Will people prefer future travel with battery-powered airplanes?

Various small battery-powered airplane models have been developed over the last years and are approaching the stage of being included in commercial flights. However, there are relatively few studies on potential customers’ preference for flying with electric airplanes. Some insights can be drawn from the literature on electric vehicles and other technology adaption, but choices between air travel services differ from choices involving technologically advanced durables. A sample of transport users travelling between the Norwegian cities Bergen and Stavanger were asked about their willingness to choose flying with a future battery-electric airplane instead of a standard kerosene-based one. A majority would consider flying electric, some are also willing to pay a premium, but a substantial share was reluctant and would require a discount. Age was the strongest observable characteristic explaining willingness to pay. Latent technology attitudes also co-varied positively with preference for electric airplanes against conventional airplanes.Will people prefer future travel with battery-powered airplanes?publishedVersio

Where is power really situated in the EU? Complex multi-stakeholder negotiations and the climate and energy 2030 targets

The literature on EU integration gives no clear answer as to where real decision-making power in the EU is situated. Which stakeholders are the most influential when major decisions are made, for example? An approach held to have consid-erable explanatory potential for EU policies in general, and potentially for climate and energy policy in particular, is the advocacy coalition framework (ACF). However, few studies have applied ACF together with other theories/frameworks, such as liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and historical institutionalism (HI), to assess the degree to which various stakeholders involved at the EU level manage to achieve their preferences. Using the EU’s new 2030 headline climate and energy policy targets as a case of EU climate and energy policy, this study asks: how can we explain the outcome of negotiations in the EU, as exemplified in the 2030 negotiations? Drawing on more than 30 research interviews with representa-tives of key stakeholders conducted before and after the final political negotia-tions, combined with extensive document studies and participation in stakeholder events, this report argues that the result appears to be a genuine compromise for all stakeholders involved. Findings confirm the Commission’s importance as an agenda setter (HI) and the crucial role and positions of heavyweight member states like Germany, France, the UK and Poland (LI), which were probably affected by their key energy industries and long-term energy policies. The study also finds large long-term advocacy coalitions within the interest group com-munity (ACF). Moreover, the final decision may be viewed as negotiated compromise between advocacy coalitions at various levels (ACF), but only when the ACF criterion of non-trivial degree of coordination is not very rigorously operationalized

What drives investment in wind energy? A comparative study of China and the European Union

Although the expansion of new renewable energy has been dependent on support in state policies, the research literature has scant focus on the political motivations for implementing policies to stimulate such development. The growth of wind power is an illustrative case of renewables expansion, as this is the most mature of the new renewable technologies. What can explain the rapid development of wind power production capacity in the EU and in China, despite their very different political systems and basic preconditions? Applying the method of most-different systems design in combination with document studies and interviewing, this article demonstrates how large-scale investments in wind power have come about through a specific set of political motivations backed by strong governmental support policies with similar main aims: security of energy supply, creating future-oriented industries and employment, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution. These three factors together, broadly perceived, might also explain the political motivations that drive large investment in new renewable energy sources elsewher

Multi-level lobbying in the EU. The case of the Renewables Directive and the German energy industry.

This study examines the lobbying strategies employed by the German energy industries in the process leading up to EU's Renewable Energy Directive. The focus is on the most controversial part of it: Choice of support mechanisms for increasing production of renewable energy in Europe. The position on this issue roughly divided the energy industry into two sectors: the utilities, favoring green certificates and other supranational incentives and the renewables industry, promoting feed-in tariffs. Nine interest organizations, five German and four at the European level, serve as cases. Expectations based on the two theoretical perspectives liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) and multi-level governance (MLG) are formulated and tested against the empirics in a most likely case design. In addition, resources, mainly in terms of manpower, are assessed as a conditioning factor for choice of lobbying strategies. The findings show that the observations provide more support for the multi-level perspective, MLG, than for liberal intergovernmentalism, LI. Two findings supported the LI perspective: 1) All the German interest organizations put top priority at lobbying the German government. 2) The interest organizations provided German decision makers with crucial information. As envisioned by the MLG-perspective, there was a clear division of work between the organizations at the two political levels. Further, the lobbying activity displayed several multi-level characteristics. First, all the German interest organizations lobbied both at the national and at the European level. Second, the national interest organizations participated in multi-level political coalitions, in particular the renewables industry. There, they coordinated their political positions, pooled resources, shared information and made common strategies. Third, all the European-level interest organizations lobbied both the core EU institutions and national governments. Fourth, their information strategy matched the Commission's need for critical information on the complicated issues involved. It might be expected that interest groups loosing at home could try to “by-pass” national politics by lobbying extra much at the European level, but the observations are inconclusive in this respect. That more resources were associated with a higher number of lobbying channels was true at the European level, but not nationally. The number of political channels used by the German interest organizations rather depended on level of political mobilization and creating of broad coalitions

What drives investment in wind energy? A comparative study of China and the European Union

Although the expansion of new renewable energy has been dependent on support in state policies, the research literature has scant focus on the political motivations for implementing policies to stimulate such development. The growth of wind power is an illustrative case of renewables expansion, as this is the most mature of the new renewable technologies. What can explain the rapid development of wind power production capacity in the EU and in China, despite their very different political systems and basic preconditions? Applying the method of most-different systems design in combination with document studies and interviewing, this article demonstrates how large-scale investments in wind power have come about through a specific set of political motivations backed by strong governmental support policies with similar main aims: security of energy supply, creating future-oriented industries and employment, and reducing greenhouse gas emissions and local pollution. These three factors together, broadly perceived, might also explain the political motivations that drive large investment in new renewable energy sources elsewher

INER 23.3 Ydersbond Supplemental Material Appendix 1-7 final 17 July.pdf

<p><br></p><p>International Negotiation 23(3) (2018) 1–37, </p><p>"Power through Collaboration: Stakeholder Influence in EU Climate and Energy Negotiations"</p><p> <br></p><p></p><p>7 Appendixes:</p><p>APPENDIX 1 Outline of Causal Mechanisms in Liberal Intergovernmentalism, the Advocacy Coalition Framework and Historical Institutionalism</p><p> APPENDIX 2 List of Interviews</p><p> APPENDIX 3 Methodological Considerations</p><p> Appendix 4 The Policy Core Beliefs of the Three Advocacy Coalitions</p><p> APPENDIX 5: The EU Member States’ Energy Mixes and Energy Policies, Part 1: Renewable Energy Policy, GHG Emissions Reduction Policy and Coal Policy</p><p> APPENDIX 6 Overarching Coalitions Based on Similar Political Views</p><p>Appendix 7 Path Dependency in the EU’s Climate and Energy Policy Targets</p><p><br></p><p> <br></p><p> </p

Kombinert mobilitet tilbudt av kollektivselskapene : er det en oppnåelig visjon?

If public stakeholders like public transport authorities (PTAs) take on the role as a provider of Mobility as a Service (MaaS), this may contribute to attaining key targets, including reduced car use, congestion and transport poverty. Therefore, we ask: Can PTAs provide MaaS, and if so, how can they achieve this target? This study applies three complementary theoretical approaches to public innovation to analyse the service innovation of the Norwegian MaaS leaders, the PTAs Kolumbus and Ruter. These are theories about public risk tolerance, reorganisation, and collaborative innovation. Methods applied are interviews, comparative analyses, event participation and document studies. Our analyses demonstrate that the selected PTAs exercise a “loose” form of meta-governance, or partnerships, and gradually innovate and have become early MaaS providers. Hence PTAs may be able to lead MaaS development. Moreover, various public authorities may, by setting environmental standards and providing funding, be essential in attaining innovation in MaaS and electrification.Hvis offentlige aktører som kollektivselskaper tar rollen som tilbyder av mobilitet som tjeneste (mobility as a service, MaaS), kan dette bidra til at viktige mål nås, slik som redusert bilbruk, kødannelse og transportfattigdom. Derfor spør vi: kan kollektivselskaper tilby mobilitet som tjeneste, og hvordan kan de oppnå dette målet? Denne studien benytter tre komplementære teoretiske tilnærminger til offentlig innovasjon for å analysere tjenesteinnovasjonen i de norske MaaS-lederne, kollektivselskapene Kolumbus og Ruter. Dette er teorier om offentlig risikotoleranse, omorganisering og innovasjon gjennom samarbeid. Metoder anvendt er intervjuer, komparative analyser, deltakelse i arrangementer og dokumentstudier. Våre analyser viser at de utvalgte kollektivselskapene utøver en type “løs” nettverksstyring, altså partnerskap, og har gradvis utviklet seg til å bli MaaS-tilbydere. Derav kan kollektivselskaper lede utviklingen mot mobilitet som tjeneste. Videre kan ulike offentlige myndigheter, gjennom å sette miljøstandarder og tilby finansiering, være essensielle i å oppnå innovasjon i MaaS og elektrifisering.Regulating smart mobilit

Nordic measures to promote sustainable aviation fuels: Artikel

Decarbonising transportation is necessary to reach long-termed climate goals and Nordic countries havecommitted themselves to be ambitious and lead the way. Finding technically feasible and economicallyviable solutions for aviation is among the most difficult challenges. This paper examines opportunities forincreased Nordic cooperation to promote use of sustainable aviation fuels. Pros and cons of implementingeach of five policy instruments in a Nordic context are analyzed and their impacts in terms of impact on airtravel, CO2-emissions and Government budget are estimated.The paper concludes that the most suitable common Nordic policy for significant CO2 reductions from airtravel is to announce a gradually increasing blend-in share of sustainable fuels toward 2030 backed byestablishing a Nordic fund that will compensate the price premium compared to fossil fuels. The fund shouldbe financed by common earmarked passenger taxes for all departing flights from the Nordics

Nordic Experiences with Smart Mobility: Emerging Services and Regulatory Frameworks

In a time where emerging technologies bundled within “smart mobility” represent a new transformation of the mobility system, it is critical that governments pro-actively take part in these developments. This means steering measures to ensure that the benefits of innovative technologies contribute towards a sustainable mobility system and avoiding the risk of increased attractiveness and use of private motorized transport, such as private cars. New technologies, largely accelerated by the ongoing digital transformation in mobility, have the potential to disrupt existing market structures entirely. Existing legal and regulatory frameworks may not be prepared for accommodating new and innovative services. It is therefore critical to gain more a thorough understanding of how new smart mobility services need and may be governed through regulatory frameworks. This paper looks into approaches and experiences in Finland and Norway, focusing on the role the public authorities have adopted in the two countries with respect to smart mobility solutions and emerging Mobility as a Service (MaaS) offerings in particular. The paper first presents a typology of new mobility services and a review of emerging services. An analysis is then presented of the interplay between the government as a regulatory authority and the new MaaS initiatives, drawing on the frameworks by Docherty et al. (2018) on elements and challenges related to the transition to smarter mobility. Our main finding is that the services available on the street and challenges faced by the authorities in the short run are surprisingly similar, but that the toolbox available and the long run challenges may prove more diverging