Advanced Modalizing De Dicto and De Re

Lewis’ (1968, 1986) analysis of modality faces a problem in that it appears to confer unintended truth values to certain modal claims about the pluriverse: e.g. ‘It is possible that there are many worlds’ is false when we expect truth. This is the problem of advanced modalizing. Divers (1999, 2002) presents a principled solution to this problem by treating modal modifiers as semantically redundant in some such cases. However, this semantic move does not deal adequately with advanced de re modal claims. Here, we motivate and detail a comprehensive semantics (a la Lewis 1968) for advanced modalizing de dicto and de re. The generalized semantic feature of the initial solution is not redundancy but absence from counterpart-theoretic translations of world-constrictions

\u3cem\u3eThe End of the World\u3c/em\u3e and other poems

Translated from German by Gregory Divers: The End of the World by Jakob van Hoddis The Dreaming Man by Jakob van Hoddis natura morta by Yaak Karsunke dazzling deception by Yaak Karsunk

Viktor Žmegač, ed.: Geschichte der deutschen Literatur - vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, 1918-1980

Königstein/Ts.: Athenäum, 1984. 876 p

Philosophical Issues From Kripke's 'Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic'

In ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, Kripke articulates his project in the discourse of “possible worlds”. There has been much philosophical discussion of whether endorsement of the Kripke semantics brings ontological commitment to possible worlds. However, that discussion is less than satisfactory because it has been conducted without the necessary investigation of the surrounding philosophical issues that are raised by the Kripke semantics. My aim in this paper is to map out the surrounding territory and to commence that investigation. Among the surrounding issues, and my attitudes to them, are these: (1) the potential of the standard distinction between pure and impure versions of the semantic theory has been under-exploited; (2) there has been under-estimation of what is achieved by the pure semantic theory alone; (3) there is a methodological imperative to co-ordinate a clear conception of the purposes of the impure theory with an equally clear conception of the content the theory; (4) there is a need to support by argument claims about how such a semantic theory, even in an impure state, can fund explanations in the theory of meaning and metaphysics; (5) greater attention needs to be paid to the crucial advance that Kripke makes on the precursors of possible-worlds semantics proper (e.g. Carnap 1947) in clearly distinguishing variation across the worlds within a model of modal space from variation across such models and, finally, (6) the normative nature of the concept of applicability, of the pure semantic theory, is both of crucial importance and largely ignored

\u3cem\u3eWoe to those...\u3c/em\u3e by Jakob van Hoddis and \u3cem\u3emystery and crime\u3c/em\u3e and \u3cem\u3eelderly couple\u3c/em\u3e by Yaak Karsunke

Translated from German by Gregory Diver

Three Conceptions of Modal Realism

The thesis is divided into three sections. The first of these is a critique of the conceptions of modal realism due to Lewis; the second, a critique of that due to McGinn. The third section comprises the development and initial evaluation of a third conception of moral realism which I term secondary modal realism. In Section One of the thesis [Ch.1- Ch.5] I argue against the acceptability of the objectual modal realism of David Lewis and I argue (tentatively) for one theory of the meaning of possible world statements which is consistent with this denial of the existence of possible worlds. Chapters 1- 4 concern the former argument, Ch.5 concerns the latter. In Ch.1, I argue that there is no genuine semantic utility afforded by the adoption of realism about possible worlds. The case is (i) that the genuine semantical utility which does accrue via the ontological commitment to possible worlds can be had without that ontological commitmment and (ii) that other claims to semanti utility which are associated with possible world semantics do not reflect legitimate semantic-explanatory interests. The main part of the discussion of objectual realism - constituted by Chapters 2, 3 & 4 - takes a different turn. Since Lewis is fond of comparing his modal realism to realism about the entities of mathematics, I attempt to show that, on both epistemological and metaphysical grounds, the comparison is quite unfavourable for objectual modal realism. In Ch.2, I defend the objectual modal realist's right to an a priori epistemology of modality in face of Benaceraffs dilemma, but, it is argued in Ch.3, even granted a priority, there is still a serious epistemological difficulty since the internal epistemology of modal realism which is proposed by Lewis is seriously flawed. In Ch.4, it is argued that there is at least one important metaphysical consideration which militates against an ontological commitment to worlds but which does not appear to have the same impact re. mathematical ontology, viz: that the mooted possible worlds are identification- transcendent. Having made the case for anti-realism about possible worlds I am concerned in Ch.5 with the outline of a theory of the meaning of possible world statements which is consistent with this ontological position. I argue for the unacceptability of a theory, outlined by Forbes, which depends upon the claim that possible world statements do not mean what they appear to mean. I then counterpose the options of an error theory and a metaphor theory of world-talk arguing that while both of these are prima facie tenable, the latter is preferable. In Section Two of the thesis [Ch.6 - Ch.9] I deal with the non-objectual modal realism of McGinn. Having set out the salient theses of McGinn's conception of modal realism [Ch.6], the critique of this conception follows. Ch. 6: the variety and resources of anti-realisms about modality are seriously underestimated by McGinn. In particular the option of anti-realism based on the strategy of proposing a sceptical solution as a response to a sceptical paradox is ignored. Ch.7: McGinn proposes that the only defensible form of modal realism consists in endorsing the thesis of supervenience (without reduction) of the modal on the actual. However, the discussion of supervenience fails to acknowledge many of the difficulties associated with the application of supervenience and related theses in the modal case. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that acceptance of modal/actual supervenience involves no commitment to modal realism. Ch.8: consideration of the issues that flow from the discussion of the thesis of supervenience should point towards a central question of modal epistemology i.e. whether modal knowledge is attainable by conceptual means alone. However, McGinn's discussion of supervenience leads him away from this central question and as a result he mislocates the problematic nature of modal epistemology in the claim that we cannot represent modal facts as causally explaining our knowledge of them. Ch.9:The modal realism that McGinn offers is wholly unacceptable since it provides neither a clear conception of the truth-conditions of modal statements nor any account of how we detect modalities. The realism he offers is redolent of sceptical paradox and seems ripe for an anti-realist treatment in the form of a sceptical solution. Hence, the upshot of the first two sections is that the existing conceptions of modal realism, i.e. those of Lewis and of McGinn respectively, are indefensible. In Section Three of the thesis [Ch.10 - Ch. 12] the aim is to characterize and evaluate a third conception of modal realism - secondary modal realism. This project is inspired by (i) McDowell's secondary quality conception of moral reality and (ii) the observation of crucial similarities between the failings of more traditional conceptions of moral realism and those conceptions of modal realisms dealt with above. In Ch.10, I argue that anthropocentricity as opposed to perceptibility is the feature of paradigmatic secondary properties which is an appropriately generalizable feature of secondary realism and that a proper conception of the standard of correctness for secondary property judgments facilitates the extrapolation of that standard to the cases of moral and modal judgement. (Abstract shortened by ProQuest.)

Enteric coronavirus infection in adult horses.

A new enteric virus of adult horses, equine coronavirus (ECoV), has recently been recognized. It is associated with fever, lethargy, anorexia, and less frequently, colic and diarrhea. This enteric virus is transmitted via the feco-oral route and horses become infected by ingesting fecally contaminated feed and water. Various outbreaks have been reported since 2010 from Japan, Europe and the USA. While the clinical signs are fairly non-specific, lymphopenia and neutropenia are often seen. Specific diagnosis is made by the detection of ECoV in feces by either quantitative real-time PCR, electron microscopy or antigen-capture ELISA. Supportive treatment is usually required, as most infections are self-limiting. However, rare complications, such as endotoxemia, septicemia and hyperammonemia-associated encephalopathy, have been reported, and have been related to the loss of barrier function at the intestinal mucosa. This review article will focus on the latest information pertaining to the virus, epidemiology, clinical signs, diagnosis, pathology, treatment and prevention of ECoV infection in adult horses

<i>Clitoria ternatea</i> L. flower extract inhibits α-amylase during <i>in vitro </i>starch digestion

This study aimed to investigate the inhibitory effect of Clitoria ternatea flower against α-amylase during simulated in vitro wheat starch digestion. The dark-blue tropical flower is used as a food colorant but its ability to modulate starch digestion has not been tested before. The aqueous extract of the flower containing anthocyanins was a competitive inhibitor against α-amylase with an IC50 value (concentration of inhibitor required to reduce the enzyme activity by half) and inhibition constant, Ki, of 0.91 mg/mL and 0.75 mg/mL,respectively. Subjecting the extract to pasteurisation (72oC for 15 s) and boiling (for 30 min) it significantly (P&lt;0.05) decreased the anthocyanin content as determined by a pH-shift method, although the light absorbance profile of the extract remained virtually unchanged, suggesting that the equilibrium mixture of anthocyanin species was unaffected. The thermal degradation of the anthocyanins explained the partial loss of inhibition activity of the extract, as indicated by the decrease in Michaelis-Menten constant, Km, from 14.8 mg/mL in thesystems with unheated extract to 11.3 and 6.1 mg/mL in pasteurised and boiled extracts, respectively. The thermal treatments, however, did not change the type (competitive) of inhibition. The results from this work demonstrated the potential of C. ternatea flower extract in inhibiting α-amylase during starch digestion, which might lead to development of functional food/drink for controlling postprandial blood glucose level