A Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Mobile Crowdsensing Service Market

Mobile Crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive Mobile Users (MUs). The MUs will participate in a Crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, in order to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient MUs, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal reward mechanism of the monopoly Crowdsensing Service Provider (CSP). We model the rewarding and participating as a two-stage game, and analyze the MUs' participation level and the CSP's optimal reward mechanism using backward induction. At the same time, the reward is designed taking the underlying social network effects amid the mobile social network into account, for motivating the participants. Namely, one MU will obtain additional benefits from information contributed or shared by local neighbours in social networks. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory reward as well as uniform reward with complete information, and approximations of reward incentive with incomplete information. Performance evaluation reveals that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the CSP. In addition, the discriminatory reward enables the CSP to extract greater surplus from this Crowdsensing service market.Comment: 7 pages, accepted by IEEE Globecom'1

A Stackelberg Game Approach Towards Socially-Aware Incentive Mechanisms for Mobile Crowdsensing (Online report)

Mobile crowdsensing has shown a great potential to address large-scale data sensing problems by allocating sensing tasks to pervasive mobile users. The mobile users will participate in a crowdsensing platform if they can receive satisfactory reward. In this paper, to effectively and efficiently recruit sufficient number of mobile users, i.e., participants, we investigate an optimal incentive mechanism of a crowdsensing service provider. We apply a two-stage Stackelberg game to analyze the participation level of the mobile users and the optimal incentive mechanism of the crowdsensing service provider using backward induction. In order to motivate the participants, the incentive is designed by taking into account the social network effects from the underlying mobile social domain. For example, in a crowdsensing-based road traffic information sharing application, a user can get a better and accurate traffic report if more users join and share their road information. We derive the analytical expressions for the discriminatory incentive as well as the uniform incentive mechanisms. To fit into practical scenarios, we further formulate a Bayesian Stackelberg game with incomplete information to analyze the interaction between the crowdsensing service provider and mobile users, where the social structure information (the social network effects) is uncertain. The existence and uniqueness of the Bayesian Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the mobile users. Numerical results corroborate the fact that the network effects tremendously stimulate higher mobile participation level and greater revenue of the crowdsensing service provider. In addition, the social structure information helps the crowdsensing service provider to achieve greater revenue gain.Comment: Submitted for possible journal publication. arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1711.0105

Incentive mechanism design for citizen reporting application using Stackelberg game

The growing utilization of smartphones equipped with various sensors to collect and analyze information around us highlights a paradigm called mobile crowdsensing. To motivate citizens’ participation in crowdsensing and compensate them for their resources, it is necessary to incentivize the participants for their sensing service. There are several studies that used the Stackelberg game to model the incentive mechanism, however, those studies did not include a budget constraint for limited budget case. Another challenge is to optimize crowdsourcer (government) profit in conducting crowdsensing under the limited budget then allocates the budget to several regional working units that are responsible for the specific city problems. We propose an incentive mechanism for mobile crowdsensing based on several identified incentive parameters using the Stackelberg game model and applied the MOOP (multi-objective optimization problem) to the incentive model in which the participant reputation is taken into account. The evaluation of the proposed incentive model is performed through simulations. The simulation indicated that the result appropriately corresponds to the theoretical properties of the model

Cloud/fog computing resource management and pricing for blockchain networks

The mining process in blockchain requires solving a proof-of-work puzzle, which is resource expensive to implement in mobile devices due to the high computing power and energy needed. In this paper, we, for the first time, consider edge computing as an enabler for mobile blockchain. In particular, we study edge computing resource management and pricing to support mobile blockchain applications in which the mining process of miners can be offloaded to an edge computing service provider. We formulate a two-stage Stackelberg game to jointly maximize the profit of the edge computing service provider and the individual utilities of the miners. In the first stage, the service provider sets the price of edge computing nodes. In the second stage, the miners decide on the service demand to purchase based on the observed prices. We apply the backward induction to analyze the sub-game perfect equilibrium in each stage for both uniform and discriminatory pricing schemes. For the uniform pricing where the same price is applied to all miners, the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium are validated by identifying the best response strategies of the miners. For the discriminatory pricing where the different prices are applied to different miners, the Stackelberg equilibrium is proved to exist and be unique by capitalizing on the Variational Inequality theory. Further, the real experimental results are employed to justify our proposed model.Comment: 16 pages, double-column version, accepted by IEEE Internet of Things Journa

An Efficient Collaboration and Incentive Mechanism for Internet-of-Vehicles (IoVs) with Secured Information Exchange Based on Blockchains

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from IEEE via the DOI in this recordWith the rapid development of Internet-of-Things (IoT), mobile crowdsensing, i.e., outsourcing sensing tasks to mobile devices or vehicles, has been proposed to address the problem of data collection in the scenarios such as smart city. Despite its benefits for a wide range of applications, mobile crowdsensing lacks an efficient incentive mechanism, restricting the development of IoT applications, especially for Internet-ofVehicles (IoV) – a typical example of IoT applications; this is because vehicles are usually reluctant to participate these sensing tasks. Moreover, in practice some sensing tasks may arrive suddenly (called an emergent task) in the IoV environment, but the resources of a single vehicle may be insufficient to handle, and thus multi-vehicles collaboration is required. In this case, the incentive mechanisms for the participation of multiple vehicles and the task scheduling for their collaborations are collectively needed. To address this important problem, we firstly propose a new model for the scenario of two vehicles collaboration, considering the situation of emergent appearance of a task. In this model, for a general sensing task, we propose a bidding mechanism to better encourage vehicles to contribute their resources, and the tasks for those vehicles are scheduled accordingly. Secondly, for an emergent task, a novel time-window based method is devised to manage the tasks among vehicles and to incent the vehicles to participate. Finally, we develop a blockchain framework to achieve the secured information exchange through smart contract for the proposed models in IoV.National Key Research and Development Program of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC)Purple Mountain Laboratory: Networking, Communications and SecurityAcademician Expert Workstation of Bitvalue Technology (Hunan) Company Limite

A Novel Methodology for designing Policies in Mobile Crowdsensing Systems

Mobile crowdsensing is a people-centric sensing system based on users' contributions and incentive mechanisms aim at stimulating them. In our work, we have rethought the design of incentive mechanisms through a game-theoretic methodology. Thus, we have introduced a multi-layer social sensing framework, where humans as social sensors interact on multiple social layers and various services. We have proposed to weigh these dynamic interactions by including the concept of homophily and we have modelled the evolutionary dynamics of sensing behaviours by defining a mathematical framework based on multiplex EGT, quantifying the impact of homophily, network heterogeneity and various social dilemmas. We have detected the configurations of social dilemmas and network structures that lead to the emergence and sustainability of human cooperation. Moreover, we have defined and evaluated local and global Nash equilibrium points by including the concepts of homophily and heterogeneity. We have analytically defined and measured novel statistical measures of social honesty, QoI and users' behavioural reputation scores based on the evolutionary dynamics. We have defined the Decision Support System and a novel incentive mechanism by operating on the policies in terms of users' reputation scores, that also incorporate users' behaviours other than quality and quantity of contributions. Experimentally, we have considered the Waze dataset on vehicular traffic monitoring application and derived the disbursement of incentives comparing our method with baselines. Results demonstrate that our methodology, which also includes the local (microscopic) spatio-temporal distribution of behaviours, is able to better discriminate users' behaviours. This multi-scale characterisation of users represents a novel research direction and paves the way for novel policies on mobile crowdsensing systems

Crowdcloud: A Crowdsourced System for Cloud Infrastructure

The widespread adoption of truly portable, smart devices and Do-It-Yourself computing platforms by the general public has enabled the rise of new network and system paradigms. This abundance of wellconnected, well-equipped, affordable devices, when combined with crowdsourcing methods, enables the development of systems with the aid of the crowd. In this work, we introduce the paradigm of Crowdsourced Systems, systems whose constituent infrastructure, or a significant part of it, is pooled from the general public by following crowdsourcing methodologies. We discuss the particular distinctive characteristics they carry and also provide their “canonical” architecture. We exemplify the paradigm by also introducing Crowdcloud, a crowdsourced cloud infrastructure where crowd members can act both as cloud service providers and cloud service clients. We discuss its characteristic properties and also provide its functional architecture. The concepts introduced in this work underpin recent advances in the areas of mobile edge/fog computing and co-designed/cocreated systems

A crowdsensing method for water resource monitoring in smart communities

Crowdsensing aims to empower a large group of individuals to collect large amounts of data using their mobile devices, with the goal of sharing the collected data. Existing crowdsensing studies do not consider all the activities and methods of the crowdsensing process and the key success factors related to the process. Nor do they investigate the profile and behaviour of potential participants. The aim of this study was to design a crowdsensing method for water resource monitoring in smart communities. This study opted for an exploratory study using the Engaged Scholarship approach, which allows the study of complex real-world problems based on the different perspectives of key stakeholders. The proposed Crowdsensing Method considers the social, technical and programme design components. The study proposes a programme design for the Crowdsensing Methodwhich is crowdsensing ReferenceFrameworkthat includes Crowdsensing Processwith key success factors and guidelines that should be considered in each phase of the process. The method also uses the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) to investigate citizens’intention to participate in crowdsensing for water resource monitoring and explores their attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control on these intentions. Understanding the profiles of potential participants can assist with designing crowdsensing systems with appropriate incentive mechanisms to achieve adequate user participation and good service quality. A survey was conducted to validate the theoretical TB model in a real-world context. Regression and correlation analyses demonstrated that the attitudes, norms and perceived behavioural control can be used to predict participants’ intention to participate in crowdsensing for water resource monitoring. The survey results assisted with the development of an Incentive Mechanism as part of the Crowdsensing Method. This mechanism incorporates recruitment and incentive policies, as well as guidelines derived from the literature review and extant system analysis. The policies, called the OverSensepolicies, provide guidance for recruitment and rewarding of participants using the popular Stackelberg technique. The policies were evaluated using simulation experiments with a data set provided by the case study, the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. The results of the simulation experiments illustrated that the OverSenserecruitmentpolicycan reduce the computing resources required for the recruitment of participants and that the recruitment policy performs better than random or naïve recruitment policies. The proposed Crowdsensing Method was evaluated using an ecosystem of success factors for mobile-based interventions identified in the literature and the Crowdsensing Method adhered to a majority (90%) of the success factors. This study also contributes information systems design theory by proposing several sets of guidelines for crowdsensing projects and the development of crowdsensing systems. This study fulfils an identified need to study the applicability of crowdsensing for water resource monitoring and explores how a crowdsensing method can create a smart community

Proximity as a Service via Cellular Network-Assisted Mobile Device-to-Device

PhD ThesisThe research progress of communication has brought a lot of novel technologies to meet the multi-dimensional demands such as pervasive connection, low delay and high bandwidth. Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is a way to no longer treat the User Equipment (UEs) as a terminal, but rather as a part of the network for service provisioning. This thesis decouples UEs into service providers (helpers) and service requesters. By collaboration among proximal devices, with the coordination of cellular networks, some local tasks can be achieved, such as coverage extension, computation o oading, mobile crowdsourcing and mobile crowdsensing. This thesis proposes a generic framework Proximity as a Service (PaaS) for increasing the coverage with demands of service continuity. As one of the use cases, the optimal helper selection algorithm of PaaS for increasing the service coverage with demands of service continuity is called ContAct based Proximity (CAP). Mainly, fruitful contact information (e.g., contact duration, frequency, and interval) is captured, and is used to handle ubiquitous proximal services through the optimal selection of helpers. The nature of PaaS is evaluated under the Helsinki city scenario, with movement model of Points Of Interest (POI) and with critical factors in uencing the service demands (e.g., success ratio, disruption duration and frequency). Simulation results show the advantage of CAP, in both success ratio and continuity of the service (outputs). Based on this perspective, metrics such as service success ratio and continuity as a service evaluation of the PaaS are evaluated using the statistical theory of the Design Of Experiments (DOE). DOE is used as there are many dimensions to the state space (access tolerance, selected helper number, helper access limit, and transmit range) that can in uence the results. A key contribution of this work is that it brings rigorous statistical experiment design methods into the research into mobile computing. Results further reveal the influence of four factors (inputs), e.g., service tolerance, number of helpers allocated, the number of concurrent devices supported by each helper and transmit range. Based on this perspective, metrics such as service success ratio and continuity are evaluated using DOE. The results show that transmit range is the most dominant factor. The number of selected helpers is the second most dominant factor. Since di erent factors have di erent regression levels, a uni ed 4 level full factorial experiment and a cubic multiple regression analysis have been carried out. All the interactions and the corresponding coe cients have been found. This work is the rst one to evaluate LTE-Direct and WiFi-Direct in an opportunistic proximity service. The contribution of the results for industry is to guide how many users need to cooperate to enable mobile computing and for academia. This reveals the facts that: 1, in some cases, the improvement of spectrum e ciency brought by D2D is not important; 2, nodal density and the resources used in D2D air-interfaces are important in the eld of mobile computing. This work built a methodology to study the D2D networks with a di erent perspective (PaaS)