The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The concepts and axioms, related to the Shapley value, have been extended and a characterization for the Shapley value has been provided.Finally, an application of the Shapley value is given.game theory

International Fisheries Agreements: The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.international fisheries;overexploitation;partial cooperation;games in partition function form;competitive equilibrium;modified Shapley value.

Essays in Game Theory and Natural Resource Management.

This thesis presents a collection of essays in game theory with applications to environmental resource problems and their management. A major focus of these essays is related to coalitional games in which several classes of games, their properties and solution concepts are studied. Game theory is applied to international fisheries management in the context of the 1995 United Nations Agreement on the Implementation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

Oligopoly Games With and Without Transferable Technologies

In this paper standard oligopolies are interpreted in two ways, namely as oligopolies without transferable technologies and as oligopolies with transferable technologies.From a cooperative point of view this leads to two different classes of cooperative games.We show that cooperative oligopoly games without transferable technologies are convex games and that cooperative oligopoly games with transferable are totally balanced, but not necessarily convex.Oligopolies;cooperative games;convexity;total balancedness

Transboundary Fishery Management: A Game Theoretic Approach

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.game theory;fishing industry;Nash equilibrium

International Fisheries Agreements:The Feasibility and Impacts of Partial Cooperation

This paper deals with partial cooperation among countries involved in the exploitation of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.We analyse the feasibility of coalition structures and their impacts on fishing e.orts by means of games in partition function form.Furthermore, we demonstrate that the modified Shapley value is an appropriate device for the division of the gains from cooperation.

The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The concepts and axioms, related to the Shapley value, have been extended and a characterization for the Shapley value has been provided.Finally, an application of the Shapley value is given

The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games

Different axiomatic systems for the Shapley value can be found in the literature.For games with a coalition structure, the Shapley value also has been axiomatized in several ways.In this paper, we discuss a generalization of the Shapley value to the class of partition function form games.The concepts and axioms, related to the Shapley value, have been extended and a characterization for the Shapley value has been provided.Finally, an application of the Shapley value is given.

Connection Problems in Mountains and Monotonic Allocation Schemes

Directed minimum cost spanning tree problems of a special kind are studied,namely those which show up in considering the problem of connecting units (houses)in mountains with a purifier.For such problems an easy method is described to obtain a minimum cost spanning tree.The related cost sharing problem is tackled by considering thecorresponding cooperative cost game with the units as players and also the related connection games,for each unit one.The cores of the connection games have a simple structure and each core element can be extended to a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas)and also to a bi-monotonic allocation scheme.These pmas-es for the connection games result in pmas-es for the cost game.cost allocation;operational research

Transboundary Fishery Management:A Game Theoretic Approach

A basic issue in transboundary fishery management is the new member problem. In this paper we address the problem of allocating the profits between the charter members and the entrants, once the nations concerned have expressed an interest in achieving an agreement.Using game theory we argue that in the case of independent countries adjustment from the Nash equilibrium can be achieved by means of the proportional rule.Furthermore, we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for division of profits within a coalition. Finally, we show that the equal division of the net gain value can be used to expand a coalition.