Institutions and Multinational Ownership Strategy

This paper examines the impact of institutions on a multinational firm’s ownership strategy. We develop an international joint venture (IJV) model in which a multinational firm and its local partner both can undertake costly ex post actions to increase their revenue share specified by the ex ante IJV contract. The model captures the effects of two institutional features on the optimal IJV ownership structure: contract enforceability and cronyism. We introduce the IJV model into an industry equilibrium framework to analyze the impact of institutions on a multinational firm’s choice between forming an IJV or setting up a wholly-owned subsidiary. Ce papier examine l'impact des institutions sur la stratégie de propriété d’une entreprise multinationale. Nous développons un modèle de coentreprise internationale dans lequel une entreprise étrangère et son partenaire local peuvent ex post entreprendre des actions coûteuses pour augmenter leur part de revenus indiquée dans le contrat de coentreprise. Le modèle analyse les impacts de deux caractéristiques institutionnelles sur la structure de propriété optimale : le renforcement du contrat et le copinage. Nous introduisons le modèle de coentreprise dans un modèle d'équilibre général pour analyser l'impact des institutions sur le mode d’entrée des entreprises multinationales.liability of foreignness, international joint venture, contract enforceability, cronyism, coentreprise internationale, renforcement du contrat, copinage

Input Specificity and Global Sourcing

This paper investigates the role of productivity on a firm’s organizational choice. We expand Antràs and Helpman (2004) by allowing heterogeneous firms to choose between adopting specific and generic inputs. In input-intensive industries, firms face a trade-off between the lower productivity of generic inputs and the reduced hold-up friction of generic outsourcing. We demonstrate that the hold-up friction under generic outsourcing increases with a firm’s productivity. This implies that: (i) high productivity firms choose ideal outsourcing to the South, (ii) medium productivity firms choose generic outsourcing to the South, (iii) low productivity firms choose generic outsourcing to the North. Cet article étudie le rôle de la productivité sur les choix organisationnels des entreprises. Nous élargissons l’étude d’Antràs et Helpman (2004) en permettant aux entreprises hétérogènes de choisir entre l’adoption d’intrants spécifiques ou génériques. Au sein des industries caractérisées par une forte utilisation d’intrants, les entreprises font face à un compromis entre une productivité réduite liée aux intrants génériques et un problème de hold-up moindre découlant de l’impartition générique. Nous démontrons que le problème de hold-up lié à l’impartition générique augmente selon la productivité d’une entreprise. Ce qui implique que : les entreprises dont le taux de productivité est élevé choisissent l’impartition optimale au Sud, (ii) les entreprises dont le taux de productivité est moyen choisissent l’impartition générique au Sud, (iii) les entreprises dont le taux de productivité est bas choisissent l’impartition générique au Nord.input specificity, outsourcing, firm heterogeneity, incomplete contracts, hold-up problem, spécificité des intrants, impartition, hétérogénéité des entreprises, incomplétude des contrats, problèmes de hold-up.

A game theory model for electricity theft detection and privacy-aware control in AMI systems

We introduce a model for the operational costs of an electric distribution utility. The model focuses on two of the new services that are enabled by the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): (1) the fine-grained anomaly detection that is possible thanks to the frequent smart meter sampling rates (e.g., 15 minute sampling intervals of some smart meter deployments versus monthly-readings from old meters), and (2) the ability to shape the load thanks to advanced demand-response mechanisms that leverage AMI networks, such as direct-load control. We then study two security problems in this context. (1) In the first part of the paper we formulate the problem of electricity theft detection (one of the use-cases of anomaly detection) as a game between the electric utility and the electricity thief. The goal of the electricity thief is to steal a predefined amount of electricity while minimizing the likelihood of being detected, while the electric utility wants to maximize the probability of detection and the degree of operational cost it will incur for managing this anomaly detection mechanism. (2) In the second part of the paper we formulate the problem of privacy-preserving demand response as a control theory problem, and show how to select the maximum sampling interval for smart meters in order to protect the privacy of consumers while maintaining the desired load shaping properties of demand-response programs

Design and baseline characteristics of the finerenone in reducing cardiovascular mortality and morbidity in diabetic kidney disease trial

Background: Among people with diabetes, those with kidney disease have exceptionally high rates of cardiovascular (CV) morbidity and mortality and progression of their underlying kidney disease. Finerenone is a novel, nonsteroidal, selective mineralocorticoid receptor antagonist that has shown to reduce albuminuria in type 2 diabetes (T2D) patients with chronic kidney disease (CKD) while revealing only a low risk of hyperkalemia. However, the effect of finerenone on CV and renal outcomes has not yet been investigated in long-term trials. Patients and Methods: The Finerenone in Reducing CV Mortality and Morbidity in Diabetic Kidney Disease (FIGARO-DKD) trial aims to assess the efficacy and safety of finerenone compared to placebo at reducing clinically important CV and renal outcomes in T2D patients with CKD. FIGARO-DKD is a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallel-group, event-driven trial running in 47 countries with an expected duration of approximately 6 years. FIGARO-DKD randomized 7,437 patients with an estimated glomerular filtration rate >= 25 mL/min/1.73 m(2) and albuminuria (urinary albumin-to-creatinine ratio >= 30 to <= 5,000 mg/g). The study has at least 90% power to detect a 20% reduction in the risk of the primary outcome (overall two-sided significance level alpha = 0.05), the composite of time to first occurrence of CV death, nonfatal myocardial infarction, nonfatal stroke, or hospitalization for heart failure. Conclusions: FIGARO-DKD will determine whether an optimally treated cohort of T2D patients with CKD at high risk of CV and renal events will experience cardiorenal benefits with the addition of finerenone to their treatment regimen. Trial Registration: EudraCT number: 2015-000950-39; ClinicalTrials.gov identifier: NCT02545049

Incentives and security in electric distribution networks

978-3-642-34265-3International audienceWe study incentive problems in electricity distribution when customer energy usage is imperfectly observable by the utility. Thus, we assume that each customer has private information about the amount of his consumed energy. Imperfect observability of individual user demand results is non-technical energy losses. In developing countries, these losses amount to 20 − 30% per year, and are largely attributed to theft by residential customers. Reducing these losses will allow a marked increase in efficiency of the electricity distribution. Usage of smart energy management devices enables new functionalities and brings the potential for such increased efficiency. However, employing smart energy management devices also entails a new set of problems. Typically, such devices are commercially produced, and employ off-the-shelf information technology (IT) solutions with inherent security vulnerabilities. Thus, due to technology limitations and cost constraints, smart devices are vulnerable to tampering and may enable systemic energy theft, threatening to reduce, or even erase the gains in efficiency. In this paper, we address incentives of utility company to combat theft (i.e., non-technical losses), when utility is subject to rate (tariff) regulation. From our analysis, such regulated utilities invest less than socially optimal in theft reduction. We suggest that regulators should include explicit targets for the allowable losses to remedy the problem of incentive misalignment

Input specificity and global sourcing

This paper identifies a new industry-equilibrium channel through which a firm's productivity affects its organizational choice. In a two-country model with firm heterogeneity and incomplete contracts, we show that the degree of input specificity and the hold-up friction in an outsourcing relation become a function of the final good firm's productivity when inputs are not completely specific. We examine the implications for the equilibrium international sorting pattern of firms.Firm heterogeneity Input specificity Hold-up problem Incomplete contracts