Nest architecture of Oxaea austera (Andrenidae, Oxaeinae) and its significance for the interpretation of Uruguayan fossil bee cells

Oxaea austera nests in hard, red lateritic soils with dense grass cover. Some characters of Oxaea austera nests conform to the known architecture of the oxaeine nests such as the long, vertical shaft and the radiating, horizontal tunnels connected to vertical cells. The presence of more than one cell per lateral, cells at different depths containing larvae at different stages, and discrete walls in the main and laterals are described for the first time for Oxaeinae. One cell was located at the end of each lateral with others (2–4) near them, in some cases arranged in a row just beneath the lateral. Cells are oriented vertically and consist of a chamber, a spiral closure and an antechamber connected with a lateral. The chamber and antechamber are surrounded by a thick discrete wall. Each nest was occupied by at least two active females indicating communal nesting. They also contained older cells, suggesting the reutilization of the nests by successive generations. Both behaviors may be a response to the difficulties of excavation in hard soils. Communal nesting may be also a defensive behavior against nest cleptoparasites. The shape, size, discrete walls of lateritic soil material, spiral closure, and antechamber of O. austera cells closely resemble the fossil bee cells included in the ichnogenus Palmiraichnus from the early Eocene Asencio Formation of Uruguay. This new evidence reinforces the proposal of extinct representatives of Oxaeinae as it constructor.Fil: Sarzetti, Laura Cristina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Museo Argentino de Ciencias Naturales "Bernardino Rivadavia"; ArgentinaFil: Genise, Jorge Fernando. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Museo Argentino de Ciencias Naturales "Bernardino Rivadavia"; ArgentinaFil: Sánchez, María Victoria. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Museo Argentino de Ciencias Naturales "Bernardino Rivadavia"; Argentin

A ‘Dual’-Improved Shortcut to the Long Run

I use the theories of duality and optimal branchings to find a necessary and sufficient characterization of stochastically stable limit sets (SSLS) that helps improve the radius -- modified coradius test of Ellison (2000). The improved shortcut I offer may permit the identification of SSLS when Ellison’s radius -- modified coradius test fails to identify any, or may be able to pinpoint the true SSLS in cases where Ellison’s test identifies only a superset. I also demonstrate precisely why the radius -- modified coradius test is not universally applicable and illuminate the connection between the modified coradius and the Lagrange multipliers of the optimal branching problem.Evolutionary games, Stochastic stability, Optimal branchings, Extended radius, Extended coradius, Modified coradius

Conflict Leads to Cooperation in Nash Bargaining

We consider a multilateral Nash demand game where short-sighted players come to the bargaining table with requests for both coalition partners and the potentially generated resource. We prove that group learning leads with probability one to complete cooperation and a strictly self-enforcing allocation (i.e., in the interior of the core). Highlighting group dynamics, we demonstrate that behaviors which appear destructive can themselves lead to beneficial and strictly self-enforcing cooperation.Nash bargaining, Learning, Core, Group conflict

A pragmatic argument against equal weighting

We present a minimal pragmatic restriction on the interpretation of the weights in the “Equal Weight View” regarding peer disagreement and show that the view cannot respect it. Based on this result we argue against the view. The restriction is the following one: if an agent, $$\hbox {i}$$ i, assigns an equal or higher weight to another agent, $$\hbox {j}$$ j,, he must be willing—in exchange for a positive and certain payment—to accept an offer to let a completely rational and sympathetic $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him whether to accept a bet with positive expected utility. If $$\hbox {i}$$ i assigns a lower weight to $$\hbox {j}$$ j than to himself, he must not be willing to pay any positive price for letting $$\hbox {j}$$ j choose for him. Respecting the constraint entails, we show, that the impact of disagreement on one’s degree of belief is not independent of what the disagreement is discovered to be

Rationalizing Choice with Multi-Self Models

This paper studies a class of multi-self decision-making models proposed in economics, psychology, and marketing. In this class, choices arise from the set-dependent aggregation of a collection of utility functions, where the aggregation procedure satisfies some simple properties. We propose a method for characterizing the extent of irrationality in a choice behavior, and use this measure to provide a lower bound on the set of choice behaviors that can be rationalized with n utility functions. Under an additional assumption (scale-invariance), we show that generically at most five "reasons" are needed for every "mistake."Multi-self models, Index of irrationality, IIA violations, Rationalizability