Civil liability issues associated with a "heroin trial"

In terms of civil liability, the legal duties owed by researchers in a heroin trial may be classified under three headings: liability in battery; liability in negligence; and liability for disclosing confidential information. Each of these areas of liability is discussed in this paper. Particular attention is paid to situations where the researchers’ legal duties are unclear or may be conflictin

The Strict Liability in Fault and the Fault in Strict Liability

Tort scholars have long been obsessed with the dichotomy between strict liability and liability based on fault or wrongdoing. We argue that this is a false dichotomy. Torts such as battery, libel, negligence, and nuisance are wrongs, yet all are “strictly” defined in the sense of setting objective and thus quite demanding standards of conduct. We explain this basic insight under the heading of “the strict liability in fault.” We then turn to the special case of liability for abnormally dangerous activities, which at times really does involve liability without wrongdoing. Through an examination of this odd corner of tort law, we isolate “the fault in strict liability”—that is, the fault line between the wrongs-based form of strict liability that is frequently an aspect of tort liability and the wrongs-free form of strict liability that is found only within the very narrow domain of liability for abnormally dangerous activities. We conclude by defending these two features of the common law of tort: the strictness of the terms on which it defines wrongdoing and its begrudging willingness to recognize, in one special kind of case, liability without wrongdoing

Consent is Not a Defense to Battery: A Reply to Professor Bergelson

In this essay I argue that, contrary to what most criminal law scholars believe, consent does not operate as a justification that relieves the actor of liability for conduct that admittedly satisfies the offense elements of battery. Rather, I contend that consent is only relevant to battery liability when, in conjunction with other factors, it modifies the definition of the crime in a way that reveals that the defendant’s act does not actually fall within the range of conduct prohibited by the offense. The argument proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I argue that there are three ways of conceiving the interest sought to be protected by the offense of battery. These approaches provide different accounts of the exculpatory nature of consent in battery cases, none of which is compatible with the claim that consent operates as a justification defense. In Part II, I argue that, contrary to what several criminal theorists have argued, the offense of battery does not seek to protect personal autonomy. Therefore, I claim that the exculpatory role of consent in cases of battery cannot be explained by claiming that recognizing consent as a defense vindicates the victim’s autonomy. Instead, I suggest that consent is relevant only insofar as it reveals that the infliction of bodily harm was socially acceptable. In Part III, I argue that consent to battery currently operates as a factor that modifies the definition of the offense in a way that demonstrates that the defendant did not engage in the type of conduct that the legislature desired to prohibit as battery. Furthermore, I claim that the offense of battery seeks to prevent the infliction of non-trivial physical harm in circumstances where the infliction of such harm is not considered a normal occurrence given current societal practices. Consequently, I suggest that consent is relevant in cases of battery only when, in conjunction with other factors, it reveals that the perpetrator’s infliction of bodily harm was a normal occurrence rather than an extraordinary or regrettable event

The Prosser Myth of Transferred Intent

The main theme of this Article is that Prosser advanced a mythical doctrine of transferred intent. What Prosser asserted to be the law was not the law when he wrote his article on transferred intent and amended his treatise. The cases he relied on to support his conclusions on transferred intent did not support them. Moreover, despite Prosser’s great influence on American tort law, Prosser’s position on transferred intent is not the law now and should not be. Its consequences are undesirable. Recognition of transferred intent as a basis of liability is due primarily to its inclusion in the First and Second Restatements of Torts. Transferred intent does not and should not extend beyond the Restatements’ rules

The Moral Reading of HIV Prevention in the United States: Criminal Law and Tort Law

The United States government has been campaigning to encourage people to take HIV testing and thus get treated. It is puzzling that more than 50% of States have HIV-specific criminal laws that criminalize both exposure and transmission. At the same time, there is an increased tort law to seek financial compensation for unwanted HIV exposure and transmission. While both laws the moral claim of protecting people from HIV infection, this paper is trying to find an answer to the following inquiry: What is the difference of the moral reading between the use of criminal law and tort law in addressing HIV prevention in the United States? This paper uses the traditional descriptive comparison between criminal law and tort law under the American legal system with a nationwide jurisdictional scope. This paper measures the difference using the frame of reference of Ronald Dworkin's law, morality, and interpretation theory. Both criminal law and tort law have been developing similar liability principles regarding HIV exposure and transmission under the United States' common law tradition. For HIV prevention itself, both criminal law and tort law play a marginal role in gaining public health purposes in reversing the HIV epidemic. Criminal law has been scrutinized as not aligned with the purpose of law where misconceptions exist in both substantive dimension and the underlying moral claim. Tort law, on the other hand, suffers an even less moral claim on public health purposes. However, tort law maintains a consistent narrow sense of financial liability