The Election Sabotage Scheme and How Congress Can Stop It

This paper briefly catalogs recent election sabotage legislation and the status of those efforts and explains how they threaten our democratic system. Specifically, there are four categories of legislation to sabotage the electoral process: (1) legislation to give state officials the power to change or reject election results; (2) legislation to give partisan state officials the power to seize control of the election administration and vote-counting processes; (3) legislation to restrict, control, or punish the conduct of local election officials; and (4) legislation to make it harder to vote.The paper then details the most significant legislative solution: the Freedom to Vote Act (FTVA), a transformative voting rights and democracy reform bill that would thwart most election sabotage efforts. The Freedom to Vote Act includes provisions targeted at specific election sabotage threats. But its core voting rights provisions would also defang election sabotage laws. By establishing clear, enforceable national standards on issues such as early voting, vote by mail, and the counting of ballots, the Freedom to Vote Act would deprive partisans of the discretion to suppress or discard legitimate votes. It would also deprive partisans of the raw material that underlies their phony claims of fraud whenever marginalized communities are given fair access to the ballot. Partisan election boards, for example, could not claim that counties had improperly allowed people to vote by mail if they were merely following unambiguous federal requirements. The same is true for vote-counting standards. Congress must act quickly and decisively to blunt the election sabotage scheme before it gathers more momentum at the state level

Propuesta del sistema de abastecimiento de agua potable para mejorar la salubridad en dos localidades del distrito de Shatoja, Dorado, San Martin

El presente proyecto fue de tipo descriptivo-aplicativo con el fin de resolver un problema social, a través de un saneamiento que permitió evaluar el abastecimiento de agua para los pobladores, tales que sufren por la escasez, al mismo tiempo consumiendo agua que no es óptima para el consumo humano, estos causando problemas de comodidad y salud en la población de las localidades del distrito de Shatoja, Dorado, San Martin. El desarrollo de la población está siendo muy acelerado como en todas las ciudades en todo el país durante estos últimos años, trayendo como consecuencia escasez de agua, contaminación, y deficiencia en todo aspecto, el cual con suma importancia es acceder a un diseño para el abastecimiento de agua, con suma salubridad para la población. El proyecto de tesis denominado propuesta del sistema de abastecimiento de agua potable para mejorar la salubridad en dos localidades del distrito de Shatoja, Dorado, San Martin, busco dar solución integral a los graves problemas de abastecimiento de agua y las condiciones de salubridad que estos pobladores reciben. Se evaluó el caudal de diseño utilizando el método Racional, en función al Coeficiente de escorrentía, áreas colectoras, pendiente del terreno y la intensidad de diseño correspondiente a un tiempo de retorno Tr = 20 años. Con el caudal de diseño en promedio Qp=0.25 l/s, pendiente y rugosidad se calculó la geometría de las secciones de cada tramo de colector, los mismos que hacen su entrega final. En todo momento se tuvo en cuenta que es obligatorio 50 m3 solo para poblaciones mayores o iguales a 10,000.00 habitantes, de acuerdo a la norma OS.030 del Reglamento Nacional de Edificaciones, para nuestro caso no se considera

Sex differences in rheumatoid arthritis: more than meets the eye...

Sex differences in the prevalence of autoimmune diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis (RA) are well described, but the literature is not as clear about sex differences in RA disease course and prognosis. A recent study from a very large cross-sectional international cohort demonstrated slightly worse levels of disease activity and function in female patients with RA, compared with men. These findings are discussed in the context of our evolving knowledge of sex differences in the expression of this prototypic autoimmune disease, both in terms of the actual disease activity level, the effects that the disease has on physical function, and our ability accurately to measure these aspects

Election Officials as Regulators of Voting Access

Election officials play an essential role in American elections—not only by facilitating the casting of ballots, but also through their use of regulatory discretion. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, election officials across the country used their discretion constructively to protect voters from unprecedented threats. Their faithful and brave service to American democracy’s most fundamental act should be applauded. Instead, in many states, the reaction has resulted in legislative backlash—a warning shot to the future of democracy. In many ways, the role of an election official is regulatory. As the primary officials implementing election laws passed by legislatures, their responsibilities extend beyond setting up rooms and counting ballots. Election officials make decisions about a wide range of resource allocation issues, such as polling place siting, information distribution, and recruiting and training poll workers. All 50 states have laws that grant election officials some form of rulemaking authority. But to protect voting rights and voter access, these statutory grants of authority appropriately constrain election officials in certain ways—for example, by limiting polling place closures or mandating that certain registration opportunities be available. It is equally important, however, that election officials have some discretion to adopt best practices that protect voter access within the scope of the law. Election officials use this statutory authority to protect voter access in a variety of ways. The Montana Secretary of State, Christi Jacobsen, has used rulemaking authority to issue regulations ensuring polling place accessibility for elderly voters and voters with disabilities. The North Carolina State Board of Elections has used its rulemaking authority to issue poll watcher conduct regulations that ensure watchers cannot impede or harass voters. Beyond formal rulemaking authority, election officials use their discretion to protect voting access in more informal ways. During the 2020 election cycle, some election officials changed their poll worker recruitment practices to focus on younger people at the lowest risk for COVID-19. Other officials provided pre-paid ballot postage to registered voters in response to the increased reliance on mail voting. The need for regulatory discretion to protect voter access is best highlighted through disaster response planning. During times of uncertainty, local election officials possess the expertise and knowledge of conditions on the ground to preserve voting access. For 150 years, election officials have moved the democratic process forward in the face of war, terrorist attacks, and hurricanes. Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has strained election administration in unprecedented ways and presented a compelling example of the importance of election official regulatory discretion. Some states successfully passed emergency legislation to protect the election process during COVID-19. Fourteen states passed substantive legislation affecting election administration during COVID-19, including laws to extend mail ballot receipt deadlines, expand early voting hours, and affirmatively distribute mail ballot applications. Despite these positive measures, emergency legislation is an imperfect form of disaster response. The legislative process is intentionally deliberative and requires substantial time to draft bills, establish quorum, debate, amend, broker deals, and vote. In addition, legislatures often require large numbers of people to work in close quarters, which can be dangerous during a public health emergency. In many states, election officials have been able to use their regulatory authority either to complement emergency legislation or step in to protect voters where no emergency legislation passed. For example, in 2020, Harris County, Texas, Clerk Chris Hollins tripled the number of early voting locations in his county, sent mail-in ballot applications to voters 65 and older, and instituted drive-through voting to allow at-risk people to vote safely from their cars. These actions came despite intense opposition from statewide officials. In Georgia, Fulton County Elections Director Rick Barron expanded early voting hours to cut down on long lines. In Florida, 20 counties used their existing authority under Florida election law to offer additional days of early voting, and 19 counties opened additional early voting locations. North Carolina’s State Board of Elections Executive Director Karen Brinson Bell used her emergency authority to expand early voting, mandate health and safety protocols at polling places, and require all counties to seek approval before moving or consolidating polling places. Rather than hold up these efforts as models of effective and nimble election administration and regulation, many states have embarked on a legislative backlash campaign seeking to restrict election officials’ emergency and regulatory power. Legislators in at least 23 states have introduced at least 37 different bills seeking to curtail election official discretion or punish or restrict election officials for taking certain actions. Many of these bills are directly targeted at actions local election officials took to protect voters in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Texas the legislature recently banned drive-through voting and made it a crime for election officials to distribute mail ballot applications affirmatively. Texas Senate Bill 1 also bars public officials from creating, altering, modifying, waiving, or suspending any election standard, practice, or procedure. This law will make it more difficult for election officials in Texas to protect voters in future disasters. In Georgia, Senate Bill 202 directly limits some emergency actions that election officials took to provide safe options for voting during COVID-19 by restricting mail ballot drop boxes and banning mobile polling places. The Georgia law also limits election official discretion by standardizing early voting hours. Although at first glance these restrictions may not seem as oppressive as other elements of the current wave of state voter suppression bills, they could have massive ramifications. Restricting election administrators’ regulatory authority for retaliatory reasons harms voters by deterring the most knowledgeable and capable officials from making the decisions necessary to ensure full and fair access to the ballot. At a moment when election officials have demonstrated their critical role in America’s democracy, many state legislatures across the country are embarking on a national campaign to restrict their authority to protect voters. This legislative backlash against election officials is an urgent warning sign to anyone concerned about the resiliency of American democracy

Election Officials as Regulators of Voting Access

Election officials play an essential role in American elections—not only by facilitating the casting of ballots, but also through their use of regulatory discretion. In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, election officials across the country used their discretion constructively to protect voters from unprecedented threats. Their faithful and brave service to American democracy’s most fundamental act should be applauded. Instead, in many states, the reaction has resulted in legislative backlash—a warning shot to the future of democracy. In many ways, the role of an election official is regulatory. As the primary officials implementing election laws passed by legislatures, their responsibilities extend beyond setting up rooms and counting ballots. Election officials make decisions about a wide range of resource allocation issues, such as polling place siting, information distribution, and recruiting and training poll workers. All 50 states have laws that grant election officials some form of rulemaking authority. But to protect voting rights and voter access, these statutory grants of authority appropriately constrain election officials in certain ways—for example, by limiting polling place closures or mandating that certain registration opportunities be available. It is equally important, however, that election officials have some discretion to adopt best practices that protect voter access within the scope of the law. Election officials use this statutory authority to protect voter access in a variety of ways. The Montana Secretary of State, Christi Jacobsen, has used rulemaking authority to issue regulations ensuring polling place accessibility for elderly voters and voters with disabilities. The North Carolina State Board of Elections has used its rulemaking authority to issue poll watcher conduct regulations that ensure watchers cannot impede or harass voters. Beyond formal rulemaking authority, election officials use their discretion to protect voting access in more informal ways. During the 2020 election cycle, some election officials changed their poll worker recruitment practices to focus on younger people at the lowest risk for COVID-19. Other officials provided pre-paid ballot postage to registered voters in response to the increased reliance on mail voting. The need for regulatory discretion to protect voter access is best highlighted through disaster response planning. During times of uncertainty, local election officials possess the expertise and knowledge of conditions on the ground to preserve voting access. For 150 years, election officials have moved the democratic process forward in the face of war, terrorist attacks, and hurricanes. Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has strained election administration in unprecedented ways and presented a compelling example of the importance of election official regulatory discretion. Some states successfully passed emergency legislation to protect the election process during COVID-19. Fourteen states passed substantive legislation affecting election administration during COVID-19, including laws to extend mail ballot receipt deadlines, expand early voting hours, and affirmatively distribute mail ballot applications. Despite these positive measures, emergency legislation is an imperfect form of disaster response. The legislative process is intentionally deliberative and requires substantial time to draft bills, establish quorum, debate, amend, broker deals, and vote. In addition, legislatures often require large numbers of people to work in close quarters, which can be dangerous during a public health emergency. In many states, election officials have been able to use their regulatory authority either to complement emergency legislation or step in to protect voters where no emergency legislation passed. For example, in 2020, Harris County, Texas, Clerk Chris Hollins tripled the number of early voting locations in his county, sent mail-in ballot applications to voters 65 and older, and instituted drive-through voting to allow at-risk people to vote safely from their cars. These actions came despite intense opposition from statewide officials. In Georgia, Fulton County Elections Director Rick Barron expanded early voting hours to cut down on long lines. In Florida, 20 counties used their existing authority under Florida election law to offer additional days of early voting, and 19 counties opened additional early voting locations. North Carolina’s State Board of Elections Executive Director Karen Brinson Bell used her emergency authority to expand early voting, mandate health and safety protocols at polling places, and require all counties to seek approval before moving or consolidating polling places. Rather than hold up these efforts as models of effective and nimble election administration and regulation, many states have embarked on a legislative backlash campaign seeking to restrict election officials’ emergency and regulatory power. Legislators in at least 23 states have introduced at least 37 different bills seeking to curtail election official discretion or punish or restrict election officials for taking certain actions. Many of these bills are directly targeted at actions local election officials took to protect voters in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In Texas the legislature recently banned drive-through voting and made it a crime for election officials to distribute mail ballot applications affirmatively. Texas Senate Bill 1 also bars public officials from creating, altering, modifying, waiving, or suspending any election standard, practice, or procedure. This law will make it more difficult for election officials in Texas to protect voters in future disasters. In Georgia, Senate Bill 202 directly limits some emergency actions that election officials took to provide safe options for voting during COVID-19 by restricting mail ballot drop boxes and banning mobile polling places. The Georgia law also limits election official discretion by standardizing early voting hours. Although at first glance these restrictions may not seem as oppressive as other elements of the current wave of state voter suppression bills, they could have massive ramifications. Restricting election administrators’ regulatory authority for retaliatory reasons harms voters by deterring the most knowledgeable and capable officials from making the decisions necessary to ensure full and fair access to the ballot. At a moment when election officials have demonstrated their critical role in America’s democracy, many state legislatures across the country are embarking on a national campaign to restrict their authority to protect voters. This legislative backlash against election officials is an urgent warning sign to anyone concerned about the resiliency of American democracy

Data from: Mismatch between dietary requirements for lipid by a predator and availability of lipid in prey

Growth is an important factor in predicting an organism's overall success as an adult. Understanding how abiotic and biotic factors influence body size is key to predicting how environmental changes will impact organisms and predicting optimal behaviors under varying conditions. Food items can vary widely in nutrient content and this variation can affect growth. We tested how the quantity and macronutrient content of live prey affected the growth of juvenile jumping spiders, Phiddipus audax, using 420 spiderlings raised on one of 21 diets. In addition, we measured the nutrient content of prey from the field and compared average prey nutrient content with the diet at which spiders maximized growth. Our results show that the quantity and nutrient content of prey have significant and interacting effects on the growth of an actively hunting predator. In particular, spiders grew larger in body size (tibia/patella length and posterior lateral eye width) and were heavier on diets with higher lipid content. Yet, data on the nutrient content of prey from the field shows that most potential prey have high protein and low lipid content in their bodies. This apparent mismatch between spider nutritional requirements and prey nutrient availability likely presents a challenge to spiders seeking to maximize growth in the field. Several hypotheses for how these predators overcome this challenge to reach the large body sizes observed in the field are discussed

oikos_dryad_wiggins_OIK-04766R1

data associate with juvenile jumping spiders fed live prey that varied in nutrients alter growth rates and sizes over four months

Targeted Radiosensitization of ETS Fusion-Positive Prostate Cancer through PARP1 Inhibition

ETS gene fusions, which result in overexpression of an ETS transcription factor, are considered driving mutations in approximately half of all prostate cancers. Dysregulation of ETS transcription factors is also known to exist in Ewing's sarcoma, breast cancer, and acute lymphoblastic leukemia. We previously discovered that ERG, the predominant ETS family member in prostate cancer, interacts with the DNA damage response protein poly (ADP-ribose) polymerase 1 (PARP1) in human prostate cancer specimens. Therefore, we hypothesized that the ERG-PARP1 interaction may confer radiation resistance by increasing DNA repair efficiency and that this radio-resistance could be reversed through PARP1 inhibition. Using lentiviral approaches, we established isogenic models of ERG overexpression in PC3 and DU145 prostate cancer cell lines. In both cell lines, ERG overexpression increased clonogenic survival following radiation by 1.25 (±0.07) fold (mean ± SEM) and also resulted in increased PARP1 activity. PARP1 inhibition with olaparib preferentially radiosensitized ERG-positive cells by a factor of 1.52 (±0.03) relative to ERG-negative cells (P < .05). Neutral and alkaline COMET assays and immunofluorescence microscopy assessing γ-H2AX foci showed increased short- and long-term efficiencies of DNA repair, respectively, following radiation that was preferentially reversed by PARP1 inhibition. These findings were verified in an in vivo xenograft model. Our findings demonstrate that ERG overexpression confers radiation resistance through increased efficiency of DNA repair following radiation that can be reversed through inhibition of PARP1. These results motivate the use of PARP1 inhibitors as radiosensitizers in patients with localized ETS fusion-positive cancers