217 research outputs found
International Mobility of the Highly Skilled, Endogenous R&D, and Public Infrastructure Investment
This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the interaction of emigration of highly skilled labor, an economy’s income gap to potential host economies of expatriates, and optimal public infrastructure investment. In a model with endogenous education and R&D investment decisions we show that international integration of the market for skilled labor aggravates between-country income inequality by harming those which are source economies to begin with while benefiting host economies. When brain drain increases in source economies, public infrastructure investment is optimally adjusted downward, whereas host economies increase it. Evidence from 77 countries well supports our theoretical hypotheses.R&D investment, public infrastructure investment, educational choice, cross-country evidence, brain drain
How Federalism Protects Future Generations from Today's Public Debts
From the politico-economic perspective, federalism is a protector of the present generation. But what about future generations? In federal states, Ricardian equivalence cannot be assumed to work properly, as migration between local jurisdictions undermines intergenerational redistribution based on parental altruism. However, we argue that there exists another equivalence mechanism which also works with purely selfish individuals: Public debts capitalize into property values. Jurisdictions with larger net debts exhibit, ceteris paribus, lower property prices. Debt capitalization in property values is the more pronounced the less elastic land supply is and the more mobile the other factors of production are. Therefore, capitalization is more relevant for local than for national debts, i.e. it is more pronounced in a federal than in a centralized state. Thus, federalism also becomes a protector of future generation
Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions over 160 Years: Voter Behavior and Increasing Complexity in Decision-Making
Using a quasi-natural voting experiment encompassing a 160-year period (1848-2009) in Switzerland, we investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on trusted parliamentary representatives. We find that when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations when making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum is held. We also demonstrate that when constituents face a higher level of complexity, they follow the parliamentary recommendations rather than those of interest groups. "Viewed as a geometric figure, the ant's path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its complexity is really a complexity in the surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant." ( [1] p. 51)
Does High-Skilled Migration Affect Publicly Financed Investments ?
This paper analyzes the interaction between migration of high-skilled labor and publicly financed investment. We develop a theoretical model with multiple, ex ante identical jurisdictions where individuals decide on education and subsequent emigration. Migration decisions are based on differences in net income across jurisdictions which endogenously may occur. The interaction between income differences and migration flows gives rise to the potential of multiple equilibria: a symmetric equilibrium without migration and an asymmetric equilibrium in which net income levels differ among jurisdictions and trigger migration flows. In the former equilibrium, all jurisdictions have the same public investment level. In the latter one, public investment is high in host economies of skilled expatriates and low in source economies. We empirically test the hypothesis that emigration rates are negatively associated with various kinds of publicly .nanced investment levels for OECD countries
Political competition and legislative shirking in roll-call votes : Evidence from Germany for 1953–2017
Wer ist der beste Formel 1 Fahrer? Eine ökonometrische Talentbewertung
Who is the best Formula 1 driver? Until today it was impossible to answer this question because the observable performance of a driver depends both on his talent and the quality of his cars. In this article we separate for the first time driver talent from car quality by econometrically analyzing data for 57 years of Formula 1 racing. Our estimates also control for the number of drivers finishing, technical breakdowns and many other variables that influence race results. While Michael Schumacher is often believed to be the best driver, he is overtaken by Juan Manuel Fangio and Jim Clar
Mobility and local income redistribution
Mobility may undermine local income redistribution in federal systems, because rich taxpayers can evade high taxes by moving to low tax jurisdictions. By analyzing a model of local income redistribution with endogenous voting, income heterogeneity and an exogenously given degree of mobility we focus explicitly on the link between redistribution and mobility. Our findings suggest a nonlinear relationship between redistribution and mobility: high and low degrees of mobility permit major income redistribution as income sorting is absent, while a medium degree of mobility leads to high differences in tax rates between jurisdictions and thus to income sorting and less redistribution
Coastal proximity and individual living standards : Econometric evidence from georeferenced household surveys in sub-Saharan Africa
District magnitude and representation of the majority's preferences—a reply and new perspectives
We reply to the comment of John Carey and Simon Hix on our original contribution entitled "District Magnitude and Representation of the Majority's Preferences: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Popular and Parliamentary Votes” in Public Choice 151:585-610 (2012). District magnitude does not necessarily affect deviations between political representatives and their district voters in a strictly monotonic way but monotonicity is upheld for deviations between representatives and the national majority. We provide new perspectives and caution against evaluating electoral systems by focusing on individual politicians' behavior but neglecting aggregation effect
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