Trade secrets law

The standardisation of trade secret protection was one of the goals of the TRIPs Agreement of 1998. Nevertheless, substantial differences in this protection remain across jurisdictions. When defining the optimal scope of trade secrets law, lawmakers should be aware that strong trade secret protection is likely to promote inventiveness, but it is also likely to hinder the diffusion of knowledge and prevent competition

‘Better late than never’: the interplay between green technology and age for firm growth

This paper investigates the relationship between green/non-green technologies and firm growth. By combining the literature on eco-innovations, industrial organisation and entrepreneurial studies, we examine the dependence of this relationship on the pace at which firms grow and the age of the firm. From a dataset of 5498 manufacturing firms in Italy for the period of 2000–2008, longitudinal fixed effects quantile models are estimated, in which the firm’s age is set to moderate the effects of green and non-green patents on employment growth. We find that the positive effect of green technologies on growth is greater than that of non-green technologies. However, this result does not apply to struggling and rapidly growing firms. With fast-growing (above the median) firms, age moderates the growth effect of green technologies. Inconsistent with the extant literature, this moderation effect is positive: firm experience appears important for the growth benefits of green technologies, possibly relative to the complexity of their management

Activity Overinvestment: The Case of R&D

The literature on corporate diversification has often argued for and established the case that companies often overdiversify in a product market sense – i.e. enter into unrelated product markets where they may not fully cover their cost of capital. Yet, even without engaging in unrelated diversification, managers need to make resource allocation decisions to a variety of activities that a company conducts to consummate its business. In this article we focus on Research and Development (R&D) activity and we discuss the effects that the uncertainty, boundary ambiguity, feedback latency, R&D lumpiness and legitimacy that characterize technological contexts can have in making overinvestment in R&D likely. Specifically, in this article we a) draw attention to the construct of activity overinvestment, and specifically R&D overinvestment, b) use the received literature to argue that there exists a prima facie case for examining this construct and its antecedents in order to evaluate the extent and implications of R&D overinvestment, and c) make the more general case that the resource allocation literature needs to study the issue of activity overinvestment systematically

Do patents over-compensate innovators?

Is the current level of patent protection too high or too low? To address this issue, this paper reformulates the theoretical analysis of the optimal level of patent protection to take into account the empirical findings of the innovation production function literature. This literature finds a strong relationship between R&D spending and inventions and estimates an elasticity of the supply of inventions of 0.5 or more. The paper then assesses the current level of patent protection, exploiting estimates of the private and social returns to R&D taken from the empirical literature and other available sources. Although more research is needed for a more precise assessment, the evidence available suggests that patents do not overcompensate innovators

Patent protection for complex technologies

We analyse patent protection with sequential and complementary innovation. We argue that in these cases the classic Nordhaus trade-off between innovation and static monopoly distortions is different from the case of isolated innovations. We parametrize the degree of innovation sequentiality and complementarity and show that the optimal level of paten protection increases with both. We also address the issue of the optimal division of profit among different innovation

Trading with a common agent under complete information: A characterization of Nash equilibria

We analyze an abstract model of trading where N principals submit quantity-payment schedules that describe the contracts they offer to an agent, and the agent then chooses how much to trade with every principal. This represents a special class of common agency games with complete information. We study all the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of these games, not only truthful ones, providing a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs. In particular, we show that the equilibrium that is Pareto-dominant for the principals is not truthful when there are more than two of them. We also provide a partial characterization of equilibrium strategies

Entry, Product Line Expansion and Predation

The paper shows that a monopolist can have no incentive to expand the product line when entry is blocked while the optimal strategy entails offering a second product when facing entry. The model is applied to a recent antitrust Italian case

Algorithmic collusion: Genuine or spurious?

Reinforcement-learning pricing algorithms sometimes converge to supra-competitive prices even in markets where collusion is impossible by design or cannot be an equilibrium outcome. We analyze when such spurious collusion may arise, and when instead the algorithms learn genuinely collusive strategies, focusing on the role of the rate and mode of exploration