A New Macro-Micro Approach to the Study of Political Careers:Theoretical, Methodological and Empirical Challenges and Solutions

The study of political careers is often criticised for remaining overly focused on macro-level observations. In this book I present a new approach that focuses on individual micro-level political careers. The following questions are central: • What should a new micro-level approach to the study of political careers look like? • What knowledge can the fields of sociology and political science gain from the application of a new micro-level approach to the study of political careers? • What methodological and theoretical innovations are needed to make this new approach successful? This book has three parts. First, I investigate the main roadblocks currently hampering the study of political careers and sketch the contours of an alternative approach. In the second part, I develop the methodological toolbox needed to follow this new approach. In the third part, I present three empirical studies that aim to investigate the value of the suggested approach. Here, I focus on the careers of Dutch members of parliament (1947-2012) and highlight how career transitions occur only when political candidates are able to acquire gatekeepers' approval by accumulating sufficient political human capital’

Identity Expression Through Collective Action:How Identification With a Politicized Group and Its Identity Contents Differently Motivated Identity-Expressive Collective Action in the US 2016 Presidential Elections

Although political action often requires activists to express who they are and what they stand for, little is known about the motivators of such identity expression. This research investigates how group identity content and identification with this content predict identity-expressive collective action in the U.S. 2016 presidential elections. We recruited a longitudinal community sample of U.S. party supporters (N = 426) mid-October (T1), beginning November (T2), and mid-November (T3). Participants listed words they associated with party campaigners, and self-reported their identification with this identity content and the politicized group. Supporting H1, politicized group identification longitudinally predicted increased frequency of collective action more strongly than did identification with specific identity content. Supporting H2, identification with specific identity content longitudinally predicted increased desires to express that content through collective action more strongly than politicized group identification. Implications for our understanding of identity expression and identity content in collective action are discussed

Affective Polarization and Political Belief Systems: The Role of Political Identity and the Content and Structure of Political Beliefs

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work is financially supported by the NORFACE Joint Research Programme on Democratic Governance in a Turbulent Age and co-funded by NWO, ESRC, AEI, NSC, FWO, and the European Commission through Horizon 2020 under grant agreement number 822166.We investigate the extent that political identity, political belief content (i.e., attitude stances), and political belief system structure (i.e., relations among attitudes) differences are associated with affective polarization (i.e., viewing ingroup partisans positively and outgroup partisans negatively) in two multinational, cross-sectional studies (Study 1 N = 4,152, Study 2 N = 29,994). First, we found a large, positive association between political identity and group liking-participants liked their ingroup substantially more than their outgroup. Second, political belief system content and structure had opposite associations with group liking: Sharing similar belief system content with an outgroup was associated with more outgroup liking, but similarity with the ingroup was associated with less ingroup liking. The opposite pattern was found for political belief system structure. Thus, affective polarization was greatest when belief system content similarity was low and structure similarity was high.NORFACE Joint Research Programme on Democratic Governance in a Turbulent AgeNetherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO)UK Research & Innovation (UKRI) Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC)AEIMinistry of Science and Technology, TaiwanFWOEuropean Commission Horizon 2020: 82216

Policy or person?:What voters want from their representatives on Twitter

Social media have the potential to transform democracies as they allow for direct contact between representatives and represented. Politicians can use social media to show their policy positions but they can also give insight into their private lives. Based on survey experiments in Germany and Switzerland we show that social media messages about politicians’ private lives rather deter voters. Instead, we find that voters prefer candidates that communicate policy positions. The effect of a policy-oriented communication style on Twitter can even lead to appreciating a politician from a different party in Switzerland, which has an electoral system that gives a strong incentive to cultivate a personal vote

Conservatives moral foundations are more densely connected than liberals’ moral foundations

We use network psychometrics to map a subsection of moral belief systems predicted by moral foundations theory (MFT). This approach conceptualizes moral systems as networks, with moral beliefs represented as nodes connected by direct relations. As such, it advances a novel test of MFT’s claim that liberals and conservatives have different systems of foundational moral values, which we test in three large datasets (N(Sample1) = 854; N(Sample2) = 679; N(Sample3) = 2,572), from two countries (the United States and New Zealand). Results supported our first hypothesis that liberals’ moral systems show more segregation between individualizing and binding foundations than conservatives. Results showed only weak support for our second hypothesis, that this pattern would be more typical of higher educated than less educated liberals/conservatives. Findings support a systems approach to MFT and show the value of modeling moral belief systems as networks

Achieving harmony among different social identities within the self-concept:The consequences of having a group-based philosophy of life

It can be hard for individuals to manage multiple group identities within their self-concept (e.g., being a Christian and a woman). We examine how the inter-identity fit between potentially conflicting identities can become more harmonious through a self-defining group philosophy for life. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that holistic group identities (based in group philosophies for life that prescribe the behavior of their members in any situation, such as religion) become more strongly related to other identities in the self-concept (e.g., gender) when they are strongly self-defining (i.e., devotedly applied to daily life). In three studies we investigated the inter-identity fit between individuals' (highly holistic) religious identity and (less holistic) gender identity. Results provided converging support for our hypothesis across diverging methods (explicit questionnaires, more implicit associations, and a novel network analysis of group traits). We discuss the importance of understanding how some (i.e., holistic and self-defining) group identities may harmonize otherwise less harmonious group identities within one's self-concept

Economic Threats, Political and National Identification Predict Affective Polarization:Longitudinal Evidence From Spain

Economic threats, along with political identities and ideologies, are associated with affective polarization. However, there is still a need to learn more about the consequences of different economic threats and identities fueling polarization. We take a longitudinal perspective in testing the influence of these phenomena on affective polarization. Specifically, we tested the effect of subjective personal and collective economic threats and political, national, regional, and European identities on affective polarization towards politicians and partisans in Spain. We use four waves of the E-DEM panel study from Spain (N = 2,501) collected between 2018 and 2019. We conducted longitudinal multilevel analyses to determine the growth in affective polarization and included predictors at the between- and within-person levels. Consistent with our hypotheses, we found that collective economic threats, such as perceiving more unfairness in the distribution of wealth and being dissatisfied with the Spanish economy, positively predict affective polarization. Contrary to our expectations, personal economic threats did not predict affective polarization. Furthermore, political and national identities positively predicted affective polarization towards politicians and partisans. Interestingly, exploratory analyses suggested that the associations between economic threats, identities, and affective polarization are moderated by political ideology. We discuss how economic threats and identities may exacerbate animosities toward political actors.</p

The association between threat and politics simultaneously depends on the type of threat, the political domain, and the country

Theories link threat with right-wing political beliefs. We use the World Values Survey (60,378 participants) to explore how six types of threat (e.g., economic, violence, and surveillance) are associated with multiple political beliefs (e.g., cultural, economic, and ideological identification) in 56 countries/territories. Multilevel models with individuals nested in countries revealed that the threat-political belief association depends on the type of threat, the type of political beliefs, and the country. Economic-related threats tended to be associated with more left-wing economic political beliefs and violence-related threats tended to be associated with more cultural right-wing beliefs, but there were exceptions to this pattern. Additional analyses revealed that the associations between threat and political beliefs were different across countries. However, our analyses identified few country characteristics that could account for these cross-country differences. Our findings revealed that political beliefs and perceptions of threat are linked, but that the relationship is not simple. Keywords: Ideology, Belief Systems, Threat, Cultur

The psychology of online activism and social movements:Relations between online and offline collective action

We review online activism and its relations with offline collective action. Social media facilitate online activism, particularly by documenting and collating individual experiences, community building, norm formation, and development of shared realities. In theory, online activism could hinder offline protests, but empirical evidence for slacktivism is mixed. In some contexts, online and offline action could be unrelated because people act differently online versus offline, or because people restrict their actions to one domain. However, most empirical evidence suggests that online and offline activism are positively related and intertwined (no digital dualism), because social media posts can mobilise others for offline protest. Notwithstanding this positive relationship, the internet also enhances the visibility of activism and therefore facilitates repression in repressive contexts

Associations between social identity diversity, compatibility, and recovery capital amongst young people in substance use treatment

This study explored associations between group memberships and recovery capital amongst 20 young adults aged 18 to 21 years in residential alcohol and drug treatment. Method Participants completed an interviewer administered research interview based on measures of recovery capital and a social networks assessment mapping group memberships, group substance use, and relationships between groups. Results Higher personal and social recovery capital was associated with lower diversity of group memberships, a higher number of positive links between groups, and greater compatibility of lower substance-using groups with other groups in the network. Higher compatibility of heavier-using groups was also associated with having a higher number of negative, antagonistic ties between groups. Conclusions These findings indicate that it is higher compatibility of a lower substance-using social identity and lower-using group memberships that contributes to recovery capital. Further, positive ties between groups and lower diversity of group memberships appear to be key aspects in how multiple social identities that are held by young adults relate to personal and social recovery capita