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Decay spectroscopy at the two-proton drip line: radioactivity of the new nuclides 160Os and 156W

The radioactivity of 76160Os84 and 74156W82 that lie at the two-proton drip line have been measured in an experiment performed at the Accelerator Laboratory of the University of Jyväskylä. The 160Os nuclei were produced using fusion-evaporation reactions induced by a beam of 310 MeV 58Ni ions bombarding a 106Cd target. The 160Os ions were separated in flight using the recoil separator MARA and implanted into a double-sided silicon strip detector, which was used to measure their decays. The α decays of the ground state of 160Os (Eα = 7092(15) keV, t1/2 = 97−32+97 μs) and its isomeric state (Eα = 8890(10) keV, t1/2 = 41−9+15 μs) were measured, allowing the excitation energy of the isomer to be determined as 1844(18) keV. These α-decay properties and the excitation energy of the isomer are compared with systematics. The α decays were correlated with subsequent decays to investigate the β decays of the ground state of 156W, revealing that unlike its isotones, both low-lying isomers were populated in its daughter nuclide, 156Ta. An improved value for the half-life of the proton-decaying high-spin isomeric state in 73156Ta83 of 333−22+25 ms was obtained in a separate experiment using the same experimental systems with a 102Pd target. This result was employed to improve the precision of the half-life determined for 156W, which was measured as 157−34+57 ms

The Politics of Cutback Management: A Case Study of Interorganizational Relations and Influence Structures During a Local Government Retrenchment Process

This paper focuses on the political processes initiated by a sudden fiscal crisis in a community. It outlines the basic features of cutback policy-making and discusses the problems that political agents face when forced to make hard decisions. A case study on Rivertown budgetary politics is presented to illustrate how unspecified cutbacks sparked off a number of counter-implementation activities among the service agencies. In this process, interest groups and other external actors played an important role. They also served as brokers between the service agencies and executive bodies. This paper introduces a leverage model containing six alternative indirect channels through which the agencies can influence policy-making. It is assumed that the most efficient way for service agencies to influence political decision-makers is to gain leverage by coopting a third party who can constrain the behavior of the political agents. This model is then tested empirically by analyzing the inter-organizational networks and the final cutback decisions. The empirical results show that an agency's network position, combined with its institutional protection mechanisms, is an important factor explaining its success in a battle over scarce resources.In diesem Papier werden politische Prozesse erörtert, die durch die plötzliche Finanzkrise einer Stadtgemeinde ausgelöst wurden. Dabei werden die Grundmerkmale einer finanziellen Sparpolitik hervorgehoben und die Probleme diskutiert, denen politische Akteure ausgesetzt sind, die harte Entscheidungen fällen müssen. Mit der Haushaltspolitik von Rivertown wird eine Fallstudie präsentiert, die illustriert, wie unspezifizierte finanzpolitische Einschnitte eine Reihe von GegenImplementationsaktivitäten unter den jeweiligen Dienstleistungsbehörden hervorbringen. Hierbei spielten Interessengruppen und andere externe Akteure eine wichtige Rolle, die u.a. auch als Vermittler zwischen den Behörden und der Verwaltungsexekutive fungierten. In dem Papier wird ein Einflußmodell entwickelt, in dem die betroffenen Behörden über sechs alternative Einflußkanäle verfügen, um auf die betreffenden Politiken einzuwirken. Es wird davon ausgegangen, daß die effizienteste Einflußstrategie von Dienstleistungsbehörden darin besteht, eine dritte Partei zu kooptieren, die das Verhalten der relevanten politischen Akteure einschränken kann. Mittels einer Analyse interorganisatorischer Netzwerke und der endgültigen finanzpolitischen Entscheidungen wird das Modell empirisch getestet. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, daß die Netzwerkposition einer Dienstleistungsbehörde, kombiniert mit ihren institutionellen Schutzmechanismen, ein wichtiger Erklärungsfaktor für den Erfolg im Kampf um knappe Ressourcen darstellt.1 Introduction 2 The politics of hard times 2.1 Dark clouds over Rivertown 2.2 Political response to the fiscal crisis 2.3 Paralyzed democracy and political crisis 2.4 Asking for help 3 From talk to action 3.1 Institutional and political protection mechanisms 3.2 Indirect leverage models 3.3 Organizational protection clusters 4 The politics of organizations 4.1 Data and methods 4.2 Testing the model 4.3 The clusters of equivalent agencies 4.4 The outcome of the process 5 Conclusions Reference

OECD Environmental Performance Review Programme: accountability (f)or learning?

The growing interest in evaluation as a new form of environmental governance stems from two developments: the movement towards New Public Management, and the search for new policy instruments for managing complexity, uncertainty and plurality of values in the pursuit of sustainable development. The former holds increasing accountability as the main purpose of evaluation, while the latter stresses the importance of learning. These approaches are often considered as mutually exclusive, but recent literature has underlined their complementary roles in policy making. This article examines to what extent the OECD Environmental Performance Review (EPR) programme has succeeded in combining the objectives of learning and accountability within a single evaluation framework. he EPRs have been relatively successful in avoiding the negative side-effects often associated with traditional performance measurement, but have usually ailed to generate broad debate. Focusing on enhancing accountability through social learning would probably contribute to overcoming this problem