42 research outputs found
Security and Privacy of IP-ICN Coexistence: A Comprehensive Survey
Internet usage has changed from its first design. Hence, the current Internet
must cope with some limitations, including performance degradation,
availability of IP addresses, and multiple security and privacy issues.
Nevertheless, to unsettle the current Internet's network layer i.e., Internet
Protocol with ICN is a challenging, expensive task. It also requires worldwide
coordination among Internet Service Providers , backbone, and Autonomous
Services. Additionally, history showed that technology changes e.g., from 3G to
4G, from IPv4 to IPv6 are not immediate, and usually, the replacement includes
a long coexistence period between the old and new technology. Similarly, we
believe that the process of replacement of the current Internet will surely
transition through the coexistence of IP and ICN. Although the tremendous
amount of security and privacy issues of the current Internet taught us the
importance of securely designing the architectures, only a few of the proposed
architectures place the security-by-design. Therefore, this article aims to
provide the first comprehensive Security and Privacy analysis of the
state-of-the-art coexistence architectures. Additionally, it yields a
horizontal comparison of security and privacy among three deployment approaches
of IP and ICN protocol i.e., overlay, underlay, and hybrid and a vertical
comparison among ten considered security and privacy features. As a result of
our analysis, emerges that most of the architectures utterly fail to provide
several SP features including data and traffic flow confidentiality,
availability and communication anonymity. We believe this article draws a
picture of the secure combination of current and future protocol stacks during
the coexistence phase that the Internet will definitely walk across
Parallel Processes in HPX: Designing an Infrastructure for Adaptive Resource Management
Advancement in cutting edge technologies have enabled better energy efficiency as well as scaling computational power for the latest High Performance Computing(HPC) systems. However, complexity, due to hybrid architectures as well as emerging classes of applications, have shown poor computational scalability using conventional execution models. Thus alternative means of computation, that addresses the bottlenecks in computation, is warranted. More precisely, dynamic adaptive resource management feature, both from systems as well as application\u27s perspective, is essential for better computational scalability and efficiency. This research presents and expands the notion of Parallel Processes as a placeholder for procedure definitions, targeted at one or more synchronous domains, meta data for computation and resource management as well as infrastructure for dynamic policy deployment. In addition to this, the research presents additional guidelines for a framework for resource management in HPX runtime system. Further, this research also lists design principles for scalability of Active Global Address Space (AGAS), a necessary feature for Parallel Processes. Also, to verify the usefulness of Parallel Processes, a preliminary performance evaluation of different task scheduling policies is carried out using two different applications. The applications used are: Unbalanced Tree Search, a reference dynamic graph application, implemented by this research in HPX and MiniGhost, a reference stencil based application using bulk synchronous parallel model. The results show that different scheduling policies provide better performance for different classes of applications; and for the same application class, in certain instances, one policy fared better than the others, while vice versa in other instances, hence supporting the hypothesis of the need of dynamic adaptive resource management infrastructure, for deploying different policies and task granularities, for scalable distributed computing
Small TCBs of policy-controlled operating systems
IT Systeme mit qualitativ hohen Sicherheitsanforderungen verwenden zur
Beschreibung, Analyse und Implementierung ihrer Sicherheitseigenschaften
zunehmend problemspezifische Sicherheitspolitiken, welche ein
wesentlicher Bestandteil der Trusted Computing Base (TCB) eines IT
Systems sind. Aus diesem Grund sind die Korrektheit und Unumgehbarkeit
der Implementierung einer TCB entscheidend, um die geforderten
Sicherheitseigenschaften eines Systems herzustellen, zu wahren und zu
garantieren.
Viele der heutigen Betriebssysteme zeigen, welche Herausforderung die
Realisierung von Sicherheitspolitiken darstellt; seit mehr als 40 Jahren
unterstützen sie wahlfreie identitätsbasierte Zugriffssteuerungspolitiken
nur rudimentär. Dies führt dazu, dass große Teile der
Sicherheitspolitiken von Anwendersoftware durch die Anwendungen selbst
implementiert werden. Infolge dessen sind die TCBs heutiger
Betriebssysteme groß, heterogen und verteilt, so dass die exakte
Bestimmung ihres Funktionsumfangs sehr aufwendig ist. Im Ergebnis sind
die wesentlichen Eigenschaften von TCBs - Korrektheit, Robustheit und
Unumgehbarkeit - nur schwer erreichbar.
Dies hat zur Entwicklung von Politik gesteuerten Betriebssystemen
geführt, die alle Sicherheitspolitiken eines Betriebssystems und seiner
Anwendungen zentral zusammenfassen, indem sie Kernabstraktionen für
Sicherheitspolitiken und Politiklaufzeitumgebungen anbieten. Aktuelle
Politik gesteuerte Betriebssysteme basieren auf monolithischen
Architekturen, was dazu führt, dass ihre Komponenten zur Durchsetzung
ihrer Politiken im Betriebssystemkern verteilt sind. Weiterhin verfolgen
sie das Ziel, ein möglichst breites Spektrum an Sicherheitspolitiken zu
unterstützen. Dies hat zur Folge, dass ihre Laufzeitkomponenten für
Politikentscheidung und -durchsetzung universal sind. Im Ergebnis sind
ihre TCB-Implementierungen groß und komplex, so dass der TCB-
Funktionsumfang nur schwer identifiziert werden kann und wesentliche
Eigenschaften von TCBs nur mit erhöhtem Aufwand erreichbar sind.
Diese Dissertation verfolgt einen Ansatz, der die TCBs Politik
gesteuerter Betriebssysteme systematisch entwickelt. Die Idee ist, das
Laufzeitsystem für Sicherheitspolitiken so maßzuschneidern, dass nur die
Politiken unterstützt werden, die tatsächlich in einer TCB vorhanden
sind. Dabei wird der Funktionsumfang einer TCB durch kausale
Abhängigkeiten zwischen Sicherheitspolitiken und TCB-Funktionen bestimmt.
Das Ergebnis sind kausale TCBs, die nur diejenigen Funktionen enthalten,
die zum Durchsetzen und zum Schutz der vorhandenen Sicherheitspolitiken
notwendig sind. Die präzise Identifikation von TCB-Funktionen erlaubt,
die Implementierung der TCB-Funktionen von nicht-vertrauenswürdigen
Systemkomponenten zu isolieren. Dadurch legen kausale TCBs die Grundlage
für TCB-Implementierungen, deren Größe und Komplexität eine Analyse und
Verifikation bezüglich ihrer Korrektheit und Unumgehbarkeit ermöglichen.
Kausale TCBs haben ein breites Anwendungsspektrum - von eingebetteten
Systemen über Politik gesteuerte Betriebssysteme bis hin zu
Datenbankmanagementsystemen in großen Informationssystemen.Policy-controlled operating systems provide a policy decision and enforcement environment to protect and enforce their security policies. The trusted computing base (TCB) of these systems are large and complex, and their functional perimeter can hardly be precisely identified. As a result, a TCB's correctness and tamper-proofness are hard to ensure in its implementation.
This dissertation develops a TCB engineering method for policy-controlled operating systems that tailors the policy decision and enforcement environment to support only those policies that are actually present in a TCB. A TCB's functional perimeter is identified by exploiting causal dependencies between policies and TCB functions, which results in causal TCBs that contain exactly those functions that are necessary to establish, enforce, and protect their policies. The precise identification of a TCB's functional perimeter allows for implementing a TCB in a safe environment that indeed can be isolated from untrusted system components. Thereby, causal TCB engineering sets the course for implementations whose size and complexity pave the way for analyzing and verifying a TCB's correctness and tamper-proofness.Auch im Buchhandel erhältlich:
Small TCBs of policy-controlled operating systems / Anja Pölck
Ilmenau : Univ.-Verl. Ilmenau, 2014. - xiii, 249 S.
ISBN 978-3-86360-090-7
Preis: 24,40
Trustworthiness in Mobile Cyber Physical Systems
Computing and communication capabilities are increasingly embedded in diverse objects and structures in the physical environment. They will link the ‘cyberworld’ of computing and communications with the physical world. These applications are called cyber physical systems (CPS). Obviously, the increased involvement of real-world entities leads to a greater demand for trustworthy systems. Hence, we use "system trustworthiness" here, which can guarantee continuous service in the presence of internal errors or external attacks. Mobile CPS (MCPS) is a prominent subcategory of CPS in which the physical component has no permanent location. Mobile Internet devices already provide ubiquitous platforms for building novel MCPS applications. The objective of this Special Issue is to contribute to research in modern/future trustworthy MCPS, including design, modeling, simulation, dependability, and so on. It is imperative to address the issues which are critical to their mobility, report significant advances in the underlying science, and discuss the challenges of development and implementation in various applications of MCPS
TACKLING INSIDER THREATS USING RISK-AND-TRUST AWARE ACCESS CONTROL APPROACHES
Insider Attacks are one of the most dangerous threats organizations face today. An insider attack occurs when a person authorized to perform certain actions in an organization decides to abuse the trust, and harm the organization by causing breaches in the confidentiality, integrity or availability of the organization’s assets. These attacks may negatively impact the reputation of the organization, its productivity, and may incur heavy losses in revenue and clients. Preventing insider attacks is a daunting task. Employees need legitimate access to effectively perform their jobs; however, at any point of time they may misuse their privileges accidentally or intentionally. Hence, it is necessary to develop a system capable of finding a middle ground where the necessary privileges are provided and insider threats are mitigated. In this dissertation, we address this critical issue.
We propose three adaptive risk-and-trust aware access control frameworks that aim at thwarting insider attacks by incorporating the behavior of users in the access control decision process. Our first framework is tailored towards general insider threat prevention in role-based access control systems. As part of this framework, we propose methodologies to specify risk-and-trust aware access control policies and a risk management approach that minimizes the risk exposure for each access request. Our second framework is designed to mitigate the risk of obligation-based systems which are difficult to manage and are particularly vulnerable to sabotage. As part of our obligation-based framework, we propose an insider-threat-resistant trust computation methodology. We emphasize the use of monitoring of obligation fulfillment patterns to determine some psychological precursors that have high predictive power with respect to potential insider threats. Our third framework is designed to take advantage of geo-social information to deter insider threats. We uncover some insider threats that arise when geo-social information is used to make access control decisions. Based on this analysis, we define an insider threat resilient access control approach to manage privileges that considers geo-social context. The models and methodologies presented in this dissertation can help a broad range of organizations in mitigating insider threats