Animal moral psychologies

Observations of animals engaging in apparently moral behavior have led academics and the public alike to ask whether morality is shared between humans and other animals. Some philosophers explicitly argue that morality is unique to humans, because moral agency requires capacities that are only demonstrated in our species. Other philosophers argue that some animals can participate in morality because they possess these capacities in a rudimentary form. Scientists have also joined the discussion, and their views are just as varied as the philosophers’. Some research programs examine whether animals countenance specific human norms, such as fairness. Other research programs investigate the cognitive and affective capacities thought to be necessary for morality. There are two sets of concerns that can be raised by these debates. They sometimes suffer from there being no agreed upon theory of morality and no clear account of whether there is a demarcation between moral and social behavior; that is, they lack a proper philosophical foundation. They also sometimes suffer from there being disagreement about the psychological capacities evident in animals. Of these two sets of concerns—the nature of the moral and the scope of psychological capacities—we aim to take on only the second. In this chapter we defend the claim that animals have three sets of capacities that, on some views, are taken as necessary and foundational for moral judgment and action. These are capacities of care, capacities of autonomy, and normative capacities. Care, we argue, is widely found among social animals. Autonomy and normativity are more recent topics of empirical investigation, so while there is less evidence of these capacities at this point in our developing scientific knowledge, the current data is strongly suggestive

A society of mind approach to cognition and metacognition in a cognitive architecture

This thesis investigates the concept of mind as a control system using the "Society of Agents" metaphor. "Society of Agents" describes collective behaviours of simple and intelligent agents. "Society of Mind" is more than a collection of task-oriented and deliberative agents; it is a powerful concept for mind research and can benefit from the use of metacognition. The aim is to develop a self configurable computational model using the concept of metacognition. A six tiered SMCA (Society of Mind Cognitive Architecture) control model is designed that relies on a society of agents operating using metrics associated with the principles of artificial economics in animal cognition. This research investigates the concept of metacognition as a powerful catalyst for control, unify and self-reflection. Metacognition is used on BDI models with respect to planning, reasoning, decision making, self reflection, problem solving, learning and the general process of cognition to improve performance.One perspective on how to develop metacognition in a SMCA model is based on the differentiation between metacognitive strategies and metacomponents or metacognitive aids. Metacognitive strategies denote activities such as metacomphrension (remedial action) and metamanagement (self management) and schema training (meaning full learning over cognitive structures). Metacomponents are aids for the representation of thoughts. To develop an efficient, intelligent and optimal agent through the use of metacognition requires the design of a multiple layered control model which includes simple to complex levels of agent action and behaviours. This SMCA model has designed and implemented for six layers which includes reflexive, reactive, deliberative (BDI), learning (Q-Ieamer), metacontrol and metacognition layers

Intending to be ethical: An examination of consumer choice in sweatshop avoidance

While much research in ethical consumption has focused on contexts such as food, this research explores ethical consumer decision-making in the context of intention to avoid sweatshop apparel. This research seeks to deepen the Theory of Planned Behavior with respect to the motivation and volitional stages underlying behavior. The findings of the research, based on 794 consumers, are novel and support an enriched framework which reveals that the role of attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioral control are mediated by desire, intention and plan. The findings have implications for research seeking to address the ‘intention-behavior’ gap

A Simple-to-Use BDI Architecture for Agent-Based Modeling and Simulation

With the increase of computing power and the development of user-friendly multi-agent simulation frameworks, social simulations have become increasingly realistic. However, most agent architectures in these simulations use simple reactive models. Cognitive architectures face two main obstacles: their complexity for the field-expert modeler, and their computational cost. In this paper, we propose a new cognitive agent architecture based on the Belief-Desire-Intention paradigm integrated into the GAMA modeling platform. Based on the GAML modeling language, this architecture was designed to be simple-to-use for modelers, flexible enough to manage complex behaviors, and with low computational cost. This architecture is illustrated with a simulation of the evolution of land-use in the Mekong Delta

The Current State of Normative Agent-Based Systems

Recent years have seen an increase in the application of ideas from the social sciences to computational systems. Nowhere has this been more pronounced than in the domain of multiagent systems. Because multiagent systems are composed of multiple individual agents interacting with each other many parallels can be drawn to human and animal societies. One of the main challenges currently faced in multiagent systems research is that of social control. In particular, how can open multiagent systems be configured and organized given their constantly changing structure? One leading solution is to employ the use of social norms. In human societies, social norms are essential to regulation, coordination, and cooperation. The current trend of thinking is that these same principles can be applied to agent societies, of which multiagent systems are one type. In this article, we provide an introduction to and present a holistic viewpoint of the state of normative computing (computational solutions that employ ideas based on social norms.) To accomplish this, we (1) introduce social norms and their application to agent-based systems; (2) identify and describe a normative process abstracted from the existing research; and (3) discuss future directions for research in normative multiagent computing. The intent of this paper is to introduce new researchers to the ideas that underlie normative computing and survey the existing state of the art, as well as provide direction for future research.Norms, Normative Agents, Agents, Agent-Based System, Agent-Based Simulation, Agent-Based Modeling

A Simple-to-use BDI architecture for Agent-based Modeling and Simulation

International audienceWith the increase of computing power and the development of user-friendly multi-agent simulation frameworks, social simulations have become increasingly realistic. However, most agent architectures in these simulations use simple reactive models. Cognitive architectures face two main obstacles: their complexity for the field-expert modeler, and their computational cost. In this paper , we propose a new cognitive agent architecture based on the BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) paradigm integrated into the GAMA modeling platform. Based on the GAML modeling language, this architecture was designed to be simple-to-use for modelers, flexible enough to manage complex behaviors, and with low computational cost. This architecture is illustrated with a simulation of the evolution of land use in the Mekong Delta

Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility

In light of the abundance of studies focusing on the genetic contributions to addiction, Morse develops a meaningful background on the legal and scientific images of behavior, the disease concept of addiction, and the aspects of addiction for which a person may be held legally accountable

ABC-EBDI: A cognitive-affective framework to support the modeling of believable intelligent agents.

El Grupo de Investigación de Interfaces Avanzadas (AffectiveLab), es un grupo reconocido por el Gobierno de Aragón (T60-20R) cuya actividad se enmarca en el área de la Interacción Humano-Computadora (IHC). Su actividad investigadora se ha centrado, en los últimos años, en cuatro temas principales: interacción natural, informática afectiva, accesibilidad e interfaces basadas en agentes inteligentes, siendo esta última en la que se enmarca esta tesis doctoral. Más concretamente, la realización de esta tesis doctoral se enmarca dentro de los proyectos de investigación nacionales JUGUEMOS (TIN2015-67149-C3-1R) y PERGAMEX (RTI2018-096986-B-C31). Una de sus líneas de investigación se centra en el desarrollo de arquitecturas cognitivo-afectivas para apoyar el modelado afectivo de los agentes inteligentes. El AffectiveLab tiene una sólida experiencia en el uso de agentes de interfaz incorporados que exhiben expresiones afectivas corporales y faciales (Baldassarri et al., 2008). En los últimos años, se han centrado en el modelado del comportamiento de los agentes inteligentes (Pérez et al., 2017).La definición de agente inteligente es un tema controvertido, pero se puede decir que es una entidad autónoma que recibe información dinámica del entorno a través de sensores y actúa sobre el medio ambiente a través de actuadores, mostrando un comportamiento dirigido a un objetivo (Russell et al., 2003). El modelado de los procesos cognitivos en los agentes inteligentes se basa en diferentes teorías (Moore, 1980; Newell, 1994; Bratman, 1987) que explican, desde diferentes puntos de vista, el funcionamiento de la mente humana. Los agentes inteligentes implementados sobre la base de una teoría cognitiva se conocen como agentes cognitivos. Los más desarrollados son los que se basan en arquitecturas cognitivas, como Soar (Laird et al., 1987), ACT-R (Anderson, 1993) y BDI (Rao and Georgeff, 1995). Comparado con Soar y otras arquitecturas complejas, BDI se destaca por su simplicidad y versatilidad. BDI ofrece varias características que la hacen popular, como su capacidad para explicar el comportamiento del agente en cada momento, haciendo posible una interacción dinámica con el entorno. Debido a la creciente popularidad del marco BDI se ha utilizado para apoyar el modelado de agentes inteligentes (Larsen, 2019; (Cranefield and Dignum, 2019). En los últimos años, también han aparecido propuestas de BDI que integran aspectos afectivos. Los agentes inteligentes construidos en base a la arquitectura BDI que también incorporan capacidades afectivas, se conocen como agentes EBDI (Emotional BDI) y son el foco de esta tesis. El objetivo principal de esta tesis ha sido proponer un marco cognitivo-afectivo basado en el BDI que sustente el modelado cognitivo-afectivo de los agentes inteligentes. La finalidad es ser capaz de reproducir un comportamiento humano creíble en situaciones complejas donde el comportamiento humano es variado y bastante impredecible. El objetivo propuesto se ha logrado con éxito en los términos descritos a continuación:• Se ha elaborado un exhaustivo estado del arte relacionado con los modelos afectivos más utilizados para modelar los aspectos afectivos en los agentes inteligentes.• Se han estudiado las arquitecturas de BDI y las propuestas previas de EBDI. El estudio, que dio lugar a una publicación (Sánchez-López and Cerezo, 2019), permitió detectar las cuestiones abiertas en el área, y la necesidad de considerar todos los aspectos de la afectividad (emociones, estado de ánimo, personalidad) y su influencia en todas las etapas cognitivas. El marco resultante de este trabajo doctoral incluye también el modelado de la conducta y el comportamiento comunicativo, que no habían sido considerados hasta ahora en el modelado de los agentes inteligentes. Estos aspectos colocan al marco resultante entre EBDI los más avanzados de la literatura. • Se ha diseñado e implementado un marco basado en el BDI para soportar el modelado cognitivo, afectivo y conductual de los agentes inteligentes, denominado ABC-EBDI (Sanchez et al., 2020) (Sánchez et al., 2019). Se trata de la primera aplicación de un modelo psicológico muy conocido, el modelo ABC de Ellis, a la simulación de agentes inteligentes humanos realistas. Esta aplicación implica:o La ampliación del concepto de creencias. En el marco se consideran tres tipos de creencias: creencias básicas, creencias de contexto y comportamientos operantes. Las creencias básicas representan la información general que el agente tiene sobre sí mismo y el entorno. Las conductas operantes permiten modelar la conducta reactiva del agente a través de las conductas aprendidas. Las creencias de contexto, que se representan en forma de cogniciones frías y calientes, se procesan para clasificarlas en creencias irracionales y racionales siguiendo las ideas de Ellis. Es la consideración de creencias irracionales/racionales porque abre la puerta a la simulación de reacciones humanas realistas.o La posibilidad de gestionar de forma unificada las consecuencias de los acontecimientos en términos de consecuencias afectivas y de comportamiento (conducta). Las creencias de contexto racionales conducen a emociones funcionales y a una conducta adaptativa, mientras que las creencias de contexto irracionales conducen a emociones disfuncionales y a una conducta maladaptativa. Este carácter funcional/disfuncional de las emociones no se había utilizado nunca antes en el contexto del BDI. Además, el modelado conductual se ha ampliado con el modelado de estilos comunicativos, basado en el modelo Satir, tampoco aplicado previamente al modelado de agentes inteligentes. El modelo de Satir considera gestos corporales, expresiones faciales, voz, entonación y estructuras lingüísticas.• Se ha elegido un caso de uso, "I wish a had better news" para la aplicación del marco propuesto y se han realizado dos tipos de evaluaciones, por parte de expertos y de usuarios. La evaluación ha confirmado el gran potencial del marco propuesto para reproducir un comportamiento humano realista y creíble en situaciones complejas.<br /

Resolved and unresolved bioethical authenticity problems

Respect for autonomy is a central moral principle in bioethics. It is sometimes argued that authenticity, i.e., being “real,” “genuine,” “true to oneself,” or similar, is crucial to a person’s autonomy. Patients sometimes make what appears to be inauthentic decisions, such as when anorexia nervosa patients refuse treatment to avoid gaining weight, despite that the risk of harm is very high. If such decisions are inauthentic, and therefore non-autonomous, it may be the case they should be overridden for paternalist reasons. However, it is not clear what justifies the judgment that someone or something is inauthentic. This article discusses one recent theory of what justifies judgments of inauthenticity. It is argued that the theory is seriously limited, as it only provides guidance in three out of nine identified cases. There are at least six authenticity-related problems to be solved, and autonomy theorists thus have reason to engage with the topic of authenticity in practical biomedicine

The Counterfactual Theory of Free Will: A Genuinely Deterministic Form of Soft Determinism

I argue for a soft compatibilist theory of free will, i.e., such that free will is compatible with both determinism and indeterminism, directly opposite hard incompatibilism, which holds free will incompatible both with determinism and indeterminism. My intuitions in this book are primarily based on an analysis of meditation, but my arguments are highly syncretic, deriving from many fields, including behaviorism, psychology, conditioning and deconditioning theory, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, simulation theory, etc. I offer a causal/functional analysis of meta-mental control, or 'metacausality', cashed out in counterfactual terms, to solve what I call the easy problem of free will