The Grand Challenges and Myths of Neural-Symbolic Computation

The construction of computational cognitive models integrating the connectionist and symbolic paradigms of artificial intelligence is a standing research issue in the field. The combination of logic-based inference and connectionist learning systems may lead to the construction of semantically sound computational cognitive models in artificial intelligence, computer and cognitive sciences. Over the last decades, results regarding the computation and learning of classical reasoning within neural networks have been promising. Nonetheless, there still remains much do be done. Artificial intelligence, cognitive and computer science are strongly based on several non-classical reasoning formalisms, methodologies and logics. In knowledge representation, distributed systems, hardware design, theorem proving, systems specification and verification classical and non-classical logics have had a great impact on theory and real-world applications. Several challenges for neural-symbolic computation are pointed out, in particular for classical and non-classical computation in connectionist systems. We also analyse myths about neural-symbolic computation and shed new light on them considering recent research advances

Platonic model of mind as an approximation to neurodynamics

Hierarchy of approximations involved in simplification of microscopic theories, from sub-cellural to the whole brain level, is presented. A new approximation to neural dynamics is described, leading to a Platonic-like model of mind based on psychological spaces. Objects and events in these spaces correspond to quasi-stable states of brain dynamics and may be interpreted from psychological point of view. Platonic model bridges the gap between neurosciences and psychological sciences. Static and dynamic versions of this model are outlined and Feature Space Mapping, a neurofuzzy realization of the static version of Platonic model, described. Categorization experiments with human subjects are analyzed from the neurodynamical and Platonic model points of view

Computational and Robotic Models of Early Language Development: A Review

We review computational and robotics models of early language learning and development. We first explain why and how these models are used to understand better how children learn language. We argue that they provide concrete theories of language learning as a complex dynamic system, complementing traditional methods in psychology and linguistics. We review different modeling formalisms, grounded in techniques from machine learning and artificial intelligence such as Bayesian and neural network approaches. We then discuss their role in understanding several key mechanisms of language development: cross-situational statistical learning, embodiment, situated social interaction, intrinsically motivated learning, and cultural evolution. We conclude by discussing future challenges for research, including modeling of large-scale empirical data about language acquisition in real-world environments. Keywords: Early language learning, Computational and robotic models, machine learning, development, embodiment, social interaction, intrinsic motivation, self-organization, dynamical systems, complexity.Comment: to appear in International Handbook on Language Development, ed. J. Horst and J. von Koss Torkildsen, Routledg

A neural-symbolic system for temporal reasoning with application to model verification and learning

The effective integration of knowledge representation, reasoning and learning into a robust computational model is one of the key challenges in Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence. In particular, temporal models have been fundamental in describing the behaviour of Computational and Neural-Symbolic Systems. Furthermore, knowledge acquisition of correct descriptions of the desired system’s behaviour is a complex task in several domains. Several efforts have been directed towards the development of tools that are capable of learning, describing and evolving software models. This thesis contributes to two major areas of Computer Science, namely Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Software Engineering. Under an AI perspective, we present a novel neural-symbolic computational model capable of representing and learning temporal knowledge in recurrent networks. The model works in integrated fashion. It enables the effective representation of temporal knowledge, the adaptation of temporal models to a set of desirable system properties and effective learning from examples, which in turn can lead to symbolic temporal knowledge extraction from the corresponding trained neural networks. The model is sound, from a theoretical standpoint, but is also tested in a number of case studies. An extension to the framework is shown to tackle aspects of verification and adaptation under the SE perspective. As regards verification, we make use of established techniques for model checking, which allow the verification of properties described as temporal models and return counter-examples whenever the properties are not satisfied. Our neural-symbolic framework is then extended to deal with different sources of information. This includes the translation of model descriptions into the neural structure, the evolution of such descriptions by the application of learning of counter examples, and also the learning of new models from simple observation of their behaviour. In summary, we believe the thesis describes a principled methodology for temporal knowledge representation, learning and extraction, shedding new light on predictive temporal models, not only from a theoretical standpoint, but also with respect to a potentially large number of applications in AI, Neural Computation and Software Engineering, where temporal knowledge plays a fundamental role

A Manifesto of Nodalism

This paper proposes the notion of Nodalism as a means describing contemporary culture and of understanding my own creative practice in electronic music composition. It draws on theories and ideas from Kirby, Bauman, Bourriaud, Deleuze, Guatarri, and Gochenour, to demonstrate how networks of ideas or connectionist neural models of cognitive behaviour can be used to contextualize, understand and become a creative tool for the creation of contemporary electronic music

A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience

When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of connectionism; and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: phenomenal experience consists in the explicit representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks. This hypothesis leads us to re-assess some common wisdom about consciousness, but, we will argue, in fruitful and ultimately plausible ways