Asymmetric information in credit markets and entrepreneurial risk taking

The paper constructs a search-theoretic model of credit markets with a bilateral trading mechanism that enables the manageable introduction of asymmetric information. Borrowers´ success probabilities are unobservable to financiers, but the degree of risk in observable projects can be used as a sorting device. We find that the efficiency of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium depends negatively/positively on the credit market ´tightness´/liquidity. In general equilibrium, where the underlying market conditions are endogenously determined, steady states with greater credit market tightness are always associated with increasingly excessive investment in risky projects. Since tighter market conditions also imply less intense competition among financiers, the commonly asserted trade-off between competition and efficiency does not emerge. Tighter monetary policy is shown to worsen the adverse effect of informational frictions on efficiency.credit market; asymmetric information; search; risk taking

Bank safety under Basel II capital requirements

We consider the impact of mandatory information disclosure on bank safety in a spatial model of banking competition in which a bank’s probability of success depends on the quality of its risk measurement and management systems. Under Basel II capital requirements, this quality is either fully or partially disclosed to market participants by the Pillar 3 disclosures. We show that, under stringent Pillar 3 disclosure requirements, banks’ equilibrium probability of success and total welfare may be higher under a simple Basel II standardized approach than under the more sophisticated internal ratings-based (IRB) approach.Basel II; capital requirements; information disclosure; market discipline; moral hazard

Relative age effects in political selection

We exploit a regression discontinuity design to provide causal evidence of the relative age effect (RAE) on a long-run adult age outcome: Political selection. We find strong evidence of the RAE in politics in Finland. However, the effect is heterogeneous: We find that male candidates born early in the calendar year have a significantly higher probability of getting elected to the parliament but no similar RAE applies to female candidates nor to municipal elections. Moreover, this effect only takes place in the most competitive parliamentary districts and is present only for some parties. We also find that in all the groups where the RAE does not exist, early-born candidates are under-represented suggesting attrition of talent in the candidate placement. Overall, our results show that seemingly artificial cutoffs imposed by the government have persistent consequences even on the selection to the highest positions of power within a society

Screening in the credit market when the collateral value is stochastic

This theoretical paper explores screening with loan collateral when both the collateral value and the probability of project success fluctuate. Some model versions challenge the classic findings of Bester (1985) by showing that high-risk borrowers may in such case be more willing to pledge collateral than low-risk borrowers. Abundant collateral then would not signal low risk. The results may help explain the mixed empirical findings on the role of collateral. The paper also extends the analysis of the topical subprime crises and risky real estate collateral.banking; collateral; screening; signalling; subprime lending

Credit allocation, capital requirements and procyclicality

Although beneficial allocational effects have been a central motivator for the Basel II capital adequacy reform, the interaction of these effects with Basel II’s procyclical impact has been less discussed. In this paper, we investigate the effect of capital requirements on the allocation of credit and its interaction with procyclicality, and compare Basel I and Basel II type capital requirements. We consider competitive credit markets where entrepreneurs of varying ability can apply for loans for one-period investment projects of two different risk types. The risk of a project further depends on the state of the economy, modelled as a two-state Markov process. In this type of setting, excessive risk taking typically arises because higher-type borrowers cross-subsidize lower-type borrowers via a pricing regime based on average success rates. We find that risk-based capital requirements (such as Basel II) alleviate the cross-subsidization effect and can be chosen so as to implement first-best allocation. This implies that the ensuing reduction in the proportion of high-risk investments may mitigate the procyclical effect of Basel II on economic activity. Moreover, we find that optimal risk-based capital requirements should be set lower in recessions than in normal times. Our simulations show that when measured by either cumulative output or output variation, Basel II type capital requirements may actual be slightly less procyclical than flat capital requirements. The biggest reduction in procyclicality is however achieved with optimal risk-based capital requirements which are considerably higher than Basel II requirements and which are adjusted downwards in recession periods.Basel II; bank regulation; capital requirements; credit risk; procyclicality

How do you make a time series sing like a choir? Using the Hilbert-Huang transform to extract embedded frequencies from economic or financial time series

The Hilbert-Huang transform (HHT) was developed late last century but has still to be introduced to the vast majority of economists. The HHT transform is a way of extracting the frequency mode features of cycles embedded in any time series using an adaptive data method that can be applied without making any assumptions about stationarity or linear data-generating properties. This paper introduces economists to the two constituent parts of the HHT transform, namely empirical mode decomposition (EMD) and Hilbert spectral analysis. Illustrative applications using HHT are also made to two financial and three economic time series.business cycles; growth cycles; Hilbert-Huang transform (HHT); empirical mode decomposition (EMD); economic time series; non-stationarity; spectral analysis

Transmission of macro shocks to loan losses in a deep crisis: the case of Finland

Building on the work of Sorge and Virolainen (2006), we revisit the data on aggregate Finnish bank loan losses from the corporate sector, which covers the ‘Big Five’ crisis in Finland in the early 1990s. Several extensions to the empirical model are considered. These extensions are then used in the simulations of the aggregate loan loss distribution. The simulation results provide some guidance as to what might be the most important dimensions in which to improve the basic model. We found that making the average LGD depend on the business cycle seems to be the most important improvement. We also compare the empirical fit of the annual expected losses over a long period. In scenario-based analyses we find that a prolonged deep recession (as well as simultaneity of various macro shocks) has a convex effect on cumulative loan losses. This emphasizes the importance of an early policy response to a looming crisis. Finally, a comparison of the loan loss distribution on the eve of the 1990s crisis with the most recent distribution demonstrates the greatly elevated risk level prior to the 1990s crisis.credit risk; bank loan losses; banking crisis; macro shocks; default rates; stress testing