On formal aspects of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency

This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for both BLE and LET J . The meanings of the connectives of BLE and LET J , from the point of view of preservation of evidence, is explained with the aid of an inferential semantics. A formalization of the notion of evidence for BLE as proposed by M. Fitting is also reviewed here. As a novel result, the paper shows that LET J is semantically characterized through the so-called Fidel structures. Some opportunities for further research are also discussed

Logics of Formal Inconsistency enriched with replacement: an algebraic and modal account

One of the most expected properties of a logical system is that it can be algebraizable, in the sense that an algebraic counterpart of the deductive machinery could be found. Since the inception of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, an algebraic equivalent for such systems have been searched. It is known that these systems are non self-extensional (i.e., they do not satisfy the replacement property). More than this, they are not algebraizable in the sense of Blok-Pigozzi. The same negative results hold for several systems of the hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs). Because of this, these logics are uniquely characterized by semantics of non-deterministic kind. This paper offers a solution for two open problems in the domain of paraconsistency, in particular connected to algebraization of LFIs, by obtaining several LFIs weaker than C1, each of one is algebraizable in the standard Lindenbaum-Tarski's sense by a suitable variety of Boolean algebras extended with operators. This means that such LFIs satisfy the replacement property. The weakest LFI satisfying replacement presented here is called RmbC, which is obtained from the basic LFI called mbC. Some axiomatic extensions of RmbC are also studied, and in addition a neighborhood semantics is defined for such systems. It is shown that RmbC can be defined within the minimal bimodal non-normal logic E+E defined by the fusion of the non-normal modal logic E with itself. Finally, the framework is extended to first-order languages. RQmbC, the quantified extension of RmbC, is shown to be sound and complete w.r.t. BALFI semantics

Sound Probabilistic Reasoning under Contradiction, Inconsistency and Incompleteness

I intend to show how probability theory can be regarded as logic-dependent, viewing probability as a branch of logic in a generalized way. A kind of meta-axiomatics permits us to define probability measures that are either classical, paraconsistent, intuitionistic, or simultaneously intuitionistic and paraconsistent, just by parameterizing on consequence relations. In particular, I intend to discuss theories of probability built upon the paraconsistent Logic of Formal Inconsistency Ci, and upon the paraconsistent and paracomplete Logic of Evidence and Truth LETj. I argue that Ci very naturally encodes an extension of the notion of probability able to express probabilistic reasoning under an excess of information (contradictions), while LETj encodes an extension of the notion of probability able to express probabilistic reasoning under lack of information (incompleteness), and is thus naturally connected to the notion of probability of evidence. I also discuss how interesting non-standard Bayesian updating can be defined in both cases. This is a joint project with J. Bueno-Soler and A. Rodrigues. and most results already appear in [1] and in [5]

Recovery operators, paraconsistency and duality

There are two foundational, but not fully developed, ideas in paraconsistency, namely, the duality between paraconsistent and intuitionistic paradigms, and the introduction of logical operators that express meta-logical notions in the object language. The aim of this paper is to show how these two ideas can be adequately accomplished by the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs) and by the Logics of Formal Undeterminedness (LFUs). LFIs recover the validity of the principle of explosion in a paraconsistent scenario, while LFUs recover the validity of the principle of excluded middle in a paracomplete scenario. We introduce definitions of duality between inference rules and connectives that allow comparing rules and connectives that belong to different logics. Two formal systems are studied, the logics mbC and mbD, that display the duality between paraconsistency and paracompleteness as a duality between inference rules added to a common core– in the case studied here, this common core is classical positive propositional logic (CPL + ). The logics mbC and mbD are equipped with recovery operators that restore classical logic for, respectively, consistent and determined propositions. These two logics are then combined obtaining a pair of logics of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness (LFIUs), namely, mbCD and mbCDE. The logic mbCDE exhibits some nice duality properties. Besides, it is simultaneously paraconsistent and paracomplete, and able to recover the principles of excluded middle and explosion at once. The last sections offer an algebraic account for such logics by adapting the swap-structures semantics framework of the LFIs the LFUs. This semantics highlights some subtle aspects of these logics, and allows us to prove decidability by means of finite non-deterministic matrices

Claude P. Bruter (editor), Mathematics in Art: Mathematical Visualization in Art and Education

Book Reviews: Claude P. Bruter (editor), Mathematics in Art: Mathematical Visualization inArt and Education, Springer Verlag, New York, 2002, pp. X + 337, ISBN 3-540-43422-4

Constructivity And Computability In Historical And Philosophical Perspective

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Towards an efficient prover for the C1 paraconsistent logic

The KE inference system is a tableau method developed by Marco Mondadori which was presented as an improvement, in the computational efficiency sense, over Analytic Tableaux. In the literature, there is no description of a theorem prover based on the KE method for the C1 paraconsistent logic. Paraconsistent logics have several applications, such as in robot control and medicine. These applications could benefit from the existence of such a prover. We present a sound and complete KE system for C1, an informal specification of a strategy for the C1 prover as well as problem families that can be used to evaluate provers for C1. The C1 KE system and the strategy described in this paper will be used to implement a KE based prover for C1, which will be useful for those who study and apply paraconsistent logics.Comment: 16 page

An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: a logic of evidence and truth

The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence (BLE), and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth (LETj). The latter is a logic of formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth. LETj is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETj, as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation