Metatheory of actions: beyond consistency

Consistency check has been the only criterion for theory evaluation in logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions. This work goes beyond that and contributes to the metatheory of actions by investigating what other properties a good domain description in reasoning about actions should have. We state some metatheoretical postulates concerning this sore spot. When all postulates are satisfied together we have a modular action theory. Besides being easier to understand and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy's sense, modular theories have interesting properties. We point out the problems that arise when the postulates about modularity are violated and propose algorithmic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to overcome them

The Potential and the Pitfalls of Metatheory in IR

publication-status: Publishedtypes: ArticleMetatheory is a type of systematic discourse on theory in a given academic discipline. This article further explores this notion of metatheory and critically discusses a number of views against and in favour of metatheory in International Relations (IR). There are 'strong' and 'mild' claims against metatheoretical IR that should not be ignored. Nevertheless, some of the claims against metatheory in IR contradict themselves. Besides, the 'strong' claim that aims for the complete elimination of metatheoretical discourse in IR depends on metatheory as a presupposition. For this reason, it cannot be maintained. 'Mild' claims, on the other hand, acknowledge to some extent the potential of metatheory in IR, whilst pointing out contingent problems in its current form. Some of these issues are acknowledged and contrasted with a number of claims in favour of metatheory, leading to a moderate defence of metatheoretical discourse in IR

Information Metatheory

This essay continues a report on the design of information metatheory. My general idea of ametatheory, or framework, is that it primarily reflects differences, rather than similarities (leave aloneidentity, or Platonic form), i.e. it helps to control variety. Grounded on differences, a metatheory isessentially about (their) coordination.I have already reported on two design steps toward a metatheory for information. The first argues for‘Multiple axiomatization in information management’ (Wisse 2002b). The second design stepestablishes the ‘Dia-enneadic framework for information concepts’ (Wisse 2003). Here, a third stepsynthesizes previous work. A more comprehensive framework, or information metatheory, results.Some remarks follow on qualifying information systems and information management, respectively,and on how information metatheory is indispensable to meet increasingly variable, dynamicrequirements

Metatheory

Constitutional theory has been challenged in recent years, by significant figures in the legal field, as essentially pointless. Too much normativity, not enough neutrality; too much conjecture, not enough data; too much politics, not enough truth. How should we constitutional theorists answer this basic challenge to the foundation of our research program? I suggest one possible solution here: we can make the discipline more rigorous by changing the way in which we assess competing claims in constitutional theory. Drawing on important work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and legal theory, I examine the question of theory assessment and selection. I propose a set of criteria for constitutional theory selection consistent with the most cutting edge work in these fields and explain how we can use these criteria—simplicity, consilience, conservatism, and fruitfulness—and demonstrate how they operate to make theory assessment more sophisticated by applying them to two distinct sets of competing theoretical claims. Along the way, I discuss perennial debates like the controversy between those who claim that adjudication should be conducted with reference to legal reasons only and those who claim that courts may consider extra-legal reasons, including moral reasons, to decide cases. I then turn to examine a much more recent debate about the nature of certain doctrinal structures in constitutional adjudication. I argue, in the end, that more nuanced theory assessment techniques will advance constitutional theory in a manner that simultaneously answers foundational challenges and makes the research program more likely to produce testable, provable claims about the nature of constitutionalism going forward

A theory and its metatheory in FS 0

Feferman has proposed FS0, a theory of finitary inductive systems, as a framework theory suitable for various purposes, including reasoning both in and about encoded theories. I look here at how practical FS0 really is. I formalise of a sequent calculus presentation of classical propositional logic in FS0 and show this can be used for work in both the theory and the metatheory. the latter is illustrated with a discussion of a proof of Gentzen's Hauptsatz