Norms for pure desire

According to a widespread, broadly Humean consensus, desires and other conative attitudes seem as such to be free from any normative constraints of rationality. However, rational subjects are also required to be attitude-coherent in ways that prima facie hold sway for desire. I here examine the plausibility of this idea by proposing several principles for coherent desire. These principles parallel prin- ciples for coherent belief and can be used to make a case for a kind of purely conative normativity. I consider several objections to a principle for consistent desiring and reply to them. I conclude that, if attitude-coherence is a mark of rationality, the broadly Humean consensus must be rejected

Prospects for practice-based philosophy of logic

We explore prospects for practice-based approaches to logical theory, in particular the link between classical and intuitionistic logic and the inferential structure of traditional practices of representation & argument in science and mathematics. After discussing some key notions about practice, we outline the connection between representation practices and classical logic, and then consider a spectrum of actual practices followed or proposed by (real) scientists. Intuitionistic logic helps to clarify the potential of practice-based approaches for understanding pluralism, and to hammer some key points about the general thesis.Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad FFI2009-1002

Tratamiento multimodal de contextos

We take as starting point the context logic studied in (Grossi, Meyer, and Dignum 2008) and (Aucher et al. 2009), which was concerned with the development of a dynamic logic of rules. Here we focus on issues of Formal Epistemology and omit the addition of deontic operators.We define some basic logics that are useful for the study of epistemic actions such as expanding, contracting or revising a theory taking into account different kinds of inferential results

Abducción y semántica de teoría de juegos

An agency-inspired inferential game is proposed in which two agents (abductive and deductive) interact. It depicts hybrid inferencial contexts where deductive and abductive steps are mixed. The abductive agent can use results obtained by the deductive one but not vice versa due to the abductive process do not always generate deductive valid formulas.

Knowledge to Serve the City: Insights from an Emerging Knowledge-Action Network to Address Vulnerability and Sustainability in San Juan, Puerto Rico

This paper presents initial efforts to establish the San Juan Urban Long-Term Research Area Exploratory (ULTRA-Ex), a long-term program aimed at developing transdisciplinary social-ecological system (SES) research to address vulnerability and sustainability for the municipality of San Juan. Transdisciplinary approaches involve the collaborations between researchers, stakeholders, and citizens to produce socially-relevant knowledge and support decision-making. We characterize the transdisciplinary arrangement emerging in San Juan ULTRA-Ex as a knowledge-action network composed of multiple formal and informal actors (e.g., scientists, policymakers, civic organizations and other stakeholders) where knowledge, ideas, and strategies for sustainability are being produced, evaluated, and validated. We describe in this paper the on-the-ground social practices and dynamics that emerged from developing a knowledge-action network in our local context. Specifically, we present six social practices that were crucial to the development of our knowledge-action network: 1) understanding local framings; 2) analyzing existing knowledge-action systems in the city; 3) framing the social-ecological research agenda; 4) collaborative knowledge production and integration; 5) boundary objects and practices; and 6) synthesis, application, and adaptation. We discuss key challenges and ways to move forward in building knowledge-action networks for sustainability. Our hope is that the insights learned from this process will stimulate broader discussions on how to develop knowledge for urban sustainability, especially in tropical cities where these issues are under-explored

The systematicity challenge to anti-representational dynamicism

After more than twenty years of representational debate in the cognitive sciences, anti-representational dynamicism may be seen as offering a rival and radically new kind of explanation of systematicity phenomena. In this paper, I argue that, on the contrary, anti-representational dynamicism must face a version of the old systematicity challenge: either it does not explain systematicity, or else, it is just an implementation of representational theories. To show this, I present a purely behavioral and representation-free account of systematicity. I then consider a case of insect sensorimotor systematic behavior: communicating behavior in honey bees. I conclude that anti-representational dynamicism fails to capture the fundamental trait of systematic behaviors qua systematic, i.e., their involving exercises of the same behavioral capacities. I suggest, finally, a collaborative strategy in pursuit of a rich and powerful account of this central phenomenon of high cognition at all levels of explanation, including the representational level

The Rationalist Reply to Fodor's Analyticity and Circularity Challenge

The central Fodorian objections to Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) can be taken to include an ‘Analyticity Challenge’ and a ‘Circularity Challenge’, which are ultimately challenges to IRS explanations of concept possession. In this paper I present inferential role theories, critically examine those two challenges and point out two misunderstandings to which the challenges are exposed. I then state in detail a rationalist version of IRS and argue that this version meets the Fodorian challenges head on. If sound, this line of argument shows that there is no problem of principle in the consideration of IRS as a good candidate for a theory of concepts. Las objeciones fodorianas en contra de una Semántica del Papel Inferencial (SPI) pueden concebirse como incluyendo un ‘Reto de la Analiticidad’ y un ‘Reto de la Circularidad’, los cuales son principalmente retos a las explicaciones que SPI proporciona sobre la posesión de conceptos. En este artículo presento las teorías del papel inferencial, examino críticamente estos retos y señalo dos malentendidos a los cuales están expuestos. A continuación, presento con detalle una versión racionalista de SPI y defiendo que esta versión supera los retos fodorianos directamente. Si es correcta, esta línea argumentativa muestra que no hay un problema de principio en la consideración de SPI como una buena candidata para una teoría de los conceptos

Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)

Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers

Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either)

Vigorous Fodorian criticism may make it seem impossible for Inferential Role Semantics (IRS) to accommodate compositionality. In this paper, first, I introduce a neo-Fregean version of IRS that appeals centrally to the notion of rationality. Second, I show how such a theory can respect compositionality by means of semantic rules. Third, I argue that, even if we consider top-down compositional derivability: a) the Fodorian is not justified in claiming that it involves so-called reverse compositionality; and b) a defender of IRS can still offer a satisfactory account in terms of the inferential capacities of rational thinkers