Cognitive Mechanisms Behind the Memory-Undermining Effect of Feigned Crime-Related Amnesia

Oftentimes individuals charged with severe crimes, such as homicide, claim memory loss for their criminal experience (i.e., crime-related amnesia). However, the act of feigning amnesia negatively affects defendants’ genuine memory when they try to remember what they have committed. This dissertation examines the consequences for memory when individuals feign crime-related amnesia, in order to understand and explain why and how this phenomenon occurs. Overall, the most important finding of this dissertation yielded that although, to some extent, inhibition-based mechanism might explain simulators’ impaired recollection; genuine memory for a crime in general remains uncompromised despite a previously feigned amnesia claim

Retrieval-Induced Forgetting in the Feigning Amnesia for a Crime Paradigm

Previous studies demonstrated that, when asked to honestly provide information about a mock crime, former feigners performed worse than those who were requested to confess to this event. Thus, feigning amnesia for a mock crime undermined genuine memory for the same experience. In the present study, we examined whether retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) underlies this memory-undermining effect. After watching a mock crime, participants had to feign amnesia or confess to having committed that crime. Feigners were given retrieval practice instructions (i.e., retrieval-practice group) or no further instructions (i.e., control group). Immediately and 1 day later, all participants had to genuinely report what they remembered about the crime. Although simulators in the retrieval-practice group recalled the largest amount of information as a positive consequence of retrieval, the ratio for crucial crime-related details was lower than that exhibited by both simulators who were given no instructions and confessors. These findings suggest that RIF might play a role in forgetting critical information in claims of crime-related amnesia. Theoretical and practical implications will be discussed

Association between Ability Emotional Intelligence and Left Insula during Social Judgment of Facial Emotions

The human ability of identifying, processing and regulating emotions from social stimuli is generally referred as Emotional Intelligence (EI). Within EI, Ability EI identifies a performance measure assessing individual skills at perceiving, using, understanding and managing emotions. Previous models suggest that a brain "somatic marker circuitry" (SMC) sustains emotional sub-processes included in EI. Three primary brain regions are included: the amygdala, the insula and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). Here, our aim was to investigate the relationship between Ability EI scores and SMC activity during social judgment of emotional faces. Sixty-three healthy subjects completed a test measuring Ability EI and underwent fMRI during a social decision task (i.e. approach or avoid) about emotional faces with different facial expressions. Imaging data revealed that EI scores are associated with left insula activity during social judgment of emotional faces as a function of facial expression. Specifically, higher EI scores are associated with greater left insula activity during social judgment of fearful faces but also with lower activity of this region during social judgment of angry faces. These findings indicate that the association between Ability EI and the SMC activity during social behavior is region- and emotionspecific.Peer reviewe

False memory and COVID-19: How people fall for fake news about COVID-19 in digital contexts

People are often exposed to fake news. Such an exposure to misleading information might lead to false memory creation. We examined whether people can form false memories for COVID-19-related fake news. Furthermore, we investigated which individual factors might predict false memory formation for fake news. In two experiments, we provided participants with two pieces of COVID-19-related fake news along with a non-probative photograph. In Experiment 1, 41% (n = 66/161) of our sample reported at least one false memory for COVID-19-related fake news. In Experiment 2, even a higher percentage emerged (54.9%; n = 185/337). Moreover, in Experiment 2, participants with conspiracy beliefs were more likely to report false memories for fake news than those without such beliefs, irrespective of the conspiratorial nature of the materials. Finally, while well-being was found to be positively associated with both true and false memories (Experiment 1), only analytical thinking was negatively linked to the vulnerability to form false memories for COVID-19-related fake news (Experiment 2). Overall, our data demonstrated that false memories can occur following exposure to fake news about COVID-19, and that governmental and social media interventions are needed to increase individuals’ discriminability between true and false COVID-19-related news