Strongly Polynomial Primal-Dual Algorithms for Concave Cost Combinatorial Optimization Problems

We introduce an algorithm design technique for a class of combinatorial optimization problems with concave costs. This technique yields a strongly polynomial primal-dual algorithm for a concave cost problem whenever such an algorithm exists for the fixed-charge counterpart of the problem. For many practical concave cost problems, the fixed-charge counterpart is a well-studied combinatorial optimization problem. Our technique preserves constant factor approximation ratios, as well as ratios that depend only on certain problem parameters, and exact algorithms yield exact algorithms. Using our technique, we obtain a new 1.61-approximation algorithm for the concave cost facility location problem. For inventory problems, we obtain a new exact algorithm for the economic lot-sizing problem with general concave ordering costs, and a 4-approximation algorithm for the joint replenishment problem with general concave individual ordering costs

Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions

We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant curves and quantity-based side constraints. We develop a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a (1+ε) approximation in worst-case time T=O(n3/ε), given n bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of O(T log n). The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by εV/(1+ε), where V is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.Engineering and Applied Science

Hardness of Graph Pricing through Generalized Max-Dicut

The Graph Pricing problem is among the fundamental problems whose approximability is not well-understood. While there is a simple combinatorial 1/4-approximation algorithm, the best hardness result remains at 1/2 assuming the Unique Games Conjecture (UGC). We show that it is NP-hard to approximate within a factor better than 1/4 under the UGC, so that the simple combinatorial algorithm might be the best possible. We also prove that for any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $\delta > 0$ such that the integrality gap of $n^{\delta}$-rounds of the Sherali-Adams hierarchy of linear programming for Graph Pricing is at most 1/2 + $\epsilon$. This work is based on the effort to view the Graph Pricing problem as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) simpler than the standard and complicated formulation. We propose the problem called Generalized Max-Dicut($T$), which has a domain size $T + 1$ for every $T \geq 1$. Generalized Max-Dicut(1) is well-known Max-Dicut. There is an approximation-preserving reduction from Generalized Max-Dicut on directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to Graph Pricing, and both our results are achieved through this reduction. Besides its connection to Graph Pricing, the hardness of Generalized Max-Dicut is interesting in its own right since in most arity two CSPs studied in the literature, SDP-based algorithms perform better than LP-based or combinatorial algorithms --- for this arity two CSP, a simple combinatorial algorithm does the best.Comment: 28 page

Envy Freedom and Prior-free Mechanism Design

We consider the provision of an abstract service to single-dimensional agents. Our model includes position auctions, single-minded combinatorial auctions, and constrained matching markets. When the agents' values are drawn from a distribution, the Bayesian optimal mechanism is given by Myerson (1981) as a virtual-surplus optimizer. We develop a framework for prior-free mechanism design and analysis. A good mechanism in our framework approximates the optimal mechanism for the distribution if there is a distribution; moreover, when there is no distribution this mechanism still performs well. We define and characterize optimal envy-free outcomes in symmetric single-dimensional environments. Our characterization mirrors Myerson's theory. Furthermore, unlike in mechanism design where there is no point-wise optimal mechanism, there is always a point-wise optimal envy-free outcome. Envy-free outcomes and incentive-compatible mechanisms are similar in structure and performance. We therefore use the optimal envy-free revenue as a benchmark for measuring the performance of a prior-free mechanism. A good mechanism is one that approximates the envy free benchmark on any profile of agent values. We show that good mechanisms exist, and in particular, a natural generalization of the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. (2001) is a constant approximation

Laplacian Mixture Modeling for Network Analysis and Unsupervised Learning on Graphs

Laplacian mixture models identify overlapping regions of influence in unlabeled graph and network data in a scalable and computationally efficient way, yielding useful low-dimensional representations. By combining Laplacian eigenspace and finite mixture modeling methods, they provide probabilistic or fuzzy dimensionality reductions or domain decompositions for a variety of input data types, including mixture distributions, feature vectors, and graphs or networks. Provable optimal recovery using the algorithm is analytically shown for a nontrivial class of cluster graphs. Heuristic approximations for scalable high-performance implementations are described and empirically tested. Connections to PageRank and community detection in network analysis demonstrate the wide applicability of this approach. The origins of fuzzy spectral methods, beginning with generalized heat or diffusion equations in physics, are reviewed and summarized. Comparisons to other dimensionality reduction and clustering methods for challenging unsupervised machine learning problems are also discussed.Comment: 13 figures, 35 reference

Mechanisms for Multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions with a Few Distinct Goods

We design and analyze deterministic truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-unit Combinatorial Auctions involving only a constant number of distinct goods, each in arbitrary limited supply. Prospective buyers (bidders) have preferences over multisets of items, i.e., for more than one unit per distinct good. Our objective is to determine allocations of multisets that maximize the Social Welfare. Our main results are for multi-minded and submodular bidders. In the first setting each bidder has a positive value for being allocated one multiset from a prespecified demand set of alternatives. In the second setting each bidder is associated to a submodular valuation function that defines his value for the multiset he is allocated. For multi-minded bidders, we design a truthful Fptas that fully optimizes the Social Welfare, while violating the supply constraints on goods within factor (1 + ), for any fixed > 0 (i.e., the approximation applies to the constraints and not to the Social Welfare). This result is best possible, in that full optimization is impossible without violating the supply constraints. For submodular bidders, we obtain a Ptas that approximates the optimum Social Welfare within factor (1 + ), for any fixed > 0, without violating the supply constraints. This result is best possible as well. Our allocation algorithms are Maximal-in-Range and yield truthful mechanisms, when paired with Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments

Algorithms to Approximate Column-Sparse Packing Problems

Column-sparse packing problems arise in several contexts in both deterministic and stochastic discrete optimization. We present two unifying ideas, (non-uniform) attenuation and multiple-chance algorithms, to obtain improved approximation algorithms for some well-known families of such problems. As three main examples, we attain the integrality gap, up to lower-order terms, for known LP relaxations for k-column sparse packing integer programs (Bansal et al., Theory of Computing, 2012) and stochastic k-set packing (Bansal et al., Algorithmica, 2012), and go "half the remaining distance" to optimal for a major integrality-gap conjecture of Furedi, Kahn and Seymour on hypergraph matching (Combinatorica, 1993).Comment: Extended abstract appeared in SODA 2018. Full version in ACM Transactions of Algorithm