Nietzsche and Amor Fati

This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless. I analyse the distinction between two different sorts of love (eros and agape) and the type of valuation they involve (in the first case, the object is loved because we value it; in the second, we value the object because we love it). I use this as a lens to interpret Nietzsche?s cryptic pronouncements on amor fati and show that while an erotic reading is, up to a point, plausible, an agapic interpretation is preferable both for its own sake and because it allows for a resolution of the paradoxes initially identified. In doing so, I clarify the relation of amor fati to the eternal return on the one hand, and to Nietzsche?s autobiographical remarks about suffering on the other. Finally, I examine a set of objections pertaining both to the sustainability and limits of amor fati, and to its status as an ideal

Tiempo Histórico. Una promesa de aceleración

This manuscript intends to show some features of the concept “Historical Time” and its link with an idea of acceleration of History in constitutive terms. The Historical Time is used as concept mainly from the XVIII century and correspond to a way of understanding the contemporary World as a moment in which take place a chronology of Time and, along with it, the appearance of History. Different temporary schemes support this transit; among them, a pass from Synchrony to Diachrony, a change from iteration to the Event, the circularity to the linearity. In it follows we propose to observe some implications and forms of articulation of an Historical Time and Social Acceleration in the sense that both of them are connecting and mutual depending elements.El presente escrito es un intento por mostrar algunos rasgos característicos de la figura “tiempo histórico” y su vínculo con la idea de una aceleración de la historia desde su origen. El término tiempo histórico, utilizado como concepto fundamentalmente desde el siglo XVIII en adelante, corresponde a una manera de entender el mundo contemporáneo como el momento en que tiene lugar una cronología del tiempo y, junto a ello, la aparición de la historia. Diferentes esquemas temporales dan cuenta de este tránsito; entre ellos el paso de una sincronía a una diacronía, el cambio de la iteralidad al acontecimiento, la circularidad a la linealidad. En lo que sigue proponemos observar algunas de las implicancias y formas de articulación de un tiempo histórico y la aceleración de la sociedad en la medida que ambos se perciben como elementos interdependientes

Translation as destruction: Kezilahabi's adaptation of Heidegger's 'Being'.

Tanzanian novelist and philosopher Euphrase Kezilahabi strives to “dismantle the resemblance of language to the world” (1985: 216) through challenging the fundamental philosophical dichotomy of subject and object. The result of this dismantling will be a new “language whose foundation is Being” (Kezilahabi 1991: 69; lugha ambayo msingi wake nikuwako). This is an expression of a new relationship between humanity and Being built on a holistic epistemology of experience and embodiment. Through “kuwako”, Kezilahabi expresses in Swahili the Heideggerian concept of Sein (Being). His adherence to Heidegger, however, puts him at risk of compromising the very foundation of his own philosophy: his continued critique of essentialism. This article argues that Kezilahabi salvages his concept of “kuwako” from these essentialist pitfalls precisely through his declared “destructive rather than deconstructive stand vis-àvis the Western philosophy of value and representation” (Kezilahabi 1985: 4). The destruction is implemented on the thematic level: a phase of “vurumai” (chaos) which destroys previous traditions of philosophy is staged in Nagona. However, translation is an even more powerful device to carry out this destruction: “kuwako” is not an innocent reiteration but a radical reformulation of Heidegger’s central philosophical concept, decisively informed by Kezilahabi’s lifelong propensity for existentialism

El gusto por lo extremado: un análisis crítico de Baudrillard y Derrida sobre el terror y el terrorismo

For Baudrillard, the «new terrorism» should be understood as a symbolic exchange of gift and counter-gift: the terrorist’s death is an unanswerable counter-gift that disrupts the coercing circle of social relationships «imposed» by the global system. In turn, Derrida’s conception has two dimensions, explicative and normative. First, Derrida considers 11/9 as a multi-faceted symptom of an autoimmunitary crisis that has political, religious and technological-capitalist aspects. Second, Derrida argues that there is an Abrahamic «moment» of terror, violence and sacrifice that is <i>constitutive</i> to ethical decisions and responsibility.
 On the critical side, I will argue that Baudrillard’s view is premised on an extreme and partisan notion of a system interpreted as a totalitarian ruler writ large. In turn, Derrida unnecessarily turns the common observation that human actions can have perverse consequences into a law of autoimmunity inspired by biology. By seeing terror as constitutive even to the most common ethical relationships, Derrida also runs the risk of turning an extreme phenomenon into a catch-all concept, and of losing touch with the day-to-day ethical practice. I will conclude that Baudrillard’s and Derrida’s conceptions of terror and terrorism partake in a «taste for the extreme» that makes them ultimately unconvincing.<br><br>Baudrillard interpreta el «nuevo terrorismo» como un intercambio simbólico de regalo y contra-regalo: la muerte del terrorista es un contra-regalo irrefutable que rompe el círculo coercitivo de las relaciones sociales «impuestas» por el sistema global. A su vez, la concepción de Derrida tiene dos dimensiones, explicativa y normativa: en primer lugar, Derrida considera el 11-S como un síntoma multifacético de una crisis autoinmune que tiene aspectos políticos, religiosos y tecno-capitalistas. En segundo lugar, Derrida arguye que existe un «momento» de terror, violencia y sacrificio que es constitutivo en las decisiones y en la responsabilidad éticas.
 De forma crítica, argumentaré que la concepción de Baudrillard se basa en una noción extremada y partidista de un sistema que se interpreta como un inmenso mandato de un gobernante totalitario. Por su parte, Derrida convierte de forma innecesaria la observación de que las acciones humanas pueden tener consecuencias perversas en una ley de la autoinmumidad inspirada en la biología. Al considerar el terror como algo constitutivo incluso en las relaciones éticas más comunes, Derrida corre también el riesgo de convertir un fenómeno extremado en un concepto que lo abarca todo, y de perder contacto con la práctica ética corriente. Concluiré que las concepciones de Baudrillard y de Derrida sobre el terror y el terrorismo comparten un «gusto por lo extremado» que las hace en última instancia poco convincentes

Heidegger’s Underdeveloped Conception of the Undistinguishedness (Indifferenz) of Everyday Human Existence

This chapter provides an interpretation of the early Heidegger’s underdeveloped conception of the undistinguishedness of everyday human existence in Being and Time. After explaining why certain translation choices of some key terms in this text are interpretively and philosophically important, I first provide a concise argument for why the social constitution interpretation of the relation between ownedness and unownedness makes better overall sense of Heidegger’s ambivalent attitude toward the social constitution of the human being than the standard existentialist interpretation of this relation. I then proceed to the heart of this chapter, which develops his inchoate conception of the undistinguishedness of everydayness by arguing that it specifies the third distinctive mode of concrete human existence in addition to ownedness and unownedness. Accordingly, I show how unownedness is actually a generic phenomenon with two distinct species, namely, undistinguishedness and disownedness, which are at once closely related to, but also differ in significant respects from, each other. Consequently, instead of taking for granted a one-dimensional and mutually exclusive opposition between ‘authenticity’ and ‘inauthenticity’, I argue that we should adopt a two-dimensional and more nuanced understanding of the relations among undistinguishedness, disownedness, and ownedness that intersects with Heidegger’s underappreciated distinction between genuineness and ungenuineness. After raising and replying to some objections to this interpretation of undistinguishedness, I conclude this chapter by briefly sketching three of its philosophical consequences and pointing out its potential as an important resource for contemporary social theories