35 research outputs found

    Cash flow or income? : the choice of base for company taxation

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    Considerable interest has been expressed in recent years by tax theorists as well as practitioners, for the taxation of companies based on their cash flow. Unlike the equity-income tax base, which requires the deductibility of economic depreciation and debt financing costs, the cash-flow base expenses capital at the point of purchase, eliminating the need for the subsequent costing of this capital. This paper raises some of the issues that would arise in trying to implement a company tax either in the form of an indexed equity-income or a cash-flow tax. Issues raised include: (i) administrative complexity; (ii) international tax coordination and competition; and (iii) transition problems. In a closed economy the cash-flow tax seems a simple, efficient form of company taxation, administratively straightforward and neutral with regard to investment decisions. The more complicated equity-income tax is harder to defend in a closed economy.Economic Theory&Research,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism

    Optimal Nonlinear Policies for Non-Utilitarian Motives

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    This paper studies optimization by a principal, e.g. a government or a firm, whose choice among social alternatives is constrained to those it can decentralize, as in the nonlinear taxation literature, but whose ranking of these alternative equilibria is not constrained to be of any special form, such as utilitarian or profit-maximising. Accordingly, we shall define welfare directly on the various quantities arising in the economy, on the consumption vectors of consumers in full detail, without necessarily processing this information in any particular way.

    Taxation and market power

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    "We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales taxes in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of a tax burden on to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. In monopoly markets, a monopolist bears a large share of the burden of a tax increase. With human buyers, however, this share is smaller than with automated buyers as the presence of human buyers constrains the pricing behavior of a monopolist." (author's abstract)"Dieser Artikel untersucht Inzidenz- und Wohlfahrtseffekte einer Mengensteuer in experimentellen Monopol- und Bertrand-Märkten. Im Einklang mit der ökonomischen Theorie sind Firmen ohne Marktmacht in der Lage, einen großen Anteil der Last einer Steuererhöhung an die Konsumenten weiterzugeben. Dies gilt unabhängig davon, ob die Käufer simuliert sind oder die Kaufentscheidungen durch reale Käufer getroffen werden. In Monopolmärkten trägt der Monopolist einen großen Anteil der Last einer Steuererhöhung. Werden die Kaufentscheidungen durch reale Käufer getroffen, ist dieser Anteil jedoch kleiner als mit simulierten Käufern, da reale Käufer im Experiment das Preissetzungsverhalten des Monopolisten einschränken." (Autorenreferat
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