The new intergovernmentalism seeks to understand the changing dynamics of
contemporary European integration. It emphasises, inter alia, member states’
preference for deliberative modes of decision-making and their reluctance to
delegate new powers to traditional supranational institutions. The euro crisis is
sometimes seen as a difficult case for the new intergovernmentalism because of the
perceived importance of hard bargaining over crisis measures during this episode
and the new roles entrusted to the European Commission and the European Central
Bank under crisis reforms. Such criticisms, this paper argues, overlook: the
importance of high-level consensus-seeking and deliberation in saving the single
currency; the disparate forms of delegation deployed to preserve member state
influence over Economic and Monetary Union; and the extent to which the euro crisis
has amplified the European Union’s political disequilibrium. Far from running counter
to the new intergovernmentalism, it concludes, the euro crisis exemplifies the
turbulent dynamics of the post-Maastricht period
