Competitive Balance vs. Incentives to Win: A Theoretical Analysis of Revenue Sharing

We analyze a dynamic model of strategic interaction between the league organizing a professional sport, the teams playing the tournament organized by this league, and broadcasters competing for the rights to televise their matches. Teams and broadcasters maximize expected profits, while the league's objective may be either to maximize the demand for the sport or to maximize the teams' joint profits. Demand depends positively on competitive balance among teams and how intensively they compete to win the tournament. Revenue sharing increases competitive balance but decreases incentives to win. Under demand maximization, a performance-based reward scheme (as used by European top soccer leagues for national TV deals) may be optimal. Under joint profit maximization, full revenue sharing (as used by US team sport leagues for national TV deals) is always optimal.

Morphologically Conditioned Changes in Wanka-Quechua

published or submitted for publicationis peer reviewe

Revenue sharing in professional sports leagues: for the sake of competitive balance or as a result of monopsony power?

We analyze the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues. In the context of an isolated league, we show that when the teams engage in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league's optimal choice is full revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if the revenues are independent of the level of balancedness. This result is overturned when the league has no monopsony power in the talent market. When the teams of two different leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is bounded away from sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme. Finally, we argue that our model explains the observed differences in revenue sharing rules used by the U.S. sports leagues (full revenue sharing) and European soccer leagues (performance-based reward).

Evaluation of the causes of error in the MCD45 burned-area product for the savannas of northern South America [Evaluación de las causas de error en el producto de área quemada MCD45 para las sabanas del norte de Suramérica]

Forest fires contribute to deforestation and have been considered a significant source of CO2 emissions. There are global maps that estimate the area affected by a fire using the reflectance variation of the surface. In this study, we evaluated the reliability and the causes of error of the MCD45 Burned Area Product, by applying the confusion matrix method to the Orinoco River Basin. This basin is located in the northern zone of South America, and consists mainly of savanna ecosystems. For the evaluation, we used as reference data five pairs of Landsat images, covering 165,000 km2. The Burned Area Product estimated a burned area of 7,576.43 km2, which is lower than the area of 12,100.16 km2 found with Landsat images, leading to an overall underestimation. The causes of error are associated to the spatial resolution of the map, and to some structures of the algorithm that generates the map

El rol de la inteligencia emocional en el rendimiento en escalada

Purpose: To investigate the association between emotional intelligence (EI) and self-reported climbing ability. Methods: Redpoint climbing ability was used as an indicator of rock climbing performance and EI were assessed as ability and a trait using two different questionnaires MSCEIT and SSEIT in forty-three climbers (15 females and 28 males). ANOVA was used to analyse differences between male and female and advanced and elite climbers in EI parameters in both questionnaires. The analyses were also adjusted by age using ANCOVA. Results: Linear regression analysis revealed that there are no differences between trait EI and climbing performance, but we found the component `Facilitation Thought’ of EI measured as ability was inversely associated with the highest red-point ability. Conclusion: Our results suggest that elite climbers do not use their emotions to facilitate thinking as much as expert climbers, which is positively related to performance. Future researches should direct to investigate how elite climbers manage their emotions.Objetivo: Investigar la asociación entre la inteligencia emocional (IE) y el nivel de escalada autoinformada. Método: Se usó el nivel de escalada ensayado como un indicador del rendimiento de la escalada en roca y se evaluó en cuarenta y tres escaladores (15 mujeres y 28 hombres) la IE como habilidad tanto como rasgo, utilizando dos cuestionarios diferentes MSCEIT y SSEIT. Se utilizó un ANOVA para analizar las diferencias entre los escaladores masculinos y femeninos y avanzados y élite en los parámetros de IE en ambos cuestionarios. Los análisis también se ajustaron por edad utilizando un ANCOVA. Resultados: El análisis de regresión lineal reveló que no hay diferencias entre el rasgo IE y el rendimiento en escalada, pero encontramos que el componente´facilitación del pensamiento´ de IE como habilidad estaba inversamente asociado con un mayor nivel de escalada ensayada. Conclusión: Nuestros resultados sugieren que los escaladores de élite no usan sus emociones para facilitar el pensamiento, en relación con los escaladores expertos, lo que se relaciona positivamente con el rendimiento. Las investigaciones futuras deben dirigirse a investigar cómo los escaladores de élite manejan sus emocione

The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win

We analyze a dynamic model of strategic interaction between a professional sport league that organizes a tournament, the teams competing to win it, and the broadcasters paying for the rights to televise it.Teams and broadcasters maximize expected profits, while the league's objective may be either to maximize the demand for the sport or to maximize the teams'joint profits.Demand depends positively on symmetry among teams (competitive balance) and how aggressively teams try to win (incentives to win).Revenue sharing increases competitive balance but decreases incentives to win.Under demand maximization, a performance-based reward scheme (used by European sport leagues) may be optimal. Under joint profit maximization, full revenue sharing (used by many US leagues) is always optimal.These results reflect institutional differences among European and American sports leagues.sport;competition;incentives;broadcasting industry;revenue sharing

Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues: For the Sake of Competitive Balance or as a Result of Monopsony Power?

We analyze the distribution of broadcasting revenues by sports leagues.In the context of an isolated league, we show that when the teams engage in competitive bidding to attract talent, the league's optimal choice is full revenue sharing (resulting in full competitive balance) even if the revenues are independent of the level of balancedness.This result is overturned when the league has no monopsony power in the talent market.When the teams of two different leagues bid for talent, the equilibrium level of revenue sharing is bounded away from the full sharing of revenues: leagues choose a performance-based reward scheme.Finally, we argue that our model explains the observed differences in revenue sharing rules used by the U.S. sports leagues (full revenue sharing) and European soccer leagues (performance-based reward).broadcasting industry;sport;competition;revenue sharing

The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win

We analyze a dynamic model of strategic interaction between a professional sport league that organizes a tournament, the teams competing to win it, and the broadcasters paying for the rights to televise it. Teams and broadcasters maximize expected profits, while the league's objective may be either to maximize the demand for the sport or to maximize the teams' joint profits. Demand depends positively on symmetry among teams (competitive balance) and how aggressively teams try to win (incentives to win). Revenue sharing increases competitive balance but decreases incentives to win. Under demand maximization, a performance-based reward scheme (used by European sport leagues) may be optimal. Under joint profit maximization, full revenue sharing (used by many US leagues) is always optimal. These results reflect institutional differences among European and American sports leagues.