380 research outputs found
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Limit-Average Games
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games
with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a
Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence
of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is decidable, even if we put a
constraint on the payoff of the equilibrium. Our undecidability result holds
even for a restricted class of concurrent games, where nonzero rewards occur
only on terminal states. Moreover, we show that the constrained existence
problem is undecidable not only for concurrent games but for turn-based games
with the same restriction on rewards. Finally, we prove that the constrained
existence problem for Nash equilibria in (pure or randomised) stationary
strategies is decidable and analyse its complexity.Comment: 34 page
The Complexity of Admissibility in Omega-Regular Games
Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical
game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games.
As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to
infinite games played on graphs with omega-regular objectives. In this paper,
we study the algorithmic properties of this concept for such games. We settle
the exact complexity of natural decision problems on the set of strategies that
survive iterated elimination of dominated strategies. As a byproduct of our
construction, we obtain automata which recognize all the possible outcomes of
such strategies
Pure Nash Equilibria in Concurrent Deterministic Games
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent
deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel
construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player
concurrent game into a two-player turn-based game which turns Nash equilibria
into winning strategies (for some objective that depends on the preference
relations of the players in the original game). We use that transformation to
design algorithms for computing Nash equilibria in finite games, which in most
cases have optimal worst-case complexity, for large classes of preference
relations. This includes the purely qualitative framework, where each player
has a single omega-regular objective that she wants to satisfy, but also the
larger class of semi-quantitative objectives, where each player has several
omega-regular objectives equipped with a preorder (for instance, a player may
want to satisfy all her objectives, or to maximise the number of objectives
that she achieves.)Comment: 72 page
Games on graphs with a public signal monitoring
We study pure Nash equilibria in games on graphs with an imperfect monitoring
based on a public signal. In such games, deviations and players responsible for
those deviations can be hard to detect and track. We propose a generic
epistemic game abstraction, which conveniently allows to represent the
knowledge of the players about these deviations, and give a characterization of
Nash equilibria in terms of winning strategies in the abstraction. We then use
the abstraction to develop algorithms for some payoff functions.Comment: 28 page
The Complexity of Quantitative Information Flow in Recursive Programs
Information-theoretic measures based upon mutual information can be employed to quantify the information that an execution of a program reveals about its secret inputs. The information leakage bounding problem asks whether the information leaked by a program does not exceed a given threshold. We consider this problem for two scenarios: a) the outputs of the program are revealed, and b)the timing (measured in the number of execution steps) of the program is revealed. For both scenarios, we establish complexity results in the context of deterministic boolean programs, both for programs with and without recursion. In particular, we prove that for recursive programs the information leakage bounding problem is no harder than checking reachability
On Relevant Equilibria in Reachability Games
We study multiplayer reachability games played on a finite directed graph
equipped with target sets, one for each player. In those reachability games, it
is known that there always exists a Nash equilibrium (NE) and a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE). But sometimes several equilibria may coexist such that in
one equilibrium no player reaches his target set whereas in another one several
players reach it. It is thus very natural to identify "relevant" equilibria. In
this paper, we consider different notions of relevant equilibria including
Pareto optimal equilibria and equilibria with high social welfare. We provide
complexity results for various related decision problems
The Complexity of Nash Equilibria in Stochastic Multiplayer Games
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in stochastic multiplayer games with -regular objectives. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a game~, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of~ where player 0 wins with probability~. Moreover, this problem remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite memory. However, if randomised strategies are allowed, decidability remains an open problem; we can only prove NP-hardness in this case. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and PSPACE respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability~ can be done in polynomial time for games where, for instance, the objective of each player is given by a parity condition with a bounded number of priorities
- …