297 research outputs found
Time preferences: do they matter in bargaining?
Experimental studies of bargaining generally impose time preferences' on subjects, in the sense that in case of disagreement, the experimenter reduces the size of the surplus bargained over by imposing exogenously some monetary cost. Contrary to this practice, in this study time preferences are first elicited in a preliminary phase, and then bargaining begins. I show that although subjects are sensitive to the timing of a monetary reward, this plays no role in determining bargaining behaviour. To the contrary, when the bargaining game is played in conventional experimental setting with monetary cost of delay, these do have an impact on subjects? conduct in negotiations.Bargaining, time preferences, experiments
Divide et impera: Negotiating with a Stakeholder
In many kinds of bilateral negotiations the resolution of the issues at stake has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, negotiations ought to account for the interests of such stakeholder, whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. This interplay of different interests may introduce a strategic incentive to delay agreement in order to win the maximum concessions from one's opponents.Stakeholders, Bargaining, War of attrition
Two-stage Bargaining Solutions
We introduce and characterize a new class of bargaining solutions: those which can be obtained by sequentially applying two binary relations to eliminate alternatives. As a by-product we obtain as a particular case a partial characterization result by Zhou (Econometrica, 1997) of an extension of the Nash axioms and solution to domains including non-convex problems, as well as a complete characterizations of solutions that satisfy Pareto optimality, Covariance with positive affine transformations, and Independence of irrelevant alternatives.Bargaining, Non-convex problems, Nash bargaining solution
Choice by Lexicographic Semiorders
We propose an extension of Tversky's lexicographic semiorder to a model of boundedly rational choice. We explore the connection with sequential rationalisability of choice, and we provide axiomatic characterisations of both models in terms of observable choice data.lexicographic semiorders, bounded rationality, revealed preference, choice
Rationalizing Boundedly Rational Choice
A Rational Shortlist Method (RSM) translates into economic language some sequential choice heuristics studied in psychology. We show that the use of this boundedly rational procedure can be detected from observed choice data through tests that are very similar to those used to detect `rational' choice (such as Samuelson's WARP). Yet, RSMs are compatible with some highly `irrational' patterns of choice observed in experiments, such as pairwise cycles. We also provide partial results on a generalization of RSMs.rationalizability of choice, bounded rationality, intransitive choice, incomplete preferences, menu dependence
Alliances and Negotiations
A characteristic of many bargaining situations is that the negotiators represents the interests of a set of parties (trade unions, political parties, etc.) with composite interests, whose bargaining behaviour is regulated by some collective decision mechanism. In this paper we provide a natural model of such circumstances, and show how different preference aggregation procedures within the composite player affect the bargaining outcome. In particular we find that unanimity procedures lead to 'more aggressive' behaviour than majority procedures, and that procedures which introduce minimum safeguards for the members of an alliance may result in agreements that are worse than without those safeguards.Alliances, multiperson bargaining
How vague can one be? Rational preferences without completeness or transitivity
What can it mean for preferences to be rational when transitivity or completenss are not assumed? In this paper we provide a framework and a set of conditions to deal with this question. We provide representation results in terms of a pair of functions, a utility function and a vagueness function.incomplete preferences, vagueness, sure-thing principle
Stakeholders in Bilateral Conflict
The resolution of a conflict often has an impact which extends beyond the remits of the parties directly involved in the confrontation (e.g. labour negotiations in sectors of public interest, where a strike would impact on the public at large). Once this is recognised, models addressing negotiations in such situations ought to account for the role and interests of the stakeholder - a third party whose stake is linked to the original negotiations. In this paper we address the strategic role of stakeholders in bilateral confrontations that take the form of a war of attrition; we assume that the bilateral confrontation runs concurrently with the parties interaction with the stakeholder, that chooses strategically her timing to intervene and take action to promote agreement. We show that under complete information the interplay of different interests in this tripartite timing game results in delayed outcomes. We also explore the role of incomplete information and show that asymmetries of information do not necessarily translate in increased inefficiency.stakeholders, bargaining, war of attrition
Two-stage Boundedly Rational Choice Procedures: Theory and Experimental Evidence
We study and test a class of boundedly rational models of decision making which rely on sequential eliminative heuristics. We formalize two sequential decision procedures, both inspired by plausible models popular among several psychologists and marketing scientists. However we follow a standard `revealed preference' economic approach by fully characterizing these procedures by few, simple and testable conditions on observed choice. Then we test the models (as well as the standard utility maximization model) with experimental data. We find that the large majority of individuals behave in a way consistent with one of our procedures, and inconsistent with the utility maximization model.Bounded rationality, Choice experiments
Shortlisting
We study the properties of decisions made by committees who select alternatives by constructing shortlists. We find that even when committees are themselves rational, such procedures may not give rise to rational choices. A necessary condition for this to occur is disagreement between committees. However, we delimit substantially the extent of `irrationality' that these procedures allow.Committees, shortlist, menu-dependence, cycles of choice
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