The New Intergovernmentalism and the Euro Crisis: A Painful Case? LEQS Paper No. 145/2019 June 2019

The new intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the changing dynamics of contemporary European integration. It emphasises, inter alia, member states’ preference for deliberative modes of decision-making and their reluctance to delegate new powers to traditional supranational institutions. The euro crisis is sometimes seen as a difficult case for the new intergovernmentalism because of the perceived importance of hard bargaining over crisis measures during this episode and the new roles entrusted to the European Commission and the European Central Bank under crisis reforms. Such criticisms, this paper argues, overlook: the importance of high-level consensus-seeking and deliberation in saving the single currency; the disparate forms of delegation deployed to preserve member state influence over Economic and Monetary Union; and the extent to which the euro crisis has amplified the European Union’s political disequilibrium. Far from running counter to the new intergovernmentalism, it concludes, the euro crisis exemplifies the turbulent dynamics of the post-Maastricht period

Preferences, preference formation and position taking in a Eurozone out: Lessons from the United Kingdom

In the literature on member state position-taking in the eurozone crisis, the debate has mainly centred on whether national preferences are shaped exclusively within the domestic setting or influenced by shared EU-level norms or interaction within EU institutions. This article goes beyond this discussion. Drawing on original data collected by the authors, it uses the UK’s experience to test the claims both of society-centred approaches, including liberal intergovernmentalism, and perspectives that emphasise the importance of shared EU norms or interaction. It argues that while the first overlook the role of institutions as both actors and mediating variables in preference formation, the second have so far focused on the experience of eurozone members, thereby raising the possibility of selection bias. Treating eurozone form as a series of processes rather than a single event, it contests the claim that preference formation is always driven by societal interests, highlights instances where government acts in the absence of or contrary to expressed societal interests, and reveals limitations of the shared norms critique of liberal intergovernmentalism. It shows that the UK government was driven by a scholars concern to protect the UK economy from financial contagion rather than solidarity with its European partners

Neofunctionalism revisited : integration theory and varieties of outcomes in the Eurocrisis

The Euro crisis has produced a plethora of new institutions, policies, and projects to reform the Euro Area. This paper offers a theoretical and empirical contribution in the study of the New Economic Governance. By building on insights from classical Neofunctionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the paper revisits the static component of Philippe Schmitter's 'Neo-Neofunctionalist' framework. Static Neo-Neofunctionalism is then applied as a means to provide a systemic interpretation of crisis-led integration in the Euro crisis. The large majority of episodes of crisis-led integration in the 2011-2016 years is included in the analysis. In assessing Neo-Neofunctionalist expectations on the New Economic Governance, the paper matches analysis of legal documents with the results of a dedicated Expert Survey on the EMU governance fielded in October 2018

The end of social Europe? Understanding EU social policy change

The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton’s political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision

Interlinking neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism: Sidelining governments and manipulating policy preferences as "passerelles"

The EU's founding fathers had the protection of the EU's constituent units as a key concern and set up serious hurdles to policy innovation in the absence of unanimous governmental agreement. These institutional design features, aptly characterised as "joint-decision trap" by Fritz W. Scharpf, were only softened but not erased over time. Nonetheless, the problem of how to innovate has, at times, been overcome through eclectic means. There are indeed some well known and quite visible practices as well as some less expected and more obscure strategies that have propelled the EU's policy system beyond what has for a long time been expected. This paper argues that there are two strategic moves the European Commission (and, at times, other supranational actors such as the European Court of Justice) can use to actively overcome member state opposition: first, sidelining some or even all national governments; and, second, manipulating relevant policy preferences. These two basic strategies can be seen to interconnect the diverging basic assumptions of intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism as 'passerelles'.political science; joint decision making; unanimity; integration theory; intergovernmentalism; neo-functionalism

Explaining the EU's Policy Portfolio: Applying a Federal Integration Approach to EU Cohesion Policy. Bruges Political Research Paper No. 20, December 2011

This paper engages with the debate about why the nature of the EU's policy portfolio is as it is. It does so by taking cohesion policy and asking the question, why has it come to occupy so important a position in the EU‟s policy portfolio? It is argued that the two most common conceptually-based approaches applied to cohesion policy – intergovernmentalism and multilevel governance – do not adequately explain either the timing or the dynamic of cohesion policy. A model that combines economic integration approaches and federal approaches is developed in the paper to provide a basis for a new explanatory framework for the prominent position of cohesion in the portfolio. We suggest that our approach – which we call a federal integration approach – has the potential to be applied to other policy areas

Bilateral dynamics and multilateral perspectives in Euro-Mediterranean relations (1995-2010)

The author points out the increasing complexity of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the ever more differentiated relationships. He underlines the return to a more intergovernmentalist approach promoted by the UfM and the creation of an “avant-garde” generated by an ENP positive conditionality approach. At bilateral level, Mediterranean partners must decide to what extent they can go further in the process of economic integration with the EU. At multilateral level, the next step is a comprehensive understanding of what could be the future Euro-Mediterranean economic model of integration. The author alerts us to the development of a multi-speed UfM that could lead to the division of Mediterranean partners into two subgroups: the “good” and “rewarded students” and the “bad” and “non-rewarded students”. Finally, the question of the definitive articulation between the old institutional structures of the Barcelona Process and the new ones has still to be more precisely defined

Intergubernamentalismo y Federalismo: Dos aproximaciones teóricas a la integración europea

SUMMARY INTRODUCTION II. AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK l. The realistic antecedent: Morgenthau 2. Intergovernmentalism: Hoffmann 3. Liberal intergovernmentalism: Moravcsik A) Intergovernmental Institutionalism B) Liberal intergovernmentalism C) «The Choice for Europe» III. THE FEDERAL HORIZON l. Federalism 2. Neofederalism: some recent developments A) Spirit, method and federal institutions: Sidjanski B) From the political principle and process to the normative structure: Mazan C) Federalism not state, but supranational: Bogdand

The future of sovereignty in multilevel governance Europe: a constructivist reading

Multilevel governance presents a depiction of contemporary structures in EU Europe as consisting of overlapping authorities and competing competencies. By focusing on emerging non-anarchical structures in the international system, hence moving beyond the conventional hierarchy/anarchy dichotomy to distinguish domestic and international arenas, this seems a radical transformation of the familiar Westphalian system and to undermine state sovereignty. Paradoxically, however, the principle of sovereignty proves to be resilient despite its alleged empirical decline. This article argues that social constructivism can explain the paradox, by considering sovereign statehood as a process-dependent institutional fact, and by showing that multilevel governance can feed into this process

The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neofunctionalism of Ernst B. Haas

This article suggests that the neofunctionalist theoretical legacy left by Ernst B. Haas is somewhat richer and more prescient than many contemporary discussants allow. The article develops an argument for routine and detailed re-reading of the corpus of neofunctionalist work (and that of Haas in particular), not only to disabuse contemporary students and scholars of the normally static and stylized reading that discussion of the theory provokes, but also to suggest that the conceptual repertoire of neofunctionalism is able to speak directly to current EU studies and comparative regionalism. Neofunctionalism is situated in its social scientific context before the theory's supposed erroneous reliance on the concept of 'spillover' is discussed critically. A case is then made for viewing Haas's neofunctionalism as a dynamic theory that not only corresponded to established social scientific norms, but did so in ways that were consistent with disciplinary openness and pluralism