Relevant for us? We-prioritization in cognitive processing

Humans are social by nature. We ask whether this social nature operates as a lens through which individuals process the world even in the absence of immediate interactions or explicit goals to collaborate. Is information that is potentially relevant to a group one belongs to (“We”) processed with priority over information potentially relevant to a group one does not belong to (“They”)? We conducted three experiments using a modified version of Sui, He, and Humphreys’ (2012) shape–label matching task. Participants were assigned to groups either via a common preference between assigned team members (Experiment 1) or arbitrarily (Experiment 2). In a third experiment, only personal pronouns were used. Overall, a processing benefit for we-related information (we-prioritization) occurred regardless of the type of group induction. A final experiment demonstrated that we-prioritization did not extend to other individual members of a short-term transitory group. We suggest that the results reflect an intrinsic predisposition to process information “relevant for us” with priority, which might feed into optimizing collaborative processes

Imagine all the synchrony: The effects of actual and imagined synchronous walking on attitudes towards marginalised groups

Stereotyping is a pervasive societal problem that impacts not only minority groups but subserves individuals who perpetuate stereotypes, leading to greater distance between groups. Social contact interventions have been shown to reduce prejudice and stereotyping, but optimal contact conditions between groups are often out of reach in day to day life. Therefore, we investigated the effects of a synchronous walking intervention, a non-verbal embodied approach to intergroup contact that may reduce the need for optimal contact conditions. We studied attitude change towards the Roma group in Hungary following actual and imagined walking, both in a coordinated and uncoordinated manner. Results showed that coordinated walking, both imagined and in vivo, led to explicit and implicit reductions in prejudice and stereotyping towards both the Roma individual and the wider Roma social group. This suggests that coordinated movement could be a valuable addition to current approaches towards prejudice reduction

Observing joint action : coordination creates commitment

Previous research has shown that interpersonal coordination enhances pro-social attitudes and behavior. Here, we extend this research by investigating whether the degree of coordination observed in a joint action enhances the perception of individuals' commitment to the joint action. In four experiments, participants viewed videos of joint actions. In the low coordination condition, two agents made independent individual contributions to a joint action. In the high coordination condition, the individual contributions were tightly linked. Participants judged whether and for how long the observed agents would resist a tempting outside option and remain engaged in the joint action. The results showed that participants were more likely to expect agents to resist outside options when observing joint actions with a high degree of coordination. This indicates that observing interpersonal coordination is sufficient to enhance the perception of commitment to joint action

Giving a helping hand: effects of joint attention on mental rotation of body parts

Research on joint attention has addressed both the effects of gaze following and the ability to share representations. It is largely unknown, however, whether sharing attention also affects the perceptual processing of jointly attended objects. This study tested whether attending to stimuli with another person from opposite perspectives induces a tendency to adopt an allocentric rather than an egocentric reference frame. Pairs of participants performed a handedness task while individually or jointly attending to rotated hand stimuli from opposite sides. Results revealed a significant flattening of the performance rotation curve when participants attended jointly (experiment 1). The effect of joint attention was robust to manipulations of social interaction (cooperation versus competition, experiment 2), but was modulated by the extent to which an allocentric reference frame was primed (experiment 3). Thus, attending to objects together from opposite perspectives makes people adopt an allocentric rather than the default egocentric reference frame

Evidence for we-representations during joint action planning

Do people engaged in joint action form action plans that specify joint outcomes at the group level? EEG was recorded from pairs of participants who performed coordinated actions that could result in different postural configurations. To isolate individual and joint action planning processes, a pre-cue specified in advance the individual actions and/or the joint configuration. Participants had 1200 ms to prepare their actions. Then a Go cue specified all action parameters and participants performed a synchronized action as quickly as possible. Action onsets were shorter when the pre-cue specified the joint configuration, regardless of whether individual action was also specified. EEG analyses showed that specifying joint action parameters in advance reduced ambiguity in a structured joint action plan (reflected in the decrease of the amplitude of the P600) and helped with representing action goals and interpersonal coordination patterns in sensorimotor brain areas (reflected in increased alpha/mu suppression and CNV amplitudes). These results provide clear evidence that joint action is driven not only by action plans that specify individual contributions, but also by action plans that specify joint action outcomes at the group level

Attention allocation and task representation during joint action planning

We investigated whether people take into account an interaction partner's attentional focus and whether they represent in advance their partner's part of the task when planning to engage in a synchronous joint action. The experiment involved two participants planning and performing joint actions (i.e., synchronously lifting and clinking glasses), unimanual individual actions (i.e., lifting and moving a glass as if clinking with another person), and bimanual individual actions. EEG was recorded from one of the participants. We employed a choice reaction paradigm where a visual cue indicated the type of action to be planned, followed 1.5 sec later by a visual go stimulus, prompting the participants to act. We studied attention allocation processes by examining two lateralized EEG components, namely the anterior directing attention negativity and the late directing attention positivity. Action planning processes were examined using the late contingent negative variation and the movement-related potential. The results show that early stages of joint action planning involve dividing attention between locations in space relevant for one's own part of the joint action and locations relevant for one's partner's part of the joint action. At later stages of joint action planning, participants represented in advance their partner's upcoming action in addition to their own action, although not at an effector-specific level. Our study provides electrophysiological evidence supporting the operation of attention sharing processes and predictive self/other action representation during the planning phase of a synchronous joint task

Task Construal Influences Estimations of the Environment

People’s characteristics can affect their perception of the physical environment, and the judgments and estimates they make about their surroundings. Estimates of the environment change based on observers’ metabolic state, physical properties, and the potential effort they would need to exert for a certain action. The functional role of such scaling is to provide agents with information on possible actions and their energetic costs. Combining actions with costs facilitates both higher-level planning (e.g., choosing an optimal running speed on a marathon) as well as planning on lower levels of an action hierarchy, such as determining the best movement trajectories for energy-efficient action. Recently, some of the findings on reported effects of effort on perception have been challenged as arising from task demands—participants guessing the purpose of the experimental manipulation and adjusting their estimates as a result. Arguably however, the failed replications used overly distracting cover stories which may have introduced task demands of their own, and masked other effects. The current study tested the generality of effects of potential effort on height and distance perception, employing effective yet not distracting cover stories. Four experiments attempted to identify conditions under which anticipated effort may systematically change perceptual estimates. Experiment 1 found that height estimates were not influenced by the effort required to place objects of different weights onto surfaces of varying heights. Experiments 2, 3 used two different effort manipulations (walking vs. hopping; and carrying an empty vs. a heavy backpack, respectively) and found that these did not influence estimates of distance (to be) traveled. Experiment 4 also used backpack weight to manipulate effort but critically, unlike Exp. 1–3 it did not employ a cover story and participants did not traverse distances after giving estimates. In contrast with the first three experiments, distances in the final experiment were estimated as longer when participants were encumbered by a backpack. Combined, these results suggest that the measured effects on the estimation of distance were due to how participants construed the task rather than being of a perceptual nature

The Sense of Commitment: A Minimal Approach

This paper provides a starting point for psychological research on the sense of commitment within the context of joint action. We begin by formulating three desiderata: to illuminate the motivational factors that lead agents to feel and act committed, to pick out the cognitive processes and situational factors that lead agents to sense that implicit commitments are in place, and to illuminate the development of an understanding of commitment in ontogeny. In order to satisfy these three desiderata, we propose a minimal framework, the core of which is an analysis of the minimal structure of situations which can elicit a sense of commitment. We then propose a way of conceptualizing and operationalizing the sense of commitment, and discuss cognitive and motivational processes which may underpin the sense of commitment