Miskel distinguishes two different types of realists, one with a very narrow definition of what constitutes national interests and the other one with a more inclusive definition that captures such events as Bosnia and Kosovo.⁶⁰ He sees most American presidents as bracketed between those two. America's announced conditions for intervention are very broad.⁶¹ Vital national interest is a reoccurring theme and offers the main rationale for intervention decisions. Glenn Hastedt draws a complex picture of individuals and institutions "competing for positions of prominence in setting 'values and priorities'" leading to a variety of different national interests.⁶²

There exists no agreement on the exact definition of national interests. Security and power are clearly dominant, whereas humanitarian issues are secondary and normally not categorized as vital. For Record, only a direct attack on or threat to the American territory and its citizens is widely accepted as a prime vital national interest.⁶³ Art lists six categories of national interests for the United States, ranked from highest to lowest: prevent an attack on the United States; prevent a war between the major powers in Eurasia; preserve access to oil reserves; maintain an open international economic order; spread democracy, promote upholding human rights, and prevent genocide and mass murder in civil wars; and preserve the global environment.⁶⁴ The first three are the most important ones and largely dominate policy making. Art argues that military power can guarantee the first three vital interests but not the next three: "In general, military power cannot be efficiently and effectively employed to force states to lower their barriers to trade, to create democracy in states that have never experienced it, or to force others to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Military power can be directly used to prevent aggression against the Persian Gulf oil sheikhdoms, or to preserve Eurasian great-power peace, by deterring would-be adversaries and reassuring America's great-power allies." The fifth in this list is an idealistic goal and by itself largely irrelevant for realist intervention decisions. Art proposes a strategy of selective engagement, between isolationist, unilateralist, and highly global interventionist. This strategy—what he calls "realpolitik plus"—follows both realist and liberalist ideals. Beside power and security, the promotion of democracy, human rights, free markets, and international openness are important goals of U.S. foreign policy. Military power is fundamental to selective engagement, as it furthers both military and nonmilitary goals.⁶⁵ Many different reasons for interventions have been given, but the most powerful and enduring motive has been security.⁶⁶ Feste comes to the conclusion that although intervention to protect human rights, spread democracy, or support peacekeeping missions has increased after the Cold War, these purposes cannot outweigh national interests.⁶⁷ Andrew Bacevich makes a similar statement: "I am pretty idealistic, but when it comes to American statecraft,

despite all our talk about American idealism, ideals matter only when they coincide with U.S. interest.⁶⁸ Once military operations are under way, the rhetoric shifts to idealistic goals rather than realist ones.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, these commentaries point to the overall dominance of national interest for the decision-making process.

Traditionally, “just war” theory is used for moral justification of certain interventions and wars by reference to universal values. Unlike pacifism, just war theory does not oppose all uses of force but gives clear limitations and offers guidelines as to when it is morally legitimate.⁷⁰ After the Vietnam War the theory gained increased recognition in the United States. Just-war theory comprises two parts: *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello*; the former describes the legitimate conditions for intervention, and the latter sets rules for the behavior of soldiers and states engaged in a war. Only the first category is relevant to the intervention decision. The principles trace back to Augustine in the early fifth century and to the work of Thomas Aquinas from 1265 to 1273.⁷¹ Aquinas defined three main criteria for when a war can be just.⁷²

- Just cause (e.g., violent attack)
- Right authority (e.g., United Nations)
- Right intention (e.g., to end violence).

Other definitions, such as that put forward by the *Responsibility to Protect* report of 2001, add last resort, proportionality of means, and reasonable prospect to the list.⁷³ Frequently American presidents have rhetorically employed one or more of the just-war principles to justify decisions and portray the U.S. role as a moral force, especially in promoting democracy and human rights. In the prelude to the 2003 war in Iraq, just-war principles were evoked to justify actions within “a broader moral, cultural and humanistic framework.”⁷⁴ Thus, as mentioned above, realist decisions can be linked to idealist rhetoric to “sell” intervention to the public.

Another school of thought focuses on the importance of domestic politics for foreign policy making. The “diversionary” theory assumes a connection between domestic politics and the decision to intervene.⁷⁵ Factors such as high inflation rates, high unemployment, recession or economic stagnation, and low presidential approval rates can encourage a diversionary focus on foreign policy. Benjamin Fordham empirically supports the assumption that interventions are more likely in times of high unemployment rates and low presidential-popularity ratings.⁷⁶ Although realists commonly reject the impact of domestic politics and considerations on foreign-policy decision making, some scholars emphasize it.⁷⁷ For example, Robert Gilpin acknowledges the importance of domestic factors for explaining uses of force.⁷⁸ In Paul Huth’s words, “state leaders are rational foreign policy decision makers who seek to remain in power, but they are also

concerned with promoting the international security of their country and are therefore careful to pursue security policies that do not undermine their domestic political position. . . . [B]oth domestic political concerns and international power considerations determine foreign policy choices.”⁷⁹

These interpretations illustrate the importance of a combination of theoretical approaches in explaining intervention decisions. Meernik’s 2004 *The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy*, already cited, is one of the most comprehensive research accounts of why the United States employs military force. His empirical analyses include realist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest considerations, and his various hypotheses integrate different theories in a historical context. His empirical findings strongly suggest an orientation to realist goals, such as power and security. The results for the realist model are the most convincing and provide the best explanation for decisions to use force.

However, no single model is all-powerful. While the realist model is superior to other models, the liberalist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest models also help to understand when the United States will use force. This finding supports the observation that no president is oriented to any single school of thought. As circumstances dictate, different reasons justify their decisions. What remains convincing, however, is the dominance of national interest; thus for this study I assume that the greater the threat to national interests, the stronger and more forceful the U.S. response will be. In this connection it is interesting to see how seaborne responses are influenced by national interests and how this affects naval deployments with other forces.

How Can Naval Forces Influence International Crises (Behavior)?

American military power serves as an instrument of foreign policy by its very existence. Without ever having to be used or even referred to, it heightens U.S. prestige and lends importance to proposals and expressions of concern. The knowledge that it exists influences both how American policy makers approach problems and what positions other states adopt.⁸⁰ As laid out in the previous chapter, naval forces are characterized by unique capabilities especially valuable for crisis response and the political use of force. The power of the use of force short of war is summarized in the following words by G. F. Hudson:

In traditional international politics the use of force has not been confined to actual war, but has won its greatest success when governments have been intimidated into compliance with the will of a stronger (or more determined) power without any clash of arms taking place. War can even be regarded as a failure in the application of force, just as the killing of a cashier by a bank robber usually implies that the robber has failed to intimidate by pointing a gun and has had to carry out his threat in action.⁸¹

Luttwak's Suasion


Luttwak describes the political use of sea power as “armed suasion.” He defines the phenomenon as follows: “Armed suasion defines all reactions, political or tactical, elicited by all parties—allies, adversaries, or neutrals—to the existence, display, manipulation, or symbolic use of any instrument of military power, whether or not such reactions reflect any deliberate intent of the deploying party. Naval suasion refers to effects evoked by sea-based or sea-related forces.”⁸² Suasion can be active or latent, coercive or supportive, deterrent or positive. What all forms have in common is dependence on the reactions of others. Essentially, armed suasion is about threat perception, not the actual use of force. Suasion materializes in reactions by other actors taken because of their perceptions, not in actions by or intentions of the “suasor.” Yet armed suasion is feasible only if resort to force is possible and convincingly plausible.

Active suasion includes any deliberate attempt to induce a specific reaction from the target, whether an ally, enemy, or neutral. Latent suasion, exercised through routine or undirected naval operations, works best as a deterrent but can also be supportive, reminding allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid. Further, suasion can manifest itself in signs of support (supportive mode) or can be aimed at deterring (deterrence mode) the adversary.⁸³ The coercive aspect of active suasion can deter or compel, while the supportive form reassures allies or clients.⁸⁴ Michael Codner illustrates Luttwak’s different modes of suasion with the graph given in figure 5.⁸⁵

One example given by Luttwak of unintended effects brought about by latent suasion involves U.S. naval activity in the Mediterranean in the years following World War II.⁸⁶

FIGURE 5

Armed Suasion (adapted from Codner, “Defining Deterrence,” p. 2)



While the U.S. Sixth Fleet was consciously deterring Russian and Arab moves against American interests, it may also have been giving unintended encouragement to Israeli activism in a manner inimical to the interests of the United States. The active version of supportive suasion is exemplified by the visit of the battleship USS *Missouri* (BB 63) to Istanbul in March 1946, a visit that marked the beginning of the postwar deployment of American naval power in the Mediterranean. The *Missouri* episode demonstrated the political application of naval power—the use of ships as symbols, rather than instruments, of power. The offensive power represented by *Missouri* was secondary in importance to gaining the declared commitment to Turkey. According to Luttwak this “symbolic” role is preventive of, rather than reactive to, a confrontation.⁸⁷ In my view, the symbolic power of warships can be influential at any time in a crisis, be it to convince adversaries to desist from hostilities, to encourage the termination of the crisis, or to prevent escalation.

Another example is the crisis triggered by tension between Taiwan and China in 1950. Elements of the U.S. Seventh Fleet were deployed between Taiwan and China to dissuade, and if necessary to thwart, any attempt to mount an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. At the same time, any potential unintended supportive effects for the Nationalists were neutralized by a public declaration that the fleet would also intervene to prevent a Nationalist landing on the mainland. In this case, the deterrent effect on the communist government was actually reinforced by emphasizing the supportive role of the Seventh Fleet: Beijing’s incentive to invade Taiwan was much reduced when the Nationalist threat to the mainland was neutralized. This incident again highlights the advantages of naval forces, which are flexible in a sense that has no equivalent on land. Overall, since 1945 the U.S. Navy has exercised different forms of suasion, on many occasions, at all levels of intensity, and all around the world. What Luttwak labels “suasion” can more generally be termed “naval diplomacy,” working to influence and persuade minds rather than manifesting itself in physical action.⁸⁸

Naval Diplomacy

During the nineteenth century, “naval diplomacy” was added to the naval vocabulary.⁸⁹ Over the course of history, naval forces have been used frequently and successfully to support political-diplomatic initiatives by influencing behavior and have established their role as the predominant military instrument of diplomacy.⁹⁰

History of Naval Diplomacy. With their capabilities to deploy forward, remain in international waters, stay on station indefinitely, interact with friendly countries, monitor crisis spots, withdraw when no longer needed, and respond with military power, naval forces have exercised diplomatic power to great effect.⁹¹ Sir Julian Corbett regarded

the support or obstruction of diplomatic efforts as the central task of naval fleets.⁹² As Deborah Sanders observes, “Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests in a particular region, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle reminders of their states’ military might and commitment.”⁹³ John Stuart Mill observed, “our diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it.”⁹⁴ At the lower end of the diplomatic spectrum are such measures as demonstrating presence, visiting ports, showing the flag, exercises, and other confidence-building activities. “Ship visits can be a useful form of diplomatic exchange, help maintain or secure good relations, and win popular favour.”⁹⁵

Sailors frequently help communities on land. Examples that foster goodwill and reassure American support include volunteer work, such as helping to build hospitals and schools, or invitations to foreign nationals to visit U.S. Navy ships.⁹⁶ Naval vessels also operate periodically as hospital ships (in addition to actual Navy-operated hospital ships) for poor countries and deploy in humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief missions.⁹⁷ Further traditional diplomatic peacetime activities center on cooperation with foreign military forces—military-to-military contacts, exercises with foreign navies, officer training, and access agreements—as means of demonstrating and building positive political relationships.⁹⁸ As Blechman says, these operations “provide the backbone of the strategy of global engagement.”⁹⁹ At the higher end, armed suasion is the most forceful aspect of diplomacy.¹⁰⁰ The term “naval diplomacy” has been used so broadly that it can be defined as encompassing all events, even including violence, that do not lead to war.¹⁰¹

The ability of navies to provide diplomatic leverage has long been recognized by nations. Bob Davidson locates the origins of naval diplomacy in the heritage of colonial powers.¹⁰² These powers would dispatch vessels to foreign locations to boost their prestige and reputations and also to influence events. For the majority of the nineteenth century, the United States benefited from the gunboat diplomacy of the Royal Navy, and also to some extent of the French navy, in Chinese ports.¹⁰³ At the same time the USN conducted direct American diplomacy, and sailors served as ambassadors. Naval diplomacy today is a continuation of this tradition, aimed at influencing incidents on land by controlling the sea or by threatening to project power ashore if necessary. Max Boot compares the original tasks of gunboat diplomacy with the ones of the World Trade Organization today.¹⁰⁴ For Rob McLaughlin, the U.S. Navy is the principal military arm of American diplomacy in the post-World War II world.¹⁰⁵ Bouchard notes that “observers of naval diplomacy have concluded that changes in the structure and conduct of international politics since the end of World War II have been the primary factors causing maritime powers, particularly the United States, to place greater emphasis on the use of naval forces as a political instrument relative to land-based air and ground forces.”¹⁰⁶

Likewise, Cable states that “some of the constraints on the use of American military power to exert international influence are also such as almost to encourage reliance on limited naval force for this purpose.”¹⁰⁷ Others suggest domestic political constraints as the driving force.

Whereas such authors as Booth and Peter Nailor consider gunboat diplomacy a thing of the past and the use of naval forces for diplomacy as obsolescent, Ghosh expresses an opposite viewpoint, that reluctance to become involved in full-scale wars increases the need for naval diplomacy, which can be employed to achieve national objectives without engaging in open warfare. In the latter’s words, “the focus of armed conflict is shifting from traditional regular war to the use of military power on the lines of modern gunboat coercive diplomacy.”¹⁰⁸ Thomas Goodall emphasizes the technological advantages of the United States for conducting gunboat diplomacy.¹⁰⁹ He names carrier-based aviation, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault as unique capabilities that further its effectiveness. Since the USN enjoys unmatched capabilities and worldwide presence, coercive diplomacy will remain an important tool for U.S. policy makers.

According to Matthew Scarlett, coercive diplomacy can achieve tangible foreign policy objectives; however, it requires a fusion of political, diplomatic, and naval skills for success.¹¹⁰ “The great utility of coercive naval diplomacy is made apparent through the variety of objectives for which it can be applied. Potential objectives range from general expression of foreign policy at one extreme, to the outright expulsion of a foreign government at the other extreme. Often coercive naval diplomacy is used to persuade an adversary to change their behavior. Naval forces are also used to enforce peace between two adversaries by a third party.”¹¹¹ The North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in November 2010 triggered the deployment of a well-armed naval task force, involving the carrier *George Washington*, to the Yellow Sea. Pritchett calls this “a little bit of gunboat diplomacy,” with China and North Korea as target states.¹¹² China had warned the United States in the past not to send carriers to the Yellow Sea. With this move the United States cautioned North Korea not to escalate the situation and sent a signal to China to join the international denunciation of the North Korean aggression. As Pritchett says, “Gunboat diplomacy is always distinct to time and place, and even in the twenty-first century remains a policy of force intended to deter other nations from exercising the violent use of military power.”¹¹³

The following passage from Cable summarizes thinking on the usefulness of navies for diplomacy:

Curiously enough, the expressive use of coercive diplomacy is sometimes better attempted by actions than by words, by warships rather than by politicians or diplomats. . . . The movement of warships, however, can still convey a sense of menace that is plausible to the victim because it is potent yet undefined, but convenient to the aggrieved government, because it is simultaneously impressive

to domestic opinion and noncommittal. Warships can always be withdrawn, provided the purpose of their movement has been left a little vague: verbal threats become embarrassing if they are neither productive nor implemented.¹¹⁴

The Concept of Naval Diplomacy. The U.S. Navy underscores the areas of interest to the United States by maintaining presence and conducting regular or periodic visits. But the mere presence of its ships in home ports sends a *signal* of military readiness. The primary objective of signaling is to influence events by *shaping* the perceptions and attitudes of other nations. “The influence military forces can exert in the international arena is related to their presence (or capability to be present), their core capabilities, the political will to use those forces, and, most importantly, the *perception* of those who you seek to influence.”¹¹⁵ To be successful in changing the other parties’ behavior, the presence and movements of the ships have to seize their attention. Maintaining, augmenting, and withdrawing forces all attract attention. A periodic deployment or sustained presence serves as a symbolic use of force and can attract the attention of foreign leaders. In order to signal *heightened* concern or interest, the naval force must be augmented or increase its readiness. Conversely, forces can also be left uncommitted or even sent in the opposite direction to indicate a determination not to get involved. While routine and presence functions are very similar to crisis management, they are more preventive, whereas the latter is more reactive. The choice of type of force and operation sends additional signals.¹¹⁶

While signaling can take place at any stage in a diplomatic crisis, it is most successful before a crisis is even reached.¹¹⁷ A show of interest (mere signaling) expresses the lowest level of activity. A show of resolve demonstrates intentions more clearly, and a show of force is the highest level. According to Allen, the appearance of ships and a public statement of intent are the key variables in the signaling process; the reaction of the target country establishes whether the operation is a success or failure.¹¹⁸ He distinguished four levels of signaling: routine peacetime presence (e.g., normal port visits); show of interest (expressing concern but without committing to any action); show of resolve (signal a commitment to a friend or to halt enemy action); and show of force (when the use of force in a specific way is threatened to resolve the crisis or influence its resolution to our satisfaction). Except for the first level, all can be reactions to international crises, because they divert naval forces from their regular employment. Allen states that if it is to be signaled that the United States is ready to intervene, an aircraft carrier or an amphibious force is required.¹¹⁹

When lower-level diplomatic activity is unsuccessful, actors frequently prefer a policy “combining diplomatic efforts with the threat of force”—*coercive diplomacy*—to achieve their goals in world politics.¹²⁰ If this attempt fails, the crisis escalates to a limited or general war.¹²¹ Cable emphasizes that threats are only credible when there is a real readiness

to use force.¹²² This implicit coercion is the “bread and butter of diplomacy.”¹²³ He defines this coercive “gunboat” diplomacy as “a resort to specific threats or to injurious actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”¹²⁴ With the help of coercive diplomacy, the employing actor aims at achieving an advantage from another state. If force is used for other than a specific advantage, it is no longer a diplomatic action. The same is true of inflicting damage after the desired objective has been achieved.¹²⁵ Cable distinguishes four types of coercive diplomacy:¹²⁶


- Definitive: creates a *fait accompli*, leaves the adversary no choice.
- Purposeful: induces the adversary to make a decision to do or stop something, such as policy change—success depends on victim.
- Catalytic: to influence events but is more manifest in a readiness to respond, such as through the presence of a naval force.
- Expressive: to emphasize attitudes and underline statements.

In his study on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy, Robert Mandel locates the roots of gunboat diplomacy in the theories of bargaining, signaling, deterrence, coercion, and force.¹²⁷ Like Luttwak’s *suasione*, gunboat diplomacy incorporates many aspects of the spectrum of possible reactions. According to Mandel, gunboat diplomacy is the most frequently used “show of force” tool.¹²⁸ Following Blechman and Kaplan, he defines a show of force as “when physical actions are undertaken by one or more components of the uniformed armed services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”¹²⁹ Mandel’s graph (figure 6) shows the different stages from the most general classification of gunboat diplomacy, presented by the widest circle, through the very specific, separate categorization.

Often “gunboat diplomacy” and “coercive diplomacy” are used interchangeably. Mandel observes that coercion “does seem to be at the core of gunboat diplomacy incidents.”¹³⁰ Christian Le Mière calls gunboat diplomacy a muscular negotiation that “attempts to achieve its goals, which will be either coercive or deterrent, through intimidation. It is, therefore, reliant upon a mismatch, or at least a perceived mismatch, between two states’ naval capabilities. A weaker navy will struggle to engage in gunboat diplomacy directed at a stronger adversary for the simple reason that its bluff may be called.”¹³¹ Generally it can be argued that gunboat diplomacy is more aggressive, overt, and offensive.¹³²

FIGURE 6

Conceptualization of the Theoretical Context of Gunboat Diplomacy (adapted from Mandel, "The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy," p. 61)



Coercion

Diplomacy is closely linked to coercion. Thomas Schelling was the first scholar to explore the power of coercion in depth. In his 1966 *Arms and Influence* he described war as “brute force” aimed at destroying the adversary’s capabilities. More promising are the coercion and intimidation of the enemy, as the power to hurt is more successful when it is latent. Schelling concludes that “the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted or that a victim believes can be withheld or inflicted. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it.”¹³³ His work clearly links diplomacy and violence. Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman more generally define coercion as “getting the adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force.”¹³⁴

Once distinguished from brute force, coercion is typically broken down into two subcategories, compellence and deterrence. Stephen Cimbala calls armed coercion “military persuasion,” a “psychological strategy intended to influence the decision of other state or nonstate actors, without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or society.”¹³⁵ As these different definitions show, the term can be broadly interpreted, especially in regard to the use of force. Bratton criticizes the lack of agreement on definitions and success of coercion.¹³⁶ Often the terms “coercion,” “compellence,” “coercive diplomacy,”

“military coercion,” “coercive military strategy,” and “strategic coercion” are used interchangeably. Bratton urges analysis of the effectiveness of coercion in “terms of positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or failures.”¹³⁷ His study provides a structured analysis of the most important research on coercion and groups scholars according to their different definitions of coercion characteristics. The figure presents the different types of threat involved in coercion.¹³⁸

Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion is different from deterrence)	Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, Robert Pape
Both compellent and deterrent threats (deterrence and compellence are both types of coercion)	Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellisberg, Wallace Thies, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, and Matthew Waxman

Note: For a detailed account of Robert Pape’s interesting discussion on airpower and coercive diplomacy see *Bombing to Win*. He advocates the denial strategy of coercion and rejects the punishing power of coercive airpower. His *denial theory* proposes that the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy *denies* him the probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.

A major disagreement revolves around the question whether force can be merely threatened or must actually be used. Whereas the deterrence literature does not focus on force—because deterrence has failed once force has to be employed—the coercion literature has three divisions: “coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of force; coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power); and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force.”¹³⁹ The first views the use of force as similar to deterrence: except for minor displays, force demonstrates the failure of coercion. This school underscores the political-diplomatic nature of coercion: “The goal of coercive diplomacy is to *persuade* the opponent to halt what he is doing, not to strike him until his capabilities are so reduced that further resistance is futile. ‘Coercive diplomacy, then, calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is used at all—to demonstrate one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.’”¹⁴⁰ The second division includes “sticks,” such as sanctions or force and threats of coercion, as an addition. Coercion occurs simultaneously with the use of force. However, the objective is not the destruction of the enemy’s military forces or territorial occupation but the compliance of the opposing state. Critics complain that this school of thought often makes fine distinctions between coercion and brute force. The third group does not distinguish between coercion with force and coercion without force. Coercion involves diplomatic and military means, including the use of force. “What distinguishes coercion from brute force in this school is that force is used in a measured and controlled way to ‘signal’ to the target the threat of further punishment unless it complies. . . . ‘Coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done.’”¹⁴¹ Table 2-1 presents advocates for the three different schools.

TABLE 2-1

Coercion <i>before</i> the use of force	George, Gross Stein
Coercion only <i>through</i> force	Pape
Coercion through diplomacy <i>and</i> force	Schelling, Thies

Thus, crisis coercion and brute force lie on a common continuum, as many different levels of force can be employed to coerce.¹⁴² While Schelling promotes coercion through both diplomacy and force, Alexander George urges the use of nonviolent coercion before force is used.¹⁴³ He articulates as an alternative to war a detailed coercive-diplomacy theory in which he describes the concept of coercive diplomacy as restricted to “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.” The offensive version of coercive threats, to persuade the victim aggressively to give up something, is referred to as “blackmail strategy.” Deterrence is also different because coercive diplomacy is employed as a response to something already undertaken. Compellence often includes both blackmail and coercive diplomacy. George, however, offers the criticism that compellence does not distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of coercion and provides less flexibility.¹⁴⁴

While coercive diplomacy employs coercive threats, it also includes noncoercive persuasion and accommodation. Coercive diplomacy tries to persuade an actor to cease an action and introduces the threat of punishment if he does not. This strategy relies on the restricted exemplary use of force. The adversary is given the opportunity to halt his action before more force is employed. Signaling, bargaining, and negotiating are important parts of this strategy. The goal is to avoid use of full-scale force and to minimize the risk of escalation.¹⁴⁵ Excessive use of force might have an effect contrary to that intended, by hardening the position of the opposing party, and result in a further escalation of tension.¹⁴⁶ Such characteristics of naval forces as limited intrusiveness and flexibility favor the role of the USN for this strategy. However, U.S. Marines, moving by sea, bring capabilities for seizing objectives that have proved especially valuable in threatened or actual interventions ashore.

George lists the impact of the following eight contexts on coercive diplomacy:¹⁴⁷

- *Type of provocation.* Certain provocations are more difficult to halt or even undo. For instance, a *fait accompli*, such as overrunning a neighboring country, is more challenging to reverse than coercing a state to halt an arms buildup.
- *Magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests.* Very important national interests are more complicated to manage and to reach a satisfactory solution for.

- *Image of war.* The more the parties want to avert an open war, because of the horrible consequences, the more restraint they will show in escalating tensions and the more amenable they will be to cooperation attempts (as was the case in, e.g., the Cuban missile crisis).
- *Time pressure to achieve objective.* Urgency felt by the parties to resolve the crisis (for example, because of fear of losing domestic support, the influence of weather on military operations, growing strength of the adversary, etc.).
- *Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy.* The more parties, the more difficult it is for them to speak with one voice. This loss of unity might outweigh the benefits of higher international pressure and greater resources.
- *Strong leadership.* The success of coercive diplomacy may depend on the pressure of strong and effective top-level leadership. Such leadership was provided by John F. Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis.
- *The isolation of the adversary.* Resolution is more difficult if the adversary is not (like Laos in 1961–62) an isolated state but is supported diplomatically and militarily by allies.
- *The preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary.* Parties who hope to improve the relationship after the termination of the crisis are more amenable to attempts to reach mutually acceptable outcomes.

Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly on context. George lists a number of conditions that favor coercive diplomacy.¹⁴⁸ First is the clarity of the objective of coercive diplomacy and what is demanded of the adversary. The second is strength of motivation (a necessary but not sufficient condition). The third is asymmetry of motivation—coercive diplomacy is more likely to be successful if the side employing it is more highly motivated by what is at stake in the crisis than its opponent. It is critical in this respect, however, that the adversary *believe* that the coercing power is more determined. The fourth is sense of urgency; the fifth, domestic and international support; and sixth, an opponent's fear of unacceptable escalation. Finally, the seventh is clarity concerning the precise terms of the settlement of the crisis.

The effectiveness of coercive diplomacy can be appraised differently in a variety of contexts. It succeeded during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 but failed for the Gulf War in 1990–91.¹⁴⁹ Positive incentives or negative, punishing threats can be employed. The assurance given to Cuba during the missile crisis was a positive inducement (carrots and sticks), while during the early stages of the Gulf War punishment was threatened.¹⁵⁰

The Problem of Effectiveness

As previously stated, naval forces can signal intentions, shape attitudes, and employ (coercive) diplomacy. This suggests the question of the *effectiveness* of naval forces in exercising these functions. How successful are naval forces at carrying out the different missions? Measuring effectiveness is complicated. Crises outcomes are often characterized by a mixture of success and failure.¹⁵¹ Because naval forces normally do not encroach on other nations' sovereign territory and their presence poses less of a threat than that of ground or air forces, their involvement is likely to be more readily accepted by crisis actors. At the same time, because naval forces are relatively subtle, they may lack the desired efficacy and directness in crises of high importance to the United States. Authors disagree as to whether the flexibility of naval forces increases or decreases their effectiveness.¹⁵² It is often argued that naval power is unlikely to be as influential as ground or air forces and that it is rarely decisive on its own. In Brooks's words, "Attempting to use the Navy as the sole—or even the primary—vehicle of influence is at best inefficient, and at worst useless. In an era of jointness, the Navy should leave the task of influencing other states to the other services."¹⁵³ This suggests that the biggest disadvantage of naval forces is their lack of decisiveness. Likewise, Till claims that naval diplomacy is hardly ever decisive when employed alone.¹⁵⁴ Deborah Sanders argues that naval diplomacy lacks cultural and historical awareness and suffers from inadequate information exchange.¹⁵⁵ She draws on the example of Operation SEA BREEZE in 2006 in Ukraine: designed to improve the collaboration between countries, the planned exercise "became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev over the formation of a new coalition government."

Edward Rhodes and coauthors conclude that our understanding of how shaping operations during peacetime support desired political outcomes is limited.¹⁵⁶ Neither the types of military power nor the kinds of successful shaping operations are well known. In Rhodes's study on the effectiveness of naval presence and signaling he comes to the following conclusion: "Further, and more germane to the issue of naval forward presence as a crisis deterrent tool, there is some evidence that because of the general insensitivity of potential aggressors to information, efforts to 'signal' resolve through measures such as reinforcing or redeploying forces have limited effectiveness. If force movements are large enough to foreclose particular military options, they may forestall aggression. But as a means of indicating resolve and convincing an aggressor of the credibility of deterrent commitments, they do not generally appear to have an impact."¹⁵⁷ But as Brooks says, "Navies, by their very nature, tend to operate on the margins of national consciousness. Their influence is likely to be subtle and indirect and not easy to discern or to measure."¹⁵⁸ The fact that it is hard to measure influence is an argument for better understanding and better methods of measurement. It is not, however, a reason

for ignoring the influence of naval forces in seeking to advance U.S. interests.¹⁵⁹ I will argue that while limited effectiveness poses a problem, the many other advantages of naval forces are valuable.

Hypotheses

Signaling, shaping, and coercive diplomacy are all possible reactions to international crises. Of course, many other factors contribute to coercive diplomacy, and the hypotheses based on coercion literature merely borrow the idea of a limited use of force in crises to achieve U.S. goals. These theoretical ideas, together with the functions and characteristics of navies discussed previously, provide the starting point for formulating exploratory hypotheses, attempting to answer the present research questions pertaining to the types of crises the USN responds to, and investigating the way in which other involved actors shape the USN involvement, the role naval forces play within U.S. crisis activity, and the influence they exert on outcomes. The graph in figure 7 shows the strengths of different naval-forces combinations and how they will be analyzed in the hypotheses.

FIGURE 7
USN Force Combinations Pyramid




Table 2-2 summarizes the potential impact of advantages/disadvantages of naval forces on the four categories of crises response. As laid out in the previous chapter, ubiquity, readiness, mobility, flexibility, independence, and subtleness are the main advantages; misperception, limited decisiveness, limited self-sustainment, and vulnerability are the

TABLE 2-2

	ADVANTAGES	DISADVANTAGES
Crisis Characteristics	Observing events, adapting to changes, immediate response, subtle influence	Limited influence
Crisis Actors	Subtle influence, less publicity	Limited influence, misperception
U.S. Involvement	Support of all types of activities, calibration of action to circumstances, subtle influence, less publicity	Limited or even negative influence
Crisis Outcomes	Different levels of coercion, subtle influence	Limited or even negative influence

main disadvantages. The last two affect other military services even more than they do navies and so will thus not be considered for the generation of hypotheses.

Some of the hypotheses treat the U.S. naval activity as a dependent and others as an independent variable, since certain criteria influence the decision to send naval forces but once launched, naval forces produce their own cause-and-effect outcomes.

Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses (H1a–H1d)

In the introductory chapter I presented two research questions concerning the crisis characteristics:

- In what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?
- To which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?

The following theoretical ideas and hypotheses will help to answer these questions.

Crisis characteristics are manifold and include the type of threats and issues, conflict-management techniques, levels of intensity, geographic locations, and the importance of a crisis, to name a few. The list of advantages and disadvantages of naval forces offers a starting point for analyzing the relation between crisis characteristics and seaborne crisis response. Advantages such as ubiquity, readiness, mobility, flexibility, and independence all enable seaborne forces to react immediately to crises. Subtleness and limited decisiveness, on the other hand, suggest involvement in “low threat” and “low issue” crises and, together with the problem of misperception, render U.S. seaborne activity more likely when the threat to American national interests is low. This view is also encouraged by a realist point of view. The problem of decisiveness would further suggest a more hesitant involvement in violent crises, while conversely ubiquity/flexibility allows immediate response in order to halt violence.

Threat, Stakes, and Violence. Crisis characteristics are important in deciding how to respond to and manage a crisis, as they influence severity, duration, management technique, and termination.¹⁶⁰ According to Paul Diehl, the issue of a crisis and its salience

are especially crucial to understanding national behavior and the use of military force.¹⁶¹ Depending on the issue and its salience, actors may be more willing to suffer high costs, and if so, that makes diplomacy more difficult and less likely to succeed. High-salience issues are prone to be long lasting and often call for coercion as a management technique. Not all of George's contextual variables affecting coercive diplomacy can be applied to this study of international crises, but two assumptions—*type of provocation* and *magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests*—can be transformed into hypotheses.¹⁶² As stated above, George argues that certain types of provocations pose a greater challenge and are thus more difficult to resolve. He identifies the invasion of foreign territory as an example of these greater challenges, whereas a hostile arms buildup is more amenable to coercive diplomacy. Thus, I assume, the lower the threat of the crisis, the less difficult its resolution. As a result, very limited uses or displays of force should be sufficient. Political crises suggest political/diplomatic means as response tools. In general, force is graduated to the severity of the incidents, in such terms as importance, difficulty, and risk. The more threatening and grave the crisis, the less likely naval forces will be employed alone. The same can be assumed about the issues at stake in a crisis. This assumption is based on George's concept of magnitude and depth, viz., that military issues present a greater threat to national interests than economic crises, for example, and require a more forceful intervention.

Further analyzing the type of provocation, Paul Senese finds that territorial disputes have a high likelihood of escalation and often show higher levels of severity.¹⁶³ Huth also points to the need to intervene as soon as possible: "Given that once territorial disputes emerge, domestic political incentives encourage leaders to remain deadlocked in conflict, timely diplomatic intervention is necessary to try and avoid protracted disputes."¹⁶⁴ This suggests that within the category "threat" of a crisis, territorial disputes trigger naval responses, because of their capacity to respond immediately.

H1a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in "low threat" international crises. (Based on George's type of provocation.)

H1b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in "low issues" international crises. (Based on George's magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests.)

Deterrence theories argue that if violence levels reach full-scale warfare, diplomacy has failed, in which case appropriate military force must be called on. Violent crises are also said to be more difficult to resolve; thus the limited effectiveness of naval forces may suggest more forceful responses. Graduated force can protect against violence or control, contain, or even dominate it and thereby persuade the enemy to halt his actions. As Loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry note, the issue is how much force to apply.¹⁶⁵ I assume that high levels of violence will typically bring stronger U.S. military responses.

Alternatively, however, high levels of violence may increase the need for immediate response or the capability to calibrate action to circumstances, or even encourage non-intervention. The so-called Vietnam syndrome, reinforced by the events in Lebanon in 1983 and Somalia in 1993, suggests an unwillingness to accept high casualties. Although even a single event can be sufficient, as the overall violence level of the crises increases, so does the danger of high casualties. As Susan Hannah Allen states, “In fact, the lower risk of casualties associated with air power is part of its appeal as a coercive instrument for the United States, since lower casualties are associated with lower domestic costs in democratic societies.”¹⁶⁶ It is thus not clear in which direction the hypotheses will go, but following a deterrence point of view I assume the following:

H1c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international crises with low levels of violence.

Geostrategic Importance and Geographical Location. Because of their limited decisiveness, naval forces are less likely to be employed in regions and crises of great interest to the United States. If the crisis is deemed important and national interests are threatened, the United States will send a more powerful force. According to Meernik and Chelsea Brown, “a major military operation will likely signal strong US interest in a crisis and, thus, a willingness to use such forces for longer periods of time to attain US objectives.”¹⁶⁷ The commitment of ground troops and the number of troops committed signal the level of resolve.¹⁶⁸ Similarly, Art concludes that limited uses of force usually provide equally limited incentives for targets to change their behavior and are therefore not powerful enough when important U.S. interests are at stake.¹⁶⁹

H1d (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the threat to geostrategic interests posed by the international crisis is low.

Crisis Actors and USN Crisis Response: Crisis Actors Hypotheses (H2a–H2d)

The introductory chapter presented three research questions pertaining to the relation between crisis actor characteristics and seaborne crisis response:

- How do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?
- What crisis actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?
- How is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?

Four hypotheses will help to answer these questions. The characteristics of the crisis actors and other involved third parties play an important role and influence the crisis management technique. The more subtle influence and the likelihood of misperception of naval forces suggest more power when there are fewer crisis actors. Because naval forces normally do not encroach on other countries’ sovereignty, their involvement is

likely to be perceived more favorably. Additionally, all advantages of naval forces favor their deployment in crisis with only limited publicity and global scrutiny.

Number of Actors. Some of Mandel's hypotheses on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy can be modified and applied to naval involvement in crises. According to Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, where there are several participants, accountability is more broadly diffused and hostility less pronounced.¹⁷⁰ Yet others claim that negotiations are likely to be less efficient and settlements more elusive as the number of participants grows.¹⁷¹ I share the latter position, viz., that naval forces are less effective when multiple actors are involved, because it is then more difficult to reach agreements and to influence all actors. Similarly, Art finds that a multiplicity of parties on each side of the confrontation renders coercive diplomacy more difficult.¹⁷² In this analysis there is only one coercer (the United States), not multiple coercers, but I hypothesize that the form of military deployment chosen by the United States is influenced by the number of coercion targets. Meernik argues that the importance of a crisis to U.S. national interests increases with a growing number of actors.¹⁷³ Because the potential impact of the crisis intensifies with the number of actors, so does the need to respond more visibly and decisively because of the received attention.

H2a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less likely in international crises with multiple actors. (This is a counter-hypothesis to Mandel: that gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the action involves multiple assailants or victims rather than a single assailant or victim.)

UN Involvement. The involvement of the United Nations lends a certain legitimacy to involvement in a crisis. UN involvement can range from a preliminary discussion of the crisis without resolution to authorization to use force. While multilateralism is desirable, it slows down intervention decisions; the right moment to intervene might be lost.¹⁷⁴ Because naval forces are relatively nonintrusive and politically acceptable, they might be the instrument of choice in crises without UN engagement, so as to attract minimal global attention. The unique attribute of naval as compared to other forms of military power in the diplomatic context is its oceanic ubiquity and its independence from non-U.S. authorities.¹⁷⁵ A study by Terrence Chapman and Dan Reiter found that when "uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the rally in support of the American president increases significantly."¹⁷⁶ This lends additional support for the likelihood of deployment of naval forces when the UN is not involved, as such missions also trigger less debate or criticism within the United States. Naval forces can be deployed without attracting much attention in the U.S. media, giving the U.S. policy makers the option of influencing events without attracting close scrutiny by the American society. Generally, strong military power is most

commonly endorsed by the public when seen as a last resort, which is unlikely in the case of low-level UN activity.¹⁷⁷

H2b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is more likely when there is no or low UN involvement.

Lack of Cohesion. Conflict management works best between well-identified entities. When the government of one of the involved nations faces challenges, such as a rebellion or insurgency, it will be more difficult for third parties to support conflict resolution. Internal unity is an important source of bargaining strength.¹⁷⁸ Disunity and lack of cohesion hinder successful conflict management because of the limitations they impose on the power and authority of the government.¹⁷⁹ Thus, severe political and socioeconomic disorder renders coercive diplomacy more difficult and less likely to be successful. I hypothesize that stability is related to how receptive the state is to low-level influence. In order to exercise more subtle influence it is necessary to have an entity to address; thus internal stability is more likely to yield favorable results. Additionally, unstable states have less incentive to terminate crises, because they have less to lose; naval forces are not influential enough to change their behavior. The hypothesis follows Mandel, with the United States in the role of the assailant.¹⁸⁰

H2c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the actors are politically stable. (Gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the assailant possesses equal or higher political stability than does the victim.)

Perception of U.S. Involvement. The flexibility, ubiquity, and limited intrusiveness of naval forces establish the ground for the next hypothesis. Participants in a crisis are more likely to perceive involvement of naval forces as less threatening than that of other military forces and therefore to retain a more positive view of U.S. actions. Once in the crisis area, naval forces are more flexible, less disruptive psychologically, and less offensive diplomatically than equivalent land-based forces.¹⁸¹ Additionally, their deployment is likely to be viewed with less anxiety and violence. Dov Zakheim and colleagues conducted a survey among senior opinion leaders in the Mediterranean littoral, the Middle East, and East Asia.¹⁸² The findings were that flexible American presence is perceived as most favorable and that maritime presence is the most flexible U.S. military presence. Treating naval involvement as an independent variable, I hypothesize the following:

H2d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is perceived as more favorable by the crisis actors than a combination with other military services.

U.S. Involvement and USN Crisis Response

The introductory chapter presented three research questions to analyze the role of sea-borne forces within U.S. crisis response:

- In what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?
- How do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services?
- How effective is U.S. naval involvement?

Their ubiquity, readiness, and independence make naval forces an attractive way to show concern almost immediately without waiting for a buildup, while their flexibility allows adaptation of the response as necessary. Their quality of subtlety further encourages low-level activity. The concerns regarding limited decisiveness and misperception, on the other hand, suggest that naval deployments have less leverage, a factor impacting the effectiveness of the contribution of U.S. activity to crisis termination. Similarly, when the United States has a larger stake in the crises, naval forces alone might not be the response tool of choice.

U.S. Involvement Hypotheses (H3a–H3f)

The level of military force employed signals clearly the U.S. level of commitment to a crisis. In turn, the level and choice of force mirror the political, financial, and logistical costs the United States is willing to accept.¹⁸³ Huth explains, “Rational deterrence theorists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate credibly a defender’s resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat, thereby revealing information about the actual commitment of a state to defend against an attack. States that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict.”¹⁸⁴

The questions and hypotheses involving U.S. activity include naval-force involvement as both a dependent and independent variable.

Level of U.S. Involvement. The use of the sea-borne forces, in the absence of ground or air forces, should be prevalent in international crises with limited U.S. involvement. Most forms of coercive diplomacy assume both limited involvement and limited force in a first attempt to influence the adversary. The United States will try to halt and reverse the progress of an adversary’s action before resorting to the direct use of armed forces. Alternatively, low-level involvement demonstrates a moderate interest in the crisis and reluctance to invest in a strong military deployment. In both cases a lower U.S. involvement is assumed to favor naval involvement.

H3a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international crises with lower forms of U.S. involvement.

U.S. Effectiveness. According to Cable, a limited use of naval force is effective if the threat alone achieves the objective.¹⁸⁵ However, a survey of the Mediterranean region reveals that host nations pay the most attention to the actual use of force in crisis, especially combat action. Furthermore, the study finds, U.S. military force is perceived as most effective when it takes the form of combat action—for example, the air attack on Libya in 1986. Before April of that year, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi pursued an active program of training, supplying, and sponsoring international terrorists. After the U.S. bombing, Libyan-sponsored terrorism dropped sharply and may have ceased entirely.¹⁸⁶ Meernik proposes the following hypotheses to measure the effectiveness of the different force levels: “The greater the force level deployed, the more likely the United States will achieve its objectives in the short and long term.”¹⁸⁷ The dispatch of larger and stronger forces is more likely perceived as a firmer commitment and thus can more likely lead to or enforce an abatement of the crisis.

The following three hypotheses treat naval involvement as an independent variable, influencing the effectiveness of the U.S. involvement.

H3b (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less effective than the involvement of all forces.

H3c (independent): The U.S. involvement will be most effective if direct military force is used.

H3d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less effective in contributing to the termination of the crisis.

United States as a Crisis Actor. If the United States is directly involved as a crisis actor and not as a third party, the stakes are higher for, and the outcome is more important to, the United States. Thus when the United States is directly involved in the crisis, one should expect a correspondingly heavy military commitment.

H3e (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less likely if the United States is a direct crisis actor.

Immediate Readiness. Naval forces are forward deployed in and close to regions where crises are most likely to develop and U.S. national interests lie. Because U.S. naval forces are spread around the world, they are able to react immediately. It is often argued that they react to crises because they are “there.” But Carlisle Trost and Arthur Barber, writing separately, underscore the importance of capability as well as availability, qualities that are critical in explaining their frequent use.¹⁸⁸ Barber stresses that “the political

agility and rapid in-theater availability of naval forces, as much as their military capability, have influenced decisions to use them so frequently.” Further, Cable argues that some disputes require an immediate response to be effective. I assume that naval-forces responses occur very shortly after the crisis breaks out. The state of readiness also depends on the overall overseas number of naval personnel.¹⁸⁹

H3f (dependent): Only U.S. naval forces are able to react immediately after the international crisis breaks out.

Crises Outcomes and USN Crisis Response

The last research category presented in the introductory chapter concerns the relation between seaborne crisis response and outcomes.

- How do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?

Crises Outcomes Hypotheses (H4a–H4d)

The deployment of naval forces is assumed to affect the outcome of a crisis, treating naval involvement as the *independent* variable. Although it is impossible to measure how much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring a specific adversary, naval operations can help to display national power and signal national will—both essential components of deterrence.¹⁹⁰ According to this view, naval forces can positively influence outcomes in an unthreatening fashion, yet flex muscles and subtly support diplomatic efforts.

A part of Blechman and Kaplan’s study analyzed outcomes of the interventions of different U.S. armed forces.¹⁹¹ A positive outcome is achieved when the United States is satisfied with the behavior of the other participants. Their findings on the effectiveness of the different armed services in producing positive outcomes are that land-based combat aircraft is most positively correlated with successful outcomes, followed by land-based ground forces. Positive outcomes were more frequent when land-based troops are employed, compared to amphibious ground forces, and they are even more frequent when both of them deployed together.¹⁹² Blechman and Kaplan show that positive outcomes of crises and conflicts are associated primarily with the direct use of force, although indirect or latent uses of force can be successful in the short run. When the objective is to end the use of force by another actor or to precipitate regime change, direct use of armed forces is less successful. When the objective is to deter another actor from repeated use of force, outcomes are positive.¹⁹³ The authors also study the influence of the levels of force on outcomes and conclude that “outcomes were less often positive when greater levels of force were used, unless nuclear-capable forces were used together with one or more major conventional components.”¹⁹⁴

Higher levels of force correlate with more complicated situations, which in turn negatively influence the chances of a successful outcome. The same study, however, concludes that landing U.S. forces on foreign territory is more likely to result in positive outcomes than the mere dispatch of naval forces, thus suggesting that a U.S. land commitment positively influences outcomes.¹⁹⁵ While the former finding is concerned with the level of force, the latter focuses on the type of force. Overall, the findings suggest that small land forces (satisfying criteria both for land forces and lower levels of force) correlate most strongly with positive outcomes. Further, land-based aircraft rank higher than ground troops, and ground troops higher than sea-based Marines; the combination of the Army and Marine troops is optimal. Although the two findings seem contradictory, they are focused on different issues—the type of force and the strength of the force. Hastedt finds that generally the firmer the commitment, the more often favorable outcomes are achieved.¹⁹⁶

The mere threat of intervention can prevent or end conflicts by altering the parties' perceptions of a continuation or cessation of hostilities. It can reduce the rewards of war and enhance those of peace. While this can increase the bargaining space and facilitate agreements, there remains debate over whether or when threats of intervention have this effect. Military forces can threaten to intervene if a party continues to fight or does not comply. This threat can also encourage weaker parties to fight in hopes that the stronger military force will come to their defense.¹⁹⁷

Despite the difficulty in assessing the crisis outcome from the vantage of the United States as Blechman and Kaplan did, I assume that definite outcomes are overall more positive, because they signify a clear-cut end to the crisis.¹⁹⁸ Because naval forces are said to be less decisive, I assume a negative relation between the involvement of naval forces and definite crisis resolution. Stronger forces, however, are more likely to enforce a solution instead of subtly trying to broker a formal agreement. Air and land forces pose greater threats than naval forces and raise the odds of compliance. The promotion of an agreement can be interpreted as a right intention in the context of just-war theory, while an imposed outcome is likely to further the national interests of the imposing party and thus implies an ulterior motive.

H4a (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less likely to lead to definite outcomes.

H4b (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are more likely to lead to a formal agreement.

According to Linton Brooks, the very fact that naval presence can be temporary and low-key, rather than dramatic, makes presence potentially useful in easing tension.¹⁹⁹ For example, James Tubbs assumes that excessive use of force actually escalates a

confrontation.²⁰⁰ It is debatable, however, whether the presence of naval forces plays a decisive role in ending tension. Some aver that it could even heighten it. McNulty identifies a possible deterrence effect if naval forces demonstrate their war-fighting capabilities in a tense situation.²⁰¹ This in turn has the potential to exacerbate tension if deterrence fails. According to these deliberations the direction of the next hypothesis can go either way. For now I assume a positive influence of naval forces on tension.

H4c (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is likely to reduce tensions in international crises.

Another important aspect of outcomes is the satisfaction of the crisis actors with results. Poor or weak crisis management is likely to influence negatively the overall resolution and therefore actor satisfaction. As with arguments made above, the limited power of naval forces may not be enough to resolve crises to the satisfaction of the involved parties. This is different from hypothesis 2d, which suggests that these characteristics leave the actors with a favorable impression of U.S. intentions, aside from the outcome itself.

H4d (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less likely to lead to a satisfactory outcome.

Summary

Chapter 2 began with a very broad introduction into the U.S. uses of force before focusing on the theoretical ideas of naval diplomacy and coercion. By combining these concepts with the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces discussed in chapter 1 and other research on crisis management, I attempted to explain the generation of the various hypotheses. Before turning to the statistical analyses, chapter 3 describes the efforts to find and combine reliable naval-response data.

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194. *Ibid.* MAJOR LEVEL OF FORCE—*naval*: two or more aircraft carrier task groups; *ground*: More than one battalion; *Land-based air*: One or more combat wings.
- STANDARD LEVEL OF FORCE. *Naval*: One aircraft carrier task group; *Ground*: No more than one battalion, but larger than one company; *Land-based air*: One or more combat squadrons, but less than one wing.
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Uncharted Waters

Data on U.S. Naval Activity Short of War

While there is much research on naval activities, there is a dearth of empirical evidence of the influence of naval forces. Only very few studies statistically research the deployment of the U.S. Navy in employments short of war. As laid out so far, naval forces offer promising vehicles for crisis response, and by looking at different international crises, the hypotheses can be used to underline both advantages and disadvantages. This chapter lays the groundwork for the empirical analyses in this study by explaining the data collection and the creation of naval variables. The last part presents some frequencies of the newly introduced naval variables and introduces the methodology. Prior to a discussion of the data for this project, the most important empirical studies are summarized.

Empirical Literature Review on U.S. Naval Activity

James Cable's *Gunboat Diplomacy*, first published in 1971 and updated in 1981, provides a detailed account of different instances when naval gunboat diplomacy was employed, independent of the country and the target, between 1919 and 1979. "Gunboat diplomacy" captures events where naval forces either threatened or used limited force, short of war, against state actors on their territories. Cable's data for each of the more than two hundred cases provide the dates, the assailant, the victim, and a very brief description. It does not account for every single use of gunboat diplomacy but rather illustrates the range.

In 1977, Robert Mahoney, Jr., conducted a CNA study on U.S. Navy responses to crises over the previous twenty years.¹ Based on the assumption that crisis management is among the Navy's principal missions, the report provides a summary of U.S. naval (including Marine Corps) responses to international incidents and crises short of war. Only reactions of USN and of USMC forces "immediately prior and during" are included, thereby neglecting a number of activities outside this time frame, such as deterrence operations before a crisis erupts. The focus on USN and USMC activity does not account for the possibly important role other service and different policy instruments

play. Mahoney urges caution when applying the findings to future research: “The way in which the Navy has been employed as an instrument of crisis diplomacy in the past has been the result of choices made by the National Command Authorities in conjunction with certain types of foreign events. Different choices may be made in the future in response to changing circumstances.” The following criteria were applied to define the cases:

- Any actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed forces (only the Navy and Marine Corps for immediate purposes)
- Carried out in conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United States
- Occurring other than in the course of general or limited war
- With the exception of a few categories of responses (to be shown below), such as humanitarian relief efforts
- Reported at a given level in the political-military policy process.

The mere presence of naval forces is not sufficient for an event to be considered a “response.” Mahoney defines “peacetime” as the absence of war and therefore locates crisis management within the peacetime activities. The peacetime category applies to any instance with fewer than a thousand casualties; once this threshold is crossed the incident would amount to at least a limited war. Therefore, within his study’s time frame only the Vietnam War, beginning with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964 and ending in April 1975, is considered a war. Additionally, the following categories of responses are excluded:

- Humanitarian operations (e.g., the provision of medical assistance following natural disasters abroad)
- Intelligence and other special operations (these are not systematically covered in the project’s sources, which do not include compartmentalized intelligence information)
- Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy (e.g., Navy units are customarily alerted during presidential visits to Third World nations)
- Incidents at sea that are not specifically related to events taking place ashore (e.g., hijackings, rammings, overflights of Navy ships by Soviet aircraft)
- Extraregional alerts of Navy forces (during some responses the Navy was placed on global alert; while this is noted, where relevant, the principal emphasis in the analysis is on forces within the region where the crisis or incident transpired [e.g., the Mediterranean basin]).

The Mahoney analyses reveal the following:

- The Navy responded to ninety-nine international incidents and crises.
- More than three-quarters of the responses took place in three regions: the Mediterranean, the Americas (Central and South America plus the Caribbean), and East Asia (Korea through Southeast Asia).
- In fifty-nine out of the ninety-nine cases, aircraft carriers were present. From 1955 to 1960 there were twenty operations with, and seven without, carriers; 1961–65, twenty-two with carriers and twenty-eight without; and 1966–75, seventeen with and five without. The 1961–65 time frame shows the highest frequency of operations both with and without carrier deployment. The 1966–75 period was marked by fewer carrier operations, but more than 75 percent of the total responses involved carriers.
- Amphibious units were deployed in sixty-one out of the ninety-nine naval responses. In 1961–65, amphibious forces were used most frequently (twenty-eight operations with amphibious forces and twenty-two without them). The earlier and later periods were marked by higher percentages of operations involving amphibious forces, but overall fewer responses occurred. In 1955–60 occurred eighteen responses with and nine without amphibious forces, and in 1966–75, fifteen with and seven without.

Power was projected ashore mostly to influence the following kinds of events:

- Evacuation of special weapons and associated personnel
- Rescue of endangered Western nationals
- Short-term, moderate-scale landing and air-strike operations directed at Third World nations
- Signals of American intentions and concerns sent during the course of a crisis (e.g., the movement of two carrier groups toward the Syrian coast during the final phase of the 1967 June War).

Carrier aviation is most likely in the last two categories of responses, especially when overflight or basing rights are restricted or not granted. Mahoney concludes that the Navy “has been used as a flexible instrument of crisis diplomacy” and that “it appears that the force packages correspond (in at least a general sense) to certain types of crisis situations or sets of similar policy problems.”²

Blechman and Kaplan analyzed in 1978 the political use of different U.S. military services and their deployment in responses short of war.³ They concluded that

- The Navy was the armed service most often employed for political uses of force in the post–World War II period.

- Air forces, excluding sea air, were involved in about half of the incidents. Combat ground troops were the least involved and rarely without naval forces.
- Naval forces participated in events worldwide. The results demonstrate that whoever else was involved, wherever the incident took place, or whatever the type of incident, the Navy was deployed in roughly nine out of ten cases.
- Within the instances of use of naval forces, aircraft carriers were involved in more than half the cases. The authors found that aircraft carriers were most often deployed when the level of violence was high and the Chinese or Soviets either threatened or actually used force. The use of amphibious forces does not seem to be influenced by the location of the incident, with the exceptions of Southeast Asia (more frequent) and East Asia (less frequent). Often the deployment of aircraft carrier and amphibious forces overlapped.

In regard to the outcome, the following results were presented:⁴

- Most positive outcomes were reached when land-based combat aircraft were deployed, followed by ground troops; the deployment of naval forces reduced the frequency of positive outcomes.⁵
- Positive outcomes occurred less often when the objective was to reinforce (assure or deter) clients rather than to modify (compel or induce) behavior and when greater levels of force were used.
- Previous U.S. military engagement in the region, withdrawal of forces, and statements issued before the involvement by the president or senior administration officials positively influenced outcomes. Both very high and very low levels of presidential popularity were frequently related to positive outcomes.
- Involvement of the Soviet Union (as actor and as threatening or actually using force) negatively influenced outcomes, while the strategic weapons balance between the actors exerted no influence.
- Finally, direct American involvement increased the frequency of positive outcomes.

In 1986, Robert Mandel published a study entitled “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy.” Building on Cable’s data, he developed ten hypotheses to examine the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy between 1947 and 1978. The hypotheses were divided into three groups, relating to the nature of the event, the relationship between the assailant and the victim, and the natures of both assailant and victim. He found that militarily prepared and politically stable parties were more successful in gunboat diplomacy. Prior uses of force in the same region and a definitive, deterrent display of force further supported success. After 1965 actual uses of force became more successful, comparable

to the success of displays of force. The success of gunboat diplomacy was independent of the regional identity of the participants or the relative strengths of the assailant and victim. Overall, he praises the strategy of gunboat diplomacy as a viable alternative to war if meaningful dialogue between the disputing parties is no longer feasible.

In 1991, Adam Siegel conducted for CNA an empirical study of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps crisis-management responses to international incidents and crises.⁶ Like Mahoney, Siegel focused on reactions immediately prior to and during U.S. involvement. Two hundred seven cases involving the U.S. Navy were identified, excluding worldwide everyday, routine activities. Siegel defined “crisis management” as peacetime activity, including all actions short of war. A “war” was defined by the threshold of one thousand American casualties; for this reason both the Korean and Vietnam Wars were excluded—considering the dates of the Korean War as 25 June 1950–27 July 1953 and Vietnam as 10 August 1964–31 December 1974, in order that “(a) the long wind down of heavy U.S. involvement [in Vietnam] would not be unduly reflected in the study and (b) the evacuations of American personnel from Phnom Penh and Saigon would be included.” The final stages of the report were written in January 1991, before the beginning of the Gulf War of that year. Siegel surmised at the time that this conflict would be categorized as a war; however, retrospectively applying the one-thousand-and-over-casualties criterion, it would not.

All instances meeting the following criteria were included in Siegel’s study:

- Actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.S. armed forces (for an action to be included in his study, a Navy surface ship or a Marine Corps unit must have been involved)
- Actions taken in conjunction with events occurring outside the United States
- Actions taken other than in the course of general war (Korea in 1950–53 or Vietnam 1964–74)
- Actions that were reported at a given (senior) level in the political-military policy process.

A few categories of responses were not included:

- Activities inside the United States (because the focus lies on international events).
- Humanitarian missions, such as disaster relief and hospital-ship port calls.
- Intelligence operations, for security reasons (because the document is unclassified, all responses had to involve surface ships; “Other forces such as submarines, patrol aircraft, and SEALs [were] used without surface ship involvement; however, the activities of these forces are not well documented in the unclassified literature”).

- Operations that are routinely undertaken to support American diplomacy. (For example, as noted above, U.S. Navy units are often alerted during presidential visits overseas, such as during President George H. W. Bush's February 1990 trip to Colombia.)
- Law enforcement operations (for example, the Department of Defense involvement in drug-interdiction operations).
- Incidents at sea, activities not specifically related to events taking place ashore, such as incidents (collisions or harassment) between U.S. Navy and Soviet vessels. Some types of incidents at sea, specifically terrorist hijackings or seizures of U.S.-flag vessels that prompt a U.S. military response, are included.

Every entry lists the name of the crisis, the area of responsibility (AOR), the start date and duration, and the involvement of USMC, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Army, in addition to naval forces. Not counting the involvements in Korea and Vietnam, the periods 1951–55 and 1966–75 showed the lowest U.S. military response frequency. Siegel suggests either that military forces were too engaged in the war activities to make more resources available for other purposes, or that other military activities are less documented during times of war. Aircraft carriers were employed in 68 percent of the 207 cases, amphibious force in 54 percent, and the Marine Corps in 55 percent. Additionally, in twenty-one cases USMC aviation units on board carriers were involved, raising the total USMC involvement to 57 percent of all cases. In 26 percent and 18 percent of the crises, respectively, the Air Force and Army were involved.


In 2005 the Center for Naval Analyses released a report by Eugene Cobble, Hank Gaffney, and Dmitry Gorenburg, of which the initial goal had been to compare U.S. naval forces' responses with those of other services for the period between 1970 and 2000.⁷ However, it became apparent that there were no major differences between the services' responses. This finding did not surprise the study's coauthors, as they had found an increase in the number of joint and coalition operations. This latest CNA study is the only one to include responses by other military services without any naval involvement. The report divides the type of response into six different categories (a few cases are coded differently) and produces the frequencies shown below.

Combat	22
Show of force	65
Support of peacekeeping and military supply	64
Contingent positioning and reconnaissance	50

Protection of noncombatants (including evacuations)	83
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR)	366

The total cases, including some other categories, numbered 660 responses. For the period from November 2000 through June 2003, thirteen more cases (exclusive of HA/DR) were added. Out of the additions only one—an evacuation of noncombatants from the Ivory Coast in September 2002—did not involve naval forces. Without accounting for the last category (HA/DR), naval forces were involved in 54 percent of all responses. While Blechman and Kaplan had found a ratio of nine out of ten for political uses of armed forces, these numbers suggest a proportion of a little over five out of ten for the five types of responses to international incidents.⁸ More than half of USN responses included the USMC. Very few Marine Corps or Army reactions occurred without naval forces. The large majority of cases without the USN were Air Force responses. Figure 8 shows the different service-combination percentages for cases with and without naval involvement.

FIGURE 8
CNA III USN Service Combinations



The CNA study's data include the involved military services, incident name and location, response type, start/end dates, and duration. Humanitarian responses are listed on a separate data sheet. The best way to measure the size and intensity of an operation

is to take into account the number of units or their strengths; however, neither the force strength nor the length of the individual responses is accounted for. The authors observe that the cases do not represent world or conflict history. They suggest the need for further research on naval activities and their relation to world conflicts and U.S. national security priorities.

The three CNA reports offer collectively the most detailed and systematic account of naval responses to incidents besides routine deployments. The remainder of this chapter discusses the data collection and my new data set.

Data for the Empirical Analyses

I had two choices as to how to research the U.S. naval involvement in international crises: generate a data set on my own or work with an existing one. Creating my own data set with multiple variables was not feasible, because of access restrictions and logistical limitations. Next, I had to decide if I wanted to add “naval” variables to a data set or “crisis” variables to USN data. Because my goal was to include as many crises characteristics as possible, I chose the latter. By focusing on an existing data set I exclude nonroutine naval reactions not meeting the data-set definition of international crises.

Data-Set Selection: International Crisis Behavior Data Set (ICB)

There are many data sets concerning the use of armed force. “Correlates of War” (COW), “International Crisis Behavior Project” (ICB), “International Military Interventions” (IMI), “Militarized Interstate Disputes” (MID), “Military Interventions by Powerful States” (MIPS), and “Use of Armed Forces” are among the most prominent.⁹ These various projects differ in many respects, including their time frames and definitional disagreements relating to the use of force, disputes, conflicts, crises, and wars. The COW offers data on wars and is therefore not suitable for research on political uses of force short of war.¹⁰ Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani updated Pearson and Baumann’s IMI data for the years 1946–88 for the years from 1988 to 2005.¹¹ The result captures all cases where national military personnel were purposefully dispatched into other sovereign states and also includes the use of armed forces against nonstate actors. Their data set features a variable controlling for the motive of the intervenors, a very rare measurement in military-intervention data. The MID is part of the COW collection and provides information about interstate disputes; disputes involving nonstate actors are excluded. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver come to the conclusion that the MID is not well suited for the analysis of the American use of force, because of definition disagreements of the use of force; they point out important incidents missing in the data set.¹² Sullivan’s MIPS provides data for the five parties of intervention—the

United States, Britain, France, Russia/USSR, and China. The data also include a variable measuring the level of force used, ranging from a mere display of force to ground combat operations. Like most other databases, the cases cover only instances when military interventions were carried out. Blechman and Kaplan's data originally covered the Cold War era but were extended to 1995 by Fordham and Sarver. They thus do not include post-1995 incidents. The ICB is exceptional in that it includes cases with *and* without military involvement and thus allows research into different forms of intervention.

Therefore the present analysis is based on the well-established ICB data set for international crises, compiled by the Center for International Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. In addition to the advantages already mentioned, the ICB data set is, as Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher note, "rich in contextual information."¹³ Because I want to conduct a broad analysis of when and how naval forces are employed, the ideal data set should encompass many different cases and crisis characteristics. The ICB allows me to research a wide variety of international crises and offers many variables, such as controlling for the form of American involvement, the effect of that involvement, and attitudes toward it.

Moreover, the ICB provides both system and individual data, including different characteristics, reactions, and perceptions of the individual crisis actors. Although the ICB does not include every instance of the American use of force, it presents the best choice for the purpose of this project. The ICB was first published in 1975; the newest (ninth) version, of January 2009, covers the period 1918 to 2006, with 452 international crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 994 crisis actors.¹⁴ The ICB defines its goals as

the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge about interstate crises and protracted conflicts; the generation and testing of hypotheses about the effects of crisis-induced stress on coping and choice by decision makers; the discovery of patterns in key crisis dimensions—onset, actor behavior and crisis management, superpower activity, involvement by international organizations, and outcome; and application of the lessons of history to the advancement of international peace and world order. . . . Underlying the project are three assumptions: first, that the destabilizing effects of crises, as of conflicts and wars, are dangerous to global security; second, that understanding the causes, evolution, actor behavior, outcomes, and consequences of crises is possible by systematic investigation; and third, that knowledge can facilitate the effective management of crises so as to minimize their adverse effects on world order.¹⁵

Expansion of the Data Set: CNA Studies

While the ICB data may be sufficient to analyze general involvement of U.S. armed forces, it does not provide information about the type of force used. In order to control for the naval involvement, new variables had to be added to the data set. My initial attempt, to examine the naval involvement in every crisis with some form of U.S. involvement, proved to be infeasible. Complete information on where all ships of the U.S. Navy have been deployed at any given time is very difficult to find, if not unattainable. There

is no uniformity in how information and data are collected; deck logs, command histories, historical reports, and fleet histories differ enormously in detail, focus, and information. While it might be possible to find material in depth about a certain response, one cannot gain knowledge as to the day of response and the location or name of ships involved for every incident. Furthermore, even historical data often remain classified. In the case of the Second Fleet, for example, only five random years between 1946 and 2006 were available when my research was conducted. Without access to new information I had to take a step back and rely on already existing studies, consolidating sources and adding new details where possible.¹⁶

Almost all of the data on naval involvement are adapted from the comprehensive account of naval activities as documented in the three CNA reports summarized earlier in the chapter. They researched USN responses to international situations in 1946–2003. For the years 2004–2006 I collected information about naval interventions from a variety of sources.¹⁷ Except for Adam Siegel’s study, the CNA reports do not describe the incidents themselves in depth but rather provide only their names and the dates of the naval responses. Mahoney and Siegel’s data include the types of ship involved in the response—the number of aircraft carriers and the employment of amphibious forces. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg give no information about the ships involved but control for the involvement of other military forces and categorize the type of response. While Siegel’s data include the deployment of other armed forces, they do not categorize the type of mission. These responses had to be correlated with the crises in the ICB data set; for example, a crisis in Ethiopia might trigger a naval response off the coast of Somalia. Since some international crises have led to multiple naval involvements, I worked to match the dates and locations of the responses and crises. In order to validate my matching and to control for inter-rater reliability, two graduate students verified my data. Both Cohen’s kappa values were higher than 0.8. Kimberley Neuendorf speaks of 0.80 as the benchmark for satisfactory intercoder reliability; according to Joseph Fleiss, a value above $\kappa = .80$ is excellent.¹⁸ Thus the inter-rater reliability meets the statistical requirements.

There are several shortcomings in the CNA reports, including their emphasis on “responses.” The fact is that “response” encompasses only a fraction of the total range of actions that the Navy undertakes in support of national crisis-management efforts. Siegel remarks that his research excludes fleet actions during precrisis periods, which are crucial because the presence and deterrent capabilities of naval forces can then have a far-reaching impact. Similarly Mahoney states that regular peacetime presence can be far from “routine” in its effect on the ways in which events ashore develop. Clearly, the optimal solution for many crisis-management problems is to prevent the crisis from developing, by taking timely action during the precrisis period to achieve national

goals.¹⁹ Also, Siegel observes, the number of cases underestimates naval actions since it includes only surface movements. For example, SEALs, submarines, and transport aircraft can operate independently of ships. Mere alerts are also not part of the selected cases but are, according to Siegel, especially important for the U.S. Army: “For the U.S. Army, especially, alerts are often used as a crisis response action and, depending on the circumstances, alerts can be used as a signal similar to that created by the movement of a surface ship.”²⁰

Further, Siegel surmises (in the source cited) that it would be interesting to compare not only the deployment of the different services but also the types of forces employed. Unfortunately, none of the three data sets includes these measures. Siegel believes that his “research does not provide an adequate basis for comparisons of service-specific activity,” but I have supplemented it with the latest CNA study, and the result is information sufficient to research USN force combinations. Finally, the latest CNA study (by Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg) aims to compare USN responses with those from the other services, but I have preferred to study the comparison between all-forces involvement and the USN plus other individual services.

In most of the overlapping cases for the years 1970–90 the two studies (those of Siegel and Cobble et al.) agree on the services involved. There were only very few cases where the reports differed, either because a response was not listed in all reports for the overlapping years or the service combination was coded differently. Where the two coding values diverge, I followed the results of the most recent study, because its research is most up-to-date and the data focus on the activities of all military services. Where possible, more information is provided in the case-summary appendix (in the online version of this monograph). Siegel excluded humanitarian operations, although he acknowledged that they often are connected with responses to crises, because he discounts their conflict potential. Whereas Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg include peace operations in their main data set, they present a separate listing of humanitarian responses since the 1970s (defined as “responses that are not into harm’s way—the U.S. units and personnel involved did not face hostile fire”).²¹ Typically this type of response consists of disaster relief (e.g., after an earthquake) or humanitarian assistance (for example, in the form of medical aid or refugee relief—not to be confused with “humanitarian interventions”). The Air Force is primarily in charge of humanitarian responses—by a factor of ten, compared with the USN. Siegel points to ambiguity in dating the onset and end of a crisis response. Lack of information or uncertainty in the distinction between routine activity and contingency response may influence the number of cases.

I tried to address these terminological ambiguities by combining the three research papers. None of the documents attempts to answer questions with regard to how these deployments influenced the crises (or vice versa), their effectiveness, and why particular

services were deployed, to name a few. In contrast, my research aims to advance the information provided in the CNA studies. By the strengthening of their data with information about the nature of the crisis, the involved actors, the outcomes, and the U.S. activity, the USN involvement can be placed in a larger context, thereby allowing analysis in greater depth of the deployment of seaborne forces. Before describing the new variables in more detail, I shall explain my focus on aircraft carriers and amphibious forces.

Why Aircraft Carriers?

One of the most significant changes in the composition of the major navies of the twentieth century was the battleship's replacement by the aircraft carrier as the capital ship.

GEOFFREY TILL

The aircraft carrier era began with the successful Pacific campaigns of 1944, in World War II.²² Since World War II, carriers have been deployed in over 80 percent of the times when the world was faced with the risk of international violence.²³ Aircraft carriers form the core of a battle group. According to Friedman, carrier battle groups (CVBGs) are the most powerful naval formations. They are the dominant element of sea power. Normally a CVBG includes a carrier, escorts (generally including a pair of missile cruisers), and a station (replenishment) ship fast enough to steam with the group. Often CVBGs deploy with one or more nuclear submarines in support. Aircraft carriers offer both offensive and defensive firepower. They have room to embark eighty to one hundred aircraft—they can be described as “floating airfields.”²⁴ The use of aircraft carriers has changed over time. In the words of Rebecca Grant, they are “no longer main guardian[s] of the sea but rather mobile air base[s].”²⁵

During the 1990s, war fighting was replaced by forward presence as the main task of carrier forces. For Booth the aircraft carrier is the “pinnacle of operational flexibility.”²⁶ Freedom of action for policy makers is made possible by the flexibility of the carrier (or CV, in generic terms—a specifically nuclear-powered carrier is referred to as a CVN). There is hardly any place in the world where the aircraft carriers cannot respond. Till describes their functions as independent strike, amphibious support, and protection against attack by land-based aircraft.²⁷ Booth emphasizes air defense, surface ship interdiction, submarine pursuit, and on-shore power projection. A RAND study highlights unparalleled mobility, power advertisement, and sustained military presence, whereas Till additionally singles out independence on the open seas.²⁸ CVs do not have to worry

about foreign base access or overflight rights, and they can deploy rapidly, thanks to forward basing. According to the USN website, “the Carrier Mission is (1) To provide a credible, sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in peacetime, (2) To operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary forces in times of crisis, and (3) To operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies, protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations in war.”²⁹

Thus aircraft carriers are useful not only in times of war but also in action short of war. They are the most powerful and visible tool the USN possesses and can influence events ashore. Aircraft carriers are symbols of strength and resolve, and they can be sent into action quickly.³⁰ Today, aircraft carriers are primarily political instruments. They offer numerous options, ranging from discreet withdrawal to full-scale warfare.³¹ As President William Clinton once said, “When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is, where is the nearest carrier?”³² Yet the utility of aircraft carriers has frequently been questioned. Grant’s critique focuses on their inferior offensive potential compared with that of the U.S. Air Force.³³ Certainly carriers in combat often need the support of land-based air. But where the focus is on peacetime missions, combat effectiveness is not the key criterion; what counts then is the ability to observe, influence, and react to situations in international waters. Cost and vulnerability are also focuses of criticism. Aircraft carriers are virtually floating cities housing about five thousand Navy personnel. With their high construction and maintenance costs, they are the military’s costliest asset.³⁴ What sets the Navy apart, then, is its forward presence mission, its extensive observation potential, and its varied means of intervention, ranging from suasion to attack. Importantly, aircraft carriers can operate where land-based air forces lack access.

The nation’s current reliance on aircraft carriers for many naval missions is well understood by potential enemies, who are striving to find ways to counter them. For instance, antiship ballistic missiles pose a formidable threat to carriers. Because of the vulnerability of a big floating platform, Rubel suggests more widely distributed missile-firing platforms that are more difficult to find and hit.³⁵ Optimally they would include submarines, surface combatants, and guided-missile destroyers. Such a mixture of ships instead of one “key ship” offers dispersed targets and could prove valuable in crisis as a reliable deterrent. He concludes, “This sea change in the Navy indicates the early stages of a paradigm shift away from a force centered on big-deck aviation platforms. Although assault ships (LHDs) and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs) will continue to constitute a critical power-projection capability for the United States into the foreseeable future, the Navy will increasingly shift to dispersed but integrated surface and subsurface operations to constitute the credible combat power required by its new maritime strategy.”³⁶

Despite the voices calling for a different approach involving a focus on different ship types, aircraft carriers remain the center of the naval power. “For the future there might be lower cost and less vulnerable alternatives, but for now aircraft carriers will likely to continue to be an asset of choice.”³⁷ Increasingly, CVs serve as joint aviation platforms.³⁸ The important concept of sea basing emphasizes the avoidance of overflight rights and basing restrictions and, once again, favors aircraft carriers. Recent examples include Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM, as well as the Haiti earthquake of 2010.³⁹ However, as Charles Allen remarks, a single-carrier group can conduct combat operations for only a certain amount of time, for personnel reasons; extended combat requires more than one carrier group.⁴⁰ In practice, the average number of deployed CVs/CVNs steadily decreased between 1975 and 2005.⁴¹ The number dropped again in 2007 when USS *John F. Kennedy* (CV 67) was decommissioned. O’Rourke estimated in 2009 that the number of CVs would drop from eleven to ten in 2012 with the decommissioning of *Enterprise* (CVN 65) and before its replacement by *Gerald R. Ford* (CVN 78), scheduled to be ready in 2015 (though Pritchett suggests 2017 as a more likely date).⁴² With the aircraft carriers USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN 71) and *Abraham Lincoln* (CVN 72) undergoing repair and maintenance at this writing, the number of active CVBGs could temporarily even drop to nine. *Roosevelt* should be ready to deploy again in February 2013, while *Lincoln* is likely to return to active service only in 2015.⁴³ Before taking into account the now-impending budget cuts, the Navy projected that the force will increase to twelve carriers in FY 2019, when CVN 79 is commissioned.⁴⁴

Amphibious Operations

Amphibious warfare units, which project combat power ashore from the sea, make up one of the naval service’s two principal projection forces.⁴⁵ Like aircraft carriers, amphibious forces play a central role in crisis management because of their ability to affect events ashore, either by taking direct action or by establishing a naval presence.⁴⁶ Since World War II, amphibious landings have usually evoked the picture of assaults on heavily defended beaches. The most famous U.S. Army amphibious landing was the invasion of Normandy, and for the USMC the successive seizures of the Pacific islands. In the decades after the World War II, the Corps further developed its techniques, greatly aided by technological advances.⁴⁷

An amphibious force consists of a Navy element—a group of ships known as an amphibious task force (ATF)—and a landing force of U.S. Marines (occasionally Army troops), in total about five thousand people.⁴⁸ Amphibious operations include amphibious assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and special operations in support of assaults. The aim of amphibious assaults is to land on hostile territory. During an assault, supremacy on the sea, on land, and in the air is essential.⁴⁹ Amphibious raids aim

to achieve a tactical or operational goal, followed by a planned withdrawal. Amphibious feints and demonstrations are aimed at tying down the enemy's forces. Surprise and speed are essential to minimize the risk to the attacking forces; defending forces have a natural advantage over amphibious forces.⁵⁰ In most cases, the ATF will be deployed under the protection of a CVBG, which provides cover for the ATF and combat support to operations ashore. The ships of the ATF are capable of embarking and supporting other forces when the mission requires, including Army, special operations forces (SOF), or other joint and combined forces. Because they are sea-based and because decisions to position and engage amphibious forces are easily reversible, amphibious forces greatly expand the range of available response options. They are particularly well suited as demonstrations of American commitment to friends and allies, as well as adversaries. This type of deployment closely links the Navy and USMC team.

In the ideal scenario, amphibious forces confuse the enemy and force him to guess where along the coastline the landing force might be inserted. This limits the defender's ability to concentrate his forces at a single point and thereby favors a wily attacker. This idea is encompassed by the concept of sea basing. As Wood remarks, "the entire concept of 'seabasing' rests on the principle that the ocean can be used to assemble, move, project, support and sustain forces as is done on land."⁵¹

Selecting the Cases and Coding Naval Variables

The cases were selected according to the following criteria:

- "Date of Perception of Crisis Breakpoint": 1946–2006
- "Content of U.S. Activity": "low level, covert/semi-military, or direct military"
 - *Low-level U.S. activity*: political activity, including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized government officials; economic involvement (e.g., financial aid to, or the withholding of aid from, an actor); and propaganda involvement
 - *U.S. covert or semi-military activity*: covert activity (e.g., support for antigovernment forces); military aid or advisers, without participation in actual fighting
 - *U.S. direct military activity*: dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets, or naval assistance to a party in a war.

The first limitation excludes any crises before World War II, because U.S. naval power was less able to influence events ashore than it is today. When the CV replaced the battleship as the capital ship, this dramatically changed. Earlier cases can therefore not be compared to post-World War II cases.⁵²

The second limitation was chosen because cases without any U.S. involvement are irrelevant to my analyses.⁵³ Of the 452 international crises, 241 met the criteria for the

required time frame and American involvement. Because of my definition of peacetime operations and uncertainty in some cases about naval involvement, a small number of cases ($N = 12$) were coded as “missing data.” The international crises taking place in connection with the Korean and Vietnam (until 1972) Wars were excluded, because both involved full-scale war activity on the part of the United States. After 1972, U.S. naval forces were no longer engaged in major combat operations. The Gulf War of 1991 is included, because the crisis resulted in fewer than a thousand American casualties. Moreover, it led to continuing U.S. engagement in Iraq—for example, Operation SOUTHERN WATCH, aimed to prevent Iraqi aerial activity, which produced close to no coalition casualties. The different crises triggered by Iraqi noncompliance with the United Nations Special Commission and by the no-fly zones are listed as separate crises and are included. While Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM in their initial phases did not exceed the casualty threshold, those two crises are of a different kind. At the time of the analyses, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM had not ended yet, and both conflicts have far surpassed the critical value of one thousand casualties. Thus these two cases are included as naval involvements but not in the statistical analyses.

Besides the engagements during the Korean and Vietnam Wars, I identified three international crises for which I was not able to verify naval involvement.⁵⁴ Because these international crises do not meet the selection criteria, they are not included in the database. However, because the associated naval activity appears to have had at least peripheral relevance to the larger U.S. crisis responses, I have included them in the crisis description appendix (available in the online version of this monograph). I also excluded several intrawar crises during the Iran-Iraq War. For example, the USN role in protecting international commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf (the “tanker war”) was a response to secondary events deriving from the war, as distinct from the facet of the war itself. Conversely, evacuation operations were direct reactions to the crisis, although they had no bearing on its resolution, and are thus included.

“Naval” Variables

In a first step I added a dichotomous variable, “U.S. naval involvement,” simply measuring whether the USN had been involved in an international crisis or not. Naval forces rarely reacted on their own; thus the next ten variables control for the involvement of other armed forces.⁵⁵ In a next step I grouped the different service combinations. Because the number of “USN only” cases is very small, I mostly treat the USN and USMC as one “team,” the “USN-USMC Team.” (Siegel subtitled his work *U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity*.) I acknowledge the limitation posed by this combination of the U.S. seaborne forces. The addition of the Marine Corps includes the possible or actual landing of U.S. forces on foreign territory and thus represents a greater

intrusion. Conversely, it can be argued that the presence of a USMC force increases the threat perceived by the enemy and increases the likelihood of a favorable outcome. Also, given the limited number of naval responses, I could not distinguish between shows of force and actual force projection, or between the mere presence of Marines and actual landings. To research each response in detail, case studies, not just statistical analyses, are necessary. For a future project, these distinctions could prove very interesting and reveal additional information. In the online appendix listing the crises I present more comprehensive accounts and when possible describe the activities of the Navy and Marine Corps. Where the analyses allowed a distinction, however, I control for “USN only” cases.

The following table explains how the different services are grouped. There was only one case where the USN, USMC, and Army were involved. In order to qualify for an “all forces response” both the Army *and* the Air Force had to have been involved, representing all three types of forces: sea based, air based, and land based. In two cases the Marine Corps did not participate, but because the USN represents the seaborne force I counted the two crisis responses as all-forces responses. Because only one case of the variable “USN & Other Forces” includes “USARMY,” this variable is nearly congruent to seaborne forces and Air Force responses and can be treated as combinations with the Air Force. The only case including the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Army was a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) in Congo in 1998. Because of the already very low number of cases, I decided not to exclude this incident; that it was a NEO highlights the noncombat character of the mission. Using the service combination numbers, I generated different “naval variables” that will be used as both dependent and independent variables.

FIGURE 9
Three Naval Combination Variables

TYPE OF SERVICE 1 (SERVICETYPE1) (Y1)	TYPE OF SERVICE 2 (SERVICETYPE2) (Y2)	USN-USMC-TEAM (USNUMCTEAM) (Y3)
0. NO NAVY	0. NO NAVY	0. NO NAVY
1. USN ONLY	1. USN-USMC TEAM	1. USN-USMC TEAM
2. USN-USMC	2. USN AND OTHER FORCES	2. USN AND OTHER FORCES
3. USN AND OTHER FORCE	3. ALL FORCES (at least one seaborne force and USAF and USARMY)	(incl. All Forces)
4. ALL FORCES (at least one seaborne force and USAF and USARMY)		

For each crisis where naval forces were involved, I introduced the following variables:

- CV involvement (yes/no)
- Number of CVs (metric)

- CV strength (no CV / one CV / two or more CVs)
- Amphibious involvement (yes/no)
- Type of mission.

The variable “CV involvement” accounts for the deployment of an aircraft carrier. The number as well as the capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers has changed over time, and it is therefore difficult to compare the quantity of CVs deployed to crises over the years.⁵⁶ However, Blechman and Kaplan distinguish between minor, standard, and high components of force.⁵⁷ For the Navy, a standard force component is a carrier task group; two or more carriers are a major component of force; and the absence of aircraft carrier incidents defines minor components of force. To have a complete account of CV involvement I introduced another variable measuring the actual number of involved CVs, “Number of CVs.” For the years 1990 onward the CNA data did not provide information about the number of CVs. When the CV involvement can be confirmed with sufficient certainty the variable is included; otherwise it is counted as missing data. The next variable measures the involvement of amphibious forces. In all CNA documents this is simply measured by a binary variable (yes/no).

The variable “Type of mission” is divided into six categories, following Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg:⁵⁸

- Contingent positioning (naval forces are ordered to an area, diverted away from their routine schedule but without clear operational intentions)⁵⁹
- Reconnaissance (moving U.S. forces around the world to influence actions of some potential adversaries, mostly a naval activity)
- Noncombatant evacuation operation
- Show of force (similar to contingent positioning and reconnaissance but more direct and open, e.g., actually putting boots on the ground, moving weapons systems, moving supplies)
- Combat
- Peace operations.

Since only the latest CNA study provides this information, in earlier cases I coded the variable as missing data. Contingent positioning and reconnaissance responses are characterized by diverting naval ships from their schedules to position them closer to incipient crises. NEOs are conducted for the protection of American embassies or the evacuation of American and other approved personnel. Shows of force are reactions in which U.S. naval forces sail into harm’s way, though no shots are fired. In combat actions, actual combat takes place or weapons are fired. Peace operations comprise three


different activities: *support to diplomacy* (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy), *peacekeeping*, and *peace enforcement*. “Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.”⁶⁰ Disaster-relief missions are responses to natural disasters or other emergencies that are conducted in otherwise benign environments; they are not included in this analysis. Similarly, humanitarian-assistance missions—while likely to be carried out in nonpermissive environments and mostly reactions to man-made events—are likely to take place only after the initial U.S. reaction to a crisis.

Naval Involvement Frequencies

As an introduction to the main variables, I present some simple frequencies. According to the data set, U.S. naval forces were deployed in ninety-three (including Afghanistan and Iraq) out of the 229 international crises in which the nation was involved. Twelve cases are excluded because they either do not meet the criterion of fewer than a thousand American casualties or specifically naval involvement cannot be adequately confirmed. Afghanistan and Iraq are excluded from the statistical analysis (because they exceed the casualty threshold) but are otherwise treated as cases with naval involvement.

As shown in figure 10, naval forces were deployed in more than 40 percent of all U.S. engagements in international crises. Of the ninety-three cases under study, in thirty-nine the USN deployed alone or with the USMC and in fifty-four cases with other forces.

FIGURE 10
Naval Involvement Binary and USN-USMC Team & USN with Other Forces



The charts in figure 11 further break down the combinations with other forces in which the Navy was deployed. These new variables were introduced to measure the level of

joint deployment. A deployment of all forces is a much more substantial involvement than the other two categories and must include sea, air, and ground forces.

FIGURE 11
USN and Other Forces Combinations





Figure 12 presents the strength of the naval force, measured in number of aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. All cases that included the Marine Corps involved amphibious forces. The stronger the U.S. force, the more likely it was to reach or exceed force levels of two CVs. Because the latest CNA study does not provide information on vessels involved, the following charts include only cases up to 1990.

FIGURE 12
Naval Strength



The time lines of figures 13a and 13b graphically demonstrate the variation of the frequency of U.S. reactions to international crises, controlling for involvements with

and without naval forces. Whereas the first figure distinguishes only between “no naval involvement” and “naval involvement,” the second analyzes the different service combinations with which the USN deployed.

FIGURE 13A
Time Line of Naval Involvement




FIGURE 13B
Time Line of Naval Involvement, Servicetype2




Figure 13a shows that the peaks and lows of naval responses differed from those of non-naval ones. Naval responses peaked in 1958 and 1962–63, while declines occurred in the early 1950s, late 1980s, early 1990s, and after 2002. A relatively steady response pattern is visible between 1966 and 1978 and between 1992 and 1997. In the time frame between 1977 and 1991, nonnaval American activity peaks occurred on several occasions. The second time line, figure 13b, distinguishes among the different service combinations, treating maritime forces jointly. The years 1962 to 1964, 1981, and 1984 saw peaks of maritime-forces-only responses. After 1986 very few of the military responses occurred with only seaborne forces but rather were characterized by joint deployments. This increase in joint operations coincides with the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which encouraged interservice cooperation.

General Observations of U.S. (Naval) Activity in International Crises

Before statistically analyzing the circumstances in which the United States deploys naval forces, a historical account of the frequency and location of U.S. activity can provide answers to crisis-characteristics questions concerning the locations of USN responses. As shown in figure 14, the late 1940s were dominated by responses in Europe. This finding is not surprising, since many Eastern European countries were struggling against the influence of communism at the end of World War II. In roughly half of the cases, naval forces were involved. Somewhat more surprising are the responses in the Middle East. In the first years after the end of World War II the United States focused mainly on other regions, and an increasing interest in the Middle East occurs only in the early 1950s.⁶¹ However, the following decades were marked by a much higher frequency of reactions to international crises in that region. Three responses between 1946 and 1949 occurred in Asia. The 1950s were clearly dominated by two regions, Asia and the Middle East, with slightly more cases without naval involvement. Fewer responses took place in Europe, mostly without the support of naval forces. The activity in Central America was evenly distributed between no naval involvement and naval involvement, whereas crisis response in North Africa occurred without USN deployments. In the 1960s naval forces dominated American crisis-response activity in Central America and Europe, while in the other major response areas, the Middle East and in Asia, only about half of the cases featured USN forces.

The largest concentration of international crises in the 1970s occurred in Africa. During this decade many African countries gained independence from former colonial powers. Frequently this led to wars between factions or with bordering countries, resulting in international crises. Most of the American responses on this continent took place in central or southern Africa and did not include naval forces. Again, the majority of naval deployments occurred in the Middle East and Asia, with fewer cases in Europe and

Central America. Africa remained tumultuous in the 1980s, but American responses also occurred in North and East Africa. The various crises with Libya are mostly responsible for the involvement in North Africa. In the Middle East, more involvements took place without the USN, and no crisis response in Asia included naval forces. Of the three reactions to incidents in Europe, two included naval deployments. In the 1990s the United States was less active in Africa; however, half of the six responses included naval forces.


The Middle East largely dominated the 1990s, but the United States also focused on Asia, both with and without naval support. The responses in Europe are largely attributable to the wars resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Few responses show up in Central and South America. The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by a very small number of involvements. This may be a side effect of the GWOT, which tied up U.S. military forces and left little room for other deployments. Only five cases for the time span 2000–2006 led to the dispatch of naval forces, including Afghanistan and Iraq. No activity occurred in Europe or in Central or South America, but the United States reacted to three crises in Eurasia and five in Asia (two Navy, three without). Over the years the Middle East; Asia, predominantly Southeast and East Asia; and Central America were the main foci of U.S. naval forces.

In the next step, the different types of forces are analyzed in more detail. The “Navy only” cases are located in Central and South America, the Middle East, Asia (especially Southeast and East Asia), and some in Africa, especially in the north. This is not much different from the findings of naval deployments independent of the force combination. USN-USMC cases add Europe and South Asia to the regions but also occur in Central America, North and East Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia. Looking at all crises including the Army and Air Force explains the crisis responses in other regions. The distributions now cover most geographic locations, although the focus remains on the Middle East, Central America, and Southeast and East Asia.

Table 14 also distinguishes between different levels of U.S. activity. The majority of American responses occurred at only a low level of activity. For this type of response “no naval involvement” was more frequent than the deployment of naval forces. For responses of the next category, semi-military involvement, naval forces are frequently deployed. The smallest set of responses involved direct military activity, which often included naval forces. Only in two cases where the U.S. activity was coded as “direct military” were no naval forces involved. The two crises in question are the Congo II crisis of 1964 and the Libyan jets crisis of 1988. During the Congo crisis the United States and Belgium dispatched paratroops to support a hostage-rescue mission. The shooting down of two Libyan MiG-23s by U.S. fighters was coded as direct military involvement in a crisis initially triggered by the Pan American airliner crash at Lockerbie in late 1988.

FIGURE 14

*Geographic Location & Content of U.S. Activity
(the three crises where USN involvement is uncertain are circled by broken line)*



As previously shown, the majority of responses occurred in the Middle East, Central America, and South, Southeast, and East Asia. While in the first region half of the responses occurred with naval forces, the other half without, in the latter two regions more than 50 percent of the responses involved naval forces. The majority of the various responses in East Asia included the dispatch of the USN, while in Africa the larger part of U.S. activity took place without naval forces (with the exception of North Africa) and also occurred at a low level. After the end of the Cold War, direct military “all forces” responses dominated Middle East crisis response, whereas previously only USN-USMC forces had been deployed frequently. Central America shows a high level of semi-military USN-USMC response activity. Overall, since the end of the Cold War U.S. direct military crisis-response activity has increased.

Methodology

There are important limitations here. The relatively small number of naval involvements and the even more limited data on the response time, specific mission, and strength of the deployment pose great challenges to statistical analysis. While I would like to create complex models accounting for a variety of different effects, especially also interaction effects, this goal is not attainable with the current data. Instead of elaboration on the hypotheses and taking into account more variations of naval deployments, the following empirical analyses will be rather basic in nature. Based on the available information

and restrictions posed by statistical requirements, the analyses are necessarily confined to simple regression models, in an attempt to provide more information than simple frequencies. However, given the exploratory character of this study, even frequencies will be an important first step and ideally will encourage future efforts to report naval involvements in more detail as to allow deeper analysis of their impact.

Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression

Regression analyses help to understand the relation between one dependent and one or more independent variables. The most common regression, linear regression, requires the dependent variable to be metrically scaled. Logistic regressions allow us to predict dependent variables based on dichotomous, categorical, or continuous independent variables. *Binary (or binomial) logistic regression* is employed when the dependent is a dichotomous variable and the independents are of any variable type. *Multinomial logistic regression* models are applied when the dependent variable has more than two values and is categorically scaled. When the dependent variable can be ranked, an *ordinal logistic regression* model is preferred. In all of these three regression types, there can be only one dependent variable.

Logistic regression applies maximum-likelihood estimation after converting the dependent into a *logit* variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring. Logistic regression has many analogies to the ordinary-least-square (OLS) methods in linear regressions: logit coefficients correspond to *b* coefficients in the logistic regression equation, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights (*b* values), and a pseudo- R^2 statistic is available to summarize the strength of the relationship. But these “pseudo- R^2 statistics” have to be interpreted with care.⁶² For OLS regressions the R^2 value provides information on how much of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable(s). For regressions with dichotomous or categorical dependent variables, however, R^2 does not serve as a measurement of the variance of the dependent variable but rather has to be interpreted as a measurement of the strength of association.

Unlike OLS regression, logistic regression does not assume that the relationship between dependent and independent variables is linear, and the choice is not restricted to normally distributed variables. Further, no homoscedasticity (equality of statistical variance) is assumed, and generally the requirements are less stringent. Goodness-of-fit tests are available, such as the likelihood ratio test as an indicator of model suitability and the Wald statistic to test the significance of individual independent variables. In order to interpret the output, the *b* values need to be discussed. The *b* values— $Exp(B)$ —generate the factor by which the likelihood of the occurrence of “1” values of

the dependent variable (0 or 1) increases. All values smaller than 1 signify a negative relationship, and no assumption can be made regarding the strength of the negative influence. A b value of 1 signifies a neutral indicator, with no influence on the dependent variable.⁶³ Binary logistic regression predicts the “1” value of the dependent, using the “0” level as the reference value. Multinomial logistic regression compares each level of the dependent with the baseline category for each independent variable. Because the hypotheses not only measure the naval involvement as a binary variable but also distinguish between the different combinations of the services, both binary logistic and multinomial logistic models are appropriate.

For multinomial logistic regression we must select a baseline category for the dependent variable. For instance, given the multinomial dependent “naval involvement” with levels 0 = “No Navy,” 1 = “USN-USMC,” 2 = “USN & Other Forces,” and 3 = “All Forces,” four choices can be made for the baseline category. If “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, the multinomial logistic output will show, first, the comparison of “No Naval Involvement” with “All Forces”; second, the comparison of “USN-USMC” with “All Forces”; and third, the comparison of “USN & Other Forces” with “All Forces.” Similarly, for the independent variables a reference category has to be defined. The statistical program SPSS automatically defaults the highest value. If the researcher desires another reference category, the variables have to be recoded accordingly. This brings up three considerations. First, because the b coefficients for dummy variables will reflect changes in the dependent with respect to the reference group (which is the left-out group), it is best if the reference group is clearly defined. Thus leaving out the “Other” or “Miscellaneous” category, for example, is suboptimal, for the reference comparisons will be unclear. Second, the left-out reference group should have multiple cases if it is to lead to stable reference comparisons. Third, some researchers prefer to leave out a “middle” category when transforming ordinal categories into dummy variables, arguing that reference comparisons with median groups are preferable to comparisons with extremes. In this study the small number of cases often posed a problem in this regard, and I tried to choose the reference category as carefully as possible.

Structure of the Regression Analyses

In order to measure how much the independent variable influences the dependent variable, simple or stepwise regression models are employed. When the data and the theoretical considerations allow, I chose stepwise multiple regression models, thereby automatically eliminating independent variables with no significant influence. Stepwise regression assumes that the term would have a coefficient of 0 and adds the term only when there is sufficient evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. Otherwise, simple regression analyses were employed to test hypotheses separately and determine

which factors change the dependent variable independent of any intercorrelation effects between independent variables. In multiple regression models, the influence may be altered by intercorrelation effects. Moreover, because the dependent variable varies from hypothesis to hypothesis, no general overarching regression model can be calculated. In simple regression models the pseudo- R^2 values are lower, because usually one variable alone is less strongly associated with the dependent variable.⁶⁴ Again, it is important to note that R^2 values have to be interpreted with care in logistic regression models. While most regression analyses were run with “servicetype2” (treating USN-USMC as a single force team) serving as dependent variable, the basic frequencies are presented with “servicetype1” (USN and USN-USMC separate categories). To calculate the frequencies for the joint seaborne forces, the categories USN only and USN-USMC need only be added. The already low number of cases for the different variables and the additional decrease in cases when dividing into the different categories often do not allow a further distinction between the seaborne forces, especially on the system level. However, when statistically possible and when results reveal interesting differences, the more detailed regression outputs are discussed.

In a first step, tables with the frequencies for the different forms of American involvement and the variables categories are depicted. In a second step, the results of the regression analysis are presented. In order to simplify the statistical outputs, generally only two categories are chosen as baseline and reference categories. The values in the tables represent the $Exp(B)$ values with the according significance level. After the statistical analyses, if possible, historical examples are described to strengthen the validity of the argument and support the empirical results.

Notes

1. Mahoney, *U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975*.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 35.
3. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 107–108, 131–32.
5. A positive outcome is considered reached when the United States is satisfied with the outcome and has been able to achieve its goal(s).
6. Siegel, *Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era*.
7. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, *For the Record*, p. 93. Because these dates have been captured in Siegel’s 1991 work and in Thomas Barnett and Linda Lancaster, *Answering the 9-1-1 Call: U.S. Military and Naval Crisis Response Activity, 1977–1991*, CIM 229 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1992), I did not include the data.
8. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.
9. *Ibid.*
10. A “war” must involve sustained combat between organized armed forces and result in a minimum of a thousand battle-related fatalities among combatants within a twelve-month period.
11. Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet Kisangani, “The International Military Intervention Data Set: An Updated Resource for Conflict Scholars,”

- Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 4 (2009), pp. 589–99.
12. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher Sarver, “Militarized Interstate Disputes and United States Use of Force,” *International Studies Quarterly* 45, no. 3 (2001), pp. 463–64.
 13. Karl DeRouen and Christopher Sprecher, “Initial Crisis Reaction and Poliheuristic Theory,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 1 (2004), p. 60.
 14. In July 2010, version 10 of the data set, with 455 crises and a thousand actors, was released. The three new cases all occurred in Africa. Two involved Sudan and Chad, respectively (low-level U.S. activity), and the third Ethiopia and Eritrea (semi-military/covert U.S. activity). By the release date all the statistical analyses for this study had been finalized; however, it is very unlikely that these three cases would have greatly altered the results.
 15. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, “ICB Project Information,” www.cidcm.umd.edu.
 16. Had I been studying the behavior of sailors on land or how many have had to be rescued after falling overboard, I would have been more successful. I came across many interesting reports about the activities of the sailors ashore—from thefts of saltshakers at luxury hotels in Italy to fights with taxi drivers in Turkey and bargains in the ports of the Middle East. The same can be said about exercises.
 17. Only two international crises with USN involvement took place during this time frame; both are listed in appendix A (available online), sec. A2. The naval involvement could be thoroughly confirmed for only one of the two crises; therefore, only one is included in the statistical analyses.
 18. Kimberley Neuendorf, *The Content Analysis Guidebook* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002); Joseph Fleiss, *Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions* (New York: Wiley, 1981).
 19. Mahoney, *U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975*.
 20. Siegel, *Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era*.
 21. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, *For the Record*, p. 93.
 22. Till, *Seapower*. The epigraph is from p. 125.
 23. U.S. Navy Dept., “The Aircraft Carrier,” n.d., Navy.mil.
 24. Norman Friedman, *Aircraft Carriers* (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1983); Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy*.
 25. Rebecca Grant, “The Carrier Myth: The Enthusiastic Claims of Some Aircraft Carrier Proponents Frequently Defy Reality,” *Air Force Magazine* 82, no. 3 (1999), pp. 26–31.
 26. Booth, *Navies and Foreign Policy*, p. 182.
 27. Till, *Seapower*.
 28. John Gordon IV et al., *Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities: Exploring New Combat and Noncombat Roles and Missions for the U.S. Carrier Fleet* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2006); Till, *Seapower*.
 29. U.S. Navy Dept., “Fact File: Aircraft Carriers—CVN,” 2010, Navy.mil.
 30. Goodall, “Gunboat Diplomacy.”
 31. Norman Polmar, *The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet*, 19th ed. (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1981), p. 217.
 32. William Clinton, “Remarks to the Crew of the U.S.S. *Theodore Roosevelt*,” 12 March 1993, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/.
 33. Grant, “Carrier Myth.”
 34. Gordon et al., *Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities*.
 35. Rubel, “Navy’s Changing Force Paradigm,” pp. 15–18.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
 37. Gordon et al., *Leveraging America’s Aircraft Carrier Capabilities*, p. iii.
 38. Lacroix and Blickstein, *Forks in the Road for the US Navy*, p. viii.
 39. Christine Fox, *Carrier Operations Looking toward the Future: Learning from the Past* (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2009).
 40. Allen, *Uses of Navies in Peacetime*, pp. 4–5.
 41. Fox, *Carrier Operations Looking toward the Future*.
 42. Pritchett, “Down to 9”
 43. “USS *Theodore Roosevelt* Headed into Mid-life Overhaul.
 44. Ronald O’Rourke, *Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress*, CRS Report for Congress

- (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2009).
45. Wood, *Strategy for the Long Haul*.
 46. Mahoney, *U.S. Navy Responses to International Incidents and Crises, 1955–1975*.
 47. Wood, *Strategy for the Long Haul*, p. 5.
 48. U.S. Navy Dept., “The Amphibious Ready Group,” 2009, Navy.mil.
 49. Binkin and Record, *Where Does the Marine Corps Go from Here?*, p. 11.
 50. Till, *Seapower*.
 51. Wood, *Strategy for the Long Haul*, pp. 5–6.
 52. Hank Gaffney et al., *Employment of Amphibious MEUs in National Responses to Situations*, CRM D0015288.A2 (Alexandria, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 2006). According to Gaffney et al., the United States has been much less active in this respect since 2001, in large part due to its engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. The few responses have been mostly humanitarian or peace-support operations of short duration. Active combat missions have involved Afghanistan, Iraq, and counterpiracy in the Gulf of Aden.
 53. I did, however, take a closer look at the ICB cases coded as “No U.S. Involvement” and found, almost without exception, no naval activity related to the international crises. Siegel coded naval involvement during at least three crises as “no U.S. activity,” citing the ICB. The first was his number 117, “Cuba–Dominican Republic,” 1947, in which Cuban-supported anti-Trujillo forces began to be perceived as a threat and Dominican forces were put on alert. ICB codes no U.S. activity, mentioning only prohibition of the purchase of U.S. weapons; Siegel reported increased U.S. naval operations in the Caribbean as a sign of American pressure on Cuba. A few weeks later Cuban support ceased. The second was number 183, “Kuwait Independence,” 1961. The crisis triggered the dispatch of five USN vessels as a contingency force. Third was his number 207, “East African Rebellions,” early 1964. Rebels overthrew the government in Zanzibar, and an armed mutiny in Tanganyika soon followed. USS *Manley* (DD 940) evacuated foreign nationals from Zanzibar and returned to stand by for possible evacuations from Tanganyika. ICB reports only British activity.
 54. The naval involvement for three cases (numbers 344, 383, and 452) could not be confirmed with sufficient certainty. They are discussed in appendix A2 (available online).
 55. The ten variables are USMC (yes/no); USAF (yes/no); USARMY (yes/no); USN ONLY (yes/no); USN, USMC (yes/no); USN, USMC, USAF (yes/no); USN, USAF (yes/no); USN, USMC, USARMY (yes/no); USN, USARMY (yes/no); ALL FORCES (yes/no).
 56. Friedman, *Seapower as Strategy*, p. 271.
 57. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, pp. 49–50.
 58. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, *For the Record*. In some cases additional categories are identified, such as response to terrorism, no-fly zone, and security.
 59. Till, *Seapower*.
 60. U.S. Army Dept., *Peace Operations*, Field Manual 100-23 (Washington, D.C.: 1994).
 61. See, for example, Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*.
 62. University of California, Los Angeles, Academic Technology Services, “SPSS Data Analysis Examples: Logit Regression,” n.d., available at www.ats.ucla.edu/.
 63. Simon Hug, “3.5. Regressionsanalysen und qualitative Daten: Logistische Regression,” documents for the “Lecture Quantitative Methods for Political Science 2, Fall/Winter Semester 2006/07,” Univ. of Zurich, Switzerland.
 64. Nagelkerke’s R^2 can reach a maximum value of 1 and is a widely used substitute for R^2 measures for logistic regressions.

We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part I Assessing the Empirical Evidence—Crisis Characteristics and Actors

To better understand the influence of different crisis characteristics on seaborne crisis response, four hypotheses were generated in chapter 2.¹ The first three are concerned with the type of crisis, while the last one analyzes the influence of the crisis on the global system. All variables are measured on the system level.

The following three hypotheses are analyzed in a combined stepwise regression model, Crisis Characteristics Model 1 (see sidebar 1). Graver threats and higher stakes were assumed to favor “all forces” responses and render the deployment of seaborne responses less likely. In regard to higher levels of violence the hypothesis can go either way, either increasing or decreasing the likelihood of seaborne responses alone.

FIGURE 15
Crisis Characteristics Model 1



SIDEBAR 1

The variables in the hypotheses can be expressed mathematically as follows.

(1) $x1a$ and $x1b$ = gravity of threat ($gravcr$, $gravcr2$, $gravcr3$).

A low-threat crisis is measured with the variable “gravity of value threatened.” Categories have to be transformed from their original values. The variable measures the seriousness of the threat of the crisis for the actors, ranging from “low level” fear, such as economic threats, through midrange fears, such as threats to “territory” and “influence,” and ultimately to a danger to existence (“grave threat”).

(2) x_2 = issues (*issue*, *issue2*).

A low-politics crisis is measured by the nature and number of issues at stake. If a case includes military-security issues the crisis threatens high politics. The variable contains three categories: "1–2 issues non-military-security," "military-security issue alone," and "2 issues including military-security/3 issues."

(3) x_3 = violence (*viol*).

The level of violence is identified with the help of the variable "violence," controlling for the highest level of violence in a crisis. "No violence" is the lowest level, followed by "minor clashes," "major clashes," and the last category, "war."

(4) x_4 = geographic location (*geogloc*, *geogloc2*), and

(5) x_5 = geostrategic salience (*geostr*, *geostr2*).

A crisis of geostrategic interest is measured by its "geostrategic salience" and the "geographic location" of the crisis. The variable "geographic location" was converted into a new binary variable. Thomas Barnett and H. H. Gaffney define Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Southwest Asia (particularly the Persian Gulf region), Japan, Taiwan, and Korea as regions or countries of most importance to the United States.^a Blechman and Kaplan find frequent U.S. involvement in Europe, Southeast and East Asia, Middle East, and Central America.^b The Persian Gulf region is a subset of the Middle East, but clearly the United States has a great interest in the latter.^c Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are the key nations in East Asia. Therefore the ICB variable "geographic location" was converted into a binary variable depending on whether an area was or is of interest to the United States following Blechman and Kaplan's definition. Geostrategic salience identifies the level and number of the international systems affected by the crisis. The variable was reexamined as a binary variable measuring whether the crisis affected "only subsystem(s)" or the "dominant/global system."


a. Thomas Barnett and H. H. Gaffney, "100 Top Rules of the New American Way of War," *British Army Review—London Ministry of Defence*, no. 131 (2003), pp. 40–44.

b. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.

c. See, for example, Hahn, *Crisis and Crossfire*.

The second model, Crisis Characteristics Model 2 (see sidebar 1), analyzes the hypothesis assuming a negative relation between the deployment of seaborne forces only and crises of high geostrategic importance.

FIGURE 16
Crisis Characteristics Model 2



Before turning to the regression analyses, the frequencies of the variables are summarized in figure 17.

FIGURE 17
Crisis Characteristics Frequencies

CRISIS CHARACTERISTICS		NO NAVY	USN ONLY	USN-USMC	USN & OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Gravity of threat 2	Low-level threat	54/40.3	9/39.1	9/56.3	5/23.8	10/32.3
	Territorial or influence	63/47	9/39.1	3/18.8	7/33.3	12/38.7
	Grave threat	17/12.7	5/21.7	4/25	9/42.9	9/29
Gravity of threat 3	Low-level threat	54/40.3	9/39.1	9/56.3	5/23.8	10/32.3
	Territorial threat	46/34.3	7/30.4	2/12.5	3/14.3	0/0
	Threat to influence	17/12.7	2/8.7	1/6.3	4/19	12/38.7
	Grave threat	17/12.7	5/21.7	4/25	9/42.9	9/29
Issues 2	1–2 non-Mil-Sec	23/16.9	3/13.6	3/18.8	2/9.5	9/29
	1 Mil-Sec	66/48.5	6/27.3	7/43.8	2/9.5	4/12.9
	2 issues incl. Mil-Sec or 3+	47/34.6	13/59.1	6/37.5	17/81	18/58.1
Violence	No violence	33/24.3	6/26.1	5/31.3	4/19	6/19.4
	Minor clashes	43/31.6	5/21.7	4/25	4/19	11/35.5
	Major clashes	48/35.3	2/8.7	2/12.5	6/28.6	7/22.6
	War	12/8.8	10/43.5	5/31.3	7/33.3	7/22.6
Geostrategic salience	Subsystem only	118/86.8	17/73.9	11/68.8	14/66.7	9/23.1
	Global system	18/13.26	6/26.1	5/31.3	7/33.3	22/71
Geographic location	Not important	69/50.7	6/26.1	2/12.5	6/28.6	3/9.7
	Important	67/49.3	17/73.9	14/87.5	15/71.4	28/90.3

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

Different distributions of the independent variables require adapting the dependent variable in order to meet the significance requirements for conducting regression analyses. While the variables “gravity of threat 2” and “issues 2” could be analyzed employing “servicetype1”—distinguishing between the seaborne forces—the variable “violence” requires the collapse of these categories. Moreover, “gravity of threat 3” calls for “USN-USMC Team” as dependent variable, because of the zero correlations between territorial threats and the deployment of all forces.

Regression Analyses Crisis Characteristics 1

The variable “gravity of threat 2” was automatically removed from the regression model by the stepwise entry mechanism. The results show that the categories “no navy”

and “USN-USMC Team” are dominant in crises concerning one single military-security issue.

FIGURE 18

Model Crisis Characteristics 1a: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN-USMC TEAM	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
1–2 issues	0.802	0.653	0.248	bl
1 Mil-Sec issue	5.577***	3.446*	0.536	bl
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+	rf	rf	rf	bl
No violence	3.522*	1.079	0.982	bl
Minor clashes	2.218	0.428	0.462	bl
Major clashes	3.534*	0.272	1.048	bl
War	rf	rf	rf	bl
1–2 issues	bl	rf	rf	rf
1 Mil-Sec issue	bl	0.760	0.311	0.144***
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+	bl	1.229	3.233	0.803
No violence	bl	rf	rf	rf
Minor clashes	bl	0.630	0.747	1.588
Major clashes	bl	0.251**	1.063	0.996
War	bl	3.265**	3.586*	3.522*

$N = 224$

* $p < 0.1$ ** $p < 0.05$ *** $p < 0.01$

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo- $R^2 = 0.233$

rf—reference category

The $Exp(B)$ value suggests that the highest category of issues correlates with responses involving the Air Force; however, it fails to meet the significance requirements. No clear deployment pattern for “All Forces” response is visible. “No Navy” is dominant in the first three categories of violence when “war” serves as reference category and “All Forces” as baseline. Although not significant, the negative or close-to-1 results suggest that all forces are more likely in lower levels of violence than the other service combinations. Once the baseline and reference category are reversed, all military forces combinations are more likely in a setting marked by a war level of violence than by no naval deployment. While the $Exp(B)$ values are fairly similar, the combination with the Air Force shows the strongest correlation. This suggests that high levels of violence generally encourage all types of U.S. military interventions and that different military intervention strategies are better explained by looking at the issues of the crises. Neither the gravity of the threat nor the issue of the crisis seems to influence the deployment of “All Forces,” suggesting that other considerations, such as the importance of the crisis to the United States, determine the strength of the response.

When the independent “issues 2” is analyzed alone, employing a simple multinomial regression model, the correlation between the highest category and naval deployments including the Air Force shows a strong and significant value of 4.250. A model testing the variable “violence” alone shows very similar results, but the *Exp(B)* values for war change to more pronounced differences between the services, with “USN & Other Forces” displaying the strongest correlation, followed by seaborne forces, and “All Forces” having the lowest correlation. Violence and issues correlate significantly, although not very high, at $r = 0.227$. A simple frequency analysis reveals that a war level of violence is dominant in crises involving “2 incl. mil/3+ issues,” while crises concerning “one mil-sec issue” concurred eighteen times when no violence was present, twenty-six times for minor violence, thirty-one times for major violence, and fourteen times for war-level violence. Entries of “1–2 issues” rarely coincide in war-level violence (twice) but rather take place in nonviolent settings (sixteen) and minor clashes (thirteen).

In trying to explain the results, I took a closer look at the type of mission ($N = 46$) and the strength of naval deployment ($N = 73$) where the information was available. Because of the small N values, only frequencies can be presented. For the lowest issues category, “1–2 issues,” six responses took place in the form of shows of force and two as NEOs. For “mil-sec issues,” three were contingent positioning/reconnaissances, four were NEOs, and two were shows of force, while for the highest issue categories, combat (five) and show of force (eight) were dominant. In general, a show of force is the most frequent type of mission, but given the absence of combat activity in lower-level crises, this supports the assumption of a graver threat presented by crises involving multiple issues. Looking at the strength of the naval deployment, the two variables increase simultaneously. For the lowest issues category, deployments with no CVs are most frequent; conversely, for the highest issue category, deployments with two or more CVs are most likely. Blechman and Kaplan had found a correlation between the use of aircraft carriers and the importance of violence.² Examining the “eyeball” correlations (that is, those apparent on quick inspection) from the frequencies, aircraft carriers were not overwhelmingly more frequent in war levels of violence. The same was observed for the involvement of amphibious forces.

While the variable “gravity of threat 2” had been excluded from the previous model, the frequency analysis shows that maritime forces are mostly deployed in crises where territory is threatened, while “All Forces” deployed only when a threat to influence is present. This encourages a distinction between the two categories. Surprisingly, territorial crises never triggered the deployment of all U.S. military services. Following the separation of cases by the newly introduced distinction (no cases for territorial threats and

all forces), no analysis was possible with the variable “servicetype 1” or “servicetype 2.” Therefore, the variable “USN-USMC Team” was employed as dependent variable.

FIGURE 19

Model Crisis Characteristics 1b: USNUMCTEAM, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN-USMC TEAM	USN&OTHER FORCES (INCL. ALL FORCES)
Low-level threat	3.795**	3.589*	bl
Territorial threat	14.915***	7.567**	bl
Threat to influence	0.884	0.475	bl
Grave threat	rf	rf	bl
1–2 issues	1.462	1.105	bl
1 Mil-Sec issue	8.022***	5.333***	bl
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+	rf	rf	bl
No violence	3.445**	1.094	bl
Minor clashes	2.340	0.452	bl
Major clashes	3.427***	0.265*	bl
War	rf	rf	bl
Low-level threat	bl	rf	rf
Territorial threat	bl	0.536	0.254***
Threat to influence	bl	0.569	4.294***
Grave threat	bl	1.057	3.445**
1–2 issues	bl	rf	rf
1 Mil-Sec issue	bl	0.880	0.182***
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+	bl	1.323	1.462
No violence	bl	rf	rf
Minor clashes	bl	0.609	1.472
Major clashes	bl	0.244**	1.005
War	bl	3.150**	3.445*

N = 224

p* < 0.1 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-*R*² = 0.347

rf—reference category

This time, the stepwise regression included all three independent variables. The findings clearly demonstrate the dominance of maritime forces only among the military responses in crises posing a “threat to territory.” The likelihood of the deployment of naval forces increases with a “territorial threat,” by 7.567, although “no naval involvement” is even more likely, with a factor of 14.915. Thus while the United States overall is reluctant to become engaged in territorial threats with military forces, seaborne forces are the tool of choice if a military response is decided on. There is a predictable outcome

associated with the “threat to influence” category. It can be assumed that in such crises the United States was the actor coded as perceiving a threat to its influence. In this model, the threat variable also suggests that out of the military forces, seaborne forces are more likely to be deployed in low-threat crises, compared to stronger responses including the Air Force and Army.

The second half of the analysis with “no Navy” as baseline does not show significant results for seaborne forces, because they are very similar to “no naval involvement,” as the first part of the analysis reveals. The inclusion of the threat level in this model suggests that this variable is likely to be influenced by seaborne responses and “stronger involvements” not distinguishing between the Air Force and Army, in particular for low-level threats. Overall, the hypotheses concerning the gravity of threat and the level of violence can be partially confirmed—seaborne responses are more likely in crises characterized by lower threats but more violence. The hypothesis regarding the issue of the crisis has to be rejected for now, since “USN-USMC” responses do not seem to be correlated to low-stakes issues.

Case Study 1a: Threat to Influence and All Forces. The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military forces deployment, in this instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence over, the Western Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first combat-ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years.³

A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which had deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counter-revolution wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United States was mostly concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American regime would limit the influence of the United States and hinder its predominance while potentially providing the Soviet Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington’s own backyard.⁴ But the foremost official justification was the threat to the lives of American citizens.

Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of citizens of the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task force—including the helicopter carrier USS *Boxer* (LPH 4) and 1,500 Marines—off the Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with unarmed helicopters airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens. Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and a strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved to the Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone

and a safe corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had evacuated a total of three thousand civilians.

The mission's objective was extended to include the prevention of communist influence in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two thousand men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to withdraw until 28 June 1966;⁵ Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.⁶

The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the Department of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, including *Boxer*, the tank landing ship *Wood County* (LST 1178), destroyer transport *Ruchamkin* (APD 89), attack cargo ships *Yancey* (AKA 93) and *Rankin* (AKA 103), and the dock landing ships *Fort Snelling* (LSD 30) and *Raleigh* (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in the region by establishing a presence and showing determination not to allow a communist takeover.⁷

Case Study 1b: One Military-Security Issue and Seaborne Forces Only. The Turkish straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and demonstrated U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling against communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out between Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before the outbreak, an important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship USS *Missouri* (BB 63) departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States. *Missouri* was the ship on board which Japan had surrendered at the end of the war; sending it was a clear demonstration of American support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to Greece. *Missouri* demonstrated the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force and Army. The vessel could be sent to the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly be converted into a military use of force.

The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the Soviet Union sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the Soviets increased their naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United States expanded its own naval activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS *Franklin D. Roosevelt* (CV 42) entered the Mediterranean on 8 August. The presence of the world's largest aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to signal concern about increased

Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington's intentions to resist Soviet expansion. The deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the mainland through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. This crisis shows the value of seaborne forces in a military-security issue crisis.

The advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment while staying out of the way in case no direct action was necessary to solve the crisis. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a direct involvement on the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and anxiety. At the same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval forces. Although the Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval buildup, the permanent U.S. presence—announced in September 1946—was important to conveying a message of immediate readiness should any country need support against communist influence.⁸

Case Study 1c: No Violence and Seaborne Forces. The Nam Tha crisis of 1962 illustrates the deployment of naval forces in crises not involving violence. In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on the Laotian town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. The Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a Pathet Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already in Thailand for exercises to bolster that nation's defenses against Laotian communists should a request be received from Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home were put on alert. The aircraft carrier *Valley Forge* (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the *Hancock* (CV 19) group took position off Da Nang, South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted the Pathet Lao initiative and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into negotiations. The crisis ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, as well as between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed naval forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda considers a show of force.⁹ This example mirrors the pattern of show-of-force missions in nonviolent settings.

Regression Analysis Crisis Characteristics 2

The hypothesis assumes a stronger American involvement the greater the geostrategic importance of the crisis, measured with the two variables “geostrategic salience” (global versus subsystem) and “geographic location” (important versus not important). “Eye-ball” correlations suggest that the greater the threat to the global system, the more likely the United States is to become involved with all categories of military forces, while the importance of the geographic location more generally determines whether the United States becomes involved at all.

FIGURE 20

Model Crisis Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN ONLY	USN-USMC	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Loc not important	5.362**	2.025	0.861	2.497	bl
Loc important	rf	rf	rf	rf	bl
Subsystem only	11.319***	6.203***	5.485**	4.194**	bl
Global system	rf	rf	rf	rf	bl
Loc not important	bl	rf	rf	rf	rf
Loc important	bl	2.648*	6.382**	2.147	5.362**
Subsystem only	bl	rf	rf	rf	rf
Global system	bl	1.825	2.064	2.699*	11.319***

N = 227

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.247

rf—reference category

The regression results confirm the observations from the frequencies, above. If geostrategic salience is low (subsystem only), the United States is more likely to respond with lower levels of force, with “no Navy” and “USN only” being the two dominant categories. This finding is consistent with a realist interpretation of U.S. intervention decisions and motivations. Geographic location shows a significant result only for “no naval involvement,” although the *Exp(B)* values suggest that the deployment of the USN and Air Force is more likely in crises in regions of relatively low importance to the United States than a deployment of all forces. When the baseline and reference category are reversed, “USN-USMC” responses show the highest likelihood of deployment, with 6.382, even higher than “All Forces.” Geographic location represents U.S. interest in the region, but geostrategic salience is a more accurate measure of the potential impact the crisis may have on the global system. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed.

A closer look reveals that seventy-eight of the crises posing threats to subsystems occurred in geographic locations of low interest to the United States and ninety-three in geographic locations of high interest. Thus a threat to the subsystem is almost as likely

to occur in a location of interest as in one of no interest. When the crisis poses a threat to the dominant or global system, the distribution is very different, with fifty-seven cases in high-importance regions and only eight in less important ones.

Case Study 1d: Threat to Global System and All Forces. The several incidents involving Berlin during the Cold War are examples of crises posing threats to the global system and of U.S. responses including all military services. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was one of the first major escalations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones. The announcement by the three Western governments that they planned to integrate their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called Operation VITLES, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft. The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North Atlantic in reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of the Air Force. But only in late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in order to meet the demand, did the U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers extended over several months until the Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under the condition that the United States, United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions against East Germany. The last day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left Germany split into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.¹⁰

Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses Results Summary

Table 4-1 summarizes the findings for the four crisis-characteristics hypotheses.

TABLE 4-1

Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat	Mixed results
Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake	Not confirmed
Hypothesis 1c: Violence	Mixed results
Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest	Confirmed


Crisis Actor Models

The influence of crisis actor characteristics on seaborne crisis response is analyzed with the help of four hypotheses: the number of involved actors, the involvement of the United Nations, the stability of the actors, and the attitude toward the American involvement.¹¹

The models capture variables at both the macro (system) and micro (actor) levels and seaborne crisis response serves as both a dependent and an independent variable.

The two hypotheses under Crisis Actor Model 1 assume that on the one hand, a greater number of actors leads to a stronger U.S. response, while on the other hand, low or no UN involvement triggers deployments by seaborne forces only (see sidebar 2).

FIGURE 21
Crisis Actor Model 1



SIDEBAR 2

The variables in the hypotheses are expressed as follows.

(6) x_6 = number of crisis actors (*cractr*).

This variable was measured with the number of crisis actors as provided by the ICB data.

(7) x_7 = global organization organ most active in crisis (*globorg*, *globorg2*).

The “globorg” variable from the ICB was transformed into the new variable “globorg2” and is divided into three categories: no UN involvement, low-level UN organ (general activity/Secretary-General/General Assembly) involvement, and Security Council involvement.

(8) x_8 = stability (*stability*).

The variable “stability” was created by combining the two ICB2 actor variables “government stability” and “societal unrest.” Possible categories include “normal,” when both variables remained stable; “societal instability,” an increase in societal unrest with governmental stability normal; and, conversely, “governmental instability,” a decrease in governmental stability with no change in societal unrest. Finally, the most unstable category is measured by an increase in instability for both variables: “governmental and societal instability.”

(9) y_4 = attitude to U.S. involvement (*usfavr*, *usfavr2*).

This variable measures the crisis actors’ attitudes to U.S. activity, from the ICB2 data, with the possible values “unfavorable,” “neutral,” and “favorable.”


In Crisis Actor Model 2, greater stability is assumed to favor the deployment of seaborne forces only (see sidebar 2).

FIGURE 22
Crisis Actor Model 2



Crisis Actor Model 3 analyzes the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne crisis response forces only will lead to more favorable perceptions of U.S. involvement (see sidebar 2).

FIGURE 23
Crisis Actor Model 3



The table in figure 24 presents the frequencies for the actor variables, with the exception of the metric variable “number of actors.”

FIGURE 24
Crisis Actors Frequencies

ACTOR CHARACTERISTICS		NO NAVY	USN ONLY	USN-USMC	USN & OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
UN involvement (system level)	No UN involvement	49/36	10/43.5	6/40	2/9.5	4/12.9
	Low-level UN involvement	26/29.5	8/34.8	1/6.7	7/33.3	7/22.6
	Security Council	61/63.8	5/21.7	8/53.3	12/57.1	20/64.5
Stability (actor level)	Governmental instability	18/7.4	4/7	3/8.8	9/13.8	5/5.1
	Governmental and societal instability	34/13.9	10/17.5	6/17.6	5/7.7	16/16.2
	Societal instability	26/10.7	14/24.6	11/32.4	13/20	10/10.1
	Both normal	166/68	29/50.9	14/41.2	38/58.5	68/68.7
Attitude toward U.S. activity (actor level)	Favorable	124/51.9	24/49	17/54.8	25/44.6	42/50.6
	Neutral	17/7.1	6/12.2	1/3.2	6/10.7	2/2.4
	Unfavorable	98/41	19/38.8	13/41.9	25/44.6	39/47

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

The majority of “USN only” responses occurred in crisis settings with no or low-level UN involvement, while for all other service combinations, deployments coinciding with United Nations Security Council (UNSC) activity are most common. Overall, the

United States seems to be more likely to respond if the crisis actors experience neither societal nor governmental unrest. If the United States deploys in crises with societal unrest, seaborne forces are more likely to be deployed alone than in combination with the Air Force or Army. The frequencies for the attitudes toward U.S. activity show no clear pattern (all cases where the United States was coded as “crisis actor” or as “inactive” were treated as missing data). Perceptions of American activity without any military service involvement or with just naval forces are slightly more neutral or least likely to be unfavorable.

“UN involvement” and the “number of crisis actors” are measured at the system level and are combined in a stepwise multinomial regression model. The hypothesis regarding the influence of instability, measured at the actor level, is analyzed in a simple regression model. Unfortunately, the dependent variable “attitude towards U.S. activity” did not generate any significant results. The attitude of the actors will be further evaluated in the section looking at crisis outcomes with an introduction of a new variable. To understand better the impact of the often-claimed limited decisiveness, it will be interesting to see how actors’ satisfaction with the outcome correlates with attitude toward U.S. activity.

Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 1

In figure 25, the event “All Forces” is chosen as baseline, and both “no Navy” and “USN-USMC” are significantly negatively correlated with the number of actors. “USN only” and “USN & Other Forces” suggest the same direction but fail to achieve significant results. When “no Navy” functions as baseline, all military service combinations are more likely the higher the number of crisis actors, with “USN & Other Forces” and “All Forces”

FIGURE 25

Model Actor Characteristics 1: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN	USN-USMC	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Number of actors	0.486***	0.808	0.493*	0.964	bl
No UN inv	2.755*	8.702***	2.587	0.812	bl
Low-level UN inv	1.124	4.371**	0.330	1.650	bl
UNSC inv	rf	rf	rf	rf	bl
Number of actors	bl	1.664**	1.015	1.985***	2.059***
No UN inv	bl	rf	rf	rf	rf
Low-level UN inv	bl	1.232	0.312	4.984*	2.452
UNSC inv	bl	0.317*	1.065	3.394	2.755*

N = 226

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.215

rf—reference category

showing the highest correlations. The category “USN-USMC” shows a value close to 1, suggesting no influence, but because of the lack of significance this cannot be interpreted.

The most telling outcome of the model is the increase of the probable odds by a factor of 8.7 for “USN only” responses in crises with “no UN involvement” and 4.371 with “low level UN involvement.” There is an even greater likelihood than no naval involvement at all compared to “All Forces.” “All Forces” responses, and even more so the combination with the Air Force, correlate highly with “Security Council” involvement. While the $Exp(B)$ for the Air Force combination does not generate a significant result in the combined model, a simple regression analysis with “UN involvement” as the only independent shows significant values for “USN & Other Forces” and UNSC involvement.

Overall, both hypotheses can be confirmed. The results suggest that the higher the number of crisis actors, the stronger the American response. For the UN activity, naval forces alone correlate with “no UN involvement” and “low UN involvement,” while “All Forces” responses concurred mainly with Security Council involvement.

While low or no UN involvement might suggest that a crisis was of low importance, it can also suggest that the United States was hesitant to send a strong force without some form of legitimization. Running of cross-tabulation calculations indicated “low level threats” occurred thirty times with “no UN involvement,” twenty-three times with “low level UN involvement,” and thirty-five times with “UNSC involvement.” As expected, “no UN involvement” was least likely in gravely threatening crises, but the UNSC responded to all three threat categories about equally. As for issues, “UNSC involvement” is most likely in the highest category, while “no UN involvement” is most frequent in crises concerning one security/military issue. But overall, no or low UN involvement is not a synonym for low importance. The strength of the USN response does not seem to be influenced by UN activity either. “Eyeball” correlation shows that a force strength of more than one CV is also frequent with no or low UN involvement. The type of mission is a better predictor. Combat is most common when the UNSC is involved, while reconnaissance/contingent positioning coincides with no UN activity. The frequency of reconnaissance/contingent positioning lends further support to the idea of expressing concern by observing events from a distance without becoming directly involved and attracting only limited global attention.

Case Study 2b: Low UN Involvement and USN-Only Response. Trouble in Nicaragua and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. naval forces but low UN involvement. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by exiles and a revolt in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United States deployed naval and air surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’

Caribbean coasts and to stand by in case of a possible invasion from mid-November until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, USS *Shangri-La* (CV 38) and *Wasp* (CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the naval patrol force. They kept outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels heading for the two countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from Nicaragua and Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both actors.¹² This episode serves as a good example of the flexibility, readiness, and subtlety of naval forces—short reaction time, ability to wait and see, and effortless withdrawal when no longer needed.

Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 2

The next model analyzes the impact of the actors' stability on seaborne crisis response at the actor level.

FIGURE 26

Model Actor Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN	USN-USMC	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Gov. instability	1.475	1.876	2.914	3.221**	bl
Gov. & soc. instability	0.870	1.466	1.821	0.559	bl
Societal instability	1.065	3.283**	5.343***	2.326*	bl
Both normal	rf	rf	rf	rf	bl

N = 499

p* < 0.1 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.007

bl—baseline

Pseudo-*R*² = 0.057

rf—reference category

The suggested frequency distribution is confirmed in the regression analysis. The odds of “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other Forces” are increased by a factor of 3.3, 5.3, and 2.3, respectively, in crises characterized by an increase in societal unrest but no change in government conditions, with “All Forces” as baseline. The results for “only government instability,” although positive for “no Navy” and the seaborne forces, present significant results only for the combination with the Air Force. The results suggest that “All Forces” responses are most likely when both factors remain normal, while seaborne forces (and especially the Marine Corps) deploy when an increase in societal unrest is present, in combination with the Air Force in case of increased governmental instability. The low *R*² value suggests that the association is rather weak and that many other factors influencing the dependent variable remain unaccounted for.

Overall, the mixed results encourage further analysis, but for now the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne forces only is more likely when there is no decrease in stability cannot be confirmed.

Case Study 2c: Different Forms of Unrest within One Crisis. Because this variable is measured at the actor level, different actors within one crisis experience different changes. The Congo civil war crisis of 1998 can be cited as an example. Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 1998 President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and of his chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly thereafter fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda received support from Uganda. The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, joined shortly after by the two principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, and attempts to hold a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 2002, his son Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa. According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops on both sides.

The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS *Saipan* (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC) stood ready in Operation AUTUMN SHELTER for a possible evacuation of the American embassy and U.S. citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not required and was canceled on 16 August. While for five of the crisis actors—Angola, Rwanda, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—neither a change in political stability nor societal unrest was noted, Chad experienced an increase in societal unrest, and Congo suffered from both political instability and societal unrest. The USN was engaged in operations in Congo, the crisis actor experiencing the most turmoil, not Chad.

Crisis Actor Hypotheses Results

Two out of the four hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analyses (see table 4-2). The measurement of political stability needs further evaluation and results before rejecting the hypothesis.

TABLE 4-2

Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability	Mixed results
<i>Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity</i>	<i>No results</i>

Part I Conclusion: Crisis Characteristics

While knowledge of a “trigger” would point to the initial reason for the crisis breakout, the gravity of the threat assesses the whole situation. To have a thorough picture for assessing the stakes of the crisis, the variable “gravity of threat” was introduced. While a violent trigger would suggest a need for immediate action, a crisis posing a grave threat, above all else, calls for a strong response. Overall the analyses confirmed that a crisis posing a “grave threat” is more likely to trigger force responses stronger than the dispatch of seaborne forces. The Air Force dominates crises characterized by the most extreme threats. The gravity of the threat captures the more realist component of the level of the crisis, since a grave threat has the potential to destabilize and disrupt a country and thereby spill over to other countries or affect whole regions. This in turn might trigger responses by other actors. Where the gravity of the situation requires a firm response and the dispatch of ground troops seems too risky, airpower seems to be the best choice. Even in situations where the time factor might not be especially critical, the dispatch of ground troops could lose too much time, whereas air forces are capable of striking faster.

When a crisis poses a threat to influence, it is deemed important enough to send ground troops for, because it can be assumed that in most cases the influence of the superpower has been threatened. This finding evokes the realist school of thought in decisions about the intensity of engagement. While a grave threat may not threaten U.S. interests, a threat to influence most likely does so. Thus, grave threat crises need forceful intervention, but in the form of airpower, while threats to influence trigger the strongest display of U.S. force. For the most part “low gravity threats” do not trigger military involvement when compared to no naval involvement, but when assessed against stronger force levels, seaborne forces responded more frequently to low-gravity threat crises. Thus the U.S. force level is graduated to the gravity of the threat.

Interesting to note is the dominance of seaborne responses to territorial threats within military responses generally. Since territorial threats are difficult to resolve, the United States might frequently decide to minimize any involvement. But if a military response is desired, naval forces can offer advantages. From a coercion-theory perspective, a limited level of force is most effective before a threat is carried out, for coercion is

superfluous if a country has already been overrun. In the case of territorial risk, immediate action is appropriate to deter further escalation.¹³ Again, the USN is a ready force and has the ability to stand by and adapt to developments ashore, should the United States choose to send military forces at all. If the deterrence or compellence option fails, naval forces can readily switch to a more forceful posture. “Low-level threats” suggest susceptibility to deterrence to prevent continued escalation because of the lower magnitude and depth of conflict. The connection between deterrence and “low-level,” or “territorial,” threats deserves more exploration.

The second hypothesis assumed frequent seaborne activity in “low-issue” crises. The results show USN-USMC forces mostly deployed in crises concerning “one military-security issue,” the highest of the issue categories. However, in crises with more than one issue, naval forces are not deployed alone. I had expected the U.S. Navy to be dispatched mostly in crises characterized by a political-diplomatic issue and not in high-politics situations. Nevertheless, it can be argued that because only one single issue is present, albeit one of the highest importance, the crisis is more structured and the issue requiring resolution clearer. George finds that the clarity of the objective favors coercive diplomacy.¹⁴

Alternatively, the explanation of no visible correlation between seaborne forces only and low-issue crises may lie with the vast arsenal of tools the United States can choose from to react to diplomatic crises besides the military services. Examples include the diplomatic corps, foreign-aid network, and Defense Department civilians, and so on. While in the nineteenth century the United States had to rely primarily on naval forces to conduct diplomacy, today there are many other sources at the government’s disposal.¹⁵ This view is supported by the correlation between “no naval involvement” and different issue categories. For crises involving security-military issues, however, the Navy is still preferred over the other military response tools.

The time factor is likely to play an important role as well. Military-security issues might require immediate responses or long-lasting deployments, both of which seaborne forces can offer. The results of this analysis again reveal unexpected findings for the ground forces. Together with “no Navy” they correlate positively with “1 to 2 issue” crises exclusive of military-security aspects, suggesting their involvement in “low-politics crises.” In high-stakes crises, the “USAF” combination is dominant and the deployment of seaborne forces even more likely than “All Forces.” High-salience crises are said to be longer lasting and more difficult to resolve; this might explain the reluctance to put boots on the ground when no threat to American national interests is present.

The gravity of the threat and the stakes of the crisis do not include information about the level of violence. “USN & Other Forces” is most frequent in the highest category of

violence when “war-level violence” is experienced. When the independent variable is analyzed individually, ground troops show the weakest correlation among all military forces for the highest level of violence. In the combined model, the seaborne forces show the weakest correlation, but overall the difference between the service combinations is not substantial enough to confirm reluctance to put boots on the ground. Nevertheless, results also indicate that violence also does not call for a more forceful response. It is important to keep in mind that the deployment of ground troops is not a synonym for combat actions. For example, military training and providing security are important Army functions. All services can offer advantages: the USN can adopt a wait-and-see posture, the Air Force can exert more coercion power with minimal risk, and ground troops can offer decisiveness. As previously stated, violent crises bear a greater risk of third parties becoming directly involved, especially in the form of ground confrontations. Often third parties remain aloof when a crisis has become too violent, as is often the case in civil wars or ethnic conflicts. While a certain tendency to prefer airborne forces as coercion tool when violence is very high is visible, the results are not as clear-cut as anticipated. The positive correlation with seaborne forces and violence can be interpreted as an attempt to exert at least some influence by deploying near a crisis location while staying out of the immediate danger zone. After observing the events ashore, the wait-and-see approach can quickly be converted to the use of force.

Overall, the first part of the crises characteristics analysis revealed many results counter to my previous assumptions. In particular, the high frequency of use of ground forces in “low-stakes” crises and the use of seaborne forces for high-violence or territorial threats point to interesting research questions. The issues at stake and the gravity of threat are of foremost importance for the actors directly involved; thus when the United States intervenes as a third party, it is likely that other considerations, such as U.S. national interests, will exert a greater influence on the crisis management technique.

The results of the next hypothesis, controlling for geostrategic importance, show more clear-cut and predictable results. The realist school of thought and national interests suggest that a crisis of greater strategic significance to the United States triggers a stronger military response and thus a more robust commitment and signaling of intentions. Crises merely affecting “subsystems” are most positively correlated with “no naval involvement” responses, followed by “USN only,” “USN-USMC,” and “USN & Other Forces,” while “All Forces” dominates in “global system” crises. While this could point to the limited decisiveness of naval forces, crises affecting the global system are likely to be greater in magnitude and require forceful and dominant interventions. Thus, this point does not speak against the usefulness of seaborne forces but rather to the importance of using the right force for the task at hand. “All Forces” also responded frequently to crises located in important regions, although “USN-USMC” shows a slightly stronger

association to crises in these areas. This could point to the value of the USN-USMC team as a “go anywhere, do anything” force. The USN deployment in regions of both low and high importance can be supported by the continuous global presence of naval forces. While the largest presence will be close to locations of interest to the United States, forward presence allows faster reactions anywhere.

Overall, realist considerations seem to govern the decision-making process in choosing response tools for crises characterized by geostrategic importance. This is supported by Michael Gilligan and Stephen Stedman’s statement that “for a realist, the location of a conflict plays a critical role in determining its importance because it plays a significant role in determining the degree of threat the conflict poses to a state’s vital interests. This relationship stands in sharp contrast to the humanitarian idealist model in which the location of the conflict should be largely irrelevant.”¹⁶

Part I Conclusion: Crisis Actors

The next part of the analysis focused on the crisis actors. The results confirmed earlier research, concluding that more crisis actors trigger stronger military responses by the United States and thus connote more complex crises. According to Meernik, crises involving more actors are of greater importance to U.S. national interests.¹⁷ Conflict resolution is more challenging when multiple actors are involved, because more than one party needs to be convinced or coerced and it becomes difficult to find common ground for agreement. Nevertheless, the differences between the service combinations are not very large.

The most convincing actors’ results regard the influence of UN activity. The results show that for the majority of “All Forces” responses the UN involvement had reached the Security Council level. Naval forces alone are positively correlated with “no UN involvement” or “low-level UN involvement.” I note that “USN only” responses are even more likely than “no naval involvement” for these two categories. This result supports the advantage of limited intrusiveness and subtlety, while flexing muscles. The dispatch of naval forces is more politically acceptable and offers a potentially coercive diplomatic tool. The ability to exert influence discreetly attracts less attention and thus less criticism not only from other nations or the UN but also from Congress and the American public. Noninvolvement of the United Nations could also suggest a less important crisis. While there is a low statistical correlation between “no UN involvement” and the “gravity of threat,” there is no linear relationship with UN activity. More convincing are the considerations of a careful legitimization of more forceful actions, the support of diplomatic efforts, and the benefits of a wait-and-see approach. The findings also support Ekatarina Stepanova’s findings that often waiting for UNSC activity will cause the right moment for intervening to be lost.¹⁸

The political-stability analysis revealed interesting yet inconclusive results. Seaborne forces, especially with Marine Corps elements, dominate in crises with an increase in “societal unrest” but not in crises marked by “governmental instability.” The hypotheses argue that lack of unity renders negotiations and thus conflict resolution more difficult. Presumably societal unrest need not influence a leadership’s ability to speak with one voice, whereas an increase in governmental instability would. “All Forces” responses have occurred most frequently either when an increase in both governmental and societal unrest was present or when both factors remained stable. To understand more fully the dynamics of the different service deployment combinations, it would be useful to control for the type of mission. NEOs might be a frequent response to societal unrests and explain the dispatch of maritime and airborne forces. Another possibility is the naval wait-and-see approach with only limited involvement, in an attempt to calm the situation down.¹⁹ In such cases, sending “USN-USMC” forces to the crisis location to show interest visibly off a coast can be a useful strategy. As previously said, conflict management works best between well identified entities. Thus the overall high frequency of all types of American response when the stability remains constant points to a reluctance to become involved when conflict management is likely to be difficult and challenging.

The analysis regarding the last actor hypotheses did not reveal any significant results. The frequencies would suggest that “USN only” responses are most likely viewed as “neutral” and least likely to be “unfavorable,” while the category “favorable” is very comparable among the different response forms. This would support that limited intrusiveness is viewed favorably but that actors hope for a more forceful response on their behalf, though opponents express a less negative attitude toward this limited form of U.S. engagement.

The problem of all actor-level analysis is the uniform treatment of the naval variables. The USN involvement is coded identically for every involved crisis actor, without controlling exactly for the target country where the United States intervenes or the party with which the United States sides. Naval involvement is measured at the system level (the crisis as one entity), without accounting for differences at the macro level—within the crises and the actors. For example, a crisis can include five crisis actors. Out of the five crisis actors the USN might be involved in only one country, in the form of a NEO, but the current data treat all involved actors equally. Thus all five actors would be coded positively for USN involvement *and* for a NEO mission. Controlling for the difference between ally and adversary of the United States and the resulting intervention/nonintervention strategy for each actor could reveal important differences.

Notes

1. For a detailed description of all variables see appendix B, sec. B1, in the online version of this monograph. If not mentioned otherwise, all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.
2. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.
3. Abraham Lowenthal, *The Dominican Intervention* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972). Case studies are numbered to correspond to the related hypotheses.
4. *Ibid.*; Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, p. 307.
5. Siegel, *Use of Naval Forces in the Post-war Era*.
6. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979*.
7. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*, p. 78; Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979*; U.S. Defense Dept., *Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1965 (Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense: 1 July 1964 to 30 June 1965, extract)* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965); Lowenthal, *Dominican Intervention*.
8. David Alvarez, “The Missouri Visit to Turkey: An Alternative Perspective on Cold War Diplomacy,” *Balkan Studies* 15 (1974); Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, pp. 28–83; Guy Cane, *The Build-Up of U.S. Naval Forces in the Mediterranean as an Instrument of Cold War Policy* (Washington, D.C.: National War College, 1975); Edward Sheehy, “The United States Navy in the Mediterranean 1945–1947” (PhD dissertation, George Washington Univ., Washington, D.C., 1983).
9. Edward Marolda, *By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1994).
10. U.S. Navy Dept., “The U.S. Navy’s Participation in the Berlin Airlift,” *Naval History & Heritage Command*, 1998, www.history.navy.mil/.
11. For a detailed description of all variables see appendix B, sec. B1, in the online version of this monograph. If not mentioned otherwise, all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.
12. Cable, *Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–1979*.
13. Huth, *Standing Your Ground*.
14. George, *Forceful Persuasion*.
15. Capt. Peter Swartz (Ret.), e-mail exchange, June 2010.
16. Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, “Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?,” *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (2003), pp. 37–54.
17. Meernik, *Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy*, p. 67.
18. Stepanova, “Unilateral and Multilateral Use of Force by the United States.”
19. Swartz, e-mail exchange.

We Move on the Seas That We Control, Part II Assessing the Empirical Evidence—U.S. Involvement and Crisis Outcomes

The correlation between U.S. involvement and seaborne crisis response is measured with the help of six hypotheses, analyzing the degree and effect of U.S. activity.¹ Depending on the hypotheses, seaborne crisis response serves as the dependent or independent variable. Because of high intercorrelation between the independent variables, all hypotheses will be analyzed in individual simple regression models (see sidebar 1).

U.S. Involvement Model 1 tests the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne forces only is more likely in lower forms of U.S. involvement. The hypothesis for U.S. Involvement Model 2 assumes that the effectiveness of American activity will be lower when only seaborne forces are deployed. U.S. Involvement Model 3 hypothesizes that the deployment of seaborne forces only is least likely in crises where U.S. direct military activity is the most effective. U.S. Involvement Model 4 analyzes whether in cases the United States deploys only seaborne forces, the contribution to the abatement is lower. U.S. Involvement Model 5 assumes that in crises where the United States is a direct actor, stronger force levels are deployed. Finally, U.S. Involvement Model 6 tests the hypothesis assuming that the deployment of seaborne forces only positively influences response readiness.

FIGURE 27
U.S. Involvement Model 1




FIGURE 28
U.S. Involvement Model 2




FIGURE 29
U.S. Involvement Model 3




FIGURE 30
U.S. Involvement Model 4




FIGURE 31
U.S. Involvement Model 5





FIGURE 32
U.S. Involvement Model 6



SIDEBAR 1

The variables in the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.

- (1) x_9 = content of U.S. activity ($usinv$, $usinv2$).

This variable measures the highest level of U.S. activity in international crises, based on the variable "level of U.S. involvement." The same criterion was already applied to select the cases.

(2) y_5 = effectiveness of U.S. involvement (*usefct*, *usefct2*).

This dependent variable is measured with the variable coding the effectiveness of the U.S. activity on crisis abatement, ranging from the categories "escalation" to "no contribution to the abatement" and the "single most important contributor." Because of the limited number of cases, some categories had to be collapsed or excluded.

(3) y_6 = most effective type of U.S. activity (*usefac*, *usefac2*).

The most effective type of U.S. activity (dependent variable) on the crisis abatement has four values: "not effective," "low-level most effective," "semi-/covert military most effective," and "direct military most effective."

(4) y_7 = U.S. contribution to pace of abatement (*uspace*, *uspace2*).

The question of how naval forces influence the termination of a crisis is measured with the help of the variable "U.S. contribution to pace of abatement" (dependent variable), thereby specifying whether the United States "contributed," "delayed," or had "no influence" on the pace of abatement. Unfortunately, the category "no influence on the pace of abatement" showed an insufficient number of cases and had to be excluded.

(5) x_{10} = U.S. actor in crisis (*usactor*).

Whether the United States is a direct crisis actor or is involved as a third party is measured with the binary variable "U.S. actor in crisis."

(6) x_{11} = naval reaction time (*elaps*), and

x_{12} = naval forces abroad (*USNabroad*).

Next I introduced duration variables, measuring the first and last days of the response as well as the total number of days: "start of naval involvement," "end of naval involvement," and "duration of naval involvement," adapted from the CNA reports. For cases with multiple naval involvements, two time variables were created. Unfortunately, only one response date is provided, although the services rarely all deployed at the same time. This variable is unable to distinguish the speed of naval force deployment compared to that of the other military services. The readiness of naval forces is measured by the elapsed time between the crisis trigger date (from the ICB data set) and the start date of naval involvement (CNA), and by the total number of active naval personnel deployed outside the United States in the year of the crisis trigger date, as provided in U.S. Defense Dept., *Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country* (Washington, D.C.: n.d.), available at www.defense.gov/.

The table in figure 33 presents the frequencies for the U.S. involvement variables, with the exception of the metric variables "response time" and "number of USN personnel abroad."

FIGURE 33
U.S. Involvement Frequencies

U.S. INVOLVEMENT		NO NAVY	USN ONLY	USN-USMC	USN & OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Content of U.S. activity	Low level	110/80.91	8/34.8	8/50	6/28.6	8/25.8
	Semi-military	24/37.7	12/52.2	8/50	13/61.9	6/19.4
	Direct military	2/14.4	3/13	0/0	2/9.5	17/54.8
Effectiveness of U.S. activity	Intervention escalated	5/3.7	4/17.4	1/6.3	1/8	7/22.6
	No or marginal contribution	87/64.6	11/47.8	6/37.5	6/28.6	2/6.5
	Important/most important	43/31.9	8/34.8	9/56.3	14/66.7	22/71
U.S. actor in crisis	U.S. actor	7/5.1	6/26.1	4/25	10/47.6	25/80.6
	U.S. not actor	129/94.9	17/73.9	12/75	11/52.4	6/19.4
Most effective U.S. activity	Ineffective	68/50.4	9/39.1	3/18.8	5/23.8	3/9.7
	Eff. low level	51/37.8	3/13	6/37.5	6/28.6	10/32.3
	Eff. semi-military	14/10.4	8/34.8	7/43.8	8/38.1	4/12.9
	Eff. direct military	2/1.5	3/13	0/0	2/9.5	14/45.2
Contribution to pace of abatement	Not effective	80/60.2	13/68.4	4/26.7	6/28.6	2/7.7
	Effective	53/39.8	6/31.6	11/73.3	15/71.4	24/92.3
	Delayed	2/1.5	4/17.4	1/6.3	0/0	5/16.1

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable "servicetype1."

I will begin with the hypotheses treating naval involvement as the independent variable, analyzed in three different models.

Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 1: Seaborne Crisis Response Independent Variable

The frequency chart shows a high number of "All Forces" responses and American interventions contributing to an "escalation" or seen as "important/most important," while seaborne forces responses alone are most likely to coincide with "no or marginal contribution" and "important/most important." Because "USN & Other Forces," "USN-USMC," and intervention "escalated" only show a value of one each, the independent variable "USN-USMC Team" was chosen.

FIGURE 34
Model U.S. Involvement H3b: Effectiveness

CATEGORY	ESCALATED	NOT CONTRIBUTED/ MARGINAL	IMPORTANT/MOST IMPORTANT
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	rf	rf	bl
USN-USMC	1.324	4.500	bl
NO NAVY	0.523	9.105	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	bl	rf	rf
USN-USMC	bl	0.294*	1.324
NO NAVY	bl	5.188**	2.529
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	rf	bl	rf
USN-USMC	0.294*	bl	0.212***
NO NAVY	0.057***	bl	0.110***
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	1.911	0.110***	bl
USN-USMC	2.529	0.494*	bl
NO NAVY	rf	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	bl	0.057***	0.523
USN-USMC	bl	0.195**	0.395
NO NAVY	bl	rf	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. all forces)	17.400***	bl	9.105***
USN-USMC	5.118**	bl	2.023*
NO NAVY	rf	bl	rf

N = 226

p* < 0.1 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-*R*² = 0.200

rf—reference category

Effectiveness of U.S. Activity

When “USN & Other incl. all forces” responses serve as the reference category, U.S. interventions featuring “no Navy” and “USN-USMC” forces were most likely to “not/marginally contribute,” although the results fail to meet the significance requirements. If the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” responses are most likely in crises where U.S. intervention escalates the situation compared to “no/marginal contribution.” The category “important/most important” operates in the same direction, although the odds ratio is weaker. “USN-USMC” forces show the same tendency as “All Forces” responses, albeit both the correlations with “escalation” and “important/most important” are lower. But compared to “no naval involvement,” seaborne forces are also

more likely when American activity is “important/most important” rather than “not/marginal contribute.” Overall, whereas the odds of “escalation” are lower for seaborne forces, the odds for “important” influence are also weaker. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed.

A closer look at the frequency distribution of the type of mission and force strength shows that two cases of escalation coincide with a show of force and three with a NEO, while for the category “important/most important” four deployments are combat and ten are show-of-force missions. It is unlikely that NEO missions contribute to escalation; thus for future analysis it would be interesting to introduce more independent variables. The frequencies for the strength of the force show that for the category “important/most important,” more than one CV was involved in twenty-six, one CV in thirteen crises, and none in four. The “eyeball” correlations also reveal that “escalation” coincides with eight operations that included one or more CVs and only two with none. When the United States did not contribute, no CV was involved in seven cases, one CV in nine, and one or more in four. When the United States contributed to an escalation, the involvement was more frequent in the form of a direct military activity. When the U.S. contribution was important/most important, fifteen operations occurred at a low level and an equal number at the level of direct military engagement, while twenty-three were semi-military. These numbers further support the correlation with “All Forces” responses and escalations.

Case Study 3b: United States Contributed to Escalation. As with all the models where USN involvement coincides with an escalation of the crisis, we should not assume that USN activities are directly or primarily responsible for the escalation.

In the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, U.S. activity overall was directly responsible for an escalation of tension, yet the USN involvement was said to have contributed to the final resolution. The ICB coded the crisis as U.S. activity escalating the crisis, but a more in-depth look would have to distinguish between the effects of the various activities. The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s reluctance to participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus USS *Kitty Hawk* (CV 63), operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 1994, was in a state of high alert. The United States negotiated with North Korea over its nuclear program while keeping open the option of military strikes. Two carriers—*Kitty Hawk* and a second, the name of which could not be determined—were positioned off the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was later said that the carriers had contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. The crisis ended with an agreement in October 1994.²

Most Effective U.S. Activity

The following simple multinomial regression analysis shows that “USN-USMC” involvement is “most effective in covert/semi military operations,” whereas “All Forces” are “most successful in direct military activities.” A large number of naval involvements also exercise “no influence.” It is important to note that the majority of “covert/semi-military interventions” are semi-military and that only very few are covert operations.³ Low-level activities are mostly political in nature but include a small number of economic and propaganda engagements.

FIGURE 35
 Model U.S. Involvement H3c: Most Effective Activity

CATEGORY	INEFFECTIVE	EFF. LOW LEVEL	EFF. SEMI-MILITARY	EFF. MIL.
ALL FORCES	rf	rf	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	11.667**	4.200	14.000***	bl
USN-USMC	18.667***	4.200*	17.500***	bl
NO NAVY	158.667***	35.700***	24.500***	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	rf	rf	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.360	1.200	0.086***
USN-USMC	bl	0.025*	0.938	0.054***
NO NAVY	bl	0.225**	0.154**	0.006***
ALL FORCES	0.006***	0.028***	0.041***	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	0.074**	0.118**	0.571***	bl
USN-USMC	0.118**	0.118**	0.714	bl
NO NAVY	rf	rf	rf	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	4.444***	6.476**	158.667***
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	1.600	7.771***	13.600**
USN-USMC	bl	1.000	6.071***	8.500**
NO NAVY	bl	rf	rf	rf

N = 226
 *p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01
 Sig. Model = 0.000
 bl—baseline
 Pseudo-R² = 0.291
 rf—reference category

With “All Forces” as reference category and “direct military most effective” as baseline, the other three American involvement categories are positively correlated with the categories “ineffective,” “effective low level activity,” and “effective semi-military activity.” “No Navy” shows the highest values, especially for the category “ineffective,” because of the very few instances in which this type of response occurred when “direct military activity” was most effective. Seaborne forces alone increase the odds for “effective low level activity” by a factor of 4.200, the same as “USN & Other Forces,” although the latter fails

to reach the significance requirements. For effective covert/semi-military operations the “USN-USMC Team” shows a higher value of 17.500. “All Forces” correlates highest with “effective direct military activities.” The high values for “low-level effective” and “semi-military effective” are influenced by the low number of cases where “All Forces” were involved in crises in which U.S. activity was not effective.

When we examine the “eyeball” correlations with the type of mission, combat displays the highest frequency for “direct military most effective,” show of force for the category “semi-military most effective,” and show of force and NEO for “low level most effective.” CV strength presents the highest percentage of no CVs when “ineffective” and one CV when “semi-military effective.” As expected, one-plus (“1+”) CVs is most frequent when “direct military” is coded as the most effective activity. This suggests that the presence of an aircraft carrier greatly enhances the success of the U.S. activity.

In sum, the results suggest that the dominant influence of “seaborne forces only” lies in successful operations short of direct military activity. Since the hypothesis assumes that “All Forces” is most successful in direct military activities and naval forces in the lower categories of activity, the hypothesis can be confirmed. However, out of all military responses seaborne activities are also the ones most highly correlated to ineffectiveness.

Case Studies 3c: Semi-military and Low-Level Involvement. During the Cold War the United States was semi-militarily engaged in many crises in Central America. A case in point where the semi-military response was the most effective activity is the crisis in Guatemala in 1953. The United States saw the growing influence of the communist party in Guatemala as inimical to U.S. interests in Latin America.

When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment “liberation” movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the day the Soviet arms shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to control shipments to Guatemala. Talks between the parties and the United States were not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras and anti-government forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a “contingency evacuation” force was deployed. This operation, code-named HARDROCK BAKER, was used to implement a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included submarines and amphibious ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team.⁴ With this aggressive configuration of naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention. On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an anticommunist government, the crisis ended. Thus the semi-military activity of the USN greatly helped to bring about a termination of the crisis.⁵

The 1971 Bangladesh crisis can be described as a demonstration of low-level U.S. activity and USN-only deployment. This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West Pakistan army on Dacca University in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now declared its independence, bringing on armed conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of minor clashes, a formal war between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December 1971 with Pakistan's surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, the Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting of a battle group led by USS *Enterprise* (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. An evacuation operation proved unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in a show of force, monitoring both Indian and Pakistani operations and maritime and air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft and vessels, with the goal of intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.

The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal, to demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces played an important role in influencing events on the ground. "The presence of U.S. naval forces south of the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus evidently helped to sway Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of continuing the war with an offensive in the West. *Enterprise's* deployment strengthened U.S. diplomatic efforts."⁶ According to Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, this entry of *Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal left a deep impression on Indian policy makers as well as the Indian navy for much of the next two decades.⁷ Thus this crisis serves as a good example of the power of naval forces in combination with diplomatic initiatives.

U.S. Activity and Pace of Abatement

In my examination of the impact of the different American responses on the pace of abatement of crises, the frequencies show that out of the military responses, "USN only" contributes the least, and stronger military commitments the most. In order to run the regression analysis, the category "delayed" had to be recoded into missing data, because of the 0 value for "USN & Other Forces" and the low numbers for other service combinations.

FIGURE 36
 Model U.S. Involvement H3d: Abatement

CATEGORY	NOT EFFECTIVE	CONTRIBUTED
ALL FORCES	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	4.800*	bl
USN-USMC	12.000***	bl
NO NAVY	18.113***	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.028*
USN-USMC	bl	0.083***
NO NAVY	bl	0.055***
ALL FORCES	0.055***	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	0.265**	bl
USN-USMC	0.663	bl
NO NAVY	rf	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	18.113***
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	3.774***
USN-USMC	bl	1.509
NO NAVY	bl	rf

N = 214

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.182

rf—reference category

The results confirm the surmise that the stronger the force, the more the United States contributes to the pace of abatement. The greatest increase in the probable odds of “no contribution” attaches to the category “no Navy.” When “All Forces” is the reference category, all other U.S. involvement variable categories are more likely “not to contribute” to the pace of abatement. When the reference category is interchanged with “no Navy,” “USN & Other Forces” increases the odds by a factor of 3.774, “All Forces” by 18.113, and the “USN-USMC Team” by 1.509. The latter, however, fails to reach the significance level. The frequency chart suggests that for the maritime responses, the category “USN only” is largely responsible for the lack of contribution to the abatement. A second regression analysis distinguishing between the seaborne forces confirms this assumption. “USN-USMC” forces contribute even more to the pace of abatement than the combination with the Air Force. While the statistical analysis finds that naval forces do not contribute to the abatement, they do not delay termination either. This was verified by running the regression analysis with all three categories for pace of abatement and the independent variable “USN-USMC TEAM,” collapsing the categories “All Forces” and “USN & Other Forces.” “All Forces” and “USN-USMC” forces responses contribute the

most, followed by responses involving the Air Force, yet the hypothesis that naval forces alone do not contribute to the pace of the abatement can be confirmed. The different findings for naval forces alone and in combination with the USMC demonstrate the importance of differentiating between them if possible.

Looking at the “eyeball” correlations, the deployment of no CVs is more frequent when U.S. activity did not contribute, while “one-plus CVs” shows a high correlation with contribution to abatement of the crisis. Shows of force are more frequent for the category “contributed,” while most NEO operations concurred with no contribution. All combat operations coincided with a contribution to the abatement. Similarly, when amphibious forces were involved, the variable showed a high frequency for contribution. This further supports the importance of the strength of the force employed and the motivation. When the United States is engaged only in a NEO activity, the influence on the pace of the abatement is likely to be less strong.

Case Study 3d: Delay of Pace of Abatement. I select one of the U.S. crises with Libya in the 1980s to exemplify a rare case where the American involvement did delay the termination of the crisis. Only the USN was involved in the response. The Sixth Fleet announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean and thereby posed a crisis for Libya, which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya claimed that U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territorial waters in the Gulf of Sirte, where the two aircraft carriers—USS *Forrestal* (CV 59) and USS *Nimitz* (CV 68)—with four cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open-ocean missile exercises. The United States had deployed the naval forces to challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf and was holding the maneuvers to demonstrate that “America has the muscle to back up its words.” Aircraft from both carriers had to intercept Libyan aircraft multiple times. On 19 August USN pilots shot down two Libyan fighters that had threatened *Nimitz*. The United States intended to demonstrate its resolve to protect the freedom of the seas. Libya’s ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, threatened to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean should the USN again enter Libyan territorial waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981. The crisis centered on the maneuvers of U.S. naval vessels, and not on the USN response to the Libyan counterinitiative. Thus the naval activity triggered the crisis but was probably not directly responsible for the delay of the abatement.

After this analysis of American responses as an independent variable the next section presents the findings for the hypotheses with U.S. involvement as a dependent variable.

Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 2: Seaborne Crisis Response Dependent Variable

This analysis measures the level of U.S. activity without accounting for the effectiveness of the activity. As expected, no naval involvement was most frequent in “low-level U.S. interventions.” Both “USN-USMC” and “USN & Other Forces” were mostly deployed in “semi/covert-military,” whereas “All Forces” were typically dispatched as part of “direct military interventions.” As mentioned earlier, only two direct military involvements by the United States occurred without naval forces. Somewhat surprising is the relatively high number of “All Forces” responses in “low-level involvements.” While “All Forces” clearly deploy primarily in “direct military interventions,” their dispatch in “low level involvements” was not anticipated.

FIGURE 37
U.S. Involvement H3a: Content of Activity

CATEGORY	NO NAVY	USN-USMC	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Low-level	116.875***	11.333***	6.375**	bl
Covert/semi-military	34.000***	18.889***	18.417***	bl
Direct military	rf	rf	rf	bl
Low-level	bl	0.097**	0.055***	0.009***
Covert/semi-military	bl	0.556	0.542	0.029***
Direct military	bl	rf	rf	rf
Low-level	rf	rf	rf	bl
Covert/semi-military	0.291**	1.668	2.889	bl
Direct military	0.009***	0.088***	0.157**	bl
Low-level	bl	rf	rf	rf
Covert/semi-military	bl	5.720***	9.931***	3.437**
Direct military	bl	10.313**	18.333***	116.875***

N = 227

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.363

rf—reference category

Content of U.S. Activity

With “direct military intervention” as reference category, “low level activity” increases the probable odds of “no Navy” by a factor of 116.875, followed by the “USN-USMC Team” with 11.333 and “USN & Other Forces” by 6.375. For “semi/covert military involvements” the factors change to 34.000, 18.889, and 18.417. Overall, all U.S. naval involvement categories are more likely to correlate with direct military interventions than no naval involvement.

The frequencies from the “eyeball” correlations are confirmed by the more rigorous statistical model, and the hypothesis can be confirmed. Seaborne involvement only is more likely in lower forms of American involvement. Of all simple regression models, this model generated the largest R^2 , thus suggesting the strongest association between the dependent and independent variables.

Case Study 3a: Low-Level Involvement and All Forces. On careful examination of the combination of “All Forces” and “low level U.S. involvement,” one sees that military forces often served as a standby resource, as in the Cyprus crisis of 1974–75, and do not automatically become involved in combat. I could not find any specific information about U.S. Army deployments other than the codings in the CNA reports. On 15 July 1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. The ousted Cypriot government requested help from Britain and the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July and occupied parts of the island. In an immediate reaction to the coup, the United States delayed the return of USS *America* (CV 66), then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS *Independence* (CV 62). At the same time American and British diplomats began mediation attempts, which led to an unstable cease-fire. *Forrestal* was deployed to the central Mediterranean. Other assignments for *Forrestal* and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were canceled so that they would be ready if needed.

On 22 July aircraft from USS *Inchon* (LPH 12)—other sources name USS *Coronado* (LPD 11)—evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut from the British base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; *Independence* provided air cover.⁸ In early August the ships’ departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy that resulted in the murder of the American ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all contingency operations ended by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, Archbishop Michael Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were deployed again for possible evacuation duties. USS *Saratoga* (CV 60) and amphibious forces were released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended for Cyprus and Greece as well.”⁹

U.S. Crisis Actor

The variable advanced in the next model controls for the U.S. involvement as a direct crisis actor or third party. The chart of frequencies shows that seaborne forces most

often deploy alone in crises where the United States is not directly involved. Seventy-four percent of all “USN only” responses occurred when the United States acted as a third party, the remaining 26 percent when the United States was a direct crisis actor. The numbers for “USN-USMC” forces are almost identical, with 75 and 25 percent, respectively. “USN & Other Forces” show almost a fifty-fifty distribution, and “All Forces” are clearly more frequent in “U.S. direct actor” crises, with 81 percent of the total “All Forces” responses.

FIGURE 38
U.S. Involvement H3e: Actor

CATEGORY	NO NAVINV	USN-USMC	USN&OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
U.S. not crisis actor	76.786***	12.083***	4.583**	bl
U.S. crisis actor	rf	rf	rf	bl
U.S. not crisis actor	bl	0.157***	0.060***	0.013***
U.S. crisis actor	bl	rf	rf	rf
U.S. not crisis actor	6.355***	bl	0.379*	0.083***
U.S. crisis actor	rf*	bl	rf	rf
U.S. not crisis actor	16.753***	2.636*	bl	0.218**
U.S. crisis actor	rf	rf	bl	rf

N = 227

p* < 0.1 *p* < 0.05 ****p* < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-*R*² = 0.352

rf—reference category

The regression analysis confirms the previous assumptions. If the United States is not directly involved, the odds of all categories of U.S. involvement short of “all forces” responses increase. All *Exp(B)* values are significant, and “no naval involvement” and “USN-USMC forces” are the most likely responses to crises in which the United States acts as a third party. The results support the hypothesis that stronger forces are dispatched if the United States is committed as a direct actor. Crises involving the United States as a third party largely triggered responses involving no naval forces or only seaborne responses. Similar to the previous model, the *R*² is very high, and the binary variables “third party” and “direct crisis” actor are very important for the explanation of the different types of American responses.

U.S. Readiness

The “number of USN personnel abroad” and the “elapsed time” between the outbreak of the crisis and the naval reaction are metric variables. Neither significantly correlates with the different service-type combinations. As mentioned previously, the inability to distinguish between the naval reaction date and the time elapsed before other forces arrive in the theater supports the speculation that were this problem accounted for, the

results might be different. The Iraq/Lebanon upheaval in 1958 is a good example. The Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, compared with five days for the Air Force (to advance from its base in Turkey) and even longer for the Army (from Germany).¹⁰ Yet no different response dates are provided to control for this difference. Similarly, “USN personnel abroad” generated no statistically significant results. However, a further examination of the possible influence of the number of USN personnel and the response time revealed some results.

FIGURE 39

Frequency of Number of CVs Deployed and USN-USMC Deployments per Year

NUMBER OF CVs	FREQUENCY	USN-USMC DEPLOYMENTS PER YEAR	FREQUENCY
0	13	0	107
1	26	1	94
2	21	2	26
3	7	3	10
4	2		
6	3		
8	1		
Total	73	Total	237

Figure 39 shows how often different CV-strength levels were deployed and to how many crises the “USN-USMC Team” responded per year. Once these other dependent variables are chosen, alternative findings can be offered. The “number of USN personnel” is positively correlated to both the “number of CVs deployed” in a crisis and the “number of USN-USMC responses per year.” This finding supports the assumption that the frequency of crisis response is closely tied to the number of personnel the Navy has at its disposal and the number of CVs deployed. Conversely, the causation may also run the other way. Because of international crises, more naval personnel were sent overseas. There is no statistically significant relationship between “elapsed time” and “USN forces abroad,” but when direct military activities are excluded the number of USN personnel already abroad shortens the naval reaction time. Thus in low-level and semi-military U.S. response activity, the number of USN personnel and short reaction times are positively correlated. This finding further supports the assumption that the uniform treatment of elapsed time for all services negatively influences the measurement of fast naval reaction times. Here the R^2 values can be used to demonstrate the variance in the dependent variable, explained by the independent variables. While all three R^2 's are

FIGURE 40
Multivariate Regression Outputs

DEPENDENT VARIABLE	INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	MODEL R^2	COEFFICIENT β	COEFFICIENT t
Number of CVs ^a	USN personnel abroad	0.057	0.239***	3.369***
Annual USN-USMC crisis involvements	USN personnel abroad	0.051	0.225***	3.397***
USN abroad ^b	Elapsed time	0.049	-0.221*	-1.714*

a. Includes only cases up to 1990 because for the later involvements no information about the number of CVs was available.

b. Cases with direct U.S. military activity were excluded from this model.

rather low, a single independent variable is unlikely to explain much of the variance, suggesting that additional factors influence the dependent variables.

Even though some results can be presented with the currently available data, the hypothesis cannot be answered correctly and thus has to be rejected in this analysis. However, the U.S. involvement hypotheses were mostly confirmed (the exception was H3f).

TABLE 5-1

Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3d: Termination	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness	Not confirmed

Crisis Outcome Models

The relation between the crisis outcome and seaborne response is measured with the help of four hypotheses analyzing different aspects of the termination of international crises.¹¹ All hypotheses treat seaborne crisis response as the independent variable (see sidebar 2): Crisis Outcome Model 1, Crisis Outcome Model 2, Crisis Outcome Model 3, and Crisis Outcome Model 4.

FIGURE 41
Crisis Outcome Model 1




FIGURE 42
Crisis Outcome Model 2




FIGURE 43
Crisis Outcome Model 3





FIGURE 44
Crisis Outcome Model 4



SIDEBAR 2

The variables of the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.

(1) y_8 = content of outcome (*outcome*, *outcome2*).

Whether an outcome was stable was determined with the help of the variable "content of outcome," with the categories "victory" and "defeat" treated as definite and "stalemate" and "compromise" as more ambiguous.

(2) y_9 = form of outcome (*forout*, *forout2*).

This hypothesis is measured with the variable "form of outcome," including such categories as "unilateral," "imposed," "tacit," and "formal agreement," to control for the crisis outcome. Certain categories had to be collapsed. For example, the different values for unilateral self, ally, and adversary are recoded into one category, "unilateral."

(3) y_{10} = tension (*outesr*, *outesr2*).

The change in tension is measured with the variable "reduction" or "escalation" of tension. The category "recent case" was recoded into missing data.

(4) y_{11a} = extent of satisfaction with the outcome (*outevl*, *outevl2*).

The satisfaction of the actors is identified with the variable "extent of satisfaction" (*outevl*). Not all categories showed a large enough number of cases, so values had to be collapsed. All cases where at least one of the crisis actors was not satisfied were coded as dissatisfied (*outevl2*).

(5) y12 = satisfaction/attitude mix.

This variable was generated by the combination of the “extent of satisfaction with the outcome” and the “attitude towards U.S. activity.” Several categories were collapsed to establish four new categories: “favorable and satisfied” (favorable includes the category neutral), “favorable and dissatisfied,” “not favorable and satisfied,” “not favorable and dissatisfied.”

The following table presents the frequencies for the crisis outcome variables.

FIGURE 45
Crisis Outcome Frequencies

CRISIS OUTCOMES		NO NAVY	USN ONLY	USN-USMC	USN & OTHER FORCES	ALL FORCES
Content of outcome	Victory/defeat	125/48.1	28/50	28/77.8	41/62.1	80/74.8
	Compromise	61/23.5	7/12.5	7/19.4	19/28.8	17/15.9
	Stalemate	74/28.5	21/37.5	1/2.8	6/9.1	10/9.3
Form of outcome	Formal agreement	52/25.2	13/28.9	12/42.9	12/20.7	31/32.6
	Understanding	58/28.2	5/11.1	2/7.1	17/29.3	15/15.8
	Unilateral	91/44.2	26/57.8	10/35.7	25/43.1	31/32.6
	Imposed	5/2.4	1/2.2	4/14.3	4/6.9	18/18.9
Tensions	Escalation	97/40.8	29/50.9	13/38.2	36/53.7	60/55.6
	Reduction	141/59.2	28/49.1	21/61.8	31/46.3	48/44.4
Satisfaction	Satisfied	76/29.2	11/20	6/16.7	30/44.8	18/16.7
	Not satisfied	184/70.8	44/80	30/83.3	37/55.2	90/83.3
Satisfaction/attitude	Fav/satisfied	51/22.6	7/17.1	3/10	13/25.5	7/8.6
	Fav/dissatisfied	77/34.1	17/41.5	14/46.7	12/23.5	35/43.2
	Not fav/satisfied	46/20.4	10/24.4	3/10	11/21.6	5/6.2
	Not fav/dissatisfied	56/23	7/17.1	10/33.3	15/29.4	34/42

Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”

Regression Analyses Crisis Outcomes: Content of Outcome

About 44 percent of seaborne interventions ended in a “victory” for a crisis actor, compared with 20 percent that ended in “defeat,” suggesting that a little more than half terminated with a “definite outcome.”

Sixteen percent were characterized by “compromise” and 20 percent by “stalemate,” a total of roughly 36 percent “ambiguous outcomes.” Forty-nine percent of “All Forces” responses concurred with “victories” for crisis actors and 26 percent with “defeats.” Only 25 percent resulted in “ambiguous outcomes.” Because the frequencies suggest that

largely naval forces alone are deployed in crises resulting in “stalemate” (37.5 percent versus 2.8 percent for USN-UMSC), the variable “servicetype1” serves as independent variable. Although the expected values of the cross-tabulation meet the requirements, one has to be cautious interpreting the values for “USN-USMC” forces, because they were only deployed in one crisis resulting in a “stalemate.” However, because the main interest lies in “USN only” responses, I chose “servicetype1” as the independent variable, in order to highlight the strong influence on “stalemates.”

FIGURE 46
Model Crisis Outcome H4a: Content

CATEGORY	VICTORY	COMPROMISE	STALEMATE	DEFEAT
ALL FORCES	rf	rf	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	1.915	3.447**	1.867	bl
USN-USMC	1.137	1.281	0.311	bl
USN ONLY	1.346	1.441	7.350***	bl
NO NAVY	1.027	2.337**	4.819***	bl
ALL FORCES	rf	bl	rf	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	0.551	bl	0.537	0.288**
USN-USMC	0.887	bl	0.243	0.781
USN ONLY	0.934	bl	5.100***	0.694
NO NAVY	0.439**	bl	2.062*	0.428**
ALL FORCES	0.974	0.428*	0.208***	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	1.864	1.488	0.387*	bl
USN-USMC	1.107	0.548	0.065**	bl
USN ONLY	1.311	0.617	1.525	bl
NO NAVY	rf	rf	rf	bl
ALL FORCES	2.275**	bl	0.485*	2.337**
USN&OTHER FORCES	1.253	bl	0.260***	0.672
USN-USMC	2.019	bl	0.188**	1.824
USN ONLY	2.125	bl	2.473*	1.621
NO NAVY	rf	bl	rf	rf

N = 525

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.111

rf—reference category

When “All Forces” serves as the reference category and “defeat” as the baseline, “USN & Other Forces” and “no Navy” positively correlate with “compromise,” while the probable odds of “stalemate” are increased by “no Navy” and “USN only” responses. “USN only” exercises the strongest influence on “stalemate” in the model. Choosing “compromise” as baseline leads to a negative relationship between the “definite” categories of the

dependent variable and all USN involvements, although not all values are significant. “USN only” and “no Navy” remain positively correlated to “stalemate.” Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” the positive relationship between “All Forces” responses and “victory” and “defeat” becomes apparent, with “defeat” showing a slightly higher correlation. When the baseline is changed to “compromise,” both “victory” and “defeat” (stronger) are more likely for “All Forces” responses, while “compromise” is more likely than “stalemate.” The high values for “USN-USMC” response and “definite outcomes” can be ignored, because of the influence of the low number of “stalemate” outcomes for this category. “USN only” responses seem to be more correlated to “defeat” and “victory” than to “compromise,” but not significantly. The strong relationship with “stalemate” is maintained. The values for the Air Force associate positively with “victory” and “compromise.”

Overall, naval forces show the highest correlation with the ambiguous outcome “stalemates,” while “USN & Other Forces” shows significant values for “victorious” outcomes and “compromises” and “All Forces” generally dominates the “definite outcome” categories. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed, because a “stalemate” can be interpreted as an even more ambiguous outcome than a “compromise.”

Case Study 4a: Stalemate Outcome and USN Only Involvement. The most recent Taiwan Strait crisis, from 1995, serves as an example of a stalemate outcome for all involved actors. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at loggerheads following the visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit to Cornell University. This gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, increased the PRC’s fear of growing American support for Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to coerce the United States to commit formally to a “one-China policy,” the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait beginning in July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response until, according to Robert Ross, 19 December, when the aircraft carrier *Nimitz* cruised through the Taiwan Strait marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976.¹² When the Chinese activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. In March 1996 *Independence* arrived, followed shortly thereafter by *Nimitz*. With the successful conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.

It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, the effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré questions the contribution of the two CVs, Ross sees their deployments as successful coercive diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement and confirming American commitment.¹³

Agreement

Seaborne forces responses are divided among 36 percent “formal agreement,” 47 percent “unilateral,” 8 percent “imposed,” and 9 percent “understanding” outcomes. “All Forces” responses frequencies are divided among 33 percent “formal agreement,” 33 percent “unilateral,” 19 percent “imposed,” and 16 percent “understanding.” Major differences are found in “unilateral” and “imposed” outcomes. Similar to the variable “content of the outcome,” naval forces only and “imposed” outcomes concurred only once, but the expected frequencies of the cross-tabulation analysis allows “servicetype1” to serve as the independent variable.

FIGURE 47
Model Crisis Outcome H4b: Agreement

CATEGORY	FORMAL AGREEMENT	UNDERSTANDING	UNILATERAL	IMPOSED
ALL FORCES	rf	rf	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	1.742	5.100**	3.629**	bl
USN-USMC	1.742	0.600	1.452	bl
USN ONLY	7.548*	6.000	15.097**	bl
NO NAVY	6.039***	13.920***	10.568***	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	rf	rf	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	2.928**	2.083*	0.574
USN-USMC	bl	0.344	0.833	0.574
USN ONLY	bl	0.795	2.000	0.132*
NO NAVY	bl	2.305**	1.750*	0.166***
ALL FORCES	0.166***	0.072***	0.095***	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	0.288*	0.366	0.343	bl
USN-USMC	0.288*	0.043***	0.137***	bl
USN ONLY	1.250	0.431	1.429	bl
NO NAVY	rf	rf	rf	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	0.434**	0.571*	6.039***
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	1.270	1.190	3.467*
USN-USMC	bl	0.149**	0.476	3.467*
USN ONLY	bl	0.345*	1.143	0.800
NO NAVY	bl	rf	rf	rf

N = 432
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000
bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.113
rf—reference category

In a first step, “imposed” serves as the baseline and “All Forces” as reference category. “USN only” and “no Navy” show significant odds ratios of 7.548 and 6.039 for the

category “formal agreement.” Compared to “imposed,” naval forces alone show the highest correlation with “unilateral acts,” followed by “formal agreements,” while no naval involvement shows the highest *Exp(B)* for “understanding.” The combination with the Air Force shows positive associations with the categories “understanding” and “unilateral acts.” When the baseline is changed to “formal agreement,” all categories show a negative correlation with “imposed,” but only the values for “no Navy” and “USN only” are significant. Overall, naval forces alone are frequently featured in crises with “formal agreements” and “unilateral acts,” as previously suggested in the cross-tabulation. Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” correlates more highly with crises characterized by “imposed” outcomes, compared to “formal agreements.” Although not significant, “USN only” suggests a negative correlation with “imposed” outcomes.

“Naval forces alone” correlates highly with “formal agreements” and “unilateral acts.” The same is visible for “all forces” and “imposed” outcomes. Overall, these findings point to a positive relationship between naval forces only and “formal agreements.”

Tensions

The next advanced variable is “tension,” measuring the increase or decrease of tension following the termination of the crisis.

The “eyeball” correlations suggest that “All Forces” and “USN & Other Forces” responses more likely coincide with an “escalation” of tensions, whereas “USN-USMC” forces seem more positively related to a “reduction.” Naval forces alone are distributed almost fifty-fifty. The regression analysis employed the variable “servicetype1” as independent variable. Unfortunately, the significance of the model does not meet the requirements; thus the model cannot be interpreted, and for now the simple frequencies are the only results available.

Case Studies 4c: *Tension and Seaborne Involvement.* The Jordan regime crisis in 1957 serves as a good example for the possible impact of naval forces on the reduction of tensions. On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt attempted to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan but failed. The king feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the coup attempt and reacted by dismissing the entire leftist cabinet, triggering demonstrations and riots. The United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and deploying units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers *Forrestal* and *USS Lake Champlain* (CV 39), as well as the heavy cruisers *USS Salem* (CA 139) and *USS Des Moines* (CA 134), to the eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off Beirut on 20 April ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while thirty ships of the

Sixth Fleet—described as the “most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in the Eastern Mediterranean”—carried out air-defense maneuvers in the open sea. The task of all these forces was to ensure that the Jordanians maintained their independence and withstood the threat of communism. “Once again,” explained Vice Admiral Charles Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the scene of the fire.” It can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the Middle East.”¹⁴ Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a state of alert. Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led to normalization. The departure of the USN force on 3 May signaled the end of the crisis.

In contrast, the U.S. intervention in Grenada serves as a good example of the possibility of naval forces increasing tension, because their deployment heightened fear of a potential stronger U.S. backup. Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had been placed under house arrest, been freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, together with close supporters, murdered. Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in the region and to the safety of American citizens in Grenada, the United States showed concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization of East Caribbean States, the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the aircraft carrier *Independence* and assault ship *Guam* (LPH 9). The *Independence* CVBG had been en route to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in anticipation of the developments in Grenada.¹⁵ Because of its prior proximity to the Caribbean, the naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis for Grenada. On 25 October, in Operation URGENT FURY, U.S. naval, Marine, and Army forces invaded Grenada. Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear that American students were not in danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the restoration of democratic government to Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. troops had accomplished their mission, and by 4 November *Independence* finally departed for the Mediterranean.¹⁶

Actor Satisfaction

The frequencies suggest that all U.S. responses are more likely in crises with negative actors' satisfaction. “USN & Other Forces” shows the lowest “eyeball” correlation with “dissatisfaction,” while “USN-UMSC” and “All Forces” are highest, with equal percentages of 83.3.

When the category “satisfied” is chosen as baseline, “No Navy,” “USN only,” and “USN & Other Forces” are more likely to correlate with satisfactory outcomes than “All Forces.” However, the value for “USN only” is not significant. “USN & Other Forces”

FIGURE 48

Model Crisis Outcome H4d: Satisfaction

CATEGORY	SATISFIED	NOT SATISFIED
ALL FORCES	bl	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.247***
USN-USMC	bl	1.000
USN ONLY	bl	0.800
NO NAVY	bl	0.484**
ALL FORCES	bl	2.065**
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.509**
USN-USMC	bl	2.065
USN ONLY	bl	1.652
NO NAVY	bl	rf
ALL FORCES	bl	4.054***
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	rf
USN-USMC	bl	4.054***
USN ONLY	bl	3.243***
NO NAVY	bl	1.963**

N = 526

*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.000, Sig. Step Servicetype1 = 0.000

bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.055

rf—reference category

remains positively associated with “satisfaction” even after “no Navy” is chosen as reference category, whereas “All Forces” contributes significantly to “dissatisfaction.” When “USN & Other Forces” serves as reference category, all other categories increase the probable odds of “dissatisfaction” with the outcome, with “USN-USMC” forces and “All Forces” showing equally the highest value.

The combination with the Air Force is most positively correlated to “actor satisfaction,” while “All Forces” responses are most negatively correlated. Although the findings suggest that “USN only” responses correlate slightly positively with satisfaction compared to “all forces” responses, the results are mixed.

While actors might be dissatisfied with the outcome of a crisis, they might still be satisfied with U.S. involvement, and this point may be of great importance. Unfortunately, the original variable “attitude to U.S. involvement” failed to generate significant results. Thus for the next variable I combined “attitude to U.S. involvement” with the variable “actor satisfaction” (dependent variable *y12*).

Mix: Satisfaction and Attitude to U.S. Involvement

The simple frequency analyses suggest that out of all military service combinations, “USN & Other Forces” were most often associated with crises characterized by “actor satisfaction” and “favorable” perception of U.S. involvement, followed by “USN only.” With almost the same frequency, “All Forces” and seaborne forces responses rise to the top in the next category, “favorable/dissatisfied.” Naval forces alone and in combination with the Air Force were most likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors but favorable attitudes to American activity, while at the same time “USN only” was least likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors and “unfavorable” attitudes to U.S. activity. “All Forces” responses dominate in the category “not favorable/dissatisfied.”

FIGURE 49
Model Crisis Outcome H4e: Attitude/Satisfaction Mix

CATEGORY	FAV&SAT	FAV&MIX/DISS	NOT FAV&SAT	NOT FAV&MIX/DISS
ALL FORCES	rf	rf	rf	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	6.422***	0.835	4.987**	bl
USN-USMC	1.545	1.309	1.236	bl
USN ONLY	1.829	2.088*	2.833	bl
NO NAVY	3.365**	1.622*	3.612**	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	rf	rf	rf
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.130***	0.800	0.156***
USN-USMC	bl	0.800	0.800	0.647
USN ONLY	bl	1.500	1.500	0.529
NO NAVY	bl	0.482	1.074	0.297**
ALL FORCES	0.297**	0.617*	0.277**	bl
USN&OTHER FORCES	1.909	0.515	1.380	bl
USN-USMC	0.459	0.803	0.342	bl
USN ONLY	0.561	1.287	0.784	bl
NO NAVY	rf	rf	rf	bl
ALL FORCES	bl	2.075	0.913	3.365**
USN&OTHER FORCES	bl	0.270***	0.723	0.524
USN-USMC	bl	1.747	0.745	2.177
USN ONLY	bl	2.293	1.397	1.781
NO NAVY	bl	rf	rf	rf

N = 473
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01

Sig. Model = 0.001
bl—baseline

Pseudo-R² = 0.075
rf—reference category

Compared to “All Forces” responses, the categories “USN & Other Forces” and “No Navy” are positively correlated with “favorable/satisfied” (particularly the former), with “not favorable/dissatisfied” as baseline. However, both categories are also positively related to “not favorable/satisfied.” While the odds ratio for “USN & Other Forces” is stronger for “favorable/satisfied,” the opposite is true for no naval involvement. “USN only” significantly correlates only with “favorable/dissatisfied.” All four response categories suggest a negative correlation with “not favorable/dissatisfied,” but not all meet the significance requirements. Once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “All Forces” responses are mostly associated with “unfavorable/dissatisfied.” Seaborne forces fail to achieve any significant results, although “USN only” suggests a positive correlation with “favorable/dissatisfied,” while the combination with the Air Force remains correlated with “favorable/satisfied.”

The relatively high *B* values for “All Forces” and “dissatisfied” actors that are both “favorable” and “unfavorable” to U.S. activity may be influenced by the decisiveness of “All Forces” responses. This increases the likelihood of a definite outcome, leaving at least one crisis actor dissatisfied. Another explanation is that crisis actors may be grateful for the strong U.S. commitment and yet dissatisfied with the overall outcome. The results do not confirm positive attitudes to solely American maritime-force responses. Somewhat more expected was the finding that when actors seem to be favorable to U.S. seaborne-only activity, they are less satisfied with the outcomes, supporting the assumption of lower decisiveness. The low R^2 suggests that many other factors influence the attitude and satisfaction. Overall, the regression analysis revealed mixed results.

Case Study 4d: Various Actors with Different Attitudes. The Western Somalia Liberation Front invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In October, the Somalis came close to victory, having secured most of the Ogaden territory, but the USSR reacted by providing weapons and military advisers, and by transporting Cuban troops from Angola to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, defeating the Somali army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat from the Ogaden territory was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, ending the crisis. The USN became involved only in February 1978, when following the collapse of the Somali army in Ogaden the *Kitty Hawk* battle group was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore in case it should be needed for American citizen evacuation and to conduct surveillance operations. The ship was released on 23 March 1978. In this crisis, both actors were dissatisfied with the crisis outcome; Somalia was favorable to U.S. involvement, but Ethiopia was not. The United States provided military

aid to Somalia but no troops. This suggests that the military aid to Somalia rather than the naval involvement might have been seen as unfavorable.

While the first two hypotheses could be confirmed, no results were generated by the regression analysis controlling for tension, and mixed results were found for the variable “satisfaction.”

TABLE 5-2

Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome	Confirmed
Hypothesis 4b: Agreement	Confirmed
<i>Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions</i>	<i>No results</i>
Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction	Mixed results

Part II Conclusion: U.S. Involvement

The section of the models featuring the various U.S. variables lends some support to claims of critics of the lack of decisiveness of naval forces. However, while seaborne forces alone are less important for the crisis abatement, they also correlate less with escalation of crises compared to “All Forces” responses. Consequently, the influence that “All Forces” reactions exert on the crisis comes at a high price and might worsen the situation rather than help bring it to an end. Thus the dispatch of “All Forces” carries the risk of strong, unpredictable reactions, whereas seaborne forces overall exert a more moderate influence.

The findings also support critics by showing that responses by naval forces alone often correlate with crises where the U.S. activity had no influence on the situation. The greater intrusiveness associated with ground forces poses a grave threat and thus escalates the situation but brings the strength needed to enforce compliance. This supports Robert Pape’s finding that threats of force and demonstrative uses of force are less effective than the use of significant amounts of force in coercion.¹⁷ Analysis of termination tempo shows that while seaborne forces alone do not seem to contribute to the pace of abatement, these results improve when a distinction between “USN only” and the “USN-USMC Team” is made. The latter exercises a positive influence on the speed of crisis termination—indeed, stronger than a combined “seaborne-airborne” response, albeit still weaker than “All Forces.” But does a fast abatement always imply a better or more advantageous crisis outcome? It is possible that “All Forces” contribute to the pace of abatement at the cost of long-term stability. This suggests that a positive value for this variable is not intrinsically desirable and that the relationships are more complex.

Another analysis focused on the most effective American activity in the crisis. Seaborne forces are frequently deployed when the most effective U.S. activity takes the form of semi-military operations. Overall, seaborne forces are more likely correlated with all successful U.S. activity levels below the directly military. This supports the suggested advantages of subtlety and flexibility. Yet the finding that seaborne forces are also more likely to be involved when the American response is “ineffective,” rather than when “low-level activity” is successful, was not anticipated. This result would argue against the successful backing-up of diplomatic or other political efforts in low-level responses by seaborne forces. When only the “form of U.S. involvement” is analyzed—that is, without controlling for the “most effective form of involvement”—seaborne forces are mostly deployed in semi-military and low-level operations, although in the former only marginally more often than “USN & Other Forces.” “All Forces” responses correlate highly with direct military operations. As expected, seaborne forces are more likely to deploy in crises where the United States acts as a third party and is not involved as a direct crisis actor. The last finding can again be interpreted in the context of realist considerations in decision making. When the United States is directly involved, the crisis is more likely to concern national interests and is thus of greater importance to the nation.

The unsatisfactory measurement of response times posed a major problem for statistical analyses. The data set did not allow a distinction between the reaction times of the different services, for it provided only single dates for the beginning of responses. It would be valuable to examine the effects (if any) of different response times, because readiness, speed, and independence are great naval advantages. There are significant differences between the military services in regard to immediate reaction capabilities. Often, such as in Lebanon in 1958 and in Afghanistan in 2001, both forward-deployed and surged maritime forces are the first to be ready for deployment and arrive at the theater. Similarly, the coding of the naval personnel variables is also suboptimal. The numbers control only generally for all active USN personnel outside the United States, without taking into account the number of personnel deployed within reaction radius of the crisis or from which AOR they were dispatched. Controlling for these different factors might produce insight. The present results suggest that operations below a “direct military level” involving the “USN-USMC Team” have faster reaction times. This finding confirms my expectation, since ground troops require the longest preparation time before they arrive in the theater. As for the number of USN personnel abroad, positive relationships were found with the total number of USN-USMC responses per year and the number of deployed aircraft carriers.

Overall, the qualified decisiveness of naval forces was confirmed. Whereas the dispatch of “All Forces” is important for the crisis abatement, it also correlates highly with the

category “escalation.” This cannot be ignored, for it bears on the ineffectiveness of seaborne forces alone. Additionally it would be helpful to see a cost-benefit analysis of maritime operations. The USN offers subtleness and rapid response capabilities but often does not exert decisive influence. Nevertheless, seaborne forces are of great importance in semi-military operations when ground troops are less useful and thus offer a promising alternative tool for crisis engagement below direct military activity.

Part II Conclusion: Crisis Outcomes

In terms of crisis outcomes, seaborne forces correlate positively with ambiguous yet formal outcomes. Termination in “stalemate” is most frequent in crises where the United States sent naval forces only, while “victory” and, to a greater extent, “defeat” are associated with “All Forces” responses. “All Forces” also correlate highest with “imposed” outcomes, while naval forces are dispatched alone in crises terminating with “formal agreements” or “unilateral acts.” One possible explanation is that naval forces are often unable to prevent unilateral acts but in successful interventions can shape and promote formal agreements. The Navy’s function of backing up diplomacy with limited intrusiveness, signaling U.S. interest and shaping developments, would support its advantage in supporting formal agreements. “All Forces” are strong enough to impose outcomes or to help the U.S. ally win the crisis. Thus the definite crisis outcomes (victory/defeat) are imposed by the scale of force applied (all forces). This in turn can affect the other outcome criteria, “satisfaction” and “tension.”

The results for the effects on tension are more ambiguous. Because the overall model fit is poor, the results merely suggest that when “USN only” responses are treated as a separate category, “USN-USMC” correlates with a reduction of tension, even more than “no naval involvement,” whereas the other service combinations are positively correlated with an increase in tension. Nevertheless, the direction of the “eyeball” correlations is interesting and deserves further inquiry. The assumption that excessive use of force can result in escalation is supported by these results, as well as by the earlier analysis measuring the American effectiveness. “USN-USMC” forces are a powerful combination but not as threatening as “All Forces” and thus can influence escalation positively, whereas the USN alone might not provide a sufficient incentive to change behavior. Conversely, naval forces may serve as a prelude to stronger U.S. action, thereby feeding fear of escalation. In the event of “All Forces” responses, the actor-level results do not support my hypothesis that at least for the U.S. allies, tensions might ease. Where only one of several actors is supportive of U.S. intervention, the level of tension may not be diminished appreciably.

Outcomes leaving all actors satisfied are most frequent where seaborne forces were dispatched in combination with the Air Force, followed by responses with no naval

forces. Conversely, “all forces” and “USN-USMC” responses were least likely in crises where all crisis actors considered the outcomes satisfactory. The correlation between “seaborne-airborne” responses and “actor’s satisfaction” remains strong, regardless of the perception of the U.S. involvement. One possible explanation could be that the force combination was helpful in promoting a satisfactory outcome for all, but only the U.S. ally was satisfied with the American involvement. The direction of this variable may also be more dependent on the type of the crisis. Contrary to my expectation, naval forces alone were not viewed as significantly more favorable by the crisis actors. The mere frequencies suggest that USN forces alone were most often deployed in crises characterized by a favorable attitude to U.S. involvement yet dissatisfaction with the outcome. However, more robust statistical analyses show that the significance is very weak. One possible explanation is the weakness of misperception. Naval signaling could be interpreted as a prelude to a stronger American response, a development either hoped for or feared. Additionally, in some cases the U.S. ally may have been hoping for a more powerful response than was provided by naval forces. “All Forces” responses generated the highest correlation with unfavorable attitudes toward U.S. involvement. On one hand, this is surprising, since the parties favored by U.S. intervention should be more satisfied with a stronger commitment. On the other hand, the finding that not all parties were satisfied with the outcome was to have been expected, since the variable does not distinguish between allies of the United States and non-allies. This can further be influenced by the number of actors. With a large number of crisis actors, the scope for individual dissatisfaction is greater. Current data do not allow me to explore this distinction.

Importantly, the strength of the response should not be measured only by the type of service deployed. Blechman and Kaplan already distinguished between the type and the level of force.¹⁸ A possible measurement for the level of force within naval responses is the dispatch of aircraft carriers. A survey study conducted by Zakheim et al. found that there seems to be a general consensus among senior opinion leaders that only a U.S. carrier presence will be effective during a major crisis.¹⁹ In smaller incidents, the opinions differed. While some still preferred carriers, others were more cautious and favored displays of smaller naval-strength combinations. This question about the optimal type of force is crucial for a variety of reasons. Generally it is important to distinguish between the different force levels involved in naval interventions, independent of the service combinations. Blechman and Kaplan analyzed successful outcomes from the vantage point of the United States but found negative correlations with higher force levels.

Treating definite outcomes as more successful, this analysis reveals different findings. The system-level-data evidence shows that responses without aircraft carrier

involvement are more likely to lead to ambiguous outcomes, whereas the stronger the CV force, the more likely a definite outcome becomes. Likewise, the absence of CVs (or the use of only one) is positively correlated with a formal agreement, whereas more than one CV strongly increases the chances of an imposed agreement. Assuming that the United States imposes its will on the crisis actors, the Blechman/Kaplan finding can be confirmed. Responses without any aircraft carriers concurred most frequently with the variable value “all actors satisfied,” whereas there was no “eyeball” correlation for the variable “tensions.” The presence of aircraft carriers also indicates the magnitude of the crisis, but one should also distinguish between the different force levels within naval and other military interventions. Blechman and Kaplan also found a positive influence of the commitment of land troops.²⁰ The current data partially confirm this, with the strong correlation of all-forces responses and contribution to the pace of abatement, followed by USN-USMC deployments. While this does not directly control for success, the termination of a crisis can in itself be considered a success, independent of the type of outcome.

The dependent variables are influenced by many additional intervening factors—for example, whether tension is more likely to escalate in crises characterized by high levels of violence or high-politics issues, or whether the satisfaction is influenced by the type of crisis. However, accounting for all these considerations would result in an overly complex model, and the resulting outputs would be very difficult to interpret. For instance, in crises where the actors were satisfied with U.S. involvement but dissatisfied with the outcome, it is important not only to distinguish between the different service combinations but also to control for the issue of the crisis or the form of the outcome. This would include the influence of the type of mission and the question of what constitutes a positive outcome. A combat operation is likely to be perceived more negatively by the crisis actors than a NEO mission. In this context, it would be helpful to evaluate the views of beneficiaries of the missions. The data suggest that in NEO and contingent positioning missions, the U.S. crisis involvement is more likely to be perceived as favorable or neutral, whereas its involvement in combat operations is rated unfavorably. Shows of force generate nearly equal results.

Further research would also have to control for the number of crisis actors, since this will influence the correlation between attitude and mission. Currently, the same mission type is coded for all involved actors. Noteworthy is the high frequency of more than one naval mission within a single crisis. This can be interpreted as a confirmation of the naval ability to be flexible. For instance, in a single crisis seaborne forces can immediately react with a show of force, followed by combat operations if necessary, and in the aftermath operate in a contingent positioning mission to observe the implementation of an agreement, cease-fire, or peace plan. While these are general crisis outcomes, it

would also be important to distinguish between what the United States sought to deter and whether it succeeded. These goals can be very different from overall crisis characteristics. A comprehensive analysis of positive/negative outcomes should include the question of the perspective. Who perceives the outcome as satisfactory? Is a positive outcome representative of a peaceful settlement of the crisis terminating in a formal agreement, or does it refer to the perception of a crisis actor or of the United States? A positive outcome for the United States might just as well be an imposed agreement as a formal one, independent of such other considerations as the duration of the resolution or the disposition of the majority of the crisis actors.

Notes

1. For a detailed description of all variables please refer to appendix B, sec. B1. If not mentioned otherwise, all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.
2. Gaffney, *Warning Time for U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations*.
3. On the basis of the actor-level data, a further distinction is made distinguishing between semi/covert and low-level activity.
4. While Siegel (in *To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises*) coded the involvement of an aircraft carrier, I was not able to identify which one was deployed.
5. Astor, *Presidents at War*, p. 50; Hippler, *Nation-Building*.
6. Siegel, *To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises*, pp. 7–8.
7. Mrityunjy Mazumdar, "India-U.S. Naval Exercises Bearing Fruit," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 132, no. 7 (2006).
8. For *Coronado*, J. B. Finkelstein, "Naval and Maritime Events, July 1974–December 1974," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 101 (May 1975).
9. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, "ICB Data Collections."
10. Baer, *One Hundred Years of Sea Power*, p. 363.
11. For a detailed description of all variables, refer to appendix B, sec. B1. If not mentioned otherwise, all variables are adapted from the ICB data set.
12. Robert Ross, "The 1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (2000), pp. 87–123. Scarlett, "Coercive Naval Diplomacy," mentions only the deployments of the following March.
13. Gouré, "Tyranny of Forward Presence"; Ross, "1995–96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation"; Ross, "Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation Dominance, and U.S.-China Relations," *International Security* 27, no. 2 (2002), pp. 48–85.
14. Mark Evans, *Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships*, s.v. "USS Forrestal," www.history.navy.mil/.
15. Christopher Wright, "U.S. Naval Operations in 1983," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 109 (May 1984).
16. Gaffney, *Warning Time for U.S. Forces' Responses to Situations*, p. 7; Edward Marolda, *The U.S. Navy in the Cold War Era, 1945–1991* (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2000); Waltraud Queiser Morales, "US Intervention and the New World Order: Lessons from Cold War and Post-Cold War Cases," *Third World Quarterly* 15, no. 1 (1994), pp. 80–81.
17. Cited in Robert Art and Patrick Cronin, "The U.S. and Coercive Diplomacy," in *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 7th ed., ed. Robert Art and Kenneth Waltz (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009), pp. 273–74.
18. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.
19. Zakheim et al., *Political and Economic Implications of Global Naval Presence*.
20. Blechman and Kaplan, *Force without War*.

Conclusion

In this study I have sought to weave together different ideas on the usefulness of naval forces for U.S. crisis management. I created a new data set, measuring the activities of seaborne forces in American responses to international crises, by adding new variables to an already existing, well established crisis data project.¹ By means of combining different methodological and theoretical approaches, I have tried to shed light on the overarching question: “What is the role of U.S. naval forces in crisis response?” There is no short and direct answer. Drawing on various theories and assumptions I found that maritime forces are a promising response tool for certain types of crises, yet there is no unambiguous response to the question posed above. I broke the research down into four categories and have used statistical analyses and historical examples to underline my findings.

The more specific research questions posed in the introductory chapter were concerned, first, with the types of crises and locations to which U.S. naval forces mostly respond alone. Seaborne forces deploy in crises characterized by territorial threats and threats of low gravity generally and when clearly defined military-security issues are at stake. Their involvement is not correlated with crises characterized by low-salience issues. Seaborne deployments in crises with high levels of violence seem just as frequent as higher-force levels. There is no particular location that triggers seaborne deployments, but if the crisis location is of great geostrategic interest, naval forces will deploy not alone but rather together with ground troops. The research questions regarding the crisis actors were concerned with the influence of different actors’ characteristics and how they perceived the seaborne crisis response. The presence of fewer crisis actors and little or no UN involvement is more likely to favor “seaborne only responses,” while the stability of the actors does not seem to promote particular types of military response. No results were found to answer the question in regard to the perception of the naval involvement. The third set of questions looked at the type of U.S. activity, the deployment with other military services, and the effectiveness of seaborne responses. All American response activity levels below direct military favor “seaborne only deployments.”

In general, the USN often deploys with the Marine Corps or the Air Force. If the U.S. Army is involved, usually most other services participate as well. All results differed depending on whether the baseline was set to “All Forces” or to “no Navy” responses. When “All Forces” activities were chosen as baseline, “USN-USMC” responses and no naval involvement often compared similarly. When “no Navy” was defined as baseline,

the results changed to indicate the military character and highlight the adaptability of naval forces. In all cases expect for one, “USN & Other Forces” stands for seaborne force(s) and “USAF” and was therefore treated as combination with the Air Force. Navy–Marine Corps–Air Force joint forces proved to represent a highly valuable crisis-response tool. The question regarding the effectiveness of “seaborne only responses” is difficult to answer. While seaborne forces were overall less effective if deployed alone, they also show the lowest correlation with an escalation of tension of all military service combinations. Thus while seaborne-only responses exert a lower influence, this should not be translated as ineffectiveness. The last of the categories, the crisis outcome, was concerned with the influence of U.S. naval forces on outcomes. Naval forces correlated positively with crises ending with ambiguous outcomes, but also formal agreements, suggesting subtle influence that can support diplomatic efforts but not decisively terminate crises. To provide a more detailed overview, figure 50 presents all the hypotheses and results after the regression analyses.

FIGURE 50
Hypotheses Results Overview

Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat	Mixed results
Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake	Not confirmed
Hypothesis 1c: Violence	Mixed results
Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement	Confirmed
Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability	Mixed results
<i>Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity</i>	<i>No results</i>
Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3d: Termination	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor	Confirmed
Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness	Not confirmed
Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome	Confirmed
Hypothesis 4b: Agreement	Confirmed
<i>Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions</i>	<i>No results</i>
Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction	Mixed results

Both advantages and disadvantages of naval deployments were confirmed. Many findings point to the benefits of naval forces as flexible, subtle, and ready forces. Seaborne forces, and to some extent the Air Force, have the capability to arrive in the theater quickly and respond rapidly but also to stand by, in a wait-and-see posture. They are the military response tool of choice in low-level and semi-military U.S. activities. Ground forces require much longer transition times and are therefore better suited for longer-lasting crises and they signal a stronger American commitment. The findings that greater geostrategic interests, more crisis actors, and direct involvement trigger stronger responses can be explained with a realist approach. More idealist goals, such as a right intention, in the form of promoting a formal agreement, appear to be more likely to be supported by maritime forces. The results supporting realist considerations are stronger, and it remains to be seen if the idealist tendency can be confirmed in future studies.

Lack of decisiveness should not be overstated; it is not crucial that naval forces be as decisive as ground forces. It is more important to implement unique naval capabilities. The qualities of naval forces lie in other tasks and advantages that set them apart from others and allow different response activities. Fast reaction, limited intrusiveness, and the ability to wait and see are great advantages but are not necessarily suitable for all crises types and settings. For example, if the United States wants to speed up the abatement decisively, "All Forces" responses are necessary, but when a stronger emphasis is placed on minimizing the chances of escalation caused by U.S. activity, the "USN-USMC team" presents the better response tool. Similarly, if the United States wants to impose an outcome, ground troops are necessary, whereas support for reaching a formal agreement is better undertaken by USN forces alone. Conflict resolution is a central challenge of defense management, and many different tools are at the government's disposal to pursue its goals. If the United States wants to intervene successfully in crises, it is crucial to study how the characteristics of crises and actors influence naval involvement and how, in turn, naval involvement impacts outcomes. American decision makers should carefully consider the differences of the service combinations in making their crisis response choices. It is thus necessary to analyze the force combinations in more depth, further distinguishing between military interventions to improve conflict resolution strategies.

This exploratory study presents a variety of promising and interesting results and identifies areas of interest for future research. Why are naval forces not more successful in low-level U.S. activities, through supporting political crisis-resolution efforts? Why are naval forces predominant in crises focusing on single military-security issues and territorial threats? Why is there no correlation with low-gravity-of-threat crises? How can the influence of naval forces on outcomes be interpreted? Why is naval involvement not viewed more favorably by crisis actors? Examination of the psychological effects of naval

forces on an adversary and how they are perceived would provide more useful information on the questions of subtlety, intrusiveness, and effectiveness. All of this prompts the question of how sailors view themselves, as well as their role and function in conflict settings. Naval roles change over time and have to adapt to current threats and challenges. For example, the vulnerability of U.S. ships, especially of aircraft carriers to the enhanced technological resources of potential adversaries, may lead to changes in the American approach to crisis resolution. Yet this research suggests the importance of the dispatch of at least one aircraft carrier for decisive intervention. Many results, such as of hypotheses controlling for outcomes, point to the benefits of sending an aircraft carrier to underline intentions and enhance coercion power. More research is required to analyze when, how, and what type of ship to deploy to achieve the desired outcome.

In the remainder of this conclusion I will discuss the shortcomings of this analysis, followed by suggestions for additional data for future research. I will then take a closer look at the diplomatic role of naval forces and try to derive lessons from my analyses of the role of seaborne forces in crisis response as they pertain to current debates of sea power.

Shortcomings

Many of the shortcomings were already mentioned in the discussion of the results, but the following paragraphs identify and discuss additional problems.

Small Number of Cases and Generalization

One of the biggest shortcomings is the small number of cases. For further research it would be of great interest to expand the latest CNA data set in order to enlarge the number of cases and to extend them beyond international crises. The CNA studies identified more naval responses to international incidents than captured in this project. Following the definition of the ICB data project meant that many incidents were excluded. But already the definition applied here renders comparisons difficult. The question of when responses cross from peacetime to wartime is difficult to answer. By application of Siegel's 1995 definition of a threshold of one thousand casualties, incidents as diverse as the Gulf War in 1990, the Six-Day War in 1967, an international crisis in Yemen in 1979, and minor skirmishes in Latin America in 1959 and 1960 are compared.² By the addition of more cases, the different types of crises could be better grouped and distinguished. While the current work captures responses only within the time frame of the crisis, the inclusion of cases of nonroutine naval involvement before a crisis breaks out would allow one to draw more inferences about deterrence capabilities and potentially influential reactions taking place in anticipation of the crisis.

The importance of understanding events before the occurrence of a crisis is illustrated by the case of “Liberia–Sierra Leone.” The ICB codes a crisis lasting from 23 March to 31 October 1991. However, Navy, Marine, and Army elements were engaged in a NEO in Liberia from April 1990 until January 1991, before the crisis outbreak. Additionally, the NEO took place in Liberia, while the ICB crisis mainly focuses on the crisis in Sierra Leone, as a result of the long-lasting civil war in Liberia. It is further important to distinguish between different deployments within crises. Often, naval forces respond in more than one mission to a crisis, and at other times “USN forces only” either are present before other services join the operations or remain after they depart. For example, before and after the Suez nationalization war in 1956–57, the United States sent naval patrol forces with Marines on board to the area. During the peak of the crisis, the U.S. response was augmented by the Air Force. Since it was always the largest force level that was coded, this dispatch of maritime forces only before the peak was not captured in the data for statistical analysis. The distinctions between independent naval operations would allow us to judge better their respective influence on the crisis and their functions within the U.S. military services.

The treatment of crises occurring within a larger conflict or even war presents an additional problem. I tried to focus on naval responses to the specific crisis and not on the conflict at large, but alternative approaches might be as valid. In a future study, the cases where U.S. military, but not naval, forces were dispatched should be included, to control for possible differences. The Gorenburg et al. CNA report identifies 167 cases with and 142 without naval involvement, exclusive of HA/DR operations.³ It would be rewarding to analyze the type of incidents involving military services exclusive of the naval component.

Furthermore, all available CNA data could be enhanced by adding variables including controlling for the crisis characteristics, American involvement, actors, and outcomes. The inclusion of U.S. intentions and success could also produce useful findings. However, the CNA data only focus on military responses to situations, thereby excluding all U.S. involvements short of deploying military services. It would be worthwhile to expand the research to include U.S. response to international incidents short of military activities. A larger sample would also allow finer distinctions between the maritime forces. The type of mission and the type and level of force, whether power was projected ashore, how closely the vessels approached the adversary, and the principal naval and Marine activities—all these could collectively shed more light on the influence and responses of naval forces. There is a fundamental difference between whether Marines were just present and whether they landed, and if so, whether in conjunction with a NEO or in combat.

The currently low number of “USN only” cases allows for a limited number of hypotheses differentiating between USN and USN-USMC forces. As shown, this differentiation can produce insight on the variables “geographic location,” “UN involvement,” “U.S. contribution to pace of abatement,” “ambiguous outcome,” and “tension.” A larger number of cases would enable the inclusion of a factor controlling for the level of force within the USN activity. Analyses providing results on the influence of the type and strength of different ships for successful outcomes could also prove helpful in the current debate about the necessary number and types of ships. Simple frequency distributions have suggested that the force level does play an important role. Overall, it would be very helpful if there were a more standardized process to capture “naval data” within the Department of the Navy. The lack of consistent and uniform documentation renders the data collection very challenging and comparisons difficult.

All these shortcomings present me with the very problem I criticized in other data sets—generalization, particularly the generalization of “military interventions.” While this project contributes to the understanding of the different functions and capabilities of the armed services, thus differentiating between different forms of military interventions, it entailed compromises and generalizations.

Simple Regression Models

Because a wide variety of different variables was included, the analysis is composed of many different individual models and is not structured to test different theoretical approaches against each other in one comprehensive model. While its approach provides a broad overview of how naval forces are deployed in international crises, it limits depth of analysis. The reliance on largely individual models, given their inability to control for interactive effects, supports simple correlations with a measurement of association of strength to describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The stepwise regression models lowered both the $Exp(B)$ values and the number of significant results. This is not surprising, since the independent variables intercorrelate with unpredictable effects on the dependent variable.

Moreover, it also suggests that certain variables are not as influential as assumed from the simple regression outputs. Future models have to determine which factors remain important when they are no longer treated separately. As always, the independent variable is just one factor impacting the dependent variable; there are many other influences on both the dependent and independent variables. This is especially true for simple models including one independent variable and thus outputting only a low R^2 value. This suggests a low strength of association, because many other relevant factors impacting the dependent variable are not accounted for. With more data at hand, future research should strive to generate more complex models, controlling for interaction

effects. Nevertheless, the presentation of frequencies and simple regression analyses were sufficient for the purpose of this projects, since a stated goal was to generate a new data set, thereby preparing the groundwork for future projects, and to determine which factors deserve inquiry in greater depth.

The Maritime Century: The Way Ahead

I will end by focusing on the diplomatic functions of the USN and the usefulness of the sea-air team. I believe these results can offer valuable insight when placed in the larger context of the role of seaborne forces in the twenty-first century, which many analysts have termed the “maritime century,” because of the influence sea power exercises on international events.⁴ As Admiral Roughead said, “Our Navy is very different than the larger U.S. navies of the past. And while our Navy is very different, and much smaller, we are also facing a new emerging order that I believe requires more naval power.”⁵ First I will briefly discuss the promising combination of seaborne forces and the U.S. Air Force.

AirSea Battle

Since its publication by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in May 2010, the AirSea Battle concept has garnered significant attention. I do not mean to attempt to evaluate the concept but rather to apply my findings to the usefulness of the sea-air team. The AirSea Battle concept “rests fundamentally on the tight integration of Air Force and Navy operations in the WPTO [Western Pacific Theater of Operations]—each Service plays a key enabling role for the other in accomplishing critical missions.”⁶ Many of the results of this study strongly underline the effectiveness of the combination of sea and airborne forces. Signaling and coercion power can be enhanced, while much of the present flexibility and readiness can be maintained. The influence exerted is similar to a deployment of ground troops and the deterrent effect is significant, but the level of commitment is lower and less intrusive. For example, in crises involving multiple issues and when governmental instability is high, the combination with the Air Force has been the response tool of choice, suggesting its usefulness in complex situations. Yet unlike the deployment of ground troops, sea-air forces are more likely deployed in U.S. activities below direct military involvements, supporting the arguments of lower intrusiveness and greater flexibility.

Additionally, the sea-air team is also viewed as more favorable by the actors and shows a high “eyeball” correlation with crises where U.S. activity is important for the abatement; only one case coincided with activity responsible for an escalation of the situation. Of course, these findings do not directly influence the desired antiaccess and area-denial capabilities, but as Jose Carreno and his coauthors say, “The salient question is, to what

extent did and does cooperation either make U.S. forces more efficient or create real synergy? . . . [I]t is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able then and is capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. [The concept] must integrate some unique set of capabilities from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither service can accomplish individually.”⁷ The many positive results of a combination with the Air Force found in this study are particularly promising and can help to begin identifying situations where a combination of forces is most useful.⁸ A more careful analysis of these dynamics can improve effectiveness, enhance synergies, and inform the implementation of AirSea Battle.

Naval Diplomacy

Three results in particular—the frequency of the use of naval forces short of direct military activities, the correlation with low or no UN involvement, and the impact on crisis outcomes—underlined the diplomatic potential of naval forces. The *Global Strategic Assessment* of 2009 came to the following conclusion: “The character of war is changing. Low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration, whether to interdict traffickers or conduct humanitarian operations, are becoming more necessary.”⁹ To support diplomatic initiatives—especially in low-level activities—with military strength is an important task for naval forces. The results of this study distinguish the Navy from the other services, especially short of direct military involvement; still, the statistics are not as supportive as I had expected. Seaborne forces alone dominate lower-level U.S. deployments, but the overall number of responses was rather small, and the effectiveness of the activity not what would be hoped for. Although the previous paragraph points to the effectiveness of a sea-air combination, naval forces acting alone do possess critical advantages that make them particularly suited for diplomatic tasks.

The study also provides very encouraging results supporting the importance of naval forces with respect to their diplomatic potential and their subtleness. The strong and positive relation between no or low-level UN involvement and “USN only” responses highlights the diplomatic rather than the offensive military role of naval forces. Furthermore, the positive correlation between formal agreements and naval forces suggests a subtle positive influence on the solution-finding process and the form of outcome. Over the years there has been a clear decline in operations carried out by maritime forces alone, as the United States seems to place emphasis on deploying forces jointly. This development has been observed in many other studies since the end of the 1980s.¹⁰ The data confirm that after 1985, joint operations dominate American crisis response, the change coinciding with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

While joint operations have proved themselves, this very success undermines the Navy’s ability to exploit its diplomatic potential to the fullest. Since 1990 only four of

the international crises featured a maritime response only. In 1994, during the second North Korean nuclear crisis, naval vessels were displayed in a show of force, and again during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995–96 the United States deployed two aircraft carriers in a show of force. The presence of naval forces, it is said, played an important role in both cases. In the former they contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations.¹¹ During the latter, the naval deployments were a successful coercive diplomacy effort to guarantee stability during the Taiwanese elections by deterring the Chinese.¹² The two other crises involving the USN-USMC team came in the form of two NEOs: in 1998 in the Ethiopia-Eritrea crisis (although the mission was ultimately canceled) and Lebanon in 2006.

Naval diplomacy also has a crucial preventive role before crisis breaks out, an important aspect not captured in this analysis. Because every crisis is treated in the data as one unit, I have not accounted for the different responses within one crisis, such as changing missions or different levels of coercive diplomacy, or for the timing of the deployment of other military services. For example, the data do not distinguish between “sticks” employed after “carrots” have failed to solve the crisis and the two used simultaneously. During the Bosnia crisis, for instance, the United States remained reluctant to approve air strikes, but naval forces arrived in the theater in the very early stages. Because the response is coded at the highest service-combination level, the Bosnia case does not account for USN involvement only. Especially in the beginning, the naval involvement was largely meant to establish a blockade, which it successfully did. Analysis in greater depth of the timing could provide more insight into these dynamics and report such effective outcomes as this.

But most importantly, naval diplomacy is a central task for the USN on a daily basis and is not restricted to crisis response. Port visits and joint exercises also serve diplomatic functions, and the United States has employed its naval forces to coerce and deter on many occasions during routine deployments. The recent U.S. attempt to highlight the role of soft power inevitably portends an increased emphasis on diplomacy. As the QDR states,

As a global power, the United States has a broad range of tools for advancing its national interests described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplomacy, economic development and engagement, and the power of America’s ideas and values. When absolutely necessary, the United States and its allies have shown the willingness and ability to resort to force in defense of our interests and the common good.¹³

With the steadily increasing criticality of the Indo-Pacific commons, the use of naval diplomacy will become even more important. This strategy is not confined to the United States; many nations have turned to their naval forces to demonstrate interest and intention. The results in this study suggest that naval forces as a diplomatic tool in crises

are underutilized and that the Navy would have much to offer. This observation is also supported by a 2009 Naval Institute *Proceedings* article calling for the reintroduction of naval diplomacy, described as one of the most valuable national resources.¹⁴ The 2007 maritime strategy emphasizes soft power and low-level USN activities. In contrast, as Pritchett points out, no special chapter is devoted to naval diplomacy in the NOP 2010.¹⁵ He urges that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief be integrated as part of, and within, the broader frame of naval diplomacy. HA and DR were excluded in the present analysis, but they offer promising ways of exercising soft power and thus diplomatic influence. Polls revealed that disaster relief delivered in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004–2005 or the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 resulted in a more positive attitude toward the United States.¹⁶ Humanitarian assistance missions can improve the image of the United States, especially through the annual deployments of Operations CONTINUING PROMISE and PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP. Yet it is crucial to understand better the impact and the actual benefits of HA and DR, as well as the forms of naval diplomacy captured in this study, to U.S. interests.

This study presents some preliminary findings, but it will be necessary to find better measures of the influence that naval diplomacy exerts, especially in a time of “low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration.”¹⁷ Cable concludes that “gunboat diplomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular screw. It is not a hammer that will bang home any old nail.”¹⁸ This statement explains the importance of understanding possibilities and limitations of the impact and success of naval diplomacy. Naval forces alone will not decisively impose outcomes in large-scale international crises, as the results have confirmed. If doing so is the U.S. goal, other means should be chosen. The tasks assigned the USN should be more specific and limited, such as to deter a certain move by one of the actors or to support political efforts. Thus, before any conclusions are drawn in regard to the limited decisiveness of naval forces in this context, one has to take such considerations into account. Depending on the crisis and American objectives, naval forces alone may or may not be sufficient. Luttwak finds that the influence of naval diplomacy is largely determined by the reaction of others, rather than by the intentions of the employing actor.¹⁹

This could prove interesting in the context of the increasing tensions with China in the western Pacific. J. J. Widen summarizes Luttwak’s thought process as follows: “A latent and unintended application of naval diplomacy—routine fleet movements—could be more effective and considered more threatening than an active and planned threat using naval forces, which could sometimes be completely ignored.”²⁰ This aspect of naval diplomacy—in light of the continuous U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific commons—is of the highest interest, and understanding this dynamic can provide useful guidance. Luttwak offers more lessons that remain relevant today, especially in regard to the

discussion of the number of ships and their types, and above all the need for aircraft carriers. For naval diplomacy, he argued, it is often more important to be visible than to be viable for combat. He had in mind the Soviet Union, which built ships not only for combat but also to impress other actors. While one particular ship might not offer decisive combat power, it can still serve as a symbol for the might of the country, with backup readily available. “The dominating framework of armed suasion is thus the domestic, international and local political context, which in combination will determine the absolute feasibility, and degree of success, of its exercise.”²¹

Such ideas should inform forward presence, exercises, port visits, and other such considerations, as these lessons can be applied to today’s geopolitical situation, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Again, it depends on the type of influence the United States wishes to exert. For influencing outcomes decisively, this study suggests the importance of more powerful forces, including aircraft carriers. This might not be necessary for lower-level, diplomatic missions.

Overall, it is important to collect more data to confirm the usefulness of naval forces in low-level activities. The practicalities of measurement are very challenging, but this study provides a first step that can be built on in the future to evaluate how to employ naval diplomacy effectively and when this tool is appropriate. In 2009 Michael Quigley wrote, “A wide range of naval options—from sending a small escort ship sailing within sight from a foreign port to parking an entire carrier group off the coast—can provide a multitude of diplomatic options. Gunboat diplomacy can prevent or even resolve international crisis situations.”²² In the current debates regarding the future of the U.S. Navy, such considerations should be given more weight, especially in this maritime century.

Notes

1. Center for International Development and Conflict Management, “ICB Data Collections.”
2. Siegel, *To Deter, Compel, and Reassure in International Crises*.
3. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, *For the Record*.
4. Patrick Cronin, *Global Strategic Assessment 2009: America’s Security Role in a Changing World* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense Univ. Press for the Institute for National Strategic Studies, 2009).
5. Gary Roughead, remarks delivered at Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 8 June 2010, available at www.navy.mil/.
6. Jan van Tol et al., *AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure Operational Concept* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010).
7. Jose Carreno et al., “What’s New about the AirSea Battle Concept?,” U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings* 136, no. 8 (2010), pp. 52–59.
8. Also in regard to possible threats to sea control, a combination of the U.S. Navy and Air Force assets can prove helpful. John Bosone (“Airpower and the Establishment of Sea Control in an Anti-access Environment” [course paper, Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 2008], available at www.dtic.mil/) argues that land-based airpower can effectively help

- to maintain sea control in an antiaccess environment.
9. Cronin, *Global Strategic Assessment 2009*, p. 472.
 10. Cobble, Gaffney, and Gorenburg, *For the Record*.
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Appendix A: Crises Summaries

A.1. Crisis Listing

#	ICB Crisis #	Start Year	Name	Crisis Actors
1.	110	1946	Communism in Poland	USSR
2.	111	1946	Turkish Straits	Turkey, US
3.	112	1946	Greek Civil War	Greece
4.	113	1947	Communism in Hungary	Hungary, USSR
5.	114	1947	Truman Doctrine	Greece, Turkey, US
6.	115	1947	Marshall Plan	Czechoslovakia, Russia
7.	116	1947	Indonesia Independence I	Netherlands, Indonesia
8.	120	1947	Palestine Partition/Israel Independence	Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
9.	121	1948	Communism in Czechoslovakia	Czechoslovakia, USSR
10.	123	1948	Berlin Blockade	France, UK, US, USSR
11.	125	1948	China Civil War	China, US
12.	126	1948	Costa Rica-Nicaragua I	Costa Rica
13.	127	1948	Indonesia Independence Iii	Indonesia, Netherlands
14.	128	1948	Sinai Incursion	Egypt, Israel, UK
15.	131	1949	Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia	Yugoslavia
16.	132	1950	Korean War I	China, South Korea, Taiwan, US
17.	133	1950	Korean War II	North Korea, People's Republic of China, South Korea, US, USSR
18.	134	1951	Hula Drainage	Greece, Italy
19.	135	1951	Punjab War Scare I	India, Pakistan
20.	136	1951	Suez Canal	Egypt, UK
21.	137	1952	Catalina Affair	Sweden
22.	138	1953	Burma Infiltration	Burma
23.	139	1953	Invasion of Laos I	France, Laos
24.	140	1953	Korean War III	China, North Korea, South Korea; US
25.	141	1953	East German Uprising	Russia
26.	142	1953	Trieste II	Italy, Yugoslavia
27.	143	1953	Qibya	Jordan
28.	144	1953	Guatemala	Guatemala, Honduras
29.	145	1954	Dien Bien Phu	France, UK, US
30.	146	1954	Taiwan Strait I	China, Taiwan, US
31.	147	1955	Costa Rica-Nicaragua II	Costa Rica, Nicaragua
32.	148	1955	Baghdad Pact	Egypt
33.	149	1956	Gaza Raid-Czechoslovakia Arms	Egypt, Israel
34.	152	1956	Suez Nationalization-War	Egypt, France, Israel, UK, US, USSR
35.	153	1956	Qalailya	Israel, Jordan
36.	154	1956	Poland Liberalization	Poland, USSR
37.	155	1956	Hungarian Uprising	Hungary, USSR
38.	156	1957	Mocoron Incident	Honduras, Nicaragua
39.	157	1957	Jordan Regime	Jordan
40.	158	1957	France-Tunisia	Tunisia
41.	159	1957	Syria-Turkey Confrontation	Syria, Turkey, US
42.	160	1957	IFNI	Spain
43.	161	1957	West Irian I	Netherlands
44.	164	1958	Abortive Coup Indonesia	Indonesia
45.	165	1958	Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval	Jordan, Lebanon, UK, US
46.	166	1958	Taiwan Strait II	People's Republic of China, Taiwan, US
47.	168	1958	Berlin Deadline	France, German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic, UK, US, USSR
48.	170	1959	Central America-Cuba I	Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama
49.	171	1959	China-India Border I	China, India
50.	172	1959	Shatt-Al-Arab I	Iran, Iraq
51.	175	1960	Failed Assassination-Venezuela	Dominican Republic, Venezuela
52.	176	1960	Congo I-Katanga	Belgium, Congo
53.	178	1960	Central America-Cuba II	Guatemala, Nicaragua

54.	180	1961	Pathet Lao Offensive	Thailand, US
55.	181	1961	Bay of Pigs	Cuba, US
56.	182	1961	Pushtunistan III	Afghanistan, Pakistan
57.	185	1961	Berlin Wall	DDR, France, UK, US, USSR, West Germany
58.	186	1961	Vietcong Attack	South Vietnam, US
59.	187	1961	West Iraian II	Indonesia, Netherlands
60.	190	1961	Goa II	Portugal
61.	192	1962	Taiwan Strait III	China
62.	193	1962	Nam Tha	Thailand, US
63.	194	1962	China-India Border II	China, India
64.	195	1962	Yemen War I	Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
65.	196	1962	Cuban Missiles	Cuba, Soviet Union, US
66.	197	1963	Malysia Federation	Indonesia, Malaysia
67.	198	1963	Dominican Republic-Haiti II	Dominican Republic, Haiti
68.	200	1963	Cuba-Venezuela	Venezuela
69.	202	1963	Cyprus I	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
70.	203	1963	Jordan Waters	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria
71.	206	1964	Panama Flag	Panama, US
72.	208	1964	Ogaden I	Ethiopia, Somalia
73.	210	1964	Gulf of Tonkin	North Vietnam, US
74.	211	1964	Congo II	Belgium, Congo, US, USSR
75.	212	1964	Yemen War III	Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
76.	213	1965	Pleiku	South Vietnam, North Vietnam, US
77.	214	1965	Rann of Kutch	India, Pakistan
78.	215	1965	Dominican Intervention	US
79.	216	1965	Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation	India, Pakistan
80.	218	1965	Rhodesia's Udi	Zambia
81.	219	1966	Yemen War IV	Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen
82.	220	1966	El Samu	Israel, Jordan
83.	221	1967	Che Guevara-Bolivia	Bolivia
84.	222	1967	Six Day War	Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, US, USSR
85.	223	1967	Cyprus III	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
86.	224	1968	Pueblo	South Korea, North Korea, US
87.	225	1968	TET Offensive	South Vietnam, US
88.	226	1968	Karameh	Israel, Jordan
89.	227	1968	Prague Spring Offensive	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, USSR
90.	228	1968	Essequibo I	Guyana
91.	229	1968	Beirut Airport	Lebanon
92.	230	1969	Vietnam Spring Offensive	South Vietnam, US
93.	231	1969	Ussuri River	China, USSR
94.	232	1969	War of Attrition	Egypt, Israel, USSR
95.	233	1969	EC-121 Spy Plane	US
96.	235	1969	Football War	El Salvador, Honduras
97.	236	1969	Cairo Agreement-PLO	Lebanon
98.	237	1970	Invasion of Cambodia	Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
99.	238	1970	Black September	Israel, Jordan, Syria, US
100.	239	1970	Cienfuegos Submarine Base	US
101.	240	1970	Conakry Raid	Guinea
102.	241	1971	Invasion of Laos II	Laos, North Vietnam
103.	242	1971	Bangladesh	Bangladesh, India, Pakistan
104.	246	1972	Vietnam Port Mining	North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
105.	249	1972	Christmas Bombing	North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US
106.	254	1973	Cod War I	Iceland, UK
107.	255	1973	October-Yom Kippur War	Egypt, Israel, Soviet Union, Syria, US
108.	256	1973	Oman- South Yemen	Oman
109.	257	1974	Cyprus III	Cyprus, Greece, Turkey
110.	258	1974	Final North Vietnam Offensive	Cambodia, US
111.	259	1975	Mayaguez	Cambodia, US
112.	260	1975	War in Angola	Angola, Cuba, South Africa, Soviet Union, US, Zaire, Zambia
113.	261	1975	Moroccan March	Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Spain
114.	263	1975	Cod War	Iceland, UK
115.	265	1976	Lebanon Civil War	Syria
116.	267	1976	Operation Thrasher	Mozambique, Zimbabwe

117.	272	1976	Aegean Sea I	Greece, Turkey
118.	273	1976	Nagomia Raid	Mozambique
119.	274	1976	Poplar Tree	North Korea, US
120.	275	1976	Syria Mobilization	Israel
121.	277	1977	Shaba I	Angola, Congo
122.	278	1977	Mapai Seizure	Mozambique
123.	279	1977	Belize II	Iceland, UK
124.	281	1977	Egypt-Libya Clashes	Egypt, Libya
125.	282	1977	Ogaden II	Ethiopia, Somalia
126.	283	1977	Rhodesia Raid	Zambia
127.	286	1977	Chimoio-Tembue Raids	Mozambique
128.	287	1977	Beagle Channel I	Argentina, Chile
129.	289	1978	Litani Operation	Lebanon
130.	291	1978	Cassinga Incident	Angola, South Africa
131.	292	1978	Shaba II	Angola, Belgium, France, US, Zaire
132.	293	1978	Air Rhodesia Incident	Zimbabwe, Zambia
133.	294	1978	Nicaragua Civil War II	Costa Rica, Nicaragua
134.	295	1978	Beagle Channel II	Argentina, Chile
135.	296	1978	Fall of Amin	Libya, Tanzania, Uganda
136.	298	1978	Sino-Vietnam War	China, North Vietnam
137.	301	1979	North-South Yemen II	North Yemen, South Yemen
138.	303	1979	Afghanistan Invasion	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, US
139.	306	1979	Soviet Threat Pakistan	Pakistan
140.	307	1979	Rhodesia Settlement	Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe
141.	309	1979	US Hostages in Iran	Iran, US
142.	310	1979	Colombia-Nicaragua	Colombia, Nicaragua
143.	311	1980	Raid on Gafsa	Libya, Tunisia
144.	315	1980	Solidarity	Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Poland, USSR
145.	317	1980	Onset Iran- Iraq War	Iran, Iraq
146.	319	1980	Jordan- Syria Confrontation	Jordan
147.	321	1981	Chad-Libya V	France, Libya
148.	322	1981	Ecuador-Peru Border III	Ecuador, Peru
149.	324	1981	Iraq Nuclear Reactor	Iraq, Israel
150.	327	1981	Al-Biby Missiles I	Israel, Syria
151.	329	1981	Coup Attempt in the Gambia	Senegal
152.	330	1981	Gulf of Syrte I	Libya
153.	331	1981	Operation Protea	Angola
154.	332	1981	Galtat Zemmouri I	Morocco
155.	335	1982	Khorramsahr	Iraq
156.	336	1982	Falkland/Malvinas	Argentina, UK
157.	337	1982	War in Lebanon	Israel, Lebanon, Syria
158.	338	1982	Ogaden III	Ethiopia, Somalia
159.	339	1982	Lesotho Raid	Lesotho
160.	340	1983	Libya Threat to Sudan	Egypt, Libya, Sudan
161.	342	1983	Chad- Libya VI	Chad, France, Libya
162.	343	1983	Invasion of Grenada	Grenada, US
163.	344	1983	Able Archer	Russia
164.	347	1983	Operation Askari	Angola
165.	348	1984	Basra- Kharg Island	Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
166.	350	1984	Omdurman Bombing	Egypt, Libya, Sudan
167.	351	1984	Vietnam Incursion into Thailand	Thailand
168.	352	1984	Sino-Vietnam Clashes	China, North Vietnam
169.	354	1984	Nicaragua MIG-21S	Nicaragua, US
170.	355	1985	Botswana Raid	Botswana
171.	356	1985	Expulsion of Tunisians	Tunisia
172.	357	1985	Al-Biqa Missiles II	Israel, Syria
173.	358	1985	Egypt Air Hijacking	Egypt, Libya
174.	360	1985	South Africa Raid on Lesotho	Lesotho
175.	361	1986	Capture of Al-Faw	Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
176.	362	1986	Chad- Libya VII	Chad, France, Libya
177.	363	1986	Gulf of Syrte II	Libya, USA
178.	365	1986	South Africa Cross Border Raid	Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe
179.	369	1986	Contras II	Honduras, Nicaragua
180.	370	1986	Chad-Libya VIII	Chad, Libya

181.	373	1987	Todghere incident	Somalia
182.	376	1987	Aegean Sea III	Greece, Turkey
183.	379	1987	Mecca Pilgrimage	Iran, Saudi Arabia
184.	380	1987	South Africa Intervention in Angola	Angola, South Africa
185.	383	1988	Contras III	Honduras, Nicaragua
186.	385	1988	Iraq Recapture of Al-Faw	Iran, Iraq
187.	386	1988	Libyan Jets	Libya, US
188.	388	1989	Cambodia Peace Conference	Cambodia, North Vietnam
189.	391	1989	Invasion of Panama	Panama, US
190.	392	1990	Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation	India, Pakistan
191.	393	1990	Gulf War	Bahrain,Egypt,France,Iraq,Israel,Kuwait,Oman,Qatar,Saudi Arabia,Syria,UAE,UK,US
192.	394	1990	Rwanda-Uganda	Rwanda
193.	395	1991	Liberia-Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone
194.	397	1991	Yugoslavia I: Croatia-Slovenia	Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia
195.	398	1991	Bubiyian	Kuwait
196.	399	1991	Foreign Intervention in Zaire	Belgium, Congo, France
197.	400	1991	Ecuador-Peru Border IV	Ecuador, Peru
198.	401	1991	Nagorny-Karabakh	Armenia, Azerbaijan
199.	403	1992	Yugoslavia II: Bosnia	Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia
200.	406	1992	Iraq No-Fly Zone	Iraq
201.	408	1993	North Korean Nuclear	North Korea, South Korea, US
202.	409	1993	Operation Accountability	Israel, Lebanon
203.	411	1994	Haiti Military Regime	Haiti, US
204.	412	1994	Iraq Droop Deployment- Kuwait	Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, US
205.	413	1995	Ecuador-Peru V	Ecuador, Peru
206.	415	1995	Taiwan Strait IV	China, Taiwan
207.	416	1995	Red Sea Islands	Eritrea, Yemen
208.	417	1996	Aegean Sea IV	Greece, Turkey
209.	418	1996	Operation Grapes of Wrath	Israel, Lebanon
210.	419	1996	Desert Strike	Iraq, US
211.	420	1996	North Korean Submarine	North Korea
212.	421	1996	Zaire Civil War	Rwanda, Zaire
213.	422	1997	UNSCOM I	Iraq, US
214.	423	1998	Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis	Cyprus, Turkey
215.	424	1998	Ethiopia-Eritrea	Eritrea, Ethiopia
216.	425	1998	Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Tests	India, Pakistan
217.	426	1998	DRC Civil War	Angola, Chad, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe
218.	427	1998	US Embassy Bombings	Afghanistan, Sudan, US
219.	428	1998	Syria-Turkey	Syria
220.	429	1998	UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox	Iraq, UK, US
221.	430	1999	Kosovo	Albania,Belgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Netherlands,Portugal,Spain,UK,US,Yugoslavia (Serbia)
222.	431	1999	Kashmir IV Kargil	India, Pakistan
223.	432	1999	East Timor II	Australia, Indonesia
224.	433	2001	Caspian Sea	Azerbaijan
225.	434	2001	Afghanistan- USA	Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK, US
226.	436	2001	Indian Parliament Attack	India, Pakistan
227.	437	2002	Kaluchak	India, Pakistan
228.	438	2002	Parsley Island	Spain, Morocco
229.	439	2002	Pankisi Gorge	Russia, Georgia
230.	440	2002	Iraq Regime Change	Iraq, UK, USA
231.	441	2002	North Korea Nuclear II	USA, North Korea
232.	442	2003	Iran Nuclear I	France, Germany, UK, Iran
233.	443	2003	Haifa Suicide Bombing	Israel, Syria
234.	444	2004	DRC - Rwanda	Congo, Rwanda
235.	445	2004	South Ossetia - Abkhazia	Georgia, Russia
236.	446	2005	Ethiopia - Eritrea II	Ethiopia, Eritrea
237.	448	2006	Iran Nuclear II	France, USA, UK, Iran
238.	449	2006	Chad-Sudan II	Chad, Sudan
239.	450	2006	North Korean Nuclear III	USA, North Korea
240.	451	2006	Israel Lebanon War II	Israel, Lebanon
241.	452	2006	Ethiopia Invasion Somalia	Ethiopia

A.2. International Crises with USN Involvement

The following appendix A.2 summarizes the crises in which the U.S. Navy was involved. It is not meant to be a comprehensive account of the international crises as such is already provided by the ICB. All cases are structured in the same order. For each crisis, a short summary of the ICB crisis description, including additional information about the USN involvement is provided. Information was collected from USN ship histories and available materials at the operational archives, such as command histories and reports by the CNO. Any additional sources are referenced. The reference Proceedings refers to the United States Naval Institutes Proceedings May issue (since 1970) published in the year following the crisis. Because of the enormous differences in the amount of information available for the cases, the crises descriptions vary greatly in length and detail. Each case includes the ICB crisis number and the codings from all applicable datasets: ICB, CNA I (Siegel), CNA II (Mahoney) and CNA III (Cobble, Gaffney, and Goreburg) for the variables name, start and end date and form of U.S. involvement. 96 cases are described, including Afghanistan, Iraq and the three cases where naval involvement could not be confirmed sufficiently to qualify for the statistical analyses.

1. # 111 Turkish Straits; 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81

The Turkish straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and demonstrated U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling against communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out between Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before the outbreak, an important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board which Japan had surrendered at the end of the war (Blechmand and Kaplan 1978, 1); sending it was a clear demonstration of American support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to Greece. Missouri demonstrated the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force and Army. The vessel could be sent to the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly be converted into a military use of force.

The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the Soviet Union sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the Soviets increased their naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United States expanded its own naval activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) entered the Mediterranean on 8 August. The presence of the world's largest aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to signal concern about increased Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington's intentions to resist Soviet expansion. The deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the mainland through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. The advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment yet stay out of the way if no direct action was necessary. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a direct involvement on the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and anxiety. At the same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval forces. Although the Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval buildup, the permanent U.S. presence—announced in September 1946—was important to conveying a message of immediate readiness should any country need support against communist influence. Another purpose of the deployment was to show support for the government in Greece in its battle against the Communists (see case #112).

(The CNA I study combines Turkey and Greece as one crisis: Siegel describes increased naval activity in the Mediterranean)

Additional Sources: Alvarez 1974; Baer 1994, 282 – 283, Cane 1975; Sheehy 1983

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Turkish Straits	8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81	3	
CNA I	Turkey/Greece	8/16/1946, 148	USN & USMC	1 CV & Amp

2. # 112 Greek Civil War; 11/13/1946 – 2/28/1947, 108

Greek guerillas and the Greek government were embroiled in an ongoing conflict. On 13 November 1946 the guerillas, supported by the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, launched a serious attack on Greece culminating in a crisis. The Greek army responded with military operations on 18 November. In addition, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council, and in January 1947 the UNSC authorized a fact-finding mission. The mission confirmed infiltrations across Greece's borders. On the day the U.S. government encouraged Greece to draft a request of aid from the United States, the crisis is said to have ended. The request led President Truman to seek Congressional approval for economic and military assistance (see Case #114). Although the immediate crisis ended, the conflict continued over the next two years.

During this crisis U.S. naval forces were still in the Mediterranean because of their deployment in the Turkish Strait crisis. The *USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (CV 42)* visit prior to the outbreak of this crisis was part of the demonstration of U.S. support for the Greek government. The Mediterranean deployment lasted until early 1947.

Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Sheehy 1983

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Greek Civil War	11/13/1946–2/28/1947, 108	2	
CNA I	Turkey/Greece	8/16/1946, 148	USN & USMC	1 CV & Amp

3. # 114 Truman Doctrine; 2/21/1947 – 5/22/1947, 91

On 21 February 1946 the government of the United Kingdom declared that it was no longer capable of supporting Greece and Turkey. This announcement triggered a crisis for Greece, Turkey and the United States. Turkey and Greece both turned to the U.S. for help. The United States was now faced with a difficult decision: a refusal to provide aid to the two countries would signal lack of interest in Eastern Europe and encourage Soviet hegemony. Truman decided to become engaged. The U.S. would grant Greece and Turkey economic and military aid in their struggle against the Communists, ending the crisis for all three actors. With the support of Congress the Truman doctrine had been born.

In the spring of 1947 a US naval squadron, consisting of the aircraft carrier *USS Leyte (CV 32)* and the cruisers *USS Providence (CL 82)* and *USS Dayton (CL 105)* and six destroyers visited Piraeus, Suda Bay (Crete), and Istanbul during a cruise to a number of Mediterranean ports. During this period of time the Congress was still debating the request for aid. The squadron entered Greek waters in April and visited Istanbul in early May. U.S. ships would stay in the region for months to come.

(CNA I: Two of CNA I's responses cover this crisis period: the Greek Civil War and Security of Turkey. Both were part of the Leyte tour in Spring 1947)

Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Keesing's, Sheehy 1983

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Truman Doctrine	2/21/1947-5/22/1947, 91	2	
CNA I	Greece Civil War	4/16/1947, 412	USN & USMC	1 CV & Amp
CNA I	Security of Turkey	5/2/1947, 386	USN	1 CV & Amp

4. # 120 Palestine Partition / Israel Independence; 11/29/1947 – 7/20/1949, 589

Ever since the partition of Palestine in November 1947 into two states, tensions had been high in the region. The UN General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, calling for the partition of Palestine into two independent states, one Arab, the other predominantly Jewish, triggered a crisis for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For those five Arab nations this loss of Arab territory posed a serious threat. When Israel proclaimed the State of Israel in May 1948 the precarious situation escalated and they reacted with an invasion on 15 May 1948. The United Nations were heavily involved, trying to broker an agreement between the warring parties. Already in early January 1948, the Sixth Fleet began patrol operations in the Eastern Mediterranean in response to the deteriorating situation in Palestine. On 18 June a Marine Force was detached from the *USS Kearsarge (CV 33)*. One day later on 19 June the United States sent the three destroyers, *USS Putnam (DD 757)*, *USS Henley (DD 762)* and *USS Owen (DD 776)* to patrol the Palestinian coast to secure the implementation of the truce conditions, previously agreed on. No ground troops were dispatched to enforce the ceasefire. The destroyers were deployed to back-up the UN mediator in attempting to maintain peace between Arab and Israeli forces. When the truce temporarily broke down, the *USS Putnam* evacuated the UN team from

the port in Haifa on 23 July. She was thus the first U.S. Navy ship to fly the UN flag. The crisis had different outcomes and ended at different times for each crisis actor, for some with defeat, and for some with agreements, although not long-lasting. The ICB end date marked the signing of the last peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

Additional Sources: Hahn 2005

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Palestine Partition/Israel Independence	11/29/1947–7/20/1949, 589	2	
CNA I	Arab-Israel War	1/5/1948, 466	USN & USMC	1 CV & Amp

5. # 123 Berlin Blockade; 6/24/1948 – 5/12/1949, 323

The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was one of the first major escalations between the United States and the Soviet Union. After World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, French, and Soviet zones. The announcement by the three Western governments that they planned to integrate their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called Operation VITTLES, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft.

The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North Atlantic in reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of the Air Force. But only in late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in order to meet the demand, did the U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western powers extended over several months until the Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under the condition that the United States, United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions against East Germany. The last day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left Germany split into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

Additional Sources: United States Navy 1998

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Berlin Blockade	6/24/1948–5/12/1949, 323	4	
CNA I	Security of Berlin	4/26/1948, 401	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	1 CV & Amp

6. # 125 China Civil War; 9/23/1948 – 12/8/1949, 442¹

On 23 September 1948 the Chinese Communists inflicted a major defeat on the Nationalists, an event which triggered a crisis within the United States who feared for their loss of influence over China. By fall 1948 the northeast of China had fallen into Communist hands and in the following month the Communist forces took control over the Chinese mainland. The Nationalists fled to Taiwan. When in late October 1948 the United States decided not to provide the Nationalists with military aid, the crisis ended for them. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese Communists announced the creation of the People's Republic of China (PCR), followed by the proclamation by the Nationalists of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan on 8 December 1949. This action implied an unofficial acceptance of the PCR and ended the crisis. The subsequent Taiwan crises are a direct consequence of these events (#146, #166, and #192).

U.S. Marines were the first U.S. forces to arrive in the theater. As early as 1945 several thousand Marines were dispatched to Vietnam. During the entire Civil War, Marines supported the Nationalists with different force levels (Buhite 1978) and since 1946, USN forces maneuvered in the waters around China. In early November 1948, the U.S. cruisers *Helena* (CA 75) and *St. Paul* (CA 73) reached the port of Shanghai. *USS Helena* arrived from Californian waters where she had held training sessions. Throughout the summer and fall of 1948, she operated in the Yellow, East China, and South China Seas, before returning to Long Beach in December 1948. On 25 April 1949 the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that the American cruiser *St. Paul* and *Manchester* would proceed to Chinese waters from Pearl Harbor. According to CNA I, the cruiser *USS Belfast* (PF 35) was ordered from Shanghai to Hong Kong and the cruiser *USS Jamaica*² to the Far East from Bermuda. Multiple carriers operated in and around Chinese waters at different times. It was not possible to obtain exact information about the number and names of the

¹ This crisis coding is a little problematic since it was not possible to definitely determine the U.S. military activity during the ICB crisis period. However the U.S. involvement during the entire Civil War suggests a positive coding.

² ship history says Jamaica was sold 1946

involved carriers. For example the aircraft carrier *USS Antietam (CV 36)* arrived in Chinese waters on 2 September 1945 and remained in the Far East for more than three years. The Yellow Sea constituted her primary theater of operations while her air group provided support for the Allied occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Surveillance operations were part of the mission's tasks. During the assignment the CV did leave the theater for short visits to Japan, the Philippines, Okinawa, and the Marianas. Early in 1949, *USS Antietam* concluded her mission in the Orient and headed back to the United States for deactivation.

Additional Sources: Buhite 1978; Keesing's

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	China Civil War	9/23/1948 – 12/8/1949, 442	2	
CNA I	China Civil War	April 46, 1038	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	? CV & Amp

7. # 131 Soviet Bloc – Yugoslavia; 8/19/1949 – 11/99/1951, 89

Tensions in the Balkans rose with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform³ in the summer of 1948. The crisis was triggered by a Soviet ultimatum. Yugoslavia feared USSR intervention and reacted with a military build-up. In March 1951, Tito filed a complaint with the UN that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were mobilizing troops along Yugoslavia's border. The UN in turn acknowledged Yugoslavia's pursuit of a peaceful resolution of the dispute. The United States supported Yugoslavia with economic aid and in mid-March, a reinforced Marine Corps battalion arrived in the area. Later in March the relief force for the Sixth Fleet arrived about 6 weeks ahead of schedule due to the tense situation in Yugoslavia. The aircraft carrier *USS Coral Sea (CV 43)* arrived in the Mediterranean on 20 March 1951. At the end of May, the Fleet was augmented with another aircraft carrier⁴. The crisis faded in November 1951.

³ The abbreviation stands for Information Bureau of the Communists and Worker Parties. It was the first official forum of the international communist movement. The intended purpose of Cominform was to coordinate actions between Communist parties under Soviet direction.

⁴ After the end of the crisis - according to the ICB - the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Tito was welcomed aboard the *Coral Sea* for a one-day cruise. This visit in September 1952 demonstrated the U.S. support of Yugoslavia.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Soviet Bloc–Yugoslavia	8/19/1949–11/99/1951, 89	2	
CNA I	Security of Yugoslavia	3/15/1951, 869	USN, USMC	2 CV & Amp

8. #132 Korean War I; 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950

On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, serving as the border between North and South Korea since the end of World War II, triggering a crisis for both South Korea and the United States. Two days later the President of the United States announced military support for the South and ordered the Seventh Fleet to install a blockade in the Taiwan Strait in reaction to the tense situation. This action triggered a crisis for the two Chinas. While the crisis between the PRC and the U.S. faded in July 1950, USN forces were sent to the Taiwan Straits on multiple occasions during the Korean War to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the Nationalists and prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan. According to Siegel aircraft from the *USS Valley Forge (CV 45)* flew over Taipei early in the war and in April 1951 a task force (TF 77) was sent to the Taiwan Straits. While this episode does not mark the first Taiwan Straits crisis it is a prelude to the events of later coming years. Only the naval reaction to the Formosa Straits is included in the analysis. All other reactions to the Korean War are excluded.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Korean War	6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950	4	
CNA I	Korean War, Formosa Straits	6/27/1950, 951	USN	1 CV & NO Amp

9. # 144 Guatemala; 12/12/1953 – 6/29/1954, 200

When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment “liberation” movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the day the Soviet arms shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to control shipments to Guatemala. Talks between the parties and the United States were not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a “contingency evacuation” force was deployed. This operation, code-named HARDROCK BAKER, was used to implement a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included

submarines and amphibious ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team. With this aggressive configuration of naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, underscoring the weakness of Guatemala's position and opening up the option for intervention. On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala's president and the accession of an anticommunist government, the crisis ended.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006: 50; Hippler 1984, Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Guatemala	12/12/1953–6/29/1954, 200	3	
CNA I	Honduras-Guatemala	5/20/54, 14	USN, USMC	1 CV & Amp

10. # 145 Dien Bien Phu; 3/13/1954 – 7/21/1954, 131

In spring 1954, tensions between the French military and the Viet Minh peaked when they launched their first major assault on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu (13 March 1954). On 19 March, USN forces in the region, including the carriers *USS Wasp (CV 18)* and *USS Essex (CV 9)* were put on alert. Responding to pleas from the French, who were fighting in the mountains of Tonkin, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed an aircraft carrier task force and supporting units to the South China Sea. On 22 March the carrier task group steamed towards the coast of Indochina. At various times the *USS Wasp*, the *USS Essex*, the *USS Boxer (CV 21)* (replaced *USS Wasp*), and the *USS Philippine Sea (CV 47)* steamed off the Indochinese Peninsula prepared to launch their aircraft against Communist forces besieging the French base. Awaiting a possible order from Washington to enter the conflict, the USN dispatched carrier reconnaissance planes to fly over the area around Dien Bien Phu. The aircraft gathered intelligence on Viet Minh troop movements and logistic buildup. The Seventh Fleet recommended Operation VULTURE to rescue the French forces, but President Eisenhower decided against unilateral action and the idea was rejected. When Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May and a formal cease-fire began, the crisis ended for the U.S. Two months later, the signing of a final declaration ended the crisis for all actors.

Additional Sources: Marolda 1994, Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
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ICB	Dien Bien Phu	3/13/1954–7/21/1954, 131	2	
CNA I	Dien Bien Phu	3/13/1954, 90	USN	2 CV & NO Amp

11. # 146 Taiwan Strait I; 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266

In the summer of 1954, tensions increased over the Tachen islands in the Formosa Straits. The crisis centered on the Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen island groups, held by Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. The Chinese Communists planned to overwhelm the Chinese Nationalists, beginning with a bombardment of Quemoy Island, followed by an invasion of Taiwan. On 12 September the U.S. decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the area with the orders to protect Taiwan against any attacks from the Chinese mainland. Since the United States did consider the Tachen Islands vital for the defense of Taiwan, American officials acceded to an evacuation after a sudden buildup of Communist Chinese on the island group. Over one week in early February, the USN evacuated 15,000 civilians and 11,000 military⁵ personnel from the Tachen Islands without opposition.

Multiple USN ships supported the evacuation operation. From November 1954 to June 1955 the *USS Essex (CV 9)* engaged in training exercises for part of the time with the 7th Fleet and assisted in the Tachen Islands evacuation. The *USS Wasp (CV 18)* provided air cover for the evacuation mission. While operating with the Seventh Fleet, the carrier *USS Kearsarge (CV 33)* was in an alert position to assist in the evacuation of Nationalist Chinese from the Tachen Islands. In January of 1955 the *USS Yorktown (CV 10)* was called upon to help the operation. In December 1954, the *USS Midway (CV 41)* departed Norfolk on a world cruise, which culminated in her transfer to the Pacific Fleet and joining of the Seventh Fleet off Taiwan in February 1955. Not long after her arrival the carrier participated in the evacuation operation. She remained in the area patrolling the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea until June. When Mao realized that the United States was placing great military emphasis on the area, he halted the shelling and suspended the campaign against Taiwan until all U.S. ships and aircraft had departed. In this instance the U.S. military deterrence was successful, the attack was delayed. Although the U.S. was determined to support Taiwan, Mao had drawn the conclusion that the United States would not interfere in an operation against the Tachen Islands because the Mutual Defense Treaty

⁵ Numbers vary from report to report

between the U.S. and the Republic of China only covered Taiwan and the Pescadores. This misinterpretation clearly demonstrates the importance of the opponent's perception in deterrence operations (Siegel 1995, 9). According to the ICB, the crisis for Taiwan ended with the fortification of Quemoy and Matsu, supported by the United States. President Eisenhower deemed the survival of the two islands very important and feared their loss to be a first step to the loss of Taiwan, and a demoralization for the Nationalists. The crisis between China and the United States wound down when during the Bandung Conference on 23 April the Chinese Communists announced their willingness to begin negotiations. By then end of the month an unofficial cease-fire for the Formosa Straits was in place.

Additional Source: Baer 1994, Keesing's, Marolda 2000, Rushkoff 1981, Siegel 1995

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Taiwan Strait I	8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266	3	
CNA I	Tachen Island	2/8/1955, 6	USN, USMC, USAF	6 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Tachen Island	2/1955		6 CV's & Amp

12. # 152 Suez Nationalization War; 7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230

The international Suez crisis was triggered by the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and France. Nasser, the president of Egypt, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as a symbol of rising Egyptian influence in the Middle East. Britain and France viewed the nationalization of the Suez as a challenge to their authority and as a threat to shipping through the canal. Their invasion, following a provocation by Israel was supposedly intended to separate these two warring parties. Eisenhower strongly rejected the unilateral actions of his European allies. In February 1956 CNA I describes the formation of USN destroyer patrols in the Red Sea in reaction to the growing tension in the region. The events around the Suez Nationalization War are divided into three different phases and cases: Pre-Suez, Suez War, and Post-Suez. In reaction to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the two aircraft carriers *USS Coral Sea (CV 43)* and *USS Randolph (CV 15)* and an amphibious force group were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean. When tensions seemed to cool off in mid-September the force was dispersed. The United States

was monitoring the situation via U-2 reconnaissance flights out of Turkey in what Kalley (2001) calls a preemptive move. Following the Israeli attack in October which triggered the war, major portions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including three aircraft carriers were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean again. In October 1956 the Sixth Fleet landed Marines at Alexandria and other points in the Middle East to protect the evacuation of 2,000 Americans and other foreign nationals. After receiving reports that the USSR was funneling ships through the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the CNO ordered a three-carrier task force to sail from the U.S. to the Western Pacific and a two-carrier task force to sail to the vicinity of the Azores. Surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean was intensified. On 13 December the alert status was lifted. The *USS Coral Sea* evacuated American citizens from the troubled area, and stood by off Egypt until November before returning to Norfolk in February 1957. In response to the October 1956 attack, the *USS Randolph* was operating near the Suez Canal. Aircraft aboard *Randolph* provided air cover and surface and air reconnaissance for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Alexandria. The carriers *USS Forrestal (CV 59)*, *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42)* (*Lake Champlain (CVA-39)* later replaced *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt*), and *USS Antietam (CV 36)* and additional ships were involved. The carriers conducted air operations while maintaining readiness to enter the Mediterranean should their services be needed. The United States' naval involvement signaled U.S. interest in the region and the resolve to defend victims of aggression. On 5 November, both Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire and declared their intention to withdrawal from the Canal Zone. 12 March 1957 marked the final end of the episode with the completion of the Israeli withdrawal.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Kalley 2001, 34 – 35

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Suez Nationalization War	7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230	2	
CNA I	Red Sea Patrols	2/6/1956, 138	USN	0 CV & no Amp
CNA I	Pre Suez	8/1956, 69	USN, USMC	2 CV & Amp
CNA I	Suez War	10/4/1956, 8	USN, USMC, USAF	3 CV & Amp
CNA I	Post-Suez	11/6/1956, 38	USN, USMC	3 CV & Amp
CNA II	Red Sea	2 – 8/ 1955		0 CV & Amp

13. # 157 Jordan Regime; 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957

On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to Nasser attempted to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan but failed. The King feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement in the coup attempt and reacted by laying off the entire leftist cabinet triggering demonstrations and riots. The United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and deploying units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers *USS Forrestal (CV 59)*, *USS Lake Champlain (CV 39)*, and heavy cruisers *USS Salem (CA 139)* and *USS Des Moines (CA 134)* to the Eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off Beirut on 20 April to stand ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while 30 ships of the Sixth Fleet described as the "most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in the Eastern Mediterranean", carried out air defense maneuvers in the open sea. Their task was to ensure that the Jordanians maintain their independence and withstand the threat of Communism. "Once again" explained VADM Brown, "we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the scene of the fire". It can be said that "the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the Middle East" (cited in Evans 2007). Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a state of alert. Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led to a normalization of the force status. The departure of the USN on 3 May signaled the end of the crisis.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Hahn 2005, Keesing's, USS Forestall Ship History (Evans 2007)

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Jordan Regime	4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957	3	
CNA I	Jordan Unrest	4/25/1957, 9	USN, USMC	2 CVS & Amp
CNA II	Jordan	4-5/1957		2 CVS & Amp

14. # 159 Syria-Turkey Confrontation; 8/18/1957 – 19/29/1957, 73

The election of a pro-Soviet Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces triggered a crisis for Turkey and the United States. Turkey held meetings with its nearby neighbors Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and deployed troops along its Syrian borders. The United States, worrying that the Soviet Union could significantly expand their influence, emphasized the

Eisenhower Doctrine again, confirming that the U.S. will render assistance to any country in the Middle East if subject to communist threat. The Soviets and Syria accused Turkey several times of planning an attack on Syria. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean, and aircraft were redeployed from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey - another sign of U.S. support. One aircraft carrier involved was the *USS Randolph (CV 15)*⁶ which was deployed off the Syrian coast and patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis came to an end when the Soviet Premier Khrushchev made an appearance at the Turkish Embassy in the Soviet Union. The ICB describes the U.S. involvement as mainly political-diplomatic, supported by speeches reaffirming commitments to Turkey. However the presence of four aircraft carriers suggests a larger U.S. involvement.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Syria – Turkey Confrontation	8/18/1957 – 10/29/1957, 73	3	
CNA I	Syria	8/21/1957, 118	USN, USMC, USAF	4 CV's & Amp
CNA	Syria	8-12/1957		4 CV's & Amp

15. # 164 Abortive Coup Indonesia; 2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958

Indonesia's denunciation of foreign influence and the popularity of the Indonesian Communist Party had been of concern to the West for some time. The rebel headquarters was located in the southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the Northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia. The crisis was triggered by the accusation that the Indonesian rebels were instruments of the West and the military reaction by President Sukarno to defeat the rebels. The U.S. and Britain covertly supported this rebellion in its early phase, ideally wanting to see Sukarno overthrown. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet off the shore of Indonesia had a marked impact, and the Indonesian government sought to minimize any further U.S. involvement. Moreover, the U.S. remained reluctant to become officially involved and publicly declared this matter a strictly internal Indonesian affair. Many sources point to U.S. support of the rebels before the crisis broke out, but when their defeat seemed imminent, the U.S.

⁶ I was not able to identify the names of the other aircraft carriers

government tried to improve relations with the Indonesian government. Over the next several weeks the two states slowly resumed talks and the crisis terminated. In early March the United States had deployed USMC forces, one aircraft carrier, two destroyers and one heavy cruiser in the proximity of Indonesia. A contingency evacuation force operated north of Sumatra for most of this period. According to Brichoux and Gerner (2002) then CNO Admiral Burke sent the Chief of Naval Intelligence Admiral Frost to Jakarta where he worked closely with the U.S. ambassador and the Indonesian naval chiefs. The official declaration on 20 May stating no U.S. involvement in this internal affair triggered the abatement of the crisis.

Additional Sources: Brichoux & Gerner 2002; 6; Curtis 2004; Fletcher Prouty 1976

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Abortive Indonesia Coup	2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958	3	
CNA I	Indonesia	12/10/57, 174	USN, USMC	2 CV & Amp
CNA II	Indonesia	12/1957-6/1958		2 CV & Amp

16. # 165: Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval; 5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958

In May 1958 Lebanon experienced a crisis when riots among political and religious factions threatened the government. The President of Lebanon requested U.S. help to control the situation. In July 1958 the Iraqi army staged a coup against the Hashemite government in Baghdad. While first hesitant, the revolt in Baghdad led President Eisenhower to approve Operation BLUE BAT. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army were all involved. Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in Beirut, to stabilize the country and to protect the American citizens in the country. The deployed U.S. naval forces totaled 70 vessels, including the three aircraft carriers *USS Saratoga (CV 60)*, *Wasp (CV 18)* and *Essex (CV 9)* (as well as heavy cruiser *USS Des Moines (CA 134)*, guided missile heavy cruise *Boston (CV 69)*, and 28 destroyers. The entire Sixth Fleet supported the operation especially through the landing of the Marines. Their tasks included patrol missions, reconnaissance missions and transportation of Marines who needed to be evacuated by carrier aviation. This incident clearly demonstrated the Sixth Fleet's dominance over the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces in the proximity were neither capable of challenging U.S. influence in this crisis nor their control over the Mediterranean. While the Navy played an important immediate role, U.S. Air Force units and

U.S. Army units were both unable to react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to advance from its base in Turkey.

Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 363; Berkeley University; Hahn 2005, 43; Keesing's

Dataset	Name	Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval	5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958	4	
CNA I	Lebanon	5/15/1958, 48	USN, USMC	3 CVS & Amp
CNA I	Lebanon	July 1958, 93	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	3 CVS & Amp
CNA I	Jordan-Iraq	7/17/1958, 138	USN	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA II	Lebanon	5/1958		3 CVS & Amp
CNA II	Lebanon	6-10/1958		3 CVS & Amp
CNA II	Jordan-Iraq	7-12/1958		0 CV & NO Amp

17. # 166: Taiwan Strait II; 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99

In the second Taiwan crisis the Chinese Communists attacked the islands Quemoy and Matsu by air. The United States deployed an impressive naval flotilla in response. The Chinese Communists tried to cut the islands off from outside supplies and support. A reinforced Seventh Fleet with a total of six aircraft carriers, a Marine Amphibious Ready Group and additional three USMC fighter squadrons that had moved from Japan to Taiwan, made up the naval force heading toward Chinese waters. China reacted by claiming extension of its territorial water line, effectively blocking off any access to Quemoy and Matsu. The New York Times called the USN and USAF deployment "the most powerful air-naval fighting force in history" (cited in the USS Essex ship history). Aircraft carriers involved included the *USS Essex (CV 9)*, the *USS Lexington (CV 16)*, the *USS Hancock (CV 19)*, the *USS Yorktown (CV 10)* and the *USS Bennington (CV 20)*. The *USS Yorktown* and the *USS Bennington* earned the expeditionary medal for participation in an American show of strength in the Taiwan Strait. The carriers escorted Chinese Nationalist ships resupplying the islands. The U.S. involvement also included diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. This clear demonstration of U.S. commitment together with no signs of involvement by the Soviet Union led to the abatement of the crisis and no further escalations.

Additional Sources: Halperin 1966; Marolda 2000

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Taiwan Strait II	7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99	3	
CNA I	Quemoy	Aug 58, 1967	USN, USMC, USAF	6 CVS & Amp
CNA II	Quemoy	6-12/1958		6 CVS & Amp

18. # 168: Berlin Deadline; 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293

On 27 November 1958 the Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded in an ultimatum the withdrawal of the United States, Great Britain and France from Berlin and a transformation into a free, demilitarized city within six month. The Western Powers rejected the ultimatum and declared their determination to stay in West Berlin. As a reaction to the ultimatum the U.S. began to reinforce its combat and support units in Europe and U.S. transport planes prepared for an airlift. U.S. aircraft carriers⁷ with nuclear weapons aboard were redeployed to the Mediterranean and Marines alerted for a possible deployment to Berlin. For the months May through September naval forces worldwide were on general alert. A carrier force deployed to the Mediterranean was put on high alert and demonstrated readiness. In 1959 the Soviet Union agreed to annul the ultimatum and to meet with the Western powers. Although the talks did not result in an agreement they did open the door for further dialogue. Only in early August did the powers sign an interim agreement after President Eisenhower paid Khrushchev a visit in Moscow on 3 August 1959. When the Soviet returned the visit, a formal agreement was signed on 15 September, terminating the crisis for all the participants. The parties had agreed on a ban of nuclear weapons and missiles from Berlin and the reduction of local Western military forces.

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Berlin Deadline	11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293	2	
CNA I	Berlin Crisis	May 1959, 145	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CVs & Amp
CNA II	Berlin Crisis	5 – 9/ 1959		

⁷ I could not determine which aircraft carriers were dispatched.

19. # 170: Central America – Cuba I; 4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251

Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Haiti experienced crises because of invasions by Cuban supported rebels. The crisis for the first actor, Panama, was triggered by the landing of a boat carrying foreign invaders. A complaint to the OAS led to the supply of arms and the authorization of naval and aerial patrols off the Panama coast. The Cuban-backed invaders surrendered. With the termination of the patrols the Panama crisis ended.

On 1 June a small number of Nicaraguan exiles based in Costa Rica marched into Nicaragua. Again the OAS conferred and decided on a fact-finding mission. Although Nicaragua did not feel threatened by Costa Rica, which declared its neutrality, it accused Castro of being involved in supporting the exiles. A brief military action by Nicaraguan forces ended the rebellion and the crisis ended.

After the Nicaraguan crisis, the Dominican Republic experienced a crisis, triggered by a small invasion backed by Cuba. The invasion was repelled and the crisis terminated towards the end of the year after months of high tensions.

Haiti was the last country to be invaded during these years of high internal instability. Again the invaders suspected of Cuban origin, surrendered.

The United States sent a small naval surveillance patrol force to Caribbean waters, off the coast of Panama, in the early phase of the crisis, to deter further landings.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Central America – Cuba I	4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251	3	
CNA I	Panama	4/30/59, 5	USN	0 CVs & NO Amp
CNA I	Panama	Aug 59, 93	USN	0 CVs & NO Amp
CNA II	Panama	3-5/1959		

20. # 176: Congo I – Katanga; 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962

Congo won its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. When on 5 July 1960 Congolese soldiers mutinied and assaulted Belgium and European nationals in Congo, Belgium sent military forces reinforcements. Congo reacted with appeals to the United States and the UN. U.S. help was not forthcoming, although the UN decided to dispatch military forces and called for the

withdrawal of Belgian troops. In mid-July 1960 the aircraft carrier *USS Wasp (CV 18)* with Marines aboard was deployed to the Congo in reaction to the civil strife and to support the evacuation of Western nationals. For the rest of the year USN ships (the carrier *Wasp* returned to the United States) supported U.N. forces in Congo and provided sealift assistance. In early February 1961 two amphibious ships and two destroyers supported the lift of U.N. forces into the Congo. But this did not end the internal division raging in the country and the crisis continued. Only with the ratification of a cease-fire agreement and the termination of the secession attempts of the Katanga province on 15 February 1962 did the crisis terminate.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Congo I - Katanga	7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962	2	
CNA I	Congo	7/1/60, 124	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	1 CV's & Amp
CNA I	Gulf of Guinea-Congo	2/2/61	USN, USMC	0 CV's & NO amp
CNA II	Congo	7-11/1960		1 CV & Amp
CNA II	Gulf of Guinea/Congo	2-3/1961		0 CV & Amp

21. # 178: Central America – Cuba II; 11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29

Trouble in Nicaragua and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. naval forces. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by exiles and a revolt in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United States deployed naval and air surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations' Caribbean coasts and to stand by in case of a possible invasion from mid-November until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, *USS Shangri-La (CV 38)* and *Wasp (CV 18)*, as well as eight other surface ships, formed the naval patrol force. They kept outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels heading for the two countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from Nicaragua and Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both actors.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Central America – Cuba II	11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29	3	
CNA I	Guatemala	11/14/1960, 272	USN	2 CVs & NO Amp
CNA II	Guatemala-Nicaragua	11-12/1960		2 CVs & NO Amp

22. # 180: Pathet Laos Offensive; 3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69

Fighting between Pathet Laos and Laotian government troops lead to a retreat of the latter, threatening the accession of communist and neutralist troops. This triggered a crisis for the U.S. on 9 March 1961. In reaction to the deteriorating situation in Laos, ships from the Seventh Fleet, including the aircraft carriers *USS Lexington (CV 16)*, *USS Coral Sea (CV 34)*, *USS Bennington (CV 20)* and amphibious forces were ordered to deploy to the South China in January 1961. The naval forces were assigned to act as a deterrent force to prevent further attacks by Communist guerillas and to demonstrate U.S. support for the Laotian government. USN aircraft also conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. In spring 1961 the situation deteriorated further and almost the entire Seventh Fleet was moved into the area. The three carriers, *Coral Sea (CV 43)*, *Midway (CV 41)* and *Kearsarge (CV 33)*, one helicopter carrier, three groups of amphibious ships, two submarines, and three Marine battalion landing teams formed the U.S. force. In addition forces were put on alert in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Despite Kennedy's decision not to launch a military offensive, the Chinese Communists ended the intervention and declared their willingness to negotiate. A cease fire was agreed upon on 8 May 1961

(CNA I listed the deployment in January as well, but since the ICB crisis only starts in March, only the second CNA I crisis coding is listed although the previous one is described above as prelude to the spring crisis).

Additional Source: George 1991, Marolda 1994

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Pathet Laos Offensive	3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69	3	
CNA I	Laos	3/21/61, 34	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	3 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Laos	3-6/1961		3 CV's & Amp

23. # 181: Bay of Pigs, 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24

Naval, Marines and Air Force personnel supported the invasion of Cuba by exiles. On 15 April 1961 the invaders, flying U.S. aircraft, bombed locations in Cuba. On the same day, Cuba accused the United States of complicity during a UN General Assembly meeting. Two days later Cuba announced a state of national alert, ordering Cubans to fight the exiles. On the 18, the day of the invasion, escort ships and naval frogmen provided by the USN attempted to land on the beaches to facilitate the invasion. According to Astor however, reefs hindered the landing of the ships. A carrier task force and at least one Marine battalion team stood by during the invasion attempt. The forces aimed to hide any sign of U.S. involvement and the destroyers were ordered not to move closer than 20 miles to Cuban territory and not to open fire unless fired upon first. Local militias detected the invaders immediately. USN units remained in the vicinity as the U.S. attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban government and tried to negotiate terms for their release. Air cover was received from the *USS Essex (CV 9)* to intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war and not to seek air combat nor attack ground targets. A note from the USSR to the U.S. on 18 April warned of a possible chain reaction to all parts of the globe arising from the invasion and reasserted Soviet support for Cuba in repelling the attack. The U.S. responded through President Kennedy's answer to the Soviets: Kennedy emphasized that the U.S. "intends no military intervention" in Cuba, but would act to protect the hemisphere in case of military intervention by an outside force. Late on 19 April, the destroyers *USS Eaton* (code-named *Santiago*) and *USS Murray* (code-named *Tampico*) moved into Cochin Bay to evacuate the remaining retreating invaders. From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties and reconnaissance flights were flown to obtain visual intelligence over combat areas. It is reported that the *USS Shangri-La (CV 38)* was part of the task force stationed off the Cayman Islands.

The crisis ended for Cuba already on 19 April when it defeated the invaders who were unable to escape to the mountains. It ended for the U.S. on the 24 when - reversing earlier disclaimers of U.S. involvement - the White House issued a statement by Kennedy assuming direct responsibility for the events leading to the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 67 – 68; National Security Archives 2001

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Bay of Pigs	4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24	3	
CNA I	Bay of Pigs	Apr 1961, 62	USN, USMC, USAF	2 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Bay of Pigs	4-6/1961		2 CV's & Amp

24. # 185: Berlin Wall; 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89

Before the outbreak of the crisis the Soviet Union had threatened to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany if by the end of 1961 no German peace treaty was agreed upon. Following a period of increased flows of refugees from East Germany into West Germany, the Soviet Union encouraged East Germany to build a wall along the border of the two sectors of Berlin. This triggered a crisis for France, the U.K., the U.S. and Western Europe. In response, the U.S. sent reinforcements to the Berlin brigade. A rapid build-up of forward deployed forces started. Prior to this, in response to the mounting Soviet pressure, USN forces were augmented with more than 30 ships and naval reserve personnel. The Sixth Fleet⁸ was put on alert and its strength was increased by one aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier group was moved to the Northeast Atlantic. According to Blechman and Kaplan (1978), U.S. force demonstration deterred the Soviet Union from carrying out various threats previously announced, such as the signing of a unilateral peace treaty. For France, the U.K. and West Germany the crisis ended with the withdrawal of the Soviet deadline. The crisis for the two superpowers ended only later with a tacit agreement on 28 October.

Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Friedman 1983, 24

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Berlin Wall	8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89	4	
CNA I	Berlin Crisis	July 1961, 102	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	3 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Berlin Crisis	8/1961 - 5/1962		3 CV's

⁸ I was not able to confirm the names of the involved aircraft carriers, The USS Independence, Shangri-La and Saratoga were all deployed to the Mediterranean at around this time.

25. # 193: Nam Tha; 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38

In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on the Laotian town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. The Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a Pathet Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already in Thailand for exercises to bolster that nation's defenses against Laotian communists should a request be received from Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home were put on alert. The aircraft carrier *Valley Forge* (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the *Hancock* (CV 19) group took position off Da Nang, South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted the Pathet Lao initiative and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into negotiations. The crisis ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, as well as between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed naval forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda (1994) considers a show of force

Additional Sources: George 1991; Marolda 1994

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Nam Tha	5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38	3	
CNA I	Thailand	5/10/1962, 90.	USN, USMC	2 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Thailand	5-8/ 1962		2 CV's & Amp

26. # 194: China-India Border; 9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138

The Sino-Indian border dispute had been ongoing but escalated in 1962. This crisis was triggered by a Chinese troop movement that threatened India's territorial integrity. India reacted by planning the eviction of the Chinese troops. By 4 October India was ready to carry out the operation, triggering a crisis for China. On 20 October China launched massive attacks in the disputed border area. Later that day Indian Prime Minister Nehru made an urgent and open appeal to the United States for armed intervention against the Chinese. He asked for bomber and fighter squadrons to begin air strikes if PRC troops further advance into Indian territory. India rejected the Chinese suggestion for mutual withdrawal and decided to react with military force.

The U.S. offered military aid to India. A U.S. aircraft carrier⁹ was dispatched from its base in the Pacific to the Bay of Bengal, but returned before reaching Indian waters when the crisis suddenly ended (21 November) with China's declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and its planned withdrawal. In January 1963 following mediation efforts and the completed Chinese withdrawal, the crisis ended for India.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	China-India Border	9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138	3	
CNA I	Sino-Indian War	11/19/62, 2	USN	1 CV's & NO Amp
CNA II	Sino-Indian War	10-12/1962		1 CV

27. # 195: Yemen War I, 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202

On 26 September a revolution brought to an end the Yemen monarchy triggering a crisis for Jordan and Saudi Arabia which feared a spillover of anti-monarchy movements. In turn both countries supplied the Yemeni Royalists with arms, which triggered a crisis for Egypt and the YAR (Yemen Arab Republic). Egypt sent in troops and at the end of October a civil war erupted between Royalist and Republican forces. The United States recognized the Republican government on 19 December 1962, three month after the coup. The various participants interpreted U.S. recognition as they saw fit, some accusing the United States of seeking to protect its interests in Saudi Arabia, others viewing it as a response to potential communist influence. The United States did send a warship to Jeddah but was firm in not granting military aid to Yemen. Its intent was to reassure Saudi Arabia and demonstrate U.S. interest in the stability of Saudi Arabia so as to deter Egyptian and Soviet involvement. "To that end, a US Air Force squadron was dispatched to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was augmented, and a small over-the-horizon naval presence was maintained" (Prados 2005). The United States with help from the United Nations achieved the signing of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt on 10 April 1963. A few days later Jordan officially recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and ended its involvement. The two Yemen agreed on a ceasefire ending this crisis in the first phase of the Yemen War.

⁹ I was not able to identify the name of the aircraft carrier.

Additional Sources: Youssef 2004; Prados 2005

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Yemen War I	9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202	3	
CNA I	No data			
CNA II	Yemen Civil War / Saudi Arabia	1-7/1963		0 CV & NO Amp

28. # 196: Cuban Missiles; 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36

During the Cuban Missile crisis the two superpowers came as close as they ever would to a nuclear war. In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes operated by the CIA revealed the construction of bases in Cuba, capable of launching Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. Simultaneously with the gathering of additional information, naval forces in collaboration with other U.S. forces were ordered to the Atlantic and Caribbean to prepare for eventual contingencies. U.S. armed forces all around the world were put on an alerted status. The aircraft carrier groups *Enterprise (CV 65)* and *Independence (CV 62)* were dispatched together with six Polaris submarines based in Holy Loch, Scotland. Naval aerial reconnaissance units assisted in the effort to collect information about the situation in Cuba. Footage from naval aircraft confirmed the construction of a nuclear-armed redoubt. On 22 October, President Kennedy shared U.S. intelligence with the world and announced the deployment of quarantine force, including Task Force 135 and Task Force 136, to interdict Cuba-bound shipping. These naval forces consisted of antisubmarine carriers, cruisers, and close to 30 destroyers and guided missile frigates. In addition Navy shore-based patrol planes observed Soviet submarine movement and merchant ships heading toward Cuba. To demonstrate the resolute resolve to blockade all ships steaming towards Cuba the two destroyers USS *John R. Pierce (DD-753)* and USS *Joseph P. Kennedy (DD-850)* stopped and searched the *Marucla* on 26 October. The Lebanese-flagged vessel with Soviet goods aboard was heading for Cuba. Without military equipment aboard the ship was allowed to continue. Many other Soviet ships turned around before reaching the blockade line. The United States armed forces were visibly superior but were not aggressively arrayed. This allowed the Soviet Premier Khrushchev to agree to withdraw Soviet offensive weapons from Cuba without losing his face. In return the U.S. would not invade Cuba and would remove its missiles from Turkey, a step already agreed on before the crisis. By the end of November, U.S. naval forces confirmed the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba and their

return to the Soviet Union. “The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the critical importance of naval forces to the national defense. The Navy's operations were in keeping with its strategic doctrine, which is as valid today as it was in late 1962. The Navy, in cooperation with the other U.S. armed forces and with America's allies, employed military power in such a way that the president did not have to resort to war to protect vital Western interests. Khrushchev realized that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's powerful Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines and the Air Force's land-based nuclear delivery systems once these American arms became fully operational” (Utz 1993). In the end the Soviet Union was compelled to withdraw the missiles. The Cuban Missile crisis is often cited as a good example for a successful resolution through coercive diplomacy where instead of relying on military force President Kennedy chose coercive diplomacy to convince Khrushchev to remove the missiles. He also employed a carrots and sticks approach, setting an ultimatum while offering incentives in the form of the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet compliance. The extraordinary war risk further persuaded both governments to resolve the crisis peacefully.

Approximately 180 USN ships and a 60-ship amphibious force were involved in this crisis. A total of eight U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed as part of the force: the *Enterprise (CV 65)*, *Independence (CV-62)*, *Essex (CV 9)*, *Lake Champlain (CV 39)*, *Lexington (CV 16)*, *Randolph (CV 15)*, *Saratoga (CV 60)* and *Wasp (CV 18)*¹⁰

Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Utz 1993; George 1991; Marolda 2000

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cuban Missiles	10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36	4	
CNA I	Cuban Missiles Crisis	10/14/62, 38	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	8 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Cuban Missile Crisis	10-11/1962		8 CV's & Amp

29. # 197: Malaysia Federation; 2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910

President Sukarno made a statement expressing Indonesia's opposition to the formation of Malaysia on 11 February 1962. This speech triggered a crisis for Malaysia. The UK was

¹⁰ For a detailed listing of all USN ships involved see <http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-3.htm#anchor156376>

involved immediately and arranged talks between Brunei, Malaysia, Sabah (British Borneo), Sarawak, and Singapore to agree on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. The resulting agreement triggered a crisis for Indonesia. The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16 September 1962. The United States demonstrated an interest in the crisis and from 29 November through 17 December 1962 the seaplane carrier *USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13)* stopped for a port visit in Singapore. Further talks and even the involvement of the UN did not change Indonesia's position. When Indonesia called back its ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, the U.S. reacted by halting economic aid to Indonesia. Attorney General Robert Kennedy tried to mediate but the agreed cease-fire was never implemented. The crisis gradually faded. "Singapore seceded from Malaysia on 9 August 1965, an event that Indonesia viewed as the beginning of the breakup of the Federation, a "face-saver." Malaya, too, perceived a victory because Indonesia's confrontation policy ended without destroying the Federation" (ICB, Malaysia Federation Crisis Summary).

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Malaysia Federation	2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910	2	
CNA I	Indonesia-Malaysia	October 1963, 78	USN	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA II	Indonesia – Malaysia	9-12/1963		1 CV & NO Amp

30. # 198: Dominican Republic – Haiti II; 4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963

A crisis for the Dominican Republic was triggered on 26 April 1963 when Haitian policemen "forcibly entered the Dominican Republic embassy and arrested opponents of Haiti's regime" (ICB, Dominican Republic – Haiti II Crisis Summary). On 27 April, U.S. fearing for the lives of American citizens in Haiti sent a naval task force, including the carrier *USS Boxer (CV 21)* and 2,000 Marines. On 8 May Navy ships evacuated 2,279 civilians. The United Kingdom and France deployed ships as well. When the OAS fact-finding mission came to the conclusion that no further actions against Haiti should be undertaken and relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic had normalized, the naval forces were withdrawn on 3 June. Cable describes the naval forces' involvement as a positive gunboat diplomacy action.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981; Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Dominican Republic – Haiti II	4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963	3	
CNA I	Haitian Unrest	4/29/1963 34	USN, USMC	1 CV & Amp
CNA II	Haiti	4-6/1963		1 CV & Amp

31. # 200 Cuba – Venezuela; 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31

A crisis for Venezuela was triggered on 1 November 1963 with the discovery of an arms cache on a deserted beach and the uncovering of plans to hinder the elections in December and overrun Caracas. Later that month it was confirmed that the arms were provided by Cuba. When on 1 December the Venezuelan elections were held without hindrance the crisis ended.

According to Captain Roth, U.S. naval aircraft were searching for a ship suspected of carrying insurgents in November 1963. After the ship was located the Venezuelan Navy was notified.

Additional Sources: Roth 2001 and email exchange 2009.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cuba – Venezuela	11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31	2	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA II	Venezuela-Colombia	11/1963		0 CV & NO Amp

32. # 202: Cyprus I; 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256

A proposal by the President of the Cypriot Republic for a new constitution, which would change Cyprus into a unitary state with guarantees for the Turkish minority, triggered a crisis for Turkey. Turkey's opposition to the changes and the threat of intervention then broadened the crisis to include Cyprus and Greece. A series of cease-fire talks were held, which helped to defuse the situation but tensions remained (December 1963). A UN Peacekeeping Force was formed on 27 March further easing the tension. Yet in 1964 the crisis escalated between May and August, with the U.K., the U.S., the NATO and the United Nations trying to broker an agreement. The United States showed presence by sending elements of Sixth Fleet to the vicinity

of Cyprus to conduct patrols. An aircraft carrier¹¹ was stationed off Cyprus for most of March, early June, and from 8 August – 2 September 1964. A direct threat by the United States to halt all military aid to Turkey and to stand aside if the Soviets became involved, led Turkey to abandon its intervention plans. In August the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution, which Cyprus and Turkey accepted the next day, ending the crisis on 10 August 1964. “The UN was the most active mediator during the crisis, but it is likely that the U.S. -- through Johnson’s pleas to all actors and warning to Turkey that it would no longer automatically be under U.S. protection if it should invade Cyprus -- was the most effective mediator” (ICB).

The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (1997, 51) states that: “Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest broker”.

Additional Sources: National Defense University 1997, 51

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cyprus I	11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256	2	
CNA I	Cyprus	1/22/1964, 269	USN, USMC, USAF	1 CV & Amp
CNA II	Cyprus	1-10/1964		1 CV & Amp

33. # 206: Panama Flag; 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4

This short crisis between Panama and the United States was triggered by U.S. students raising the American flag at a high school in the Canal Zone. In reaction, Panamanian students marched into the Canal Zone with their flag. Serious riots followed and the U.S. responded with force. Panama accused the U.S. of aggression and suspended diplomatic relations on 9 January until 3 April. Following the riots an Amphibious Ready Squadron was stationed off Panama’s East coast. A week after diplomatic relations were restored the U.S. naval amphibious force stationed in the region was withdrawn.

Additional Sources: Global Security: Panama Canal Riots, Roth email exchange 2009

¹¹ I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Panama Flag	1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4	2	
CNA I	Panama	January 64, 101	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	0 CV & Amp
CNA II	Panama	1-4/1964		0 CV & Amp

34. # 210: Gulf of Tonkin; 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9

The crisis began with an attack on North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin by South Vietnam. In retaliation the U.S. destroyer *Maddox (DD-731)*, operating in international waters, was hit by North Vietnamese Navy on 2 August. Immediately after attack the *USS Ticonderoga (CV 14)* rushed to assist *Maddox*. Two days later *Turner Joy (DD 951)* requested support alleging a new torpedo attack. President Johnson decided to react to the unprovoked attacks (the real circumstance around the Gulf of Tonkin affair are highly debated and many disagree that the attacks on the U.S. destroyers were unprovoked. According to the North Vietnamese their sovereignty extends five miles, according to the U.S. only three). On 5 August the United States retaliated with strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland. The aircraft carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Constellation (CV 64)* were part of the force. In reaction to the events, U.S. Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing all necessary means to protect U.S. armed forces on 7 August, ending this crisis but ushering the Vietnam War escalation.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 112

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Gulf of Tonkin	7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9	4	
CNA I	Gulf of Tonkin	8/2/64, 9	USN	2 CV's & NO Amp
CNA II	Gulf of Tonkin	8/1964		2 CV's & NO Amp

35. # 212: Yemen War III; 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266

During the lengthy Yemen War, a Royalist assault on Republican territory, with Saudi support, triggered this crisis for Yemen and Egypt. United States surface combatants from the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) carried out surveillance and presence missions during the critical

period of July and August 1965. After negotiations, an agreement between the two parties led to the abatement of the crisis but the war continued.

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Yemen War III	12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266	2	
CNA I	Yemen	July 1965, 32	USN	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA II	Yemen	7/1965 - 11/1967		0 CV & NO Amp

36. # 215: Dominican Intervention; 4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130

The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military forces deployment, in this instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence over, the Western Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first combat-ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years.

A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which had deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United States was mostly concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American regime would limit the influence of the United States and hinder its predominance while potentially providing the Soviet Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington's own backyard. But the foremost official justification was the threat to the lives of American citizens.

Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of citizens of the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500 Marines—off the Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with unarmed helicopters airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens.

Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and a strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved to the Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone and a safe corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had evacuated a total of

three thousand civilians. The mission's objective was extended to include the prevention of communist influence in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two thousand men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an "Act of Dominican Reconciliation" on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to withdraw until 28 June 1966; Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.

The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the Department of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, including Boxer, the tank landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD 30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in the region by establishing a presence and showing determination not to allow a communist takeover.

Additional Sources: All Hands 1965, 2 -5, Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Cable 1981; Department of Defense 1965; Loewenthal 1972.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Dominican Intervention	4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130	4	
CNA I	Dominican Republic	4/25/1965, 515	USN; USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CV'S & Amp
CNA II	Dominican Republic	4/1965 - 9/1966		2 CV'S & Amp

37. # 216: Kashmir II; 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159

The infiltration of Pakistani fighters into Kashmir caused a crisis for India. In reaction, Indian military forces crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line, prompting the Pakistani armed forces to respond. On 5 September India invaded West Pakistan. The crisis led the United Nations to appeal for a cease-fire. Since the lives of American citizens were endangered, the U.S. decided to deploy a contingency evacuation force, to halt military aid to both parties (8 September 1965) and not to extend further economic assistance. On 11 September two ships from MIDEASTFOR left Bahrain for Karachi. Four days later U.S. citizens were evacuated from West Pakistan with the support of USAF planes. China sided with Pakistan and accused India of provocation.

Chinese involvement and the fear of their intervention led the Western Powers to push for an immediate solution to the crisis. The UN resolution of 17 September did not yet end the crisis since both parties still deployed their armed forces in Kashmir; only further talks concluding with the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966 brought the crisis to an end.

Additional Sources: Solantamity

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Kashmir II	8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159	2	
CNA I	Indo-Pakistani War	9/11/1965, 25	USN, USAF	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA II	Indio-Pak War	10-11/1965		0 CV & NO Amp

38. # 219: Yemen War IV; 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348

A further crisis in Yemen began with air attacks on Royalist territory and Saudi villages. The expectation of Royalist retaliation then triggered a crisis for Egypt and Yemen. The latter engaged in renewed attacks. After months of fighting reconciliation was reached in April 1966. The situation changed with the beginning of the Six Day War. At the end of August the Prime Minister of Sudan successfully proposed a new peace plan. With the final Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen the crisis ended on 26 September 1967. Since 1965 U.S. naval forces had been on station in the area to observe the developments.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Yemen War IV	10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348	2	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA II	Yemen	7/1965 - 11/1967	USN	0 CV & NO Amp

39. # 222: Six Day War; 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26

An Egyptian overflight of Israel's nuclear research center and increased Egyptian presence in the Sinai precipitated a crisis between the two countries. Israel felt compelled to protect its rights of freedom of navigation when Egyptian President Nasser closed off the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. Preemptive strikes by Israel against Egypt forced Egypt and Jordan to react with military force. On 5 June the crisis escalated with an Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force and the occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai. On 9 June the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights

drew Syria and the Soviet Union into the crisis. Egypt and Syria fought with Soviet weapons, employed by Soviet advisors, but were defeated by a numerically inferior Israeli Army. Syria's acceptance of the cease-fire ended the crisis on 10 June 1967 and Israel emerged with new borders and additional territory. The United States was heavily involved. After initial hesitancy the United States deployed their Sixth Fleet with about 50 warships, including the two aircraft carriers *USS America (CV 66)* and *USS Saratoga (CV 60)* and a Marines battalion landing team on 6 June. One of the first actions was to reduce the 100-mile territorial water claim of Syria to a 50-mile, and to send a carrier towards Syria to reinforce diplomatic efforts to reach a cease-fire agreement. The U.S. naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean showed its opposition to any Soviet intervention, and played a major role in determining the Six Day War. During the crisis the Arab combatants accused the United States of providing air cover to Israeli ground forces from its aircraft carriers, an allegation that was contradicted by the aircraft carrier's flight plans. The Sixth Fleet also warned to Israel to stand down and avoid escalation.

Additional Sources: Hahn 2005, 52 – 53; Kalley 2001

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Six Day War	5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26	2	
CNA I	Six Day War	6/6/1967, 6	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Middle East War	5-6/1967, 2		2 CV's & Amp

40. # 223: Cyprus II; 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20

The second Cyprus crisis was triggered by assaults on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, which led to the Turkish decision to dispatch military force in reaction. Turkey also requested the removal of the chief of the Greek forces in Cyprus. In combination these events triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Greece. The United Nations became involved and Cyrus Vance, the former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense acted as mediator in a shuttle diplomacy effort. On 1 December an agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece and three days later with Cyprus which ended the crisis. Cyrus Vance's intensive shuttle diplomacy helped to resolve this crisis.

Although the United States deployed a contingency force from its Sixth Fleet¹² to stand by for a possible evacuation of U.S. citizens, the evacuations took place with commercial aircraft.

Additional Sources: Slengesol 2000, 99

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cyprus II	11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20	2	
CNA I	Cyprus	11/15/1967, 24	USN, USMC	1 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Cyprus	11-12/1967		1 CV's & Amp

41. # 224: *Pueblo*; 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338

North Korean forces seized the *USS Pueblo* on 22 January 1968. The *USS Pueblo* had been operating in international waters off the coast of Korea, gathering intelligence information. This incident happened one day after North Korea had tried to assassinate the South Korean President. Since the War of 1812 no U.S. warship had surrendered to foreign forces. The surviving crew members were held hostage for eleven months, accused of spying in Korean territorial waters. The U.S. reacted by deploying Air Force and Navy forces. Naval vessels, including the aircraft carrier *USS Enterprise (CV 65)*, escorting destroyers and support ships, were dispatched to the Sea of Japan off the North Korean coast. On 6 February the *Enterprise* began to withdraw as a sign of goodwill from the United States. To secure their release the United States had to apologize and admit (falsely) that the *USS Pueblo* had entered Korean territorial waters at the time of the attack. The imposed agreement was reached on 23 December 1968 and subsequently the crew was released while the ship was never recovered. Different carriers were part of the U.S. response at different times and included the *USS Ranger (CV 61)*, *Yorktown (CV 10)*, *Coral Sea (CV 43)*, and *Kearsarge (CV 33)*. Because the safety of the held crew members was paramount the U.S. decided against a blockade, the seizure of North Korean shipping, or the dispatch of bombers against North Korean territory.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	<i>Pueblo</i>	1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338	3	
CNA I	<i>Pueblo</i>	1/24/1968, 59	USN, USAF	3 CV's & NO Amp

¹² I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier

CNA II	Pueblo	1-3/1968		3 CV's & NO Amp
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42. # 233: EC-121 Spy Plane; 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12

North Korean aircraft shot down a USN reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, accusing it of having entered Korean airspace. A Sea Air Rescue (SAR) mission began immediately after the shoot down. The United States rejected the claim and dispatched a formidable naval force to the Sea of Japan, including four aircraft carriers. The crisis ended on 26 April when the U.S. naval task force was reduced to a one carrier battle group and the other naval forces were moved from the Sea of Japan into the Yellow Sea.

The naval force included the carriers *USS Enterprise (CV 65)*, *Hornet (CV 12)*, *Ranger (CV 61)* and *Ticonderoga (CV 14)* and the battleship *New Jersey (BB 62)*.

Additional Sources: Cable 1981

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	EC-121 Spy Plane	4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12	4	
CNA I	EC-121 Shootdown	4/15/1969, 26	USN, USAF, USARMY	4 CV's & NO Amp
CNA II	EC-121	4/1969		4 CV's & NO Amp

43. # 236: Cairo Agreement – PLO; 10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13

The PLO announcement of heavy fighting between the PLO and Lebanese government forces on 22 October 1969 drew Lebanon into the crisis. Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported the resulting negotiations. On 3 October the crisis ended with the “Cairo” agreement, which allowed the PLO to “operate as a "state within a state" in Lebanon”. During 26 – 30 October the United States deployed a contingency force, consisting of two aircraft carrier forces, *USS Saratoga (CV 60)* & *USS Independence (CV 62)*, and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) to the region.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cairo Agreement – PLO	10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13	2	
CNA I	Lebanon-Libya	10/26/69, 5	USN, USMC	2 CV's & Amp

	Ops			
CNA II	NO DATA			

44. # 238: *Black September; 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15*

On 11 June the aircraft carrier *USS Forrestal (CV 59)* was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean to stand by should air cover for evacuation from Jordan become necessary. When tensions deescalated the carrier was ordered back to Italy (21 June), but once again (3 September) the Sixth Fleet was brought into play due to increasing tensions. Three days later the two aircraft carriers *Saratoga (CV 60)* and *Independence (CV 62)* as well as the MARG were positioned in the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis actually peaked on 15 September with the shuffling of the Jordan cabinet, which demonstrated its resolve to fight the PLO influence. The king was no longer willing to tolerate PLO raids from Jordanian territory. This caused a crisis for Syria and the United States. Whereas the U.S. feared the loss of its ally the king of Jordan, Syria remained committed to support the PLO and to maintain its influence in the region and invaded Jordan on 19 September. In reaction to the Syrian invasion, the U.S. deployed an additional aircraft carrier, the *USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67)* (departing from the East Coast of the U.S.) and elements of the 8th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Jordan resisted the invasion militarily while Israel declared its determination to prevent a PLO victory in Jordan. When Syrian forces withdrew from Jordan, PLO forces moved to Southern Lebanon. After mediation efforts, Jordan and Syria agreed on a cease-fire on 27 September which was put into effect two days later. Only one aircraft carrier then remained in the Eastern Mediterranean. The *USS John F. Kennedy* returned to Souda Bay on 8 October. In addition to naval forces, the U.S. had alerted troops in Germany while Soviet naval forces were closely monitoring U.S. naval activities during the crisis. Former Sixth Fleet commander Admiral Isaac Kidd observed that the eastern Mediterranean looked like “an international boat show” (cited in Baer 1994, 401).

Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 401, Cable 1981

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Black September	9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15	3	
CNA I	Jordan	9/2/1970, 60	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	3 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Jordan	9-10/1970		3 CV's & Amp
CNA	Jordan Civil War	9/2/1970 - 11/1/1970, 61	Turkey, Show of	

III			Force, USMC, USARMY	USN, USAF,	
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45. # 239: Cienfuegos Submarine Base; 9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38

U.S. intelligence flights disclosed the construction of a Soviet submarine base on the Southern coast of Cuba, triggering a crisis for the U.S. The Soviet Union rejected the accusation, claiming that no agreements had been violated and no prohibited weapons had been stored at Cienfuegos. Intelligence showed the halt of the construction and Soviet naval forces left the base. This ended the crisis for the United States, yet disagreements persisted until spring 1971. According to CNA II, U.S. naval forces operated in the area in reaction to the crisis.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cienfuegos Submarine Base	9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38	2	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA II	Cienfuegos	9/1970 - 6/1971	USN	0 CV & NO Amp

46. # 242: Bangladesh; 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268

This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West Pakistan army on Dacca University in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now declared its independence, bringing on armed conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of minor clashes, a formal war between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December 1971 with Pakistan's surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, the Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting of a battle group led by USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. An evacuation operation proved unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in a show of force, monitoring both Indian and

Pakistani operations and maritime and air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft and vessels, with the goal of intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.

The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal, to demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel (1995, 7 - 8), U.S. naval forces played an important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval forces south of the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus evidently helped to sway Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of continuing the war with an offensive in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened U.S. diplomatic efforts.” According to Mrityunjy Mazumdar (2006), this entry of Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal left a deep impression on Indian policy makers as well as the Indian navy for much of the next two decades

Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Siegel 1995

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Bangladesh	3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268	3	
CNA I	Indo-Pakistani War	12/10/1971, 30	USN	1 CV & Amp
CNA II	Indio-Pak War	12/1971 - 1/1972		1 CV & Amp
CNA III	Indo-Pac-War	12/10/1971 - 1/8/1972, 30	Bangladesh, NEO (plans only), USN, USMC	

47. # 255: October-Yom Kippur War; 10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239

Egyptian forces moved towards the Suez Canal on 5 October 1973, triggering a crisis with Israel. One day later, Egyptian and Syrian forces carried out a surprise attack against Israel, marking the onset of war. In the following months , talks and negotiations were held, mediation efforts attempted, agreements proposed, and cease-fire agreements broken until a final agreement was reached on 29 May 1974. The signing 2 days later ended the crisis. The United States and the Soviet Union played important roles in reaching the agreement and both deployed naval forces to the Eastern Mediterranean. In reaction to the outbreak of the war, U.S. forces around the world were put on alert and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced. The Sixth Fleet’s mission was the protection of U.S. transport planes delivering weapons and ammunition to Israel. The two aircraft carriers *USS Independence (CV 62)* and *USS Roosevelt (CV 42)* and an amphibious force were on a high level of alert in reaction to the crisis. During October the two carriers and

amphibious forces stood ready for a possible evacuation contingency operation. The aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy (CV 67)*, together with amphibious forces, joined the U.S Sixth Fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean on 25 October. With the reduction of tensions on 17 November, the Sixth Fleet's alert status was scaled down to a normal DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition). In April 1974 the *USS Forrestal (CV 59)* operated in the Central Mediterranean and was available to support U.S. efforts. Besides the involved carriers, CNA II lists two Marine Battalion Landing Teams and the vessels *Guadalcanal (LPH 7)* and *Iwo Jima (LPH 2)*.

U.S. naval forces played an important role in the 1973 Middle East crisis. The United States Navy with the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy, with the Fifth Eskadra both had a peacetime naval presence in the Mediterranean. In an immediate reaction to the outbreak of the war on 6 October 1973, the aircraft carrier *USS Independence* was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to demonstrate U.S. concern. The aircraft carriers *USS Franklin D. Roosevelt* and *USS John F. Kennedy* remained in European ports, until 10 October when they deployed alongside the U.S. air supply route to Israel, out of concern that Libya or Algeria might try to interdict the supply route. The Soviet Fifth Eskadra responded in turn to the Sixth Fleet's show of force and to demonstrate support for its ally Egypt. In a tit for tat the United States put its forces on yet a higher state of alert. The *USS Independence* returned to Greece only when the cease-fire agreement seemed certain to hold and after the end of the U.S. – Soviet naval confrontation (Allen 1980, 27 – 29).

Additional Sources: Allen 1980; Cable 1981; Keesing's; Marolda 2000

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	October Yom Kippur War	10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239	3	
CNA I	Middle East War	10/6/1973, 48	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	3 CV's & Amp
CNA I	Middle East Force	10/24/1973, 22	USN	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA II	Middle East War	10 – 11/1973		3 CV's & Amp
CNA III	Middle East War	10/6/1973 – 11/22/1973, 48	Syria, Cont. Pos. USN, USMC, USAF	

48. # 256: Oman – South Yemen; 11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846

The crisis was triggered when Oman announced an aerial assault carried out by South Yemen on a military post and South Yemeni involvement in fighting between rebels and government forces in Oman. Oman successfully defeated the rebels, chasing them over the border into South Yemen by the end of 1975. On 11 March 1976 Oman and South Yemen signed a cease-fire agreement, reached with the help of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, finally ending the crisis. U.S. naval forces were operating off Yemen in a show of force during the early crisis period.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Oman – South Yemen	11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846	3	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA II	NO DATA			
CNA III	Middle East Force	10/24/1973 - 11/13/1974, 386.	Yemen, Show of Force, USN	

49. # 257: Cyprus III; 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225

On 15 July 1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. Cyprus requested help from Britain and the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July and occupied parts of the island. In an immediate reaction to the coup, the United States delayed the return of USS America (CV 66), then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS Independence (CV 62). At the same time American and British diplomats began mediation attempts, which led to an unstable cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central Mediterranean. Other assignments for Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were canceled so that they would be ready if needed.

On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado (LPD 11)—evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut from the British base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover. In early August the ships' departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy that resulted in the murder of the American ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all contingency operations ended by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, Archbishop Michael Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were

deployed again for possible evacuation duties. USS *Saratoga* (CV 60) and amphibious forces were released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended for Cyprus and Greece as well.” (ICB).

Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings, Slengesol 2000

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Cyprus III	7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225	2	
CNA I	Cyprus	7/15/74, 39	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CV's & Amp
CNA I	Cyprus Unrest	1/18/75, 4	USN, USMC	1 CV & Amp
CNA II	Cyprus	7-8/1974		2 CV's & Amp
CNA II	Cyprus	1/1975		1 CV & Amp
CNA III	Cyprus Coup	7/22/1974 - 7/25/1974, 4	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY, Cyprus, NEO	
CNA III	Cyprus Unrest	1/18/1975 - 1/21/1975, 3	USN, USMC, Cyprus, NEO (plans only)	

50. # 258: Final North Vietnam Offensive; 12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138

On 14 December North Vietnam launched an offensive and on 1 January 1975 the Khmer Rouge followed their example in Cambodia. Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces both fought back and the latter requested U.S. aid. The rebels took control over the Cambodian capital on 17 April, ending for Cambodia the last Vietnam War crisis. Meanwhile North Vietnam advanced its offensive. With the fall of Saigon and the capitulation of South Vietnam (30 April 1975), the crisis ended. At the outset the U.S. provided aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia which Congress continuously reduced. Toward the end of the crisis, U.S. activity was limited to evacuating U.S. citizens. The carriers *USS Enterprise* (CV 65), *USS Coral Sea* (CV 43), *USS Hancock* (CV 19), *USS Midway* (CV 41), and the assault ship *Okinawa* (LPH 3) received orders to proceed to the Vietnamese water and stand ready for possible contingency operations in March. The *USS Hancock* served as a helicopter platform for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals from Cambodia to Okinawa as part of Operation EAGLE PULL. On 29 April 1975 the *Enterprise* together with *Coral Sea* executed Operation FREQUENT WIND, an

evacuation contingency operation to rescue foreign nationals from Vietnam, by covering evacuation helicopters. The *USS Midway* and *Okinawa* also assisted in the evacuation operations.

Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Final North Vietnam Offensive	12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138	2	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA III	Eagle Pull Cambodia	2/1/1975 - 4/12/1975, 71	Cambodia, NEO USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	
CNA III	Frequent Wind	4/4/1975 - 4/30/ 1975, 27	Vietnam, NEO USN, USMC, USAF	

51. # 259: *Mayaguez*; 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3

On 12 May 1975 Khmer Rouge forces seized the merchant vessel *USS Mayaguez* off the Cambodian coast, claiming the vessel had entered Cambodian territorial waters. The situation recalled the *Pueblo* affair and President Ford ordered an immediate military rescue mission. The U.S. had seaborne forces on location and in Thailand, who responded on the very same day. U.S. Marines recovered the empty *USS Mayaguez* while other Marines, flown by Air Force helicopters, attempted to rescue the captured seamen, protected by naval air and surface forces. USN, USMC and USAF forces were directly involved in the rescue attempt. Upon landing at Tang Island the Marines did not find the *Mayaguez* crew who had been moved to a fishing boat. On 14 May Cambodia announced the release of the captives and crew and vessel were retrieved by U.S. forces. The naval response involved two aircraft carriers the *USS Coral Sea (CV 43)* and the *USS Hancock (CV 19)*. The latter was only alerted. According to CNA II the USMC dispatched Elements of Third Marine Division while the USNI Proceedings mentions companies from the 4th and 9th Marines on USAF aircraft. With the termination of U.S. military activity the crisis ended for Cambodia on 15 May.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 175 – 180; Gaffney 2002, 5, Grossnick 1997, Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Mayaguez	5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3	4	
CNA I	Mayaguez	5/13/1975, 3	USN, USMC, USAF	2 CV'S & Amp
CNA II	Mayaguez	5/1975		1 CV & Amp
CNA III	Mayaguez Rescue	5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 4	Cambodia, Combat, USN, USMC, USAF	

52. # 261 Moroccan March; 10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181

The King of Morocco declared his intention to “march” into Western Sahara on the same day the World Court had decided that neither Mauritania nor Morocco had any sovereignty rights over the Western Sahara. By this action Morocco triggered a crisis for Spain which brought the matter before the Security Council. Spain and Algeria were resolved to oppose the Moroccan March militarily. The King of Morocco reversed the incursion (6 November) after 5 days when Spain agreed to exclude Algeria from the negotiation. Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain signed an agreement on 14 November, dividing the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco whereas Spain was granted a “share in the valuable Bu Craa phosphate mines” (ICB). Although the crisis ended for Spain, Algeria came into conflict with the Polisario Rebels. In December the rebels fought with Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. A further agreement between Morocco and Mauritania ended the crisis (14 March 1976), during which the United States provided military aid to Morocco, whereas the Soviet Union supported the Polisario Rebels. The USN vessels made three highly publicized visits to Morocco ports in January 1976 to demonstrate U.S. support in response to the USSR involvement.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Moroccan March	10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181	3	
CNA I	Polisario Rebels	1/5/1976, 18	USN	0 CV's & NO Amp
CNA III	Polisario Rebels	1/5/1976 - 1/22/1976, 18	Morocco, Show of Force, USN	

53. # 265: Lebanon Civil War; 1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298

Lebanese Christian forces attacked three towns, mostly inhabited by Moslems. Syria sent troops to support the Moslems and tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis, then to impose a resolution. By late September, Lebanese opposition against Syrian influence had ended but

unrest persisted until the Arab League authorized the stationing of Syrian soldiers in Beirut. “Shortly thereafter, Syria reverted to its traditional pro-Palestinian stance after tension and clashes between Syrian and Christian forces, supporting the PLO against the Israeli-backed Christian militias” (ICB). The United States expressed its concern over Syrian behavior. Already in August 1975 USN forces had been in the vicinity in case an evacuation operation became necessary. By the end of March 1976, vessels from the Sixth Fleet, within 20 hours distance to Lebanon were re-alerted for a possible evacuation. On 3 May 1976, the *USS America (CV 66)* was deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Operation FLUID DRIVE, a contingency operation for a possible evacuation mission of U.S. citizens and other foreign nationals. A state of readiness persisted for next three months. For its part, the Soviet Mediterranean fleet monitored events closely, as it had during the Yom-Kippur crisis. The evacuation began on 20 June 1976 after the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon. USMC with the help of USN forces evacuated 263 Americans and other foreign nationals from Beirut to the *USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32)* which brought them to Greece. After the successful operation the carrier departed for Italy on 2 August. On 28 July 308 more U.S. and foreign nationals were evacuated from Beirut via the *USS Coronado (LPD-11)* to Greece. The crisis involved one aircraft carrier the *USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67)*, later replaced with the *USS Independence (CV 62)*.

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Lebanon Civil War	1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298	2	
CNA I	Lebanon	August 1975, 367	USN, USMC	1 CV'S & Amp
CNA III	Lebanon Civil War	8/1/1975 - 7/28/1976, 363	Lebanon, NEO (plans only) USN, USMC	
CNA III	Lebanon	6/20/1976- 6/21/1976, 2	Lebanon, NEO USN, USMC, USAF	
CNA III	Lebanon	7/27/1976 - 7/27/1976, 1	Lebanon, NEO USN, USMC, USAF	

54. # 274: Poplar Tree; 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31

Two U.S. Army soldiers were killed in Korea while trying to cut down a poplar tree in the demilitarized zone of Korea, triggering a crisis for the United States. The U.S. responded by deploying a squadron of 20 F-111s and a navy task force to South Korea. In addition all U.S. forces were put on DEFCON 3. The naval task force included the aircraft carrier *Midway (CV 41)* (this deployment force was comparable to that of the 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis-war and only slightly lower than that of the Cuban Missile crisis). The U.S. was determined to show its resolve and to underscore its influence worldwide. This U.S. reaction triggered a crisis for North Korea, which put its armed forces on alert. Operation PAUL BUNYAN consisted of cutting down the tree in a sign of U.S. determination, an action that was protected from the air. No violence was used. The ICB call this “the most dramatic show of U.S. force in Korea since the Korean War” (ICB). The cutting of the tree, and North Korea’s statement recognizing the 17 August killings as a regretful incident, deescalated the tensions. The *USS Midway* carrier battle group remained in the area of the Korea Strait until 8 September. The United States and North Korea signed a new joint security area (JSA) agreement in early September which ended the crisis (16 September).

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Poplar Tree	8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31	3	
CNA I	Korean Tree Incident	8/19/76, 21	USN, USAF, USARMY	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Paul Bunyan	8/18/1976 - 8/21/1976, 4	South Korea, Show of Force USN, USAF, USARMY	

55. # 282 Ogaden II; 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236

The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In October, Somalia came close to victory, having secured most of the Ogaden territory, but the USSR reacted by providing weapons, military advisers, and Cuban troops from Angola, to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, defeating the Somali Army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat from the Ogaden territory

was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, ending the crisis. The USN became involved only in February 1978. Following the collapse of the Somali Army in Ogaden, the *USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)* battle group was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore in February, in case the CVBG should be needed for U.S. citizen evacuation and to conduct surveillance operations to monitor the situation. The ship was released on 23 March 1978.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Ogaden II	7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236	3	
CNA I	Ogaden War	February 1978, 51	USN, USAF	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Ogaden War	2/1/1978 - 3/23/1978, 51	Somalia, Cont. Posit. USN	

56. # 294: Nicaragua Civil War; 9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311

Guerillas invaded Nicaragua from Costa Rica on 10 September 1978. Nicaragua, fearing the threatened overthrow of its government launched a counterattack. Because Costa Rica did not have an official army, it signed a mutual aid agreement with Venezuela and received weapons from Panama. Nicaragua overwhelmed the guerillas on 25 September and on the same day agreed to the U.S. mediation offer. By mid-January it had become evident that the mediation efforts were not progressing and in early February the U.S. ended military support for Nicaragua. The OAS and the UN Assembly both condemned Nicaragua for repressing its citizens and endangering its neighbors. The crisis continued with occasional clashes until 27 May 1979 when a further guerilla infiltration from Costa Rica was defeated by Nicaragua. The Somoza government had become isolated and on 4 June the OAS agreed on a resolution requesting a democratic regime for Nicaragua. In mid-July the OAS approved the installation of a left-wing revolutionary junta and when President Somoza fled on 17 July the crisis ended.

USN surface ships from the Atlantic Fleet were engaged in surveillance operations off the West coast of Nicaragua. The Washington Star had reported in July that the amphibious ship *USS Saipan (LHA 2)* was in position off the coast off Nicaragua in case U.S. citizens needed evacuation following the fall of the Somoza government

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Nicaragua Civil War	9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311	3	
CNA I	Nicaragua	9/16/1978, 16	USN, USAF	O CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Nicaragua Civil Strife	9/16/1978 - 9/30/1978, 15	Nicaragua, Cont. Posit. USN	
CNA III	Nicaragua Civil War	06/12/1979 – 08/31/1979, 81	Nicaragua, NEO USN, USMC, USAF,	

57. # 298: Sino-Vietnam War; 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81

China was drawn into a crisis when Vietnam crossed the Cambodian border on 25 December 1978 and reacted with a counter-invasion of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. After more clashes, justified as punishment for Vietnamese aggression, China withdrew on 15 March. This ended the crisis. The U.S. sent six USN ships into the South China Sea, including the *USS Constellation (CV 64)* battle group, to observe the development of the crisis in a contingent positioning operation.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Sino-Vietnam War	12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81	2	
CNA I	China-Vietnam	2/25/1979, 6	USN	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	China Invasion of Vietnam	2/25/1979 - 3/3/1979, 7	China, Cont. Posit USN	

58. # 301: North-South Yemen II; 2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35

The lingering border conflict between the two Yemens worsened. This crisis was triggered when North Yemen accused South Yemen of attacking Northern territory and forwarded a complaint to the U.S. Ambassador, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN on 24 February 1979. North Yemen retaliated with a counterattack. Saudi Arabia tried to maintain their good relations with the North and to improve them with South Yemen, but alerted its troops as a precautionary measure. The U.S. supplied the YAR with Saudi-financed weapons; while the Soviet Union provided arms to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR). The LAS supported the mediation effort and brought about a cease-fire agreement, consequently broken by both parties. After a second cease-fire agreement the Yemeni troops began to withdraw on 18 March. On 30

March the two countries agreed to unite as one country. With this action the crisis ended. As a result of the Yemen crisis, the U.S. planned to send military equipment to Saudi Arabia to reimburse what the latter had given to North Yemen. In early March 1979 the United States sent the *USS Constellation (CV 64)* and two escorts from Subic Bay to the Arabian Sea for observation. CNA I assumes the naval force was also deployed to reassure Saudi Arabia and underscore its intent to remain in the region, despite the revolution in Iran. The crisis abated after some weeks.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	North-South Yemen	2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35	3	
CNA I	Yemen	3/6/79, 93	USN, USAF	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	NO DATA			

59. # 303: *Afghanistan Invasion; 3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351*

The Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States were involved in this crisis. After the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan, a revolutionary council of three leaders - politically left oriented with ties to the Soviet Union - took power. The leader of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the new President. In March 1979 Afghan Muslims rebelled against the regime in the so called Herat Uprising. The Soviet Union, determined to defend the communist forces in Afghanistan, faced a crisis. The Afghan regime replaced the leader of the PDPA with Amin, in a move that affronted the Soviet Union and deepened the crisis for Afghanistan which feared Soviet interference. In December 1979 Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan. The new PDPA leader was killed in late December and the crisis as it affected Afghanistan and the Soviet Union abated. Yet events extended the crisis to the United States and Pakistan, the former stopped exports to the Soviet Union, boycotted the Olympic Games in Moscow and supplied the anti-soviet rebels with weapons. These actions blunted the crisis for the United States. For Pakistan the crisis ended with U.S. reassurance of support and military aid. The events in the Middle East brought strategic changes for the U.S. Navy. Towards the end of 1979, in light of the Iran hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet troops, US naval concentrations were deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea including the *USS Midway (CV 41)* (late October) and one month later the *USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)* (late

November), bringing the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean to two aircraft carrier battle groups. Because of the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, the United States decided to maintain this level of presence.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 187 – 189

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Afghanistan Invasion	3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351	3	
CNA I	Afghan/Iran Hostages	10/9/79, 472	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CV's & Amp
CNA	Afghan/Iran Hostages	10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472	Iran, Afghanistan, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

60. # 309: U.S. Hostages in Iran; 11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443

On 4 November 1979 radical Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking everybody hostage. The leader of the Revolution, which had overthrown the pro-Western Shah regime, Ayatollah Khomeini gave his tacit approval. The students demanded unsuccessfully the surrender of the Shah, who at that time was in the United States for medical treatment. Three hostages were released from captivity on 19 November, and ten more on 20 November. After months of negotiation and fruitless mediation, the United States committed to a secret rescue mission Operation EAGLE CLAW/EVENING LIGHT in an attempt to free the hostages (24 April 1980). The eight helicopters in the rescue mission departed from the deck of the *USS Nimitz (CV 68)*. Unfortunately the operation was not successful and had to be aborted. All hostages remained in captivity. Only after the inauguration of the new President Ronald Reagan did Iran agree to release the remaining fifty-three hostages on 20 January 1981, after being held captive for 444 days.

As mentioned previously (Afghanistan Invasion crisis) the USN augmented its presence in the region by permanently deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea. The *USS Midway (CV 41)* was moved to the region in late October, followed by the *USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)*, who extended its cruise in late November 1979. This was the first time since World War II that the U.S. Navy had two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean in response to crises. On 21 December 1979, the Defense Department announced a three-ship

nuclear-powered carrier battle group from the Sixth Fleet would deploy to the Indian Ocean to relieve the Seventh Fleet carrier battle group led by *Kitty Hawk*. The *USS Nimitz* arrived in the Arabian Sea on 22 January 1980. At the end of 1979 the *USS Forrestal (CV 59)* had relieved *Nimitz* in Italy so the nuclear-powered carrier could move to the Middle East in response to the hostage crisis. *Forrestal* remained the only aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The Midway was relieved by the *Coral Sea (CV 43)* on 5 February 1980 which remained in the Indian Ocean until 30 April when she was succeeded by the *USS Constellation (CV 64)*. In the beginning of May the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69)*, coming from Norfolk, VA, relieved the *USS Nimitz*.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	US Hostages in Iran	11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443	4	
CNA I	Afghan/Iran Hostages	10/9/1979, 472	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	2 CV's & Amp
CNA	Afghan/Iran Hostages	10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472	Iran, Afghanistan, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	
CNA	Desert One	4/24/1980 - 4/26/1980	Iran, Combat USN, USMC, USAF	

61. # 315: Solidarity; 8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486

A crisis developed between Poland and the Soviet Union when a large number of Polish ship builders went on strike on 14 August 1980 in Gdansk. The workers demanded labor reforms and greater civil rights. The strike led to the creation of Solidarity, the free national trade union. While the Polish government denounced the strike and the demands posed by the workers an agreement was reached at the end of August. Subsequently East Germany and Czechoslovakia were thrown into crisis by the apparent political concessions made to the striking workers by the so-called “Gdansk Accords”. The Communist countries demanded a harder line by Polish government in handling the matter. In December 1981 Poland arrested almost the entire leadership of Solidarity, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and enacted martial law, thereby terminating the crisis for the four communist crisis actors. The United States provided AWACS aircraft to the NATO to monitor the border situation and expressed its overall concern. “In

December 1980, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron crews on temporary duty at Keflavik Naval Air Station, Iceland, redeployed to Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, in response to heightening tensions in Poland. Linking up with NATO groundbased radar sites, the operation, called Exercise Creek Sentry, monitored East European air activity during the crisis” (globalsecurity).

Additional Sources: Global Security: Creek Sentry

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB		8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486	2	
CNA I	Poland	12/9/1980, 24	USN, USAF	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Creek Sentry	10/1/80 - 5/1/81, 144	Poland, Reconnaissance USN, USAF	

62. # 317 Onset Iran-Iraq War; 9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75

When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, U.S. support was mostly directed towards Saudi Arabia and its safety, provided in the form of air defense. Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz against the possibility of Iranian mining was another concern. Saddam Hussein’s announcement of Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab triggered the first intrawar crisis for Iran on 17 September 1980. A few days later Iraq occupied a large part of the border area, virtually closing off Iranian access to its main oil refinery in Abadan. Additionally Iraqi forces launched air attacks on Iranian air and army bases, which precipitated counter strikes. Simultaneously Iraqi forces invaded Iranian territory in the region of its main oil facilities. The next weeks were marked by constant attacks and counterattacks. The crisis for Iran ended when Iran’s president declared the successful expulsion of Iraqi troops. Iraq unofficially accepted the stalemate on 30 November. Officially the U.S. adopted a position of ostensible neutrality but in the light of the threat to the oil facilities and to oil supplies to the Western world, the U.S., U.K., France and Australia deployed warships to the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 October MIDEASTFOR was reinforced and by mid-October about 60 warships of the four countries were in the region to avert a disruption of the oil supplies. In late September, 4 USAF AWACS aircraft had been deployed to Saudi

Arabia. By February 1981 the United States had decided to augment its naval forces in the Indian Ocean and to maintain a two aircraft carrier battle group¹³ strength.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Onset Iran – Iraq War	9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75	3	
CNA I	Iran – Iraq War	9/30/1980, 125	USN, USAF	2 CV's & Amp
CNA III	Iran – Iraq War	9/30/1980, 125	Iraq, Show of Force USN	

63. # 327: Al-Biqa Missiles I; 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88

The crisis began when Israeli forces shot down two helicopters on their route to supply Syrian troops on 28 April 1981. The Syrian retaliation on Christian militias in Lebanon prompted Israel to destroy the Syrian missile bases. “Both Israel and Syria accused each other of violating the 1976 Red Line agreement: by the use of Syrian air power against any party to the civil war and the introduction of missiles into Lebanon; and by Israel's intervention in the civil war with air power far north of the Israel/Lebanon border” (ICB, Al-Biqa Missiles I, Crisis Summary). The United States was actively involved and sent Philip Habib as main mediator to settle the dispute on 5 May. Two days earlier the U.S. deployed the *USS Forrestal (CV 59)* battle group and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The *USS Independence (CV 62)* carrier group, transiting from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal, was kept in the Eastern Mediterranean (until 26 May) to support U.S. crisis resolution efforts. To demonstrate its disapproval of the continuing bombing, the U.S. halted the delivery of F-16 planes to Israel. They were released after the cease-fire. The mediation and U.S. pressure greatly contributed to the establishment of the cease-fire. With the cease-fire in effect the crisis over the Al-Biqa valley ended for Israel and Syria (24 July). The *USS Forrestal* was released after 53 day whereas the amphibious forces were on alert until 14 September when it became apparent that evacuation operations would not be necessary.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Al-Biqa Missiles I	4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88	2	

¹³ I was not able to determine the names of the involved aircraft carriers

CNA I	Syria	5/3/1981, 135	USN, USMC	2 CV's & Amp
CNA III	Syria	5/3/1981 – 9/14/1981, 135	Syria, Contingent Positioning USN, USMC	

64. # 330: *Gulf of Syrte I; 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21*

The Sixth Fleet announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean, and posed a crisis for Libya which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya claimed U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territory by the Gulf of Syrte, where the two aircraft carriers *USS Forestall (CV 59)* and *USS Nimitz (CV 68)*, four cruiser, four destroyers, four frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open ocean missile exercises. The U.S. had deployed the naval forces to challenge Libya's claim to the Gulf of Syrte and the maneuvers were held to demonstrate that "America has the muscle to back up its words". U.S. aircraft from both carriers had to intercept Libyan aircraft multiple times. On 19 August, USN pilots shot down two Libyan fighters who had threatened the *USS Nimitz*. Libya's ruler Qaddafi threatened to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean were the USN again to enter Libyan territorial waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Gulf of Syrte I	8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21	4	
CNA I	Libya	8/1/1981, 20	USN	2 CV's & NO Amp
CNA III	Libya	8/1/1981 - 8/20/1981, 20	Libya, Cont. Posit USN	

65. # 337: *War in Lebanon; 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347*

Israel attacked the PLO in South Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. This rapid progression of the invasion deepened the crisis for Syria. Although Israel and Syrian had agreed on a cease-fire with the help of U.S. mediation, fighting erupted again on 11 June. The MARG was ordered to deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean in June and the aircraft *USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67)* was sent to the region to stand by for possible evacuation operations of U.S. and other foreign nationals from Beirut. The ship remained on station until relieved on 17 June by the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69)*. The U.S. Embassy advised all U.S. citizens to leave

Lebanon and closed the embassy on 24 June. U.S. citizens were evacuated and transported to ships of the Sixth Fleet which brought them to Cyprus. In July the U.S. halted military aid deliveries to Israel to demonstrate their disapproval of Israel's activities. In August the situation worsened and the MARG had to stand ready in case of the deployment as part of the peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut. With the help of U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syrian and Israel was resolved by September. On 22 September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon together with 2 aircraft carriers to support U.S. Marines ashore. The *USS America (CV 66)* arrived off the coast of Lebanon on 2 January and was relieved by the *USS Nimitz (CV 68)* on 20 January 1983. In February the alert level was lowered again. The United States was actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to Lebanon if necessary. Direct talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under U.S. auspices led to a peace agreement in May 1983.

The presence of U.S. (and other nations') naval forces helped to limit the conflict in Beirut by preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also supported the diplomatic efforts by the United States besides providing helicopter transportation for the U.S. mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	War in Lebanon	6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347	2	
CNA I	Israel Invasion	6/8/1982, 45	USN, USMC	1 CV & Amp
CNA I	Peacekeeping Force	8/10/1982, 30	USN, USMC	2 CV's & Amp
CNA I	Palestine Massacre	9/22/1982, 143	USN, USMC	2 CV's & Amp
CNA III	Israel Invasion of Lebanon	6/8/1982 - 7/22/1982, 45	Lebanon, NEO USN, USMC	
CNA III	Evac. of PLO-Leb.	8/10/1982 - 9/9/1982, 31	Lebanon, NEO USN, USMC, USAF	
CNA III	Palestine Massacre	9/22/1982 - 2/28/1984, 515	Lebanon, Show of Force USN, USMC	

66. # 340: Libya Threat to Sudan; 2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12

Signs of an increase of military forces in Libya threatened crises in Sudan and Egypt. Sudan feared a Libyan attempt to remove the Numeiri regime and filed a complaint with the UN while alerting its armed forces. Egypt and Sudan had been part of a mutual defense agreement since 1976 and had signed a Charter of Integration in October 1982. Egypt placed forces along its Syrian borders in case they needed to be deployed to Sudan. The United States became involved militarily on 17 February. The aircraft carrier *USS Nimitz (CV 68)* was deployed to the Red Sea to monitor the crisis off the coasts of Sudan and Egypt and delivered four multipurpose AWACS reconnaissance planes to Egypt. This U.S. reaction prompted a military expansion in Libya. The meeting of the Presidents of Sudan and Egypt on 22 February reduced tensions and ended the crisis for all actors. The U.S. asserted its interest through a show of force mission but without needing to assemble ground troops.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Libya Threat to Sudan	2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12	3	
CNA I	Libya-Sudan	2/14/1983, 11	USN	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Early Call/Libya	2/14/1983 - 2/28/1973, 15	Egypt, Show of Force USN, USAF	

67. # 342: Chad – Libya VI; 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536

Continued fighting between separatists and Libyan invaders in Chad and Sudan resulted in another crisis in June 1983. On 24 June Libyan-backed forces occupied a city in Northern Chad. France warned that it would not stand idle in the face of Libyan aggression. Together with Zaire, it supplied weapons for Chad. Chad renewed its accusations of Libyan intrusion and the OAS demanded a cease-fire, a Libyan retreat from Chad, and negotiations. Parallel to diplomatic efforts, Chad launched a counteroffensive on 9 July that brought on Libyan air strikes. In turn, French troops were deployed to Chad in Operation MANTA. Peace talks and reconciliation efforts by the OAU were unrewarding. At the end of April, Qaddafi proposed a withdrawal plan, which France accepted. Five months later the proposal was put into effect and by 12 November the crisis had ended. The United States had reacted by increasing military aid to Chad

and by placing the aircraft carrier *USS Dwight D Eisenhower (CV 69)* in a state of alert in the Gulf of Syrte.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Chad – Libya IV	6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536	3	
CNA I	Libya-Chad	8/1/1983, 16	USN	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Libya/Chad	7/25/1983 - 12/31/1983, 160	Chad, Peace Op - Military Supply USN, USAF	

68. # 343: *Invasion of Grenada; 10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10*

Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had been placed under house arrest, been freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, together with close supporters, murdered. Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in the region and to the safety of American citizens in Grenada, the United States showed concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization of East Caribbean States, the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had been en route to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in anticipation of the developments in Grenada. Because of its prior proximity to the Caribbean, the naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis for Grenada. On 25 October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and Army forces invaded Grenada. Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear that American students were not in danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the restoration of democratic government to Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. troops had accomplished their mission, and by 4 November Independence finally departed for the Mediterranean.

As Gaffney observed: “The U.S. had been watching the island anxiously as the Soviets built an airfield, using Cuban labor, ostensibly to bring in tourists, but which the U.S. thought was to be a Soviet airbase threatening the approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. seized upon an incident—a Marxist coup, using the excuse of protecting and evacuating American medical students—to invade 6 days after the coup. Grenada was a convenient distance from CONUS. The

U.S. had plenty of warning; the surprise was how ill-planned the invasion turned out to be” (Gaffney 2002, 7).

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 7, Marolda 2000, Morales 1994, 80 - 81

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Invasion of Grenada	10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10	4	
CNA I	Grenada	10/20/1983,23	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA	Urgent Fury	10/20/1983 - 12/14/1983, 55	Grenada, Combat USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

69. # 344: Able Archer; 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 9¹⁴

On 2 November 1983 the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 which had flown through Soviet airspace, killing all 269 crew members and passengers. The Soviets could not identify the plane and chose to destroy the aircraft. Immediately after the downing, USN vessels from the Seventh Fleet, USAF aircraft and ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency were deployed to the area looking for debris and demonstrating U.S. presence. The Able Archer crisis occurred only on 2 November with the start of NATO military exercises but it is often linked with the downing of KAL 007. “Able Archer” refers to the test of “nuclear release mechanisms in case of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet bloc” (ICB, Able Archer, Crisis Summary). The Soviet Union however perceived the exercise as a prelude of an actual attack and put its nuclear fighters on alert. The United States and other NATO members claimed to be surprised by the Soviet misinterpretation and reaction. The exercise ended on 11 November without any military confrontations and the associated tensions subsided. The mentioned naval deployment was triggered by the downing of the KAL 007 and naval forces remained in the region in a show of force after the search and rescue operation ended on 5 September.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Able Archer	11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 9	4	
CNA I	KAL 007	9/1/1983, 66	USN, USAF	0 CV & NO Amp
CNA	KAL 007 Shot	9/1/1983 - 11/6/1983, 67	Soviet Union,	

¹⁴ Because Able Archer and the KAL 007 Shot Down are not the same crisis this case is excluded from the statistical analysis.

III	Down		Show of Force USN, USAF	
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70. # 348: Basra-Kharg Island; 2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141

During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pulled into the conflict in a series of minor incidents between 21 February 1984 and 11 July 1984. In February 1984, Iran captured the oil drilling facility on Majnoon Island in Southern Iraq, and then attempted to intercept the Basra-Baghdad road. Iraqi forces counterattacked on Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island. Over the next week Iraq recaptured the positions held by Iranian forces ending the crisis for Iraq on 18 March. When a Kuwaiti oil tanker was hit near Bahrain, Kuwait was drawn into the crisis (13 May) with its claim that Iran was responsible. In turn, Iran threatened the safe passage of all shipping in the Gulf if Iranian access to Kharg Island was not guaranteed. This declaration set in motion the tanker war. When a Saudi ship was attacked within Saudi territorial waters by Iranian aircraft, Saudi Arabia was then implicated in the confrontation. Kuwait sought U.S. Stinger antiaircraft missiles and U.S. naval escorts for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The Saudi response was more forceful. On 5 June, with the help of U.S. advanced early-warning (AWACS) reconnaissance planes, Saudi forces shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter. For Iran, the crisis ended with the signing of an agreement with Iraq precluding the shelling of civilian areas. Saudi Arabia for its part formed an air defense zone, and Kuwaiti signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. The crisis led to a renewed U.S. commitment of a continuous aircraft carrier presence in the North Arabian Sea. In late May, MIDEASTFOR ships began to escort U.S. merchant ships because of the escalating violence in the region and the *USS Enterprise (CV 68)* was dispatched as a show of U.S. resolve.

Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. military forces remained forward deployed in the Persian Gulf. The intensity of the commitment varied. In general naval forces protected shipping and cleared mines. But especially this intra-war crisis enlarged USN involvement. Future naval operations such as the Earnest Will escort operations of 1987-1988, played an important role in preventing the spread of the war into other states of the region, but were not in direct reaction to an intra-war crisis and are therefore excluded.

Additional Sources: Proceedings

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Basra-Kharg Island	2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141	3	
CNA I	Persian Gulf	April 1984, 245	USN, USAF	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA	Persian Gulf	04/01/1984 – 11/30/1984, 244	USN, Show of Force, Iraq	

71. # 354: Nicaragua MIG-21S; 11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7

On the day Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States, intelligence identified a Soviet vessel en route to Nicaragua with MIG-21s destined for the Sandinistas and some members of the new government feared a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. U.S. military exercises in Honduras were immediately intensified and the U.S. Navy increased its presence operations in the Central America region as a show of force and to deter Nicaraguan aggression. With the Soviet Union confirmation that no jet fighter aircraft were aboard the vessel, and the official United States acknowledgment that it had no plans to intervene in Nicaragua, the crisis ended. (Even earlier, U.S. naval presence had been intensified during the election period in El Salvador and to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Central America. The operation starting in March 1984 included the *CVBG America (CV 66)*.)

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Nicaragua MIG-21S	11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7	3	
CNA I	Central America	3/13/1984, 264	USN, USMC	1 CV & Amp
CNA III	Central America CV Presence	5/13/84 – 11/26/84, 259	Nicaragua, Show of Force USN	

72. # 358: Egypt Air Hijacking; 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11

On 23 November 1985 an Egypt Air flight bound for Athens was hijacked. The terrorists were members of the “Egypt Revolution”, a group opposed to President Mubarak and supposedly part of the anti-Arafat “Al-Fatah Revolutionary Command”. Libyan involvement was suspected. Egypt’s forces were deployed along the Libyan border in a state of high alert. The hijacked plane, running out of fuel, landed in Malta. Refused refueling led the terrorists to segregate the passengers by nationality. They then shot into a group of Western European, North American,

Australian, and Israeli passport holders killing one hostage. Egypt sent elite troops to Malta on 24 November in a force that included three U.S. officers to storm the airplane. During the assault on the terrorists 60 people died. Egypt did not retaliate against Libya and the crisis subsided (3 December". In a contingency operation USN vessels, including the *USS Coral Sea (CV 43)*, were deployed to the waters off Malta during the stand-off.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Egypt Hijacking	Air 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11	3	
CNA I	Egypt Hijacking	Air 11/23/1985, 3	USN	1 CV & NO Amp
CNA III	Egypt Hijacking	Air 11/23/1985 - 11/25/1985, 3	Malta, Response to Terrorism USN	

73. # 363: *Gulf of Syrte II; 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21*

At the end of December 1985 two major terrorist attacks took place in the airports of Rome and Vienna. Libya was accused of funding the attacks, and all U.S. citizens were advised to leave Libya in January 1986. All exchange between the two governments was cancelled. The United States decided to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. Operations near Libya began at the end of January and again in February without any incidents. On 24 March 1986 the aircraft carriers *USS America (CV 66)*, *USS Coral Sea (CV 43)*, and *USS Saratoga (CV 60)* advanced into the Gulf of Syrte, ostensibly to engage in freedom of navigation exercises. Libya claimed the Gulf as Libyan territory in 1973 and U.S. naval aircraft came under fire although without suffering any damage. The U.S. retaliated by sinking two Libyan patrol boats. The last two days of the exercise "Attain Document III" ended on 27 March without further incidents. When an explosion occurred on board a TWA flight from Rome to Athens on 2 April, tensions returned. The U.S. assumed Libyan involvement, Libya denied the charges. On 5 April 1986 a bomb exploded in the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. Two U.S. soldiers and one Turkish woman died and many others were injured. Libya never publicly admitted its role but intelligence suggested Libyan involvement. Fearing U.S. retaliation, Libya threatened to kill Americans indiscriminately and to take all foreigners in Libya hostage. The U.S. was unsuccessful in dissuading Libya from the path of terrorism. Given the evidence of the West

Berlin bomb involvement, the United States decided to launch military strikes against terrorist-related sites in Libya. On 14 April 1986 Operation EL DORADO CANYON was executed. The USAF with the help of aircraft from the *USS America* and *USS Coral Sea* carried out air strikes against Libya. This action terminated the crisis for the United States. A declaration of the UN Security Council condemning the U.S. strikes on 21 April was vetoed by the U.S. and the U.K. Operation EL DORADO CANYON had two goals; first, to compel Libyan support of terrorism and second, to deter Gaddafi from resuming any form of support in the future.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5, Till 2009, 265 – 266

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Gulf of Syrte II	3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21	4	
CNA I	OVL-FON Ops	January 1986, 85	USN	3 CV & NO Amp
CNA I	La Belle Disco, Libya	4/10/1986, 6	USN, USAF	2 CV's & NO Amp
CNA III	OVL-FON Ops	1/26/86 - 4/28/86, 93	Libya, Response to terrorism USN	
CNA III	El Dorado Canyon	4/9/1986 - 4/19/1986, 11	Libya, Combat USN, USMC, USAF	

74. # 383: *Contras III; 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 23*¹⁵

On 6 March 1988 Nicaragua attacked Contra camps on Honduran territory. Nicaragua denied the Honduran allegation and sought a UN and OAS investigation, although no observers were dispatched. Honduras asked the United States for support which was granted by dispatching troops and arms. Nicaraguan troops near the border were attacked by Honduran fighter planes, threatening further fighting should Nicaragua not withdraw. With the withdrawal of Nicaraguan forces on 17 March, the crisis began to fade and was terminated once all U.S. troops left the region on 28 March.

In the operation JITTERY PROP the U.S. conducted electronic surveillance operations off Central America throughout the 1980 to interdict possible arms smuggling by the Nicaragua Sandinistas to rebels in El Salvador. According to Roth an involvement of JITTERY PROP in the crisis is possible but not confirmed. The USS Sphinx spent most of its time during 1985-1987

¹⁵ Because it USN involvement in this crisis cannot be confirmed with sufficient certainty this case is excluded from the statistical analyses.

in the Gulf of Fonseca off the coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador intercepting military and guerrilla communications. The vessel monitored suspected shipping, intercepted communications and encrypted messages, and probed the shore surveillance and air-to-air defense capabilities of the other nations.

Additional Sources: Gaffney (Email exchange), Roth (Email exchange)

Dataset	Name	Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Contras III	3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 23	3	
CNA I	NO DATA			
CNA	Jittery Prop	1/8/88 - 12/14/88, 342	El Salvador, Cont. Posit USN	

75. # 391: Invasion of Panama; 12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26

Tensions between Panama and the United States had been increasing for some time over the revised Panama Canal treaties and General Noriega. The installation of Noriega as the new head of government in Panama on 15 December 1989 brought matters to a head. Random harassments of U.S. personnel culminated in the killing of a Marine officer and the abuse of the wife of a navy officer and a declaration of a state of war by Panama.

Displays of U.S. military strength, U.S. economic sanctions, mediation attempts by other countries and an attempted coup failed to oust Noriega from power. Thus on 17 December the United States invaded Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE to protect the lives of U.S. citizens, to uphold democracy, to capture Noriega, and to safeguard the Panama Canal treaties. The U.S. overthrew the Noriega Regime, who stood down on 3 January and a new regime was installed. All military services were deployed to support the operation. U.S. naval involvement included a ship held in a MODLOC (Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations) off the coast of Panama. The U.S. deployment of Special Forces (4'000 amongst them many Navy SEALs) was the largest since the Vietnam War. Morales (1994) describes “the Panamanian intervention (...) as an important transition from 'Monroe militarism' and Reagan's 'containment militarism' to Bush's 'New World Order militarism'. Panama invokes the new model of post-Cold War military policing actions”.

Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 222 – 223, Morales 1994

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Invasion of Panama	12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26	4	
CNA I	Panama Elections	5/11/1989, 52	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	1 CV & Amp
CNA I	Panama	12/20/89 34	USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	0 CV& NO Amp
CNA III	Nimrod Dancer	3/18/1988 – 12/20/1989, 643	Panama, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

76. # 393: *Gulf War; 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254*

The Gulf War crisis erupted on 2 August 1990 with Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United States as the principal participants (Bahrain, Egypt, France, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), the U.K., and the USSR were also involved). On 28 May Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait and the UAE of launching an economic war against Iraq and Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil from the disputed oil field of Rumaila. Kuwait put its armed forces on alert and denied the Iraqi allegation. On 23 July Iraqi forces were deployed to the Saudi Arabian border. Mediation efforts between Iraq and Kuwait were unsuccessful and Iraq then mobilized forces along the Kuwaiti border before invading the nation on 2 August. Four days later troops were dispatched to the Saudi Arabian border. The U.S. responded to the threat to Kuwait and its oil sources with a build-up of U.S. forces in the region, demanding that Iraq complies with the UN resolution and withdraws from Kuwait. Iraq's response was to formally announce the annexing of Kuwait. Over the next weeks several UN resolutions were passed. In late October the U.S. began unilateral air and naval strikes and more troops were sent to the Gulf region over the next weeks. On 29 November the UN Security Council resolution 678 authorized "the use (of) all necessary mean" to coerce Iraq to comply with earlier resolutions, by no later than 15 January 1991. When the deadline had passed, a coalition of states participated in operation DESERT STORM, launched on 24 February to free Kuwait with military force. On 8 April the Iraqi forces were thrown out of Kuwait. A formal cease-fire was in effect as of 12 April.

Even before the outbreak of the crisis U.S. naval forces were active in the region. In response to Iraqi's growing pressure on Kuwait, Middle East Force ships engaged in an exercise with the United Arab Emirates, involving five MEF ships and three USAF aircraft (24 July 1990). The

forces remained in theater on higher alert during the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. But despite the combined U.S.-U.A.E. exercise, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During this crisis and war the U.S. Navy played an important role in deciding the outcome. The USN also received assistance from the British, Royal Saudi, and Kuwaiti Navy. When the crisis began the USN was already on station with six ships of its Joint Task Force Middle East, which had operated in the Persian Gulf since 1949. In the initial deployment phase the role of the USN was critical. In a matter of days the *USS Independence (CV 62)* CVBG sailed from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf area shortly followed by the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69)* CVBG departing from the Mediterranean and the *Saratoga (CV 60)* CVBG from CONUS in Florida. The *Independence* and *Eisenhower* were the first U.S. forces in the theater when operation DESERT SHIELD began. The ships were joined in the Gulf one week later by Marines who had been at a prepositioning station in the Indian Ocean, ready to support the airlifted elements of Marine Expeditionary force. According to Baer (1994, 448) this impressive display of readiness was made possible by the forward deployment of Navy and Marine Corps units. In addition an Atlantic battle group led by the battleship *Wisconsin (BB 64)* was ordered to the region. Saudi Arabian approval to insert U.S. forces was granted in about a week (Gaffney 2002, 5). Siegel (1995, 17 – 18) hypothesizes that the display of U.S. military power, underlined by the presence of two aircraft carrier battle groups, might have played a role in King Fahd's acceptance of U.S. forces into Saudi Arabia. This force signaled U.S. willingness to defend Saudi Arabia even with forces from CONUS still on their way. Navy forces (both U.S. and allied) also played a crucial role in interdiction operations, enforcing Iraqi compliance with UN economic sanctions. Naval vessels were actively patrolling and boarded vessels, suspected of breaking the sanctions. The naval patrols largely guaranteed the compliance with the sanctions at sea. Dismukes (1994, 40) points out the advantages of forward presences and notes “in some cases, where geography and politics combine against the U.S., forces forward are necessary to make the deployment of forces from CONUS possible. In the Gulf War, if Saddam had seized the ports or had attacked when U.S. forces were still small, the result would have been difficult and costly for the U.S. As it happened, the U.S. had forward forces at sea that provided an answer to those threats. The employability and thus the credibility of CONUS-based forces can depend on forces already overseas”.

The first U.S. Air Force and Army units arrived at the crisis location a few days after receiving the order to move to Saudi Arabia on 8 August. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that the U.S. had deployed such a high number of troops, with 210'000 military personnel in theater at the end of October 1990 and more than 400'000 in early January. On 7 August, President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia after King Fahd approved the deployment of a multinational force to defend his country against a possible Iraqi invasion. On 15 September the *USS John F. Kennedy* joined the *Saratoga*. The two carriers operated together for the next two days before the former assumed the watch in the Red Sea while the *USS Saratoga* moved to the Mediterranean. Aircraft took off nearly every day from the carriers and conducted training sorties over Saudi Arabia. On 27 October, *John F. Kennedy* held a turnover with *Saratoga* and headed back to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. In early November the decision was made to reinforce and double the current number of CVBGs. To meet the new force level, the *USS America (CV 66)*, *Ranger (CV 61)*, and *Roosevelt (CV 71)* were sent to the region to support *USS John F. Kennedy*, *Midway (CV 41)* and *Saratoga*. During the days before the beginning of the war the *USS Forrestal (CV 59)* received orders twice to deploy but both were cancelled. The total strength at the launch of DESERT STRIKE included six battle groups, two battleships, and a 31-ship amphibious task force totaling in over 100 ships and submarines, 75'000 Sailors and 85'000 Marines afloat and ashore.

Although the Gulf War is often seen as a victory for the Air Force and Army they needed bases, while the Navy did not. The Navy, controlling the seas, delivered most of the equipment (Baer 2003, 450). Till remarks that the “widespread notions that large surface ships, especially carriers, would be too vulnerable in narrow waters when confronted by swarms of missile-armed fast attack craft were comprehensively disproved in this conflict” (Till 2009, 172).

Additional Sources: Baer 1994; Dismukes 1994; Gaffney 2002; Siegel 1995; Till 2009

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Gulf War	8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254	4	
CNA I	Iraqi Pressure on Kuwait	7/24/1990, 9		0 CV & NO Amp
CNA I	Operation Desert Shield	8/2/1990, 166		6 CV & Amp
CNA III	Desert Shield	8/7/1990 – 1/15/1991, 162	Saudi Arabia, Show of Force USN	

CNA III	Iraq MIO	8/7/1990 – 12/31/1999, 3424	Iraq, MIO USN	
CNA III	Desert Storm	1/17/1991 – 4/5/1991, 79	Iraq, Combat USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

77. # 403: Yugoslavia II: Bosnia; 3/3/1992 – 11/21/1995¹⁶

After the passing of a referendum for an autonomous Bosnia the crisis was triggered by the Bosnian independence declaration on 3 March 1992. First, the Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim leaders agreed to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic regions during talks in Lisbon. But when they returned the Muslim President of Bosnia spoke out against a division, accusing Serbia and Croatia of trying to annex Bosnian territory. As of 6 April 1992 Bosnia was recognized by the European Union. The United States and other states followed soon thereafter. In a reaction to the EU recognition Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, proclaimed a Serbian Republic of Bosnia. Intense fighting broke out between the different ethnic groups. The situation was especially bad in Sarajevo, the capital. The UN sent peacekeeper through the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to alleviate the suffering of the civilians and create “safe areas. The NATO supported UNPROFOR with limited military involvement mainly through symbolic airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S. intervened as part of the NATO implementation. The U.S. spoke out for tighter sanctions against Serbia and the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution to enforce the no-fly zones. The crisis was marked by different policies towards Bosnia. While the European Union remained hesitant and favored a diplomatic solution the United States was more outspoken in condemning Serbian aggression. The U.S. did not send troops to support UNPROFOR but actively participated in the NATO air strikes. The longer the crisis persisted the more involved the United States became. After the shelling of the Markela Marketplace on 5 November the NATO finally engaged in offensive air power operations. On 21 November 1995 all parties signed the so called Dayton Accord agreement, ending the Bosnian crisis. ICB lists the following four decisions the parties agreed on: (1) a division of territory between the Bosnian-Croat Federation (51 percent) and the autonomous Serb entity, the republic of Srpska (49 percent); (2) a constitution comprising a central government for Bosnia as a whole with a three-person group presidency, a two-house legislature, a court, and a central bank; and

¹⁶ The crises resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia are very complex and involve many different actors and strategies. The following is only a very brief description, mostly focused on the U.S. naval involvement

separate presidencies, legislatures, and armies for each of the two entities within Bosnia; (3) the mutual withdrawal of forces by both entities behind agreed cease-fire lines; and (4) the dispatch of a peacekeeping NATO force of 60,000 under U.S. command to monitor the cease-fire and control the airspace over Bosnia.

The United States Navy supported operations MARITIME GUARD, SHARP GUARD, DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, DENY FLIGHT, DECISIVE EDGE, DECISIVE GUARD and DELIBERATE FORGE¹⁷.

The first three operations were launched to establish a blockade in the Adriatic Sea. NATO maritime forces began operating in the Adriatic on 22 November 1992 to enforce the UN embargoes in former Yugoslavia. Together with Western European Union (WEU) forces, NATO maritime forces patrolled the waters and contacted a total of 12,367 merchant vessels, inspected 1,032 and found 9 in violation of the UN embargoes. The operation ended with the commencement of operation SHARP EDGE on 15 June 1993. SHARP GUARD was established to enforce the economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Serbia-Montenegro. U.S. naval forces including surface combatants, intelligence-gathering attack submarines, and active and reserve maritime patrol aircraft operated with NATO and WEU forces. The U.S. participation in SHARP GUARD had to be restricted after U.S. Congress passed a legislation demanding a limitation in November 1994. The operation lasted more than three years and helped to provide the necessary conditions for a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the operation no ships were reported in violation of the embargoes. In December 1995 SHARP GUARD was replaced by Operation DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, lasting until December 1996.

No-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina were established after the adoption of Security Council Resolution 816. To ensure the enforcement operation DENY FLIGHT began on 12 April 1993. DENY FLIGHT proposed to neutralize Serbian aircraft that were supporting their ground forces in Bosnia. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and supporting aircraft. On 28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-

¹⁷ Provide Promise, joint operation with the U.S. Air Force, involving both naval carrier aircraft and land-based air, protected humanitarian relief efforts in the besieged cities of the former Yugoslavia, lasted from July 1992 to March 1996. This operation is not include in the summary because it constitutes a humanitarian operation and involved air transport and air drops of relief supplies to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was the first military engagement ever undertaken by the Alliance.

On 24 November 1994, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO air power could be used, under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 958 and after agreement with Croatian authorities, against aircraft flying in Croatian air space, which have engaged in attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas.

NATO's DENY FLIGHT operation, enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, terminated on December 20, 1995, when the implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for the airspace over Bosnia. DENY FLIGHT transitioned to DECISIVE EDGE in support of the IFOR Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Carrier and shore-based squadrons continued flight operations in support of joint and combined enforcement of a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone in the airspace over the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation DECISIVE EDGE then transitioned to DELIBERATE GUARD in support of the stabilization force (SFOR) Operation JOINT GUARD. Throughout 1997, Italy-based Marine F/A-18D and EA-6B aircraft provided suppression of enemy air defense and close air support and electronic warfare to Navy maritime patrol aircraft. Additionally it brought real-time, still and full-motion video imagery to the ground commanders. DELIBERATE GUARD transitioned to Operation DELIBERATE FORGE. Forces from the United States European Command participated in, and directly supported, Operation DELIBERATE FORGER, the NATO air operation in support of SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (20 June 1998 marked the transition from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to a slightly smaller force).

The U.S. CVBG's played an important role in the overall operations. Their flexibility and capability to respond rapidly contributed to the success. NATO airpower was strengthened by naval aircraft and also served as a deterrent force. For example the continuous presence of carrier based aircraft in the Adriatic and NATO land-based aircraft in Europe permitted attacks far inland.

Several carrier battle groups supported the operations. Among them were the *USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67)*, *USS America (CV 66)*, *USS Roosevelt (CV 42)* and *USS Eisenhower (CV 69)*. Shortly after Christmas 1992 the *USS John F. Kennedy* was ordered to the Adriatic Sea to support a possible U.S. intervention (the carrier remained in Marseille). A year later (25 February 1993) the carrier was called upon to monitor airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in

conjunction with Operation PROVIDE PROMISE until 25 March when she was relieved by the USS *Roosevelt*. Between 15 March 1994 and 31 December 1994 the USS *Eisenhower* participated in the different operations DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD and PROVIDE PROMISE in reaction to the tense situations in former Yugoslavia. During DENY FLIGHT from 12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) assumed responsibilities for the military aspects of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite enemy resistance including heavy and accurate ground fire, combined with logistics and bad weather problems during more than 100,000 sorties over DENY FLIGHT's 983 days, the campaign prevented Serbia from effectively using its air power. Prior to the ship's arrival the Bosnian-Serbs fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles against reconnaissance aircraft, prompting NATO commanders to assign escorts to such flights. The USS *America* participated in operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORGE.

Burg (2003, 57) concludes that “the use of coercive diplomacy [as of late 1994] in Bosnia by the United States, in cooperation with its NATO partners and local actors, succeeded in bringing the fighting in that country to an end and in persuading all sides to enter into a negotiated settlement of the war”.

Additional Sources: Burg 2003; Global Security (various); Grimmett 2010

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Yugoslavia II: Bosnia	3/3/1992 – 11/21/1995		
CNA III	Maritime A4455 Guard/Sharp Guard/Decisive Enhancement	11/1/1992 - 12/18/1996, 1509	FRY, Show of Force	
CNA III	Deny Flight/Decisive Edge/Deliberate Guard/Deliberate Forge	4/12/1993 - 7/18/1998, 1924	Yugoslavia	

78. # 406: Iraq No-Fly Zone; 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22

In March 1991 a no-fly zone over northern Iraq was established. On 18 August 1992 France, U.K. and the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone below the 32nd Parallel to safeguard the Shia population from Saddam's forces. The U.K. sent six Tornado jets to support the Southern

Watch mission. These two activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Although the no-fly zone went into effect in late August, attacks against the Shia rebels in the South increased. But Iraq seemed reluctant to cross the no-fly zone and on 8 September officially declared its non-interference with the no-fly zone, ending the crisis.

The Southern Watch mission lasted until the end of 1999 and different naval vessels were deployed in support of the operations. The *USS Independence (CV 62)* was deployed to the Arabian Gulf as of mid-1992 and was part of the beginning of the Southern Watch mission.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Iraq No-Fly Zone	8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22	4	
CNA	Southern Watch	8/19/1992 - 12/31/1999, 2691	Iraq, No Fly Zone USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

79. # 408: North Korean Nuclear; 3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600

The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea's reluctance to participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus *USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63)*, operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 1994, was in a state of high alert. The United States negotiated with North Korea over its nuclear program while keeping open the option of military strikes. Two carriers—*Kitty Hawk* and a second, the name of which could not be determined—were positioned off the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was later said that the carriers had contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. The crisis ended with an agreement in October 1994.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	North Korean Nuclear	3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600	2	
CNA III	Korea tensions	6/1/94 - 7/31/94, 61	North Korea, Show of Force USN	

80. # 411: Haiti Military Regime; 7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77

In 1991, the President of Haiti, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military junta barely one year after being elected. The resulting crisis produced a large flow of refugees fleeing from the deteriorating situation in Haiti to the United States. The refugees were perceived as a threat to domestic stability. The U.S. appeared unable to restore democratic order on the tumultuous island. On 31 July the UN Security council passed a resolution authorizing the member states to “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership”. As a result the Clinton administration intervened on 15 September 1994 despite public and Congressional reluctance, traceable to the previous Somalia disaster. The U.S. represented by former President Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Powell, and Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee began unofficial mediation. They persuaded the junta to sign an agreement to resolve the crisis without violence and to leave Haiti. The former president would then be brought back to head the government. Successful mediation owed much to the U.S. threat of military force if necessary. As part of the agreement, the U.S. dispatched 20,000 troops to guarantee a safe transition and Aristide returned on 15 October 1994.

The U.S. military services followed up with the operations SUPPORT DEMOCRACY and UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY in which the carriers *USS Eisenhower (CV 69)* and *America (CV 66)* and the amphibious ship *Wasp (LHD 1)* participated in a multinational force from 14 September 1994 – 24 September 1994. This intervention led to a historic Army-Navy collaboration in which the two services prepared for Army air assaults launched from USN aircraft carriers. The force not only included forces from the Army’s airborne corps but also a Joint Special Operations Task Force (including SEALs, Army Rangers, and the 16th USAF Special Operations Wing among others). The Marines aboard were prepared for combat search and rescue missions. Because the U.S. forces were able to land peacefully, combat was unnecessary. On 31 March 1995 U.S. forces’ peacekeeping operations were taken over by international forces.

Additional Sources: Girard 2004

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Haiti Military Regime	7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77	4	

CNA	Support Democracy	9/1/1993 - 10/18/1994, 413	Haiti, Show of Force USN, USMC	
CNA III	Uphold/Restore Democracy	9/8/94 - 4/17/95, 222	Haiti, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

81. # 412: Iraq Troop Deployment Kuwait; 10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35

This crisis had its origin in the Iraqi troop deployment and involved Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United States on 7 October 1994. The U.S. responded within a day and deployed the aircraft carrier *Eisenhower (CV 69)*, accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles to demonstrate resolve. Air Force and Navy units already in the area as part of the operation SOUTHERN WATCH, formed forces in operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The U.S. commitment to Saudi Arabia was reaffirmed. Although Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 October, the U.S. increased its military strength in the region so as to respond quickly to future threats. The crisis ended on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed the declaration of "Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political independence".

Additional vessels supporting VIGILANT WARRIOR included the *USS George Washington (CVN 73)* battle group, the *USS Tripoli (LPH 10)*, Amphibious Ready Group, 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit (SOC), and Military Sealift Command ships.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Iraq Troop Deployment Kuwait	10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35	3	
CNA III	Vigilant Warrior	10/7/1994 - 12/31/1994, 86	Kuwait, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

82. # 415: Taiwan Strait IV; 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at loggerheads following the visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit to Cornell University. This gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, increased the PRC’s fear of growing American support for Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to coerce the United States to commit formally to a “one-China policy,” the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan Strait beginning in July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response until, according to Robert Ross, 19 December¹⁸, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through the Taiwan Strait marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976. When the Chinese activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the successful conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.

It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, the effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré (2001) questions the contribution of the two CVs, Ross (2000; 2002) sees their deployments as successful coercive diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement and confirming American commitment.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 8, Gouré 2001, Ross 2000 and 2002, Scarlett 2009

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Taiwan Strait IV	5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307	3	
CNA III	Taiwan Flexible Deterrence	3/1/1996 - 4/17/1996, 48	China, Show of Force USN	

83. # 419: Desert Strike; 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15

On 31 August 1996 Iraqi forces entered in the Kurdish civil war on behalf of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP). Because the Iraqi troops crossed the 36h Parallel, violating the safe zone agreement, their mobilization brought them into conflict with the United States. Air sorties

¹⁸ Scarlett (2009) only mentions the deployments the following March.

over Iraq were increased, followed by operation DESERT STRIKE, bombing Iraqi targets on 3 and 4 September. President Clinton announced he would not tolerate any violation of the agreement and would react with force. Additionally the safe zone in the South was increased from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. The U.S. attempt to convince the UN to adopt a resolution condemning the Iraqi violation was unsuccessful. Iraq tried to oppose the increase of the exclusion zones but after U.S. forces destroyed the air defense system, Iraq agreed to the new zones and declared not to interfere with U.S. patrols anymore. This declaration terminated the crisis for Iraq and the United States.

The CVBG *Carl Vinson (CV 70)* was part of DESERT STRIKE, together with the *USS Laboon (DDG 58)* and *Shiloh (CG 67)*. USN forces fired 14 of the total of 26 cruise missiles. The remaining 13 were fired by Air Force B-52s, escorted by F-14s from *Carl Vinson*. On the second day, strikes were fired from the destroyers *Russell (DDG 59)*, *Hewitt (DD 966)*, *Laboon* and the nuclear-powered attack submarine *Jefferson City (SSN 759)*. The *USS Enterprise (CV 65)* who had been operating in the Mediterranean was ordered to the Persian Gulf and arrived in the theater two days after receiving the order to augment the displayed force.

Additional Sources: Global Security: Desert Strike

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Desert Strike	8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15	4	
CNA III	Desert Strike	9/3/1996 - 9/4/1997, 367	Iraq, Combat USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

84. # 421: Zaire Civil War; 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221

In response to the threat by the government of Zaire (on 8 October 1996) to treat the Banyamulenge as rebels if they did not leave the country within 6 days, they launched attacks against the Zairian army and refugee camps. Around 1,000,000 Hutu refugees from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi fled from their camps in Zaire in reaction to the unrest. These developments triggered a crisis for Zaire and Rwanda. Zaire accused Rwanda and Burundi of training and arming the rebels. Both rejected the accusations. When Zairian forces shelled a Rwandan town on 29 October, Rwanda dispatched troops to Eastern Zaire. The Banyamulenge together with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL)

carried out successful attacks in Eastern Zaire, creating a buffer zone between Rwanda and the rest of Zaire. Because the Zairian president was abroad and the Zairian army was incapable of halting the adversary, the political stability of the country was endangered through a threatened army coup. Parliament reacted by demanding the departure of all Tutsis from Zaire on 1 November. The following day the ADFL with the help of the Rwandan army, brought East Zaire under their control. This resulted in mass demonstrations demanding war against Rwanda and Burundi and led to attacks on Tutsi properties. More than 1,000,000 Rwandan and over 100,000 Burundian Hutu had fled from the violence in Eastern Zaire. Alarmed by these high numbers the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for immediate international intervention to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis. The ADFL announced a cease fire during which refugees might return to Rwanda, and approved the UN request for supplying humanitarian aid. U.S., Canada, U.K., South Africa and other African states approved the dispatch of UN-sponsored forces to eastern Zaire. Additionally the U.S. agreed to send 1,000 American troops. The multinational military force was ready on 14 November but the return of refugees seemed to make such intervention unnecessary. After the termination of the cease fire fighting resumed and on 20 January 1997 and Zaire declared war against the rebels. In February the UN Security Council adopted a peace plan and in March, following further escalations, a multinational force was deployed to Congo to stand by for possible evacuations of foreign nationals. When president Mobutu of Zaire returned on 21 March he urged the parties to agree on a cease fire and to assume talks. During the peace-talks, led by the President of South Africa, Mobutu agreed to step down after new elections whereas Kabila, the head of the ADFL demanded an immediate handover of power to his forces. Mobutu's resignation on 16 May ended the crisis and Kabila assumed power as the head of the new Democratic Republic of Congo.

The confused developments in Zaire led the U.S. to prepare¹⁹ for the possible evacuation of U.S. citizens. In November 1996, the *USS Nassau (LHA 4)* left port with the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 97-1) to participate in operation SILVER WAKE off Albania. During this assignment *Nassau* was redeployed in support of Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL in Zaire. Together with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) on board, the USN vessel steamed to the coast of Zaire. President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of

¹⁹ Joint Task Force Headquarters for the US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF)

U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for American private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be available for evacuation if necessary. *Nassau's* deployment lasted about one month before the *USS Kearsarge (LHD 3)* relieved the vessel²⁰.

Additional Sources: Global Security: Guardian Retrieval, Grimmett 2010

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Zaire Civil War	10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221	3	
CNA III	Guardian Retrieval	3/22/1997 - 6/5/1997, 76	Zaire, NEO USN, USMC, USAF	

85. # 422: UNSCOM I; 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102

UNSCOM was established to oversee the elimination of Iraq's biological and chemical weapons programs while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focused on the nuclear program. The Iraqi eviction of all U.S. UNSCOM personnel on 13 November 1997 brought an immediate U.S. response - the next day U.S. forces in the area were mobilized and (CENTCOM) responded with a land, sea, and air strike force of more than 35,000 U.S. and coalition forces. These activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Tensions reached a high point when Iraq interfered in the inspection of a UNSCOM team accusing the American leader of espionage and expelling him from the country. The UN Security Council was deeply divided on an appropriate response. During the first two months of 1998 the U.S. advocated military strikes against Iraq while other members (with the exception of the UK) favored a diplomatic solution of the crisis. On 20 February the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in Baghdad and defused the immediate crisis. With U.S. approval, an agreement was signed, reaffirming the authorities of UNSCOM. However President Clinton made it clear that U.S. forces would remain on alert until Iraq conformed to the new agreement.

²⁰ Globalsecurity points to a difficulty in operations in Africa: "The vast continent of Africa provides some real challenges to a military planner as well as fuel suppliers. Re-supply for remote facilities can take several days to transport jet fuel one way, in extremely difficult terrain. Limited bridger support (truck-transport) and small storage tanks are commonplace. During Operation Guardian Retrieval, the Air Force planned missions through Libreville, Gabon, expecting a certain amount of fuel based on contractor stated capabilities. Their capability was no where near this quantity, and the airport even ran out of fuel at one point".

As part of the mobilization effort the *USS George Washington (CV 73)* was sent to the Persian Gulf to join the *Nimitz (CV 68)* battle group. To maintain the two carrier battle group presence, the *USS Independence (CV 62)* relieved *Nimitz* on station a few months later. USN vessels and allied/coalition ships made up a force of 50 ships and submarines and 200 naval aircraft to flex muscles and support the diplomatic initiatives. The deployment of the *USS George Washington* was followed by the dispatch of military aircraft on 20 November. Naval and Air forces were both prepared to launch airstrikes. Force, however did not become necessary and in early June the *USS Independence* returned to Japan. This was the largest multinational mobilization since the Gulf War and this demonstration of force deterred Iraqi aggression and coerced compliance with UNSCOM.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	UNSCOM I	11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102	3	
CNA III	Desert Thunder	10/1/1997 - 5/28/1998, 239	Iraq, Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF	

86. # 424: Ethiopia – Eritrea; 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950

6 May saw violent confrontations between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Each government accused the other with invasion. Mediation attempts by regional and international leaders were unsuccessful and by late May each had mobilized additional forces leading to a full-scale war between the two nations. A peace plan, drafted by the U.S. and Rwanda and supported by the OAU, was conditionally approved by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea. Ethiopia demanded Eritrean withdrawal from Ethiopian territory which Eritrea claimed for itself. Fighting resumed until both parties reluctantly agreed on an OAU peace plan, which eased tensions for eight months before fighting broke out again (23 February 2000). Again, each blamed the other for initiating the violence. The violence ended on 12 December when both countries signed a peace agreement drafted with the help of the OAU.

The U.S. was engaged unsuccessfully as a mediator, and provided evacuation operations. Seaborne forces supported Operation SAFE DEPARTURE and evacuated 105 Americans and 67 third country nationals. Elements from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) evacuated the foreign citizens on 6 June 1998 as a precautionary measure. Marine aircraft transported the evacuees to Amman in Jordan. The 11th MEU(SOC) was on a six-month

deployment aboard the ships of the *USS Tarawa (LHA 1)* Amphibious Ready Group, which includes *USS Tarawa*, *USS Denver (LPD 9)*, and *USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39)*.

Additional Sources: Global Security: Safe Departure

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Ethiopia – Eritrea	5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950	2	
CNA III	Safe Departure	6/6/1998 - 6/17/1998, 12	Eritrea, NEO USN, USMC	
CNA III	Eritrea	11/3/98 - 11/19/98, 17	Eritrea, NEO USN	

87. # 426: DRC Civil War; 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002

Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 1998 President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and of his chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly thereafter fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda received support from Uganda. The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, joined shortly after by the two principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, and attempts to hold a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 2002, his son Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul Kagame in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa.

According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops on both sides. The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, *USS Saipan (LHA 2)* and the 22nd MEU(SOC) stood ready in Operation AUTUMN SHELTER for a possible evacuation of the American embassy and U.S. citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not required and was canceled on 16 August.

Additional Sources: Pritchett (Galrahn) 2009, Global Security: 22nd MEU Assumes Operational Control Its Major Subordinate Elements

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	DCR Civil War	7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002	3	
CNA III	Autumn Shelter	8/10/98 - 8/16/98, 7	Zaire, NEO USN, USMC, USARMY	

88. # 427: US Embassy Bombings; 8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13

On 7 August 1998 the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salam, Tanzania were the targets of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded more than 5,000 others. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. identified Al Qaeda as the primary suspect. The U.S. accused the Taliban of allowing Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to operate freely in Afghanistan. While the U.S. received international support in condemning the embassy-attacks, the Taliban refused to comply with the U.S. request to hand over bin Laden. On 20 August the U.S. forces executed retaliatory air strikes over terrorist training grounds in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan. Allegedly a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan's capital Khartoum, capable of producing chemical weapons, was collaborating with Al Qaeda. With the launch of the air strikes the crisis ended for all actors. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and included assorted naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Sea²¹. The surface combatants and SSN that fired the Tomahawks were already in the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks.

Additionally, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) sent one Marine Corps Fleet Anti-Terrorism Security Team (FAST) each to Kenya and to Tanzania. The teams were charged with augmenting the security personnel. Naval Forces Central Command was asked to set up a Joint Task Force in Nairobi. Furthermore, the USN dispatched a 30-person SEABEE unit to Kenya from Guam to assist in Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE and to locate survivors in the buildings, treat the injured and organize repatriation of the American who had died. Marines were responsible for external security at the temporary U.S. Embassy location. A Platoon of Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed to Nairobi, Kenya just weeks before they were scheduled for a routine six month deployment to the

²¹ According to a Washington Post (Gellman and Priest 1998) article, CVN Abraham Lincoln was involved.

Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf Region. The Marines of 3rd Platoon, Golf Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th MEU(SOC) replaced the Fleet Anti-Terrorist Security Team of Norfolk VA who had been in Kenya since 9 August.

Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	U.S. Embassy Bombings	8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13	4	
CNA III	Resolute Response	8/7/1998 - 10/18/1998, 73	Kenya/Tanzania, security USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	
CNA III	Sudan/Afghanistan Strikes	8/20/1998, 1	Sudan/Afghanistan, Combat USN	

89. # 429: UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox; 10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50

On 31 October 1998 Iraq refused further collaboration with UNSCOM and demanded that the UN reviewed its sanctions and replace Richard Butler as UNSCOM chair as a condition for resumed inspections. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding the immediate return of UNSCOM to Iraq on 5 November but disagreed about the means for resolving the crisis. Only the U.K. and the U.S. voted for the use of military force versus diplomacy. U.K. and U.S. forces in the Gulf region were increased unilaterally with the prospect of new military strikes. On 14 October Saddam Hussein indicated through diplomatic channels Iraqi's acceptance of UNSCOM inspectors, even as U.S. aircraft was en route to Iraq, yet no further steps were taken to cooperate with UNSCOM. U.S. and U.K. forces began operation DESERT FOX and airstrikes lasted until 20 December. Although unauthorized by the UN, the U.S. claimed prior UN authority threatening severe consequences in case of Iraqi non-compliance with UNSCOM. With the termination of DESERT FOX the crisis ended for all actors. No resolution had been found in regard to a resumption of UNSCOM activities.

The main battlegroup supporting the operation was the *USS Enterprise (CV 65)* which crossed the Atlantic in four days and transited the Strait of Gibraltar on 14 November 1998. It entered the Strait of Hormuz on 23 November after taking over from the *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69)*. During DESERT FOX the USN-USMC team launched more than 70 strike and strike-

support aircraft and in 70 hours of operations the *USS Enterprise* launched 297 combat sorties. The carrier *USS Carl Vinson (CV 70)* was diverted from her original schedule to Hong Kong and Singapore but arrived in the theater only during the last night of operation DESERT FOX. Nevertheless, the arrival of the carrier undermined U.S. resolve and relieved *USS Enterprise*.

The following USN vessels were involved in operation DESERT FOX: CVBG: *USS Enterprise (CV 65)* and *USS Carl Vinson (CV 70)*, *USS Philippine Sea (CG 58)*, *USS Gettysburg (CG 64)*, *USS Stout (DDG 55)*, *USS Nicholson (DD 982)*, *USS Hayler (DD 997)*, *USS Klakring (FFG 42)*, *USS Miami (SSN 775)*, *USS Hampton (SSN 76)*, *USS Detroit (AOE 4)*; Amphibious Ready Group: *USS Belleau Wood (LHD 2)*, *USS Dubuque (LPD 8)*, *USS Germantown (LSP 42)*; Mine Countermeasure Squadron: *USS Ardent (MCM 12)*, *USS Dextrous (MCM 13)*.

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox	10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50	4	
CNA III	Desert Viper	11/4/1998 - 11/19/1998, 16	Iraq, Cont. Posit USN, USMC	
CNA III	Desert Fox	12/16/1998 - 12/20/1998, 5	Iraq, Combat USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

90. # 430: Kosovo; 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109

Kosovo, with a population comprised of 90% Albanians, became part of Serbia in 1913. Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo sought independence. During the fighting between Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanian Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) in early 1998, NATO tried to mediate an agreement. In 23 February 1999, a tentative agreement for Kosovo' autonomy was drafted but the FRY was unwilling to endorse a lasting peace agreement. NATO forces bombarded Serbian military targets in operation ALLIED FORCE in a mission (March 24, 1999) designed to compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to pull Serbian forces out of the disputed province. NATO hoped to coerce Serbia to negotiate. Although initially expected to last only a few days, the operation continued for 78 days (June 10, 1999) until Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms. Although available, ground troops were not deployed. One day after Serbia and NATO signed an agreement, the withdrawal of

FRY forces from Kosovo began. The UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, to observe the implementation of the agreements.

Operation NOBLE ANVIL was the U.S. component of operation ALLIED FORCE. The *USS Enterprise (CV 65)* was deployed to the Adriatic Sea on 19 February and supported the buildup to the operation during 22 – 26 February 1999. The aircraft carriers *Enterprise* and *Theodore Roosevelt (CV 71)* supported by land-based squadrons and detachments, proved key to the resolution of the fighting in Kosovo. The *Kearsarge (LHD 3)* Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) operated together with the *USS Roosevelt*.

Murphy (1999) concluded: “The Navy contribution to ... the air campaign in Kosovo, although low profile, was nonetheless very significant. The Tomahawk shooters, in and of themselves, destroyed nearly 50 percent [of the] fixed target list in key categories such as the Serb army and police headquarters. ... We were able to keep nine Tomahawk shooters in-theater. Those nine sustained the air campaign in the first couple of weeks when the laser-guided bomb droppers could not find targets because of bad weather. And if it hadn't been for those nine, we would have stalled.”The [carrier] *Theodore Roosevelt* arrived 14 days after the start [of hostilities]. Nonetheless, with only 8 percent of the total dedicated aircraft [deployed by NATO], [it was] credited with 30 percent of the validated kills against fielded forces in Kosovo”.

Burg (2003, 70) describes Kosovo as a failure of coercive diplomacy.”The singular emphasis on airpower in Kosovo, and the belief among some senior U.S. policymakers that all it would take would be a few days of bombing, appears to have been based on a faulty interpretation of the events surrounding the endgame in Bosnia. This conviction, as well as concerns about the domestic political costs of committing ground troops, led U.S. policymakers to take even the possibility of deploying ground forces “off the table” and thus to weaken the coercive threat they were attempting to construct”.

Additional Sources: Baker and Evans 2001, 18, Burg 2003, 70; Murphy 1999, Rand 2001

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Kosovo	2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109	4	
CNA III	Noble Anvil	2/20/1999 - 7/2/1999, 133	Kosovo, Combat USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

CNA III	Joint Guardian	6/4/1999 - 7/20/1999, 47	Kosovo, Peacekeeping USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	
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91. # 432: *East Timor II*; 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45

On 4 November elections in East Timor resulted in a majority vote for independence from Indonesia who had controlled East Timor since 1975. This vote resulted in an outbreak of violence in East Timor where Indonesian army forces supported pro-Indonesian militias. A crisis was experienced by Australia and Indonesia. Australia, worried by the outbreak of violence and instability in relative close proximity, was committed to a peaceful settlement in contrast to Indonesia. The United Nations authorized a peace-keeping force (INTERFET) led by Australia to restore peace and security, protect refugees and provide humanitarian aid. Indonesia accepted the UN troops but remained highly critical of the Australian involvement. When on 19 October Indonesia's parliament approved East Timor's vote for independence the crisis ended. Subsequently UN troops took over the peacekeeping mission.

On 8 October the United States announced the deployment of U.S. forces, including the *USS Belleau Wood (LHA 3)* and personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, to support INTERFET. The U.S. forces provided helicopter airlifts and search and rescue missions until the peacekeeping operation was transferred from Australia to the UN. After the crisis had ended, the U.S. announced the deployment of U.S. military personnel to support of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to guarantee law and order and protect humanitarian assistance activities.

One of the lessons of the East Timor operations was the way in which naval units could conduct many different activities concurrently and for extended periods. "In a typical day in theatre, a single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling platform for maritime and land helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxations for land component personnel, provide communication facilities and support logistics over the shore" (Scott Richard quoted in Ryan 2000b, 80-81). McLaughlin (2002, 112) describes the strike

capability of naval forces as a “protective umbrella” shielding the ground forces so they could focus their attention on their peacekeeping mission without hindrance.

Additional Sources: Grimmett 2010; McLaughlin 2002; Ryan 2000b

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	East Timor II	9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45	3	
CNA III	Stabilize	9/10/1999 - 3/1/2000, 174	Indonesia, Peace Ops USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

92. # 434: Afghanistan – USA; 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001

The crisis was triggered by the Al Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. The United States accused Afghanistan of hosting the terrorists. Pakistan was implicated because of its ties to the Taliban and offered help by trying to persuade the Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. President George W. Bush declared to carry the fight to the attackers and its network of allies, especially the Taliban. Initially the world community supported the United States in its acts of self-defense. On 7 October military operations against Afghanistan began with cruise missile attacks and bombing raids. Both air and ground forces were involved. By 23 November Kabul, the capital was under U.S. control. After mediation efforts Hamid Karzai became the head of the interim government and was installed on 5 December. 2 days later Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, fell to U.S. forces. Although this brought an end to the immediate crisis, the conflict is unsettled and after 11 years Afghanistan remains critically unstable.

Naval forces played a crucial role. Within hours after the attack on the United States, naval vessels were on their way to the Arabian Gulf. One carrier was already stationed in the Indian Ocean and was soon joined by another CVBG group. Gaffney (2002, 1 – 2) calculated that it took about one month “to prepare [the U.S.] retaliatory plans, assemble the forces, and secure some initial bases as well as using existing bases in the Gulf area and Diego Garcia”. Only 5 days after the attacks the *USS Enterprise (CV 65)* and the *USS Carl Vinson (CV 70)* were in the Southwest and South Asia region. The *USS Vinson* had already departed towards the Persian Gulf in July 2001 to participate in operation SOUTHERN WATCH. After the attacks the carrier

changed route and steamed to the North Arabian Sea. When the call for action was announced on 7 October the *USS Vinson* launched the first strikes of ENDURING FREEDOM. The carrier remained in the Arabian Sea for 72 days, conducting more than 4,200 combat sorties, until mid-December. The *USS Theodore Roosevelt (CV 42)* moved her scheduled deployment date forward to 19 September. After traversing the Suez Canal on 13 October 2001 the *Roosevelt* carrier battle group arrived in the Arabian Sea on 15 October 2001. After a record breaking 159 consecutive days at sea, the carrier was relieved on 27 March 2002. The *USS Kitty Hawk (CV 73)* left port at the Yokosuka naval base for the Arabian Sea on 1 October 2001 until 23 December 2001 and flew more than 600 missions over Afghanistan, including more than 100 combat sorties. The *USS John Stennis (CV 74)* was sent to support ENDURING FREEDOM from 12 November 2001 to 28 May 2002.

An average of 200 sorties was flown per day with the same efficiency compared to 3,000 sorties a day during DESERT STORM. Whereas 10 aircraft were needed during DESERT STORM for one target, one aircraft could hit two targets during ENDURING FREEDOM. In the most intense period from 7 October to 23 December 2001, U.S. strike missions totaled in 6,500. USN carrier-based planes conducted 75% (4,900) of the strike-missions, and the Air Force 25%. Additionally the USN delivered 12,900 weapons (>70% of the total).

Additional Sources: CNN 2001; Gaffney 2002; Global Security (various); Keesing's

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Afghanistan-USA	9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001, 88	4	
CNA III	Enduring Freedom	09/16/2001 -	Combat Operations	

93. #440: Iraq Regime; 09/12/2002 – 05/01/2003

After 9/11, the Bush administration identified Iraq as the greatest threat to U.S. security, accusing Saddam Hussein of controlling weapons of mass destruction. On 12 August 2002 President Bush declared before the UN General Assembly that the United States insisted on the destruction of Iraq's weapons and termination of its weapons program. Saddam Hussein agreed to the unconditional return of the weapons inspectors. Over the next months the United States tried to gain world support for an invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq on 18 November. As part of the inspections agreement, Iraq had to provide a complete

declaration of their weapons capabilities. Iraq delivered the report but it contained, according to UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, very little new information since 1998. On 19 December the U.S. reacted and announced a breach of UN 1441, claiming that the lack of new information was a sufficient reason to invade. The United States tried to form a coalition of states supporting a military intervention. Although peaceful resolutions were still discussed, the United States viewed the inspections as a failure and strongly endorsed a military resolution. U.S. diplomatic efforts to garner support for an intervention failed, as too many nations spoke out against military action. Only the U.K. and Spain strongly supported the U.S. initiative. Yet the UN weapons inspectors continued their work in Iraq and remarked an improvement of Iraqi collaboration. On 4 March Powell stated U.S. determination to intervene in Iraq unilaterally and in mid March it had become apparent that a new UN Security Council Resolution would not pass. Following an emergency summit, the U.S., U.K., and Spain issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his sons: if they would not leave Iraq within 48 hours U.S. military forces would invade. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM was launched on 20 March with the aim of overrunning Baghdad (“shock and awe”), removing Saddam Hussein from power, and finding the weapons of mass destruction. On 9 April the coalition forces seized Baghdad. The campaign took longer and the forces met more resistance than anticipated but on 1 May President Bush declared victory on board the *USS Abraham Lincoln (CV 72)*, although Saddam Hussein had not been captured. In the following months the violence in Iraq escalated leading to an insurgency that persisted for several years. Only at the end of 2011 did the last U.S. troops leave a still unstable Iraq.

According to Keesing’s and Fox, seven carrier battle groups were deployed in support of the Iraq invasion, five in the Gulf and two in the Mediterranean. In addition there were 3 amphibious assault ships, 10 destroyers/frigates, 2 command ships and 1 submarine in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden region. In Iraq USN personnel are also active on land. The following words by CNO Admiral Roughead describe USN activity in the Middle East. “But I think many are surprised that as we deploy our Navy around the world, we have about 24,000 Sailors in the Middle East. And they are not all on ships. In fact, we have more Sailors on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan-13,600 to be exact who are there and I call them sand Sailors because we have been in that fight with the Army and Marine Corps and the other services for some time. So we have over 13,000 Sailors on the ground, some are deployed in regular units, but many are there as

individual augmentees on the ground and they bring some skills, talent and competence that the other services don't have or don't have in the numbers that they need".

Additional Sources: Global Security (various); Fox 2009, Keesing's, Roughhead 2009b

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Iraq Regime Change	9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45	3	
CNA III	OEF-Iraq	11/1/2002/3/19/2003	Show of Force USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	
CNA III	OIF	03/20/2003	Combat Operations USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

94. #441: North Korean Nuclear III; 10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004

In 2002 the U.S. concluded that North Korea was running a secret enrichment program and was in possession of the necessary technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. On 4 October a U.S. delegation, led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, visited North Korea and confronted them with the U.S. findings. While first denying the claims, North Korea later explained its action as a necessity because the U.S. branded them as part of the axis of evil, although the secret program had been discovered before 2001. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), after the IAEA did not comply with the North Korean demands of removing seals and cameras from their nuclear facilities. Initially the U.S. refused to directly negotiate with North Korea before the nuclear program was destroyed. It reversed its position when it was clear that this furthered North Korea's intransigence. In late August 2003 first talks were held between the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, Russia and North Korea. The first round resulted in a vague agreement to find a solution and to continue the talks. On 6 January 2004 North Korea agreed not to test or produce nuclear weapons.

In early February 2003 the United States alerted bombers in the Pacific to reinforce U.S. deterrence against any possible North Korean military action. By the end of May 2003 most of the B-1Bs and B-52s that had been sent to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam had returned to the United States.

Additional Sources: Global Security (various), Wolfowitz 2003

		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	North Korean Nuclear III;	10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004	2	
CNA III	North Korean Crisis	02/06/2003 – 05/17/2003, 102	North Korea, Show of Force, USN, USMC, USAF, USARMY	

95. # 451: Israel – Lebanon War II; 07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006

The crisis was triggered on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah troops invaded Lebanese territory and attacked an Israeli army patrol. Three Israeli soldiers were killed and two taken hostage and rockets were launched on Israel. Israel imposed a naval and air blockade and attacked targets in Southern Lebanon (Operation JUST REWARD). Hezbollah justified the attack on the soldiers as means of drawing attention to the Arabs, Palestinians and Lebanese held in Israeli prisons. Further Israeli attacks in Lebanon, led to a high number of civilian casualties and the evacuation of thousands of Lebanese citizens. The international community encouraged both parties to reach a cease-fire. The mediation efforts of Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, were unsuccessful. The U.S., UN, EU, and the World Bank met to discuss ways of ending the crisis and the League of Arab Nations appealed to the UN to protect Lebanon. The fighting however continued and the violence escalated. Only when the parties agreed to the UN Security Council Resolution 1701 did a cease fire become possible. On 14 August the hostilities officially terminated when the cease fire came into effect but de facto some minor clashes continued until late August. Lebanon did not join the military conflict but focused on mediation and negotiation. On 8 September the Israeli sea and air blockades were lifted, marking end of the crisis. The U.S. supplied Israel with precision-guided bombs and evacuated U.S. citizens from Lebanon.

U.S. evacuation operations began on 16 July 2006. Naval and Marine Corps forces evacuated U.S. citizens to Cyprus. A smaller number of people were evacuated by Marine helicopters. On 17 July the U.S. announced the chartering of the cruise ship *Orient Queen* to evacuate U.S. citizens. The ship left Beirut on 19 July with 900 people aboard. The cruise ship, heading to Cyprus, was being escorted by the *USS Gonzalez (DDG 66)*. Additionally U.S. sailors and marines from the *Iwo Jima (LHD 7)* Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with the ships *Iwo Jima*, *USS Nashville (LPD 13)*, *USS Whidbey Island (LSD 41)*, *USS Trenton (LPD 14)* and High Speed Vessel *Swift (HSV 2)* supported the operation. With the deployment of the *USS Barry (DDG 52)*, *USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20)*, *USS Big Horn (T-AO 198)*, and *USS Wasp (LHD 1)* more vessels arrived in the theater. On 26 July final NEO operations were carried out by U.S. military forces. A total of almost 14,000 U.S. citizens had been evacuated by sea. The NOC (2006) comes to the following conclusion after the Lebanon evacuation operation: “Our command and control capability, both afloat and ashore, as well as our ability to operate in and from the world’s oceans, will continue to make our forces well suited for global crisis response in the future”.

Additional Sources: Global Security: Lebanon Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) 2006; NOC 2006

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Israel – Lebanon War II	07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006	3	
	Lebanon NEO Operation 2006	07/16/2006 – 07/26/2006, 10	Lebanon, NEO, USN, USMC	0 CV & AMP

96. # 452: Ethiopia Invasion Somalia; 10/09/2006 – 01/02/2007²²

The crisis broke out when Somali soldiers, supported by Ethiopian forces, temporarily took over a strategic town in the South of Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), in control of Mogadishu and most of South Somalia issued a fatah declaring war on Ethiopia. Meanwhile fighting between the UIC and the transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia continued. When the UIC announced the capture of an Ethiopian officer, Ethiopia confessed the deployment of military advisers to Somalia. Despite mediation attempts by Sudan, fighting between Islamic forces and Ethiopian forces erupted in northern Somalia in early November. On 6 December the UN Security Council passed a U.S. backed resolution authorizing regional peacekeeping forces. The arms embargo in effect against Somalia was weakened as a result. The African Union also sought a resolution to the crisis, but hostilities continued and tensions escalated. In mid-December Yemen tried to mediate between the parties to no avail. Ethiopia refused to withdraw from Somalia. The United States supported Ethiopia’s right of self defense. On 2 January

²² Because I was not able to determine with sufficient certainty whether USN involvement occurred during the ICB crisis period this case was excluded from the statistical analyses.

Ethiopia achieved victory through the defeat of the UIC, and it announced the withdrawal of the troops. The United States had supported Ethiopia with military aid and equipment. Reuters reported that according to diplomats United States had provided Ethiopia with surveillance and intelligence information. According to Axe (2008), “U.S. Army advisers from the Guam National Guard trained Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian aircraft flew with U.S.-funded parts. And American warplanes targeted suspected terrorists at the same time that the Ethiopian army and its allies in the Baidoa-based transitional government forces routed Islamic Courts fighters that Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said had been on the cusp of "Talibanizing" Somalia”. The Associate Press (2007) printed the following information: “U.S. Defense Department officials said last month that a Navy strike group being sent to the Persian Gulf region as a show of force to Iran, at odds with the United States over its nuclear program and over Iraq, also would be available to help off Somalia. A U.S. Navy officer in the Gulf said Friday that the only U.S. aircraft carrier in the region, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, out of Norfolk, Virginia, was not being deployed to the Somali coast. The officer said he could not discuss the possibility of other carriers moving into the zone. However, the officer, noting media reports about another aircraft carrier, the USS John Stennis, said it as of yesterday had not been ordered to move to the region. The officer asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue”. In the New York Times Gettleman (2007) wrote “Islamists were widely believed to have been sheltering several wanted terrorists, and American officials said they were hoping to use the swift collapse of the Islamist forces as an opportunity to capture men they have been chasing for years. Ships from the Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy, based in Bahrain, have increased patrols off Somalia’s coast to prevent any suspects from escaping. “Yes, we have a presence out there,” said Lt. Denise Garcia, a spokeswoman for the Fifth Fleet”²³.

Additional Sources: Associated Press 2007, Axe 2008, Gettleman 2007, Reuters 2007

Dataset		Dates	U.S. Response	Ships involved
ICB	Ethiopia Invasion Somalia	10/09/2006 – 01/02/2007	3	
	?	?	?	?

²³ The engagement of the USN in Somalia can also be attributed to the growing piracy concerns. While in late 2007 the number of incidents had not reached their peak yet, pirates were active in the region. However, the counter-piracy Combined Task Force 151 was only established in January 2009 (United States Navy 2009d).

Appendix B: Data

B.1. Variable Codebook²⁴

B.1.1. Dependent Variables

Y1 – Y3 refers to all the different service type combination variables: *servicetype1*, *servicetype2* and *USNUMCTEAM*. All three variations are explained in detail in Chapter 3.

ATTITUDE TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT (y4)

Based on the ICB2 variable *usfavr*, this variable was transformed into *usfavr2*.

<i>usfavr</i>	<i>usfavr2 (y4)</i>
(1) U.S. activity viewed favorably	(1) U.S. activity viewed favorably
(2) U.S. activity viewed neutrally	(2) U.S. activity viewed neutrally
(3) U.S. activity viewed unfavorably	(3) U.S. activity viewed unfavorably
(4) U.S. inactivity viewed favorable	(9) MD
(5) U.S. inactivity viewed neutrally	(9) MD
(6) U.S. inactivity viewed unfavorably	(9) MD
(8) U.S. crisis actor	(9) MD
(9) MD	(9) MD

EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y5)

This variable was adapted from the ICB1 variable *usefct*. The value “U.S. not active” was eliminated by the case selection.

<i>usefct</i>	<i>usefct2 (y5)</i>
(1) No U.S. activity	(9) No U.S. activity
(2) U.S. activity escalated the crisis	(1) U.S. activity escalated the crisis
(3) U.S. activity did not contribute to crisis abatement	(2) No contribution / Marginal contribution
(4) U.S. activity contributed marginally to crisis abatement	(2) No contribution / Marginal contribution
(5) U.S. activity had an important	(3) Important/Most important impact

²⁴ For a more detailed description of the categories please refer to the ICB1 and ICB2 codebooks online at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/>

- | | | | |
|-----|---|-----|---------------------------------|
| | impact on the crisis abatement | | |
| (6) | U.S. activity was the single most important contributor to crisis abatement | (3) | Important/Most important impact |
| (9) | MD | (9) | MD |

MOST EFFECTIVE TYPE OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y6)

The most effective type of U.S. activity is adapted from the same ICB1 variable without any modifications. The value “U.S. not involved” has already been eliminated by the case selection.

- | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------------------|
| <i>usefac</i> | | <i>usefac2 (y6)</i> | |
| (1) | U.S. not involved | (9) | MD |
| (2) | U.S. ineffective | (1) | U.S. ineffective |
| (3) | Effective low-level U.S. activity | (2) | Effective low-level U.S. activity |
| (4) | Effective U.S. military activity | (3) | Effective U.S. military activity |
| (9) | MD | (9) | MD |

U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO PACE OF ABATEMENT (y7)

This variable was modified from the ICB1 *uspace* variable. The values “U.S. not active” and “U.S. activity delayed termination” were excluded. The former has already been eliminated by the case selection and the latter did not show enough frequencies.

- | | | | |
|---------------|--|---------------------|--|
| <i>uspace</i> | | <i>uspace2 (y7)</i> | |
| (1) | No U.S. activity | (9) | MD |
| (2) | U.S. activity delayed termination | (9) | MD |
| (3) | U.S. activity had no effect on the timing of termination | (1) | U.S. activity had no effect on the timing of termination |
| (4) | U.S. activity contributed to more rapid termination | (2) | U.S. activity contributed to more rapid termination |
| (9) | MD | (9) | MD |

DEFINITE OUTCOME (y8)

The outcome variable was adapted from the ICB2 variable *content of outcome*.

outcome

- (1) Victory
- (2) Compromise
- (3) Stalemate
- (4) Defeat
- (5) Other

- (9) MD

outcome2 (y8)

- (1) Victory
- (2) Compromise
- (3) Stalemate
- (4) Defeat
- (9) MD

- (9) MD

AGREEMENT (y9)

This variable is adapted from the ICB2 variable *form of outcome*.

outfor

- (1) Formal agreement
- (2) Semi-formal agreement
- (3) Tacit understanding
- (4) Unilateral – self
- (5) Unilateral – ally
- (6) Unilateral – adversary
- (7) Compliance
- (8) Imposed – imposer
- (9) Imposed – impose
- (10) Spillover
- (11) Other – glob. org. intervention
- (12) Other – ally
- (13) Other – internal or non-state actor
- (14) Other – misc.
- (15) Faded

- (99) MD

outfor2 (y9)

- (1) Formal agreement
- (2) Understanding
- (2) Understanding
- (3) Unilateral
- (3) Unilateral
- (3) Unilateral
- (2) Understanding
- (4) Imposed
- (4) Imposed
- (9) MD
- (9) MD
- (9) MD
- (9) MD
- (9) MD

- (9) MD

TENSION (y10)

This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scale.

outesr

- (1) Tension escalation

outesr2 (y10)

- (1) Tension escalation

(2)	Tension reduction	(2)	Tension reduction
(3)	Recent case	(3)	MD
(9)	MD	(9)	MD

SATISFACTION (y11)

This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scaled variable.

<i>outevl</i>		<i>outevl2 (y11)</i>	
(1)	All parties satisfied with content of outcome	(1)	All parties satisfied
(2)	Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied	(2)	At least one party not satisfied
(3)	Adversaries satisfied, crisis actor dissatisfied	(2)	At least one party not satisfied
(4)	All parties dissatisfied	(2)	At least one party not satisfied
(9)	MD	(9)	MD

SATISFACTION-ATTITUDE MIX (y12)

In a next step the variable actor satisfaction (y11) was combined with attitude towards U.S. activity (y4)

Satisfaction-attitude mix (y12)

(1)	Not favorable and not all satisfied
(2)	Not favorable and all satisfied
(3)	Favorable/neutral and not all satisfied
(4)	Favorable/neutral and all satisfied
(9)	MD

B.1.2. Independent VariablesGRAVITY OF VALUE THREAT (x1)

The variable gravity of threat was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into *gravcr2* and *gravcr3* by collapsing categories.

<i>gravcr</i>	<i>gravcr2 (x1a)</i>	<i>gravcr3(x1b)</i>
(1) Economic threat	(1) Low level threat	(1) Low level threat
(2) Limited military damage	(1) Low level threat	(1) Low level threat
(3) Territorial threat	(2) Territory or influence	(2) Territory
(4) Threat to influence	(2) Territory or influence	(3) Influence
(5) Threat of grave damage	(3) Grave threat	(4) Grave threat
(6) Threat to existence	(3) Grave threat	(4) Grave threat
(9) MD	(9) MD	(9) MD

ISSUES (x2)

Possible issues for the crisis actors are in the area of military-security, political-diplomatic, economic-developmental or cultural-status (ICB2). The variable *issue2* was adapted from the ICB1 variable *issues*, collapsing several categories.

<i>issue</i>	<i>issue2 (x2)</i>
(1) One issues other than military-security	(1) 1 -2 issues non military-security
(2) Two issues other than military-security	(1) 1 –2 issues non military security
(3) Military-security issue alone	(2) Military-security issue alone
(4) Two issues, including military-security	(3) 2 -4 issues
(5) Three or more issues	(3) 2 -4 issues
(9) MD	(9) MD

VIOLENCE (x3)

The variable violence was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any modifications.

violence (x3)

- (1) No violence

- (2) Minor clashes
- (3) Serious clashes
- (4) Full scale war

- (9) MD

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (x4)

The variable geographic location was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a binary variable *geogloc2* employing the categorization for strategic locations by Blechman and Kaplan 1978.

<i>geogloc</i>	<i>geogloc2 (x4)</i>
(9) Central Asia	(0) Not strategic location
(11) East Asia	(1) Strategic location
(12) South-east Asia	(1) Strategic location
(13) South Asia	(0) Not strategic location
(15) Middle East	(1) Strategic location
(20) West Africa	(0) Not strategic location
(21) North Africa	(0) Not strategic location
(22) East Africa	(0) Not strategic location
(23) Southern Africa	(0) Not strategic location
(24) Central Africa	(0) Not strategic location
(30) Euro-Asia	(0) Not strategic location
(31) East Europe	(1) Strategic location
(32) Central Europe	(1) Strategic location
(33) West Europe	(1) Strategic location
(34) North Europe	(1) Strategic location
(35) Southern Europe	(1) Strategic location
(41) North America	(9) Missing data
(42) Central America	(1) Strategic location
(43) South America	(0) Not strategic location
(51) Australasia	(0) Not strategic location
(99) MD	(9) MD

GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE (x5)

The variable geostrategic salience was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a binary variable *geostr2*.

geostr

- (1) One subsystem
- (2) More than one subsystem
- (3) Dominant system and one subsystem
- (4) Dominant system and more than one subsystem
- (5) Global system

- (9) MD

geostr2 (x5)

- (1) Subsystem
- (1) Subsystem
- (2) Dominant/Global system
- (2) Dominant/Global system
- (2) Dominant/Global system

- (9) MD

NUMBER OF ACTORS (x6)

The variables crisis actors was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes.

cractr (x6)

Metric: Total number of crisis actors.

UN INVOLVEMENT (x7)

This variable was transformed from the ICB1 variable *global organization organ most active in crisis* (globorg).

globorg

- (1) GO not in existence (1918 – 10 Jan. 1920)
- (2) No global organization activity
- (3) General/other global organization activity
- (4) (General) Assembly
- (5) (Security) Council

- (9) MD

globorg2 (x7)

- (9) MD
- (1) No UN activity
- (2) Low level UN activity
- (2) Low level UN activity
- (3) Security Council

- (9) MD

STABILITY (x8)

This variable was generated by combining the ICB2 variables government stability (gvinst) and societal unrest (socunr).

Gvinst

- (1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (4) Newly independent state, government in exile

(9) MD

socunr

- (1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis
- (4) Newly independent state, government in exile

(9) MD

For each variable values 3 and 4 were recoded into missing data. The new binary variables were combined as follows:

stability (x8)

- (1) Significant increase in governmental instability but normal level of societal unrest
- (2) Significant increase in both governmental instability and societal unrest
- (3) Normal level of government stability but significant increase in societal unrest
- (4) Both normal level

(9) MD

CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY (x9)

The variable content of U.S. activity was adapted from the ICB1 dataset. Except for the value U.S. not active all other categories were maintained. The category U.S. not active has already been eliminated by the case selection.

usinv

- (1) U.S. not active
- (2) Low-level U.S. activity
- (3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity
- (4) U.S. direct military activity
- (9) MD

usinv2 (x9)

- (9) MD
- (2) Low-level U.S. activity
- (3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity
- (4) U.S. direct military activity
- (9) MD

U.S. ACTOR IN CRISIS (x10)

The variable U.S. actor in crisis was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes.

usactor (x10)

- (1) U.S. not an actor in crisis
- (2) U.S. actor in crisis

- (9) MD

NAVAL REACTION TIME (x11)

elaps (x11)

Metric: Elapsed time between crisis trigger date and naval response start measured in numbers.

USN FORCES ABROAD (x12)

USNabroad (x12)

Metric: Number of USN personnel abroad per year. Data retrieved from Department of Defense, Deployment of Military Personnel by Country. Data is available as of 1950, for the years prior the variable was coded as missing data.