El argumento del «uno sobre los muchos» para las proposiciones

The meanings of utterances and thoughts are commonly regarded in philosophical semantics as abstract objects, called «propositions», which account for how different utterances and thoughts can be synonymous and which constitute the primary truth-bearers. I argue that meanings are instead natural properties that play causal roles in the world, that the kind of «One over Many» thinking underlying the characterization of shared meanings as abstract objects is misguided and that utterances and thoughts having truth-values in virtue of their meanings does not entail that meanings themselves are truth-bearers.  Los significados de enunciados y pensamientos se consideran comúnmente en la semántica filosófica como objetos abstractos, llamados «proposiciones», que explican cómo diferentes enunciados y pensamientos pueden ser sinónimos y que constituyen los principales portadores de la verdad. Argumento que los significados son propiedades naturales que juegan roles causales en el mundo, que el tipo de pensamiento del «uno sobre los muchos» que subyace a la caracterización de significados compartidos como objetos abstractos está equivocado y que el hecho que los enunciados y pensamientos tengan valores de verdad en virtud de sus significados no implica que los significados sean portadores de la verdad. &nbsp

Basic-Acceptance Teleosemantics

I propose an approach to naturalize semantics that combines the use-theory of meaning with teleosemantics. More specifically, I combine Horwich’s claim that the meanings of words are engendered by the acceptance of basic sentences that govern their deployment with the teleosemantic model, developed by Millikan, Papineau and Neander, according to which the meanings of symbols are related to functions determined by the history of their use and of the underlying biological mechanisms responsible for it. Horwich’s account is general enough to offer plausible explanations of the meanings of all kinds of words and provides a plausible explanation of how meanings govern the uses of words in inference. But, as Devitt shows, his claim that meanings are law-like regularities in the use of words does not make enough room for misuses due to ignorance or error, which may be regular. I argue that this problem can be overcome by adopting a teleonomic account of the functions of symbols, which allows for failures in performance. The teleonomic account characterizes functions as what items are supposed (but may fail) do to, based on their selective history. While this is a biological notion, Millikan and Papineau have proposed plausible ways to extend it to acquired representations. Available teleosemantic theories are truth-referential and are usually regarded as competing with use-theories that are motivated by deflationary views of truth and reference. I argue that we need the basic-acceptance account independently of the fate of deflationism and that it can be articulated in truth-referentialist terms. Additionally, I argue that we need to combine it with teleosemantics. The resulting basic-acceptance teleosemantics claims that some basic sentences containing a word are supposed (but may fail) to govern its overall use. This account, unlike Horwich’s, makes plenty of room for words being misused due to ignorance or error. Basic-acceptance semantics applies to symbols that play roles in inferential processes. For more basic animal representations that have direct perceptual causes and behavioral effects, I propose instead an account that combines Millikan’s effect-based teleosemantics with Neander’s cause-based teleosemantics. Millikan’s theory explains meanings in terms of the conditions in the world that representations are supposed to covary with in order to have the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that this theory has the advantage of making enough room for misrepresentation, due to its output-based character, but can ascribe meanings that are implausible because it ignores the causes of representations. Neander’s theory explains meanings in terms of the causes that the perceptual mechanisms are supposed to respond to. I argue that this theory has the advantage of ascribing meanings that are plausible given the perceptual capacities of organisms, but it does not make enough room for misrepresentation because it ignores the effects of representations. According to the hybrid account I propose, the meanings of basic representations are determined by what is supposed to cause their tokens in order for them to bring about the effects they have the function of producing. I argue that the hybrid account makes enough room for misrepresentation while ascribing meanings that are plausible given the capacities of the perceptual mechanisms that produce them

Can we continue research in splenectomized dogs? Mycoplasma haemocanis: Old problem - New insight

We report the appearance of a Mycoplasma haemocanis infection in laboratory dogs, which has been reported previously, yet, never before in Europe. Outbreak of the disease was triggered by a splenectomy intended to prepare the dogs for a hemorrhagic shock study. The clinical course of the dogs was dramatic including anorexia and hemolytic anemia. Treatment included allogeneic transfusion, prednisone, and oxytetracycline. Systematic follow-up (n=12, blood smears, antibody testing and specific polymerase chain reaction) gives clear evidence that persistent eradication of M. haemocanis is unlikely. We, therefore, had to abandon the intended shock study. In the absence of effective surveillance and screening for M. haemocanis, the question arises whether it is prudent to continue shock research in splenectomized dogs. Copyright (C) 2004 S. Karger AG, Basel