Proceedings of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School Student Session

This volume contains the papers presented at the Student Session of the 11th European Agent Systems Summer School (EASSS) held on 2nd of September 2009 at Educatorio della Providenza, Turin, Italy. The Student Session, organised by students, is designed to encourage student interaction and feedback from the tutors. By providing the students with a conference-like setup, both in the presentation and in the review process, students have the opportunity to prepare their own submission, go through the selection process and present their work to each other and their interests to their fellow students as well as internationally leading experts in the agent field, both from the theoretical and the practical sector. Table of Contents: Andrew Koster, Jordi Sabater Mir and Marco Schorlemmer, Towards an inductive algorithm for learning trust alignment . . . 5; Angel Rolando Medellin, Katie Atkinson and Peter McBurney, A Preliminary Proposal for Model Checking Command Dialogues. . . 12; Declan Mungovan, Enda Howley and Jim Duggan, Norm Convergence in Populations of Dynamically Interacting Agents . . . 19; Akın Günay, Argumentation on Bayesian Networks for Distributed Decision Making . . 25; Michael Burkhardt, Marco Luetzenberger and Nils Masuch, Towards Toolipse 2: Tool Support for the JIAC V Agent Framework . . . 30; Joseph El Gemayel, The Tenacity of Social Actors . . . 33; Cristian Gratie, The Impact of Routing on Traffic Congestion . . . 36; Andrei-Horia Mogos and Monica Cristina Voinescu, A Rule-Based Psychologist Agent for Improving the Performances of a Sportsman . . . 39; --Autonomer Agent,Agent,Künstliche Intelligenz

Topology and Memory Effect on Convention Emergence

Abstract—Social conventions are useful self-sustaining proto-cols for groups to coordinate behavior without a centralized entity enforcing coordination. We perform an in-depth study of different network structures, to compare and evaluate the effects of different network topologies on the success and rate of emergence of social conventions. While others have investigated memory for learning algorithms, the effects of memory or history of past activities on the reward received by interacting agents have not been adequately investigated. We propose a reward metric that takes into consideration the past action choices of the interacting agents. The research question to be answered is what effect does the history based reward function and the learning approach have on convergence time to conventions in different topologies. We experimentally investigate the effects of history size, agent population size and neighborhood size or the emergence of social conventions. I

Punishment and Gossip: Sustaining Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain coopera- tion. There are two main paths through which social control can be ap- plied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are interested in assessing how cooperation rates change when agents can play one of two different reactive strategies, i.e., they can pay a cost in order to reduce the payoff of free-riders, or they can know others\u27 reputation and then either play defect with free-riders, or refuse to interact with them. Co- operation is maintained at a high level through punishment, but also reputation-based partner selection proves effective in maintaining coop- eration. However, when agents are informed about free-riders\u27 reputation and play Defect, cooperation decreases. Finally, a combination of punish- ment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates

Diseño de investigación de re ingeniería en una finca de café a través de las fases del proceso administrativo en la República de Guatemala

Diseño de una reingeniería en la organización a través de las fases del proceso administrativo en una finca de café. Determinar cuáles son las etapas del proceso administrativo que deben desarrollarse para la reingeniería de la organización

Punish and Voice: Punishment Enhances Cooperation when Combined with Norm-Signalling

Material punishment has been suggested to play a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Experimental findings, however, show that inflicting mere material costs does not always increase cooperation and may even have detrimental effects. Indeed, ethnographic evidence suggests that the most typical punishing strategies in human ecologies (e.g., gossip, derision, blame and criticism) naturally combine normative information with material punishment. Using laboratory experiments with humans, we show that the interaction of norm communication and material punishment leads to higher and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. In this work, we argue and provide experimental evidence that successful human cooperation is the outcome of the interaction between instrumental decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect and reason upon norms that is characterized by a salience mechanism devoted to track how much a norm is prominent within a group. We test our hypothesis both in the laboratory and with an agent-based model. The agent-based model incorporates fundamental aspects of norm psychology absent from previous work. The combination of these methods allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind the observed cooperative behaviour. The consistency between the two sources of data supports our hypothesis that cooperation is a product of norm psychology solicited by norm-signalling and coercive devices

Punish and Voice: Punishment Enhances Cooperation when Combined with Norm-Signalling

Material punishment has been suggested to play a key role in sustaining human cooperation. Experimental findings, however, show that inflicting mere material costs does not always increase cooperation and may even have detrimental effects. Indeed, ethnographic evidence suggests that the most typical punishing strategies in human ecologies (e.g., gossip, derision, blame and criticism) naturally combine normative information with material punishment. Using laboratory experiments with humans, we show that the interaction of norm communication and material punishment leads to higher and more stable cooperation at a lower cost for the group than when used separately. In this work, we argue and provide experimental evidence that successful human cooperation is the outcome of the interaction between instrumental decision-making and the norm psychology humans are provided with. Norm psychology is a cognitive machinery to detect and reason upon norms that is characterized by a salience mechanism devoted to track how much a norm is prominent within a group. We test our hypothesis both in the laboratory and with an agent-based model. The agent-based model incorporates fundamental aspects of norm psychology absent from previous work. The combination of these methods allows us to provide an explanation for the proximate mechanisms behind the observed cooperative behaviour. The consistency between the two sources of data supports our hypothesis that cooperation is a product of norm psychology solicited by norm-signalling and coercive devices. © 2013 Andrighetto et al.The work presented in this paper has been performed in the frame of the following projects: 1. MacNorms(Intramurales de frontera CSIC – PIF08-007); 2. GLODERS (Grant: Gloders 315874; FP7/2007-2013); 3. The Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2011-29847-C02-01); 4. The Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2009 SGR 820 and Grant 2009SGR1434); and 5. The Antoni Serra Ramoneda Research Chair (UAB-CatalunyaCaixa)Peer Reviewe

Counter-punishment, norm-communication and accountability

Presentado como comunicación en HEIDI-CORTEX Behavioral Economics Workshop GATE, celebrado los días 29 y 30 de octubre de 2014 en Ecully (France). Presentado como comunicación el 17 de abril de 2015 en el Second International Meeting on Experimental and Behavioral Social Sciences, celebrado del 15 al 17 de abril de 2015 en Toulouse (Francia)We study whether communication can limit the negative consequences of the use of counterpunishment in a public goods environment. The two dimensions of communication we study are norm communication and accountability, having to justify one’s actions to others. We conduct four experimental treatments, all involving a contribution stage, a punishment stage and a counterpunishment stage. In the first stage there are no communication possibilities. The second treatment allows for communication at the punishment stage and the third asks for a justification message at the counter-punishment stage. The fourth combines the two communication channels of the second and third treatments. We find that the three treatments involving communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher contributions than the baseline treatment. The detrimental effect of allowing for counter-punishment is neutralized in the presence of communication possibilities. We find no difference between the three treatments with communication. Separately norm communication and being held accountable work equally well and we find no interaction effect from using them jointly. We also relate our results to those of other treatments without counter-punishment opportunities. The overall pattern of results shows that the key factor is the presence of communication. Whenever it is possible contributions are higher than when it is not, regardless of counter-punishment opportunitiesThe work presented in this paper has been performed in the frame of the MacNorms project (Intramurales de frontera CSIC – PIF08-007) and of the Gloders project (Seventh Framework EU Programme FP7/2007-2013 Grant: 315874). The authors thank the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC-CNR, Rome), the European University Institute, the Spanish Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Grant: ECO2011-29847-C02-01) and the Generalitat de Catalunya (Grant: 2009 SGR 820 and Grant 2009SGR1434) for research supportPeer Reviewe

Procedimientos de la explotación de información para la identificación de datos faltantes, con ruido e inconsistentes

La información se ha convertido, en la columna vertebral de las organizaciones, la aplicación de distintas técnicas, métodos y herramientas para garantizar mediante un proceso formal de Auditoría, la calidad y seguridad de la información es una tarea de significativa importancia. En la actualidad no se encuentran procedimientos formales especialmente diseñados para aplicar técnicas de explotación de información en la Auditoría de Sistemas en general y a la búsqueda de datos con ruido, inconsistentes y faltantes, aplicándose en algunos casos métodologías diseñadas con otros objetivos como SEMMA o CRISP que no contemplan la especificidad de los objetivos que se persiguen, en otros casos no se aplica una metodología, esta situación provoca una disminución en la calidad del proceso de Auditoría de Sistemas. Este proyecto busca establecer una taxonomía relacionada con la calidad de los datos, analizando los procesos de explotación de información que mejor aplican a la identificación de patrones de pistas de auditoria, se explorarán esas procesos analizando las ventajas y desventajas de cada una de ellos.Eje: Ingeniería de Software y Base de DatosRed de Universidades con Carreras en Informática (RedUNCI