15 research outputs found
The Prediction value
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational
importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and
a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player 's prediction
value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of when
cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member
of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a
consistency property. Every -player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV
for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV
can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some
semivalues -- including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value -- can be
interpreted in terms of informational importance.Comment: 26 pages, 2 table
Some properties for probabilistic and multinomial (probabilistic) values on cooperative games
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Optimization on 18-02-2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02331934.2016.1147035.We investigate the conditions for the coefficients of probabilistic and multinomial values of cooperative games necessary and/or sufficient in order to satisfy some properties, including marginal contributions, balanced contributions, desirability relation and null player exclusion property. Moreover, a similar analysis is conducted for transfer property of probabilistic power indices on the domain of simple games.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Essays on Cooperative Games with Restricted Cooperation and Simple Games
In this dissertation we propose and characterize new values for cooperative games with restricted cooperation and simple games. In each of the studied models parallel characterizations of different values are proposed to ease the comparison among them
Simple “Market Value” Bargaining Model for Weighted Voting Games: Characterization and Limit Theorems
Feld, Grofman and Ray (2003) offer a bargaining model for weighted voting games that is a close relative of the nucleolus and the kernel. They look for a set of weights that preserves winning coalitions that has the property of minimizing the difference between the weight of the smallest and the weight of the largest Minimum Winning Coalition. They claim that such a set of weights provides an a priori measure of a weighted voter’s bribeworthiness or market
value. Here, after reviewing the basic elements of their model, we provide a
characterization result for this model and show its links to other bargaining model
approaches in the literature. Then we offer some limit results showing that, with certain reasonable conditions on the distributions of weights, as the size of the voting body increases, the values of bribeworthiness we calculate will approach both the weights themselves and the Banzhaf scores for the weighted voting game. We also show that, even for relatively small groups using weighted voting, such as the membership of the European Council of Ministers (and its
precedessors) 1958-2003, similarities among the usual a priori power scores,
bribeworthiness/market value, and the weights themselves, will be quite strong
Game theory approach to competitive economic dynamics
This thesis deals both with non-cooperative and cooperative games in order to apply the mathematical theory to competitive dynamics arising from economics, particularly quantity competition in oligopolies and pollution reduction models in IEA (International Environmental Agreements)
Game theory approach to competitive economic dynamics
This thesis deals both with non-cooperative and cooperative games in order to apply the mathematical theory to competitive dynamics arising from economics, particularly quantity competition in oligopolies and pollution reduction models in IEA (International Environmental Agreements)
Voting Power in the EU Council of Ministers and Fair Decision Making in Distributive Politics
We analyze and evaluate the different decision rules describing the Council of Ministers of the EU starting from 1958 up to now. Most of the existing studies use the Banzhaf index (for binary voting) or the Shapley-Shubik index (for distributive politics). We argue in favor of the nucleolus as a power measure in distributive situations and an alternative to the Shapley-Shubik index. We then calculate the nucleolus and compare the results of our calculations with the conventional measures. In the second part, we analyze the power of the European citizens as measured by the nucleolus under the egalitarian criterion proposed by Felsenthal and Machover (1998), and characterize the first best situation. Based on these results we propose a methodology for the de sign of the optimal (fair) decision rules. We perform the optimization exercise for the earlier stages of the EU within a restricted domain of voting rules, and conclude that Germany should receive more than the other three large countries under the optimal voting rule